

# PALESTINE

## A STUDY OF JEWISH, ARAB, AND BRITISH POLICIES

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## CHAPTER IX

# THE 1929 DISTURBANCES AND THEIR AFTERMATH

*(August, 1929–February, 1931)*

THE summer of 1929 seemed at its outset to be under good omen for the development of the Jewish national home. There were indications that the lowest point of the economic depression had been passed; immigration had begun to exceed emigration by several hundred per month. The meeting of the Council of the Jewish Agency held at Zurich in August, marking the union of the Zionists and of the non-Zionist friends of Palestine, promised additional financial support and new moral strength for the upbuilding of the Jewish national home. There had been no serious disturbances between the Arabs and Jews since the May, 1921, riots and Sir John Chancellor at the meeting of the Permanent Mandates Commission on July 5th, could reiterate the statement that had been made year after year by the British representative to the effect that "the relations between the two communities continue to improve."<sup>1</sup>

Before the end of August this bright picture suddenly changed as a result of murderous attacks by Arabs on Jews. These began in Jerusalem on Friday, August 23rd, and spread throughout the country, the most violent being directed not against the new settlements but against the old Jewish communities in the cities. Particularly vicious outbreaks of violence occurred in Hebron (August 24th) and in Safed (August 28th), old centers of Jewish piety where the Arabs murdered defenseless Jews and indulged in an orgy of looting and destruction. As in 1921, the native police proved unreliable although there were some notable exceptions. The depleted British forces could not control the situation and troops were

1. Permanent Mandates Commission, *Minutes of the Fifteenth Session*, 1929, p. 79.



hastily rushed from Egypt. Comparative order was restored before the week was out. As far as could be ascertained, 133 Jews were killed and 339 wounded; of the Arabs, 116 were killed and 232 wounded.<sup>2</sup> The majority of the Arab casualties were inflicted by the troops or the police.

After the disturbances were suppressed, a commission was sent out from England to "enquire into the immediate causes" which had led to the outbreak and to "make recommendations as to the steps necessary to avoid a recurrence." After the submission of their report, Sir John Hope Simpson was deputed by the Secretary of State for the Colonies to make a study on the spot of the problems of immigration, land settlement, and development of the country. On the basis of these two reports, the Secretary of State for the Colonies in the newly formed Labor Government, Lord Passfield (formerly Mr. Sidney Webb) issued a White Paper which defined anew the British Government's policy in Palestine. Although purporting to be based on the Churchill White Paper, the general tone of the statement and the implied restrictions on immigration and land settlement gave the impression that it was a virtual emasculation of the Jewish national home policy. In protest, Dr. Weizmann, with the support of both the Zionist and non-Zionist elements in the Jewish Agency, resigned from his office as President. The Passfield statement of policy was hotly debated in Parliament and the Government was forced to make a reinterpretation. In a letter sent on February 13, 1931, from Ramsay MacDonald, the Prime Minister, to Dr. Weizmann as President of the Jewish Agency, assurances were given by His Majesty's Government that the policy of the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate would be faithfully carried out, and the intentions of the Government in regard to the practical implementation of the policy were clarified.

The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the reports mentioned in the preceding paragraph and other documents and statements which relate to the formulation of policy in this critical period. Before entering on this analysis, the 1929 dis-

2. Great Britain, *Report of the Commission on the Palestine Disturbances of August, 1929*, Cmd. 3530, London, 1930, p. 65. (Henceforth in this chapter referred to as *Report on the Disturbances of 1929*, and in the text sometimes as the Shaw Commission Report, from the name of its chairman.)

turbances and the circumstances which led up to them require attention.<sup>3</sup>

## THE WAILING WALL CONTROVERSY AND THE COURSE OF THE DISTURBANCES

The events of this period grew out of a controversy concerning the Western Wall—generally known to English readers as the Wailing Wall—which arose out of an incident that had occurred some eleven months before the 1929 disturbances. The Western Wall (*Kotel Maaravi*), as it is designated by Jews, is part of the western side of the ancient Jewish Temple. As the last remaining vestige of the glory of Israel it has been revered by Jews all over the world from the period of its destruction, and the custom of visiting the site and praying at the Wall has been preserved from time immemorial. On the Fast of *Tisha b'Av* (the ninth day of the month of *Av*) when Jews commemorate the destruction of Jerusalem, secular minded as well as religious Jews visit the Wall to mark this day of sorrow in Jewish history.

The Wall has a certain sanctity also for the Moslems. It is part of the area of the *Haram esh-Sharif* in which are enclosed the Dome of the Rock—sometimes erroneously referred to as the Mosque of Omar—and the Mosque of Aqsa.<sup>4</sup> The rock on which the Dome is built is reputed to have been the altar on which Abraham was bidden to sacrifice his son Isaac, and in Islamic tradition it is regarded as the spot from which Mohammed ascended to heaven. The Moslems consider the whole area of the *Haram esh-Sharif* as a sacred site, and along with Mecca and Medina, one of the three places to which Moslems turn in prayer. The Wall too has a legendary significance:

3. The account follows in the main the *Report on the Disturbances of 1929*. Other sources consulted include Horace B. Samuel, *Beneath the Whitewash*, Hogarth Press, London, 1930, which makes a critical analysis of the evidence with the purpose of showing bias in the Commission's report; and also *What Happened in Palestine*, by Maurice Samuel (Stratford, Boston, 1929) who was in Palestine at the time and immediately recorded his impressions. See also Norman Bentwich, *England in Palestine*, Kegan Paul, London, 1932; and F. H. Kisch, *My Diary*, Gollancz, London, 1938.

4. Both mosques are reputed to have been founded by Abd al-Melek, one of the Omayyad Caliphs in the seventh century. They were converted to churches at the time of the Crusades and were rebuilt a number of times. Luke and Keith-Roach, *The Handbook of Palestine and Trans-Jordan*, pp. 79 ff.

within its thickness there is a chamber opening on the *Haram esh-Sharif*, on the opposite of the wall where the Jews pray. Legend has it that in this chamber Mohammed's winged steed, the *Burak*, was stabled when the Prophet made his celestial journey from the Rock.

According to Article 14 of the Mandate, a Holy Places Commission was to have been appointed to determine the rights of the various denominations in connection with the Holy Places in Palestine. But due to disagreement among the various Powers on details, the Holy Places Commission was never appointed and the British Government continued the status quo which had prevailed under the Turks. Legally, the Wall and the strip of pavement in front of it are the absolute property of the Moslem community and belong to the *Abu Madian Waqf*, an old Moslem and religious trust said to have been founded in the time of Saladin for the benefit of a sect of Moslems of Moroccan origin known as the *Mughrabis*. However, for an indefinite term, going back at least to the Middle Ages, the Jews have enjoyed the right of entry to the strip of pavement facing the Wall and of making their devotions at the site of the Wall.

#### *The Incident of the Wailing Wall*

Shortly before *Yom Kippur*—the solemn Jewish Day of Atonement—which fell in 1928 on September 24th, the *shammash* (beadle) at the Wall set up a screen on the strip of pavement in front of the Wailing Wall to separate the men from the women, in accordance with strict Jewish ritual. Following an Arab complaint that the status quo had been infringed, Edward Keith-Roach, Deputy District Commissioner of Jerusalem, ordered the beadle on the eve of the Day of Atonement to remove the screen by the next day. Whatever may have been the reason, whether the hour was already too late to permit the removal without desecrating the Holy Day or because he was unwilling to do so, the beadle did not remove the screen. As a consequence, the police officer who had received the order to see that the instructions had been carried out, took it upon himself to remove the screen during the solemn *Ne'ilah* service which ends the Day of Atonement. The Jews remonstrated, but the screen was nevertheless removed, causing a disturbance in the service.

The Jewish community of Palestine and Jews throughout the world were indignant at what appeared to them to be wanton interference with their right to worship at the Wall. The Zionist Organization and the Chief Rabbis of Palestine—Rabbi Kook on behalf of the Ashkenazic community, and Rabbi Meir on behalf of the Sephardic community—submitted protests to His Majesty's Government and to the League of Nations. The Permanent Mandates Commission took no action beyond expressing regret that the incident had occurred, and noting its satisfaction that the Palestine Government "had already approached both parties with a view to facilitating an agreement." The Arabs on their part appealed to the Moslem world, charging that "the Jews' aim is to take possession of the Mosque of Al-Aqsa gradually on the pretence that it is the Temple, by starting with the Western Wall of this place, which is an inseparable part of the Mosque of Al-Aqsa . . ." <sup>5</sup> The Zionist Organization in its petition to the League of Nations had emphasized that it repudiated as false and libelous the rumors which were being circulated to the effect that the Jews intended to menace the inviolability of any of the Moslem Holy Places. The *Vaad Leumi* now confirmed this by a public appeal to the Arabs which included the following declarations: <sup>6</sup>

We herewith declare emphatically and sincerely that no Jew has ever thought of encroaching upon the rights of Moslems over their own Holy Places, but our Arab brethren should also recognize the rights of Jews in regard to the places in Palestine which are holy to them . . .

We call upon our Arab brethren in general and their responsible leaders in particular to disperse the poisonous clouds of the false rumors which have recently been circulated, and to create possibilities for constructive co-operation for the benefit of the country and all its inhabitants, in the place of hostility and dispute.

The Arab leaders showed no desire for cooperation. On the contrary, they set about to aggravate the issue by all means possible. On November 1st a meeting designated as the General Moslem Conference was convened under the presidency of Haj Amin al-Husaini, Mufti of Jerusalem. The Conference passed resolutions protesting against any action which aimed

5. *Report on the Disturbances of 1929*, p. 31.

6. *Ibid.*, p. 30.

at "the establishment of any right to the Jews in the Holy Burak area." It demanded that the Government "immediately and perpetually" prevent the placing of any appurtenances, such as seats, lamps, or objects of worship in the area of the Wailing Wall. The Conference resolved "to hold the Government responsible for any consequences of any measures which the Moslems might adopt to defend the Holy Burak themselves" in case the Government did not take adequate steps. It also resolved to create a "Society for the Protection of the Moslem Holy Places." Another society with a similar purpose known as "The Committee for the Defence of the Buraq-el-Sharif" had been previously formed.<sup>7</sup>

At the same time the Supreme Moslem Council, over which it will be remembered the Mufti presided, began to undertake building operations in the neighborhood of the Wailing Wall and to institute religious ceremonies which were bound to interfere with the worship at the Wailing Wall. On the north side, construction of a building was begun, ostensibly for the purpose of providing habitations for the officials of the Moslem Religious Courts. On the south side, a house belonging to the *Abu Madian Waqf* was converted into a *Zawiyah* (a hospice or convent). A doorway was constructed to provide a means of direct access from the *Haram* area to a flight of stone steps which was repaired, and thence to the *Zawiyah*. These constructions were designed to turn the narrow pavement in front of the Wall into a thoroughfare. In addition, the Moslem Council instituted religious practices designed to annoy the Jewish worshippers. A *muezzin*, who summons Moslems to prayer five times a day, was stationed on the roof of a house nearby. The Moslem Council also introduced a religious ceremony known as the "*Zikr*," which purported to be "the repetition of the name of God" accompanied by the playing of music. The so-called "playing of music" involved the use of cymbals, rattles and drums, accompanied by shouting. This could be heard for a distance of sixty to seventy yards and made impossible any attempt to pray.<sup>8</sup>

There followed months of protracted protests and pronouncements on the part of the Arabs, the Jews, and the Government authorities. The Government first ruled that the

7. *Ibid.*, p. 32.

8. Horace B. Samuel, *op. cit.*, p. 6.

status quo must be maintained and that the Jews could bring to the Wall only such appurtenances as had been permitted under the Turkish regime. But this ruling settled nothing since the appurtenances were not defined. The Executive of the Jewish Agency on their part held that the Jewish rights at the Wailing Wall should be broadly interpreted to permit religious worship in accordance with the Jewish ritual. They made this claim on the basis of the Articles of the Mandate which guaranteed to each denomination free access to their Holy Places and free exercise of worship. The Government decided to consult the Law Officers of the Crown for the purpose of obtaining an opinion as to the rights of the respective communities. Later in the year, on May 8th, the High Commissioner persuaded the Mufti to suspend building operations until the Law Officers had rendered their judgment.

On June 11th the High Commissioner informed the Mufti as follows:<sup>9</sup>

In the Law Officers' opinion the Jews are entitled to conduct their worship without any greater disturbance than has occurred in the past, or may be inevitable by reasons of changes in the habits of the population of Jerusalem or otherwise. If the erection of the proposed Zawiyah results in the observance of Moslem rites in the presence of Jewish worshippers, or in an incursion by Moslems into the places where the Jews pray during the customary times of Jewish worship so as to cause some genuine annoyance or disturbance, this would be regarded as an interference with existing rights.

In accordance with these rulings His Excellency approves of the suspended work being resumed on condition that the wall leading to the Bab al Magharbeh (Mughrabi Gate) of the Haram area is built up to its former height, and that no annoyance or disturbance is caused to Jewish worshippers during the customary times of their prayer.

His Excellency has no objection to the new proposed opening being made, provided that there shall be no incursion of Moslems into the pavement during the customary times of Jewish worship, and no other act calculated to cause annoyance or disturbance to Jewish worshippers at prayer.

The substance of this letter was also communicated to the Palestine Zionist Executive. The Executive expressed its re-

9. *Report on the Disturbances of 1929*, p. 37.

gret that "His Excellency should have rendered a decision in regard to one portion of the question of the Wailing Wall before rendering a comprehensive decision covering the principal matters at issue."<sup>10</sup> In the opinion of the Executive such piecemeal treatment of the problem was "almost certain to lead to avoidable difficulty, misunderstanding and quite possibly injustice." The opinion of the Law Officers did not in fact end the dispute, although the *Zikr* ceremony was stopped as a result of the personal influence of Mr. Luke with the Mufti. The *muezzin's* call to prayer was continued, the Government feeling that this could not legitimately be prohibited. The annoying building operations were resumed by the Moslems with the permission of the Government.

Nor did the agitation by the Moslems cease. The Society for the Protection of the Moslem Holy Places continued to be active and the Arabic press published provocative documents and articles. "These documents," as the Commission on the Disturbances (Shaw Commission) reported, "dealing as they did with the subject of the Wailing Wall which by then had become a political issue, were of a character likely to incite any susceptible readers. In addition, there appeared in the Arabic press about this time a number of articles which, had they been published in England or in other western countries, would unquestionably have been regarded as provocative."<sup>11</sup>

The Report noted that during the course of this campaign, another section of the Arabic press published accusations against the Mufti to the effect that he had misapplied *Waqf* funds, that he was displaying favoritism and nepotism in making Moslem religious appointments, and that he was bent on making permanent his appointment as President of the Supreme Moslem Council. Until July 20th, when the building operations in the neighborhood of the Wailing Wall were resumed, the Jewish section of the population remained relatively quiet. Soon after that day there was formed under Dr. Joseph Klausner, an old Zionist, now Professor of Hebrew Literature at the University of Jerusalem, an organization known as the Pro-Wailing Wall Committee. The *Doar Hayom* (Daily Mail), the more militant of the Hebrew newspapers which was under Revisionist influence, published an editorial

10. *Ibid.*, p. 39.

11. *Ibid.*, p. 41.

on July 22nd, expressing apprehension about the building operations, but, as noted by the Shaw Commission, it was temperate in tone.<sup>12</sup>

*The Outbreak of the Disturbances*

By this time most of the leading officers of the Government and of the Zionist Executive had left the country. Sir John Chancellor had gone for his vacation and left Mr. Harry Charles Luke in charge. Mr. Keith-Roach, the Commissioner of the Jerusalem District, was also away and his place was taken by Mr. Cust. All of the members of the Palestine Zionist Executive had proceeded to Europe to attend the Sixteenth Zionist Congress at which the enlarged Jewish Agency was to be constituted. Mr. Isaiah Braude, the Chief Accountant of the Zionist Treasury, was left in charge of the Executive responsibilities with the advice of Mr. S. Horowitz, a member of the English bar in practice in Palestine, and Mr. S. Hoofien, Director of the Anglo-Palestine Bank in Tel-Aviv.

The Acting Executive recognized the seriousness of the situation and kept closely in touch with the leaders in Zurich and with the Government officers. They tried to pacify the Jewish community and to restrain extreme statements in the press. But due to the Government's failure to take any action to relieve the Wailing Wall grievances, they found it increasingly difficult to control the situation as the atmosphere became more and more charged with emotion. Matters reached a high point of tension on *Tisha b'Av*, which fell on August 15th. On the eve of the Fast Day there was a huge demonstration in Tel-Aviv attended by many members of the *Haganah* and the *Brith Trumpeldor*—general and Revisionist Jewish defense forces, respectively. The demonstration passed a resolution against the "Wailing Wall outrage," criticized the Palestine Administration, and demanded that the Government in London "restore to us our full rights to the Wall."

The next morning Mr. Cust, the Acting District Commissioner, received a message from Mr. Solomon, the Acting Chairman of the *Vaad Leumi*, that a group of young men had come from Tel-Aviv and were meeting in the Laemel School for the purpose of organizing a demonstration at the Government offices and at the Wailing Wall. After a discussion with

12. *Ibid.*, p. 42.



the Jewish representatives, the Government decided to permit the demonstration. Mr. Luke, the acting High Commissioner, in his instructions declared that all who wished to go to the Wall might do so, provided that they did not march in military formation and did not carry flags. The Government also agreed to receive a deputation of three representatives of the demonstrators.

The instructions were communicated to the Jewish youths, who agreed to the restrictions imposed, but indicated that they would unfurl the Zionist flag at the Wall. With this exception, the procession was carried out in accordance with the instructions. When they reached the Wall three of the leaders left and proceeded to the Government offices where they left a copy of the resolutions passed the previous day at Tel-Aviv. At the Wailing Wall the Zionist flag was unfurled, one of the leaders of the demonstration made a short speech and read the resolutions of the previous day. A silence of two minutes was observed and the *Hatikvah*—the Jewish national hymn—was sung. There were some cries such as "The Wall is ours," "Shame on those who profane our Holy Places," and "Shame on the Government." These cries, it appears, were uttered by persons who had joined the procession; the Shaw Commission summary records that the procession on the whole behaved in an orderly manner. On its way from the Wall the procession passed through Arab quarters, but there was no clash with the Moslems either there or at the Wall itself.<sup>13</sup>

The Moslem leaders had, it appears, decided to make as much as they could out of the occasion. On the evening of August 15th, a telegram was sent by the "Protection of the Mosque Al-Aqsa Association" to two newspapers and to the Young Men's Moslem Association, Jaffa, as follows: "The Jews at 3:30 on this day, at the Wailing Wall itself, held a severe demonstration against the Moslems. Resentment is great and general. Do what should be done of protest and disapproval."<sup>14</sup> The next morning Mr. Luke received information that the Moslems were planning a counter-demonstration at the Wailing Wall. Instead of prohibiting this himself, he decided to use the good offices of the Mufti to prevent or at least limit the demonstration. The demonstrators set out about

13. *Ibid.*, p. 54.

14. *Ibid.*, p. 54.

mid-day, headed by Sheikhs of the Mosque of Aqsa and preceded by banners such as are usually carried on Moslem religious festivals. They followed a route prescribed by Government. The crowd, numbering about 2,000, was in an excited frame of mind, crying: "There is no God but Allah; the religion of Mohammed came with the sword."<sup>15</sup> According to the report of the Commission: "At the Wall an inflammatory speech was made by Hassan Abou Seoud, one of the Sheikhs of the Mosque of Aqsa, a table belonging to the Shammas or Jewish beadle was upset and broken, petitions which had been placed in the crevices of the Wailing Wall by Jewish worshippers were taken out and burnt by the crowd, as were also some prayer books and prayer sheets. The Shammas, who is said to have been the only Jew present at the Wall, was hustled and his clothes were torn."<sup>16</sup>

During the week between the Moslem demonstration and the outbreak of the disturbances on August 23rd, the atmosphere was tense with excitement. On Saturday, August 17th, an incident occurred which raised emotions to a high pitch. Some Jewish boys were playing football in the Bukharian Quarter of the New City of Jerusalem and the ball fell into a tomato garden belonging to an Arab. One of the boys went to retrieve the ball, an argument developed between him and the owner of the garden, and the boy was stabbed. A serious affray then occurred between Jews and Arabs in the neighborhood, in the course of which eleven Jews and fifteen Arabs were wounded. The police were called and one British policeman was severely injured in the melee. During the next few days, the feeling between the Jews and Arabs grew worse and there were assaults by Arabs on Jews and by Jews on Arabs.

The boy who had been stabbed died on Tuesday, the 20th of August. The police had arranged that the funeral should take place early in the morning, at six o'clock, but the procession did not start out for the cemetery until eight. Large crowds of Jews collected and the funeral procession moved slowly. No clash occurred with the Arabs but there was difficulty with the police who tried to divert the procession from the usual route to the cemetery by the Jaffa Gate in order to avoid carrying the body through the neighborhood of the Arab shops. The

15. *Ibid.*, p. 55.

16. *Ibid.*, p. 55.

crowd broke through the cordon of police, the latter charged with their batons and a number of Jews were injured. The Zionist Executive and the *Vaad Leumi* issued a communiqué to the press on the 21st of August which, while rebuking the crowd for lack of restraint, charged that the police had been unnecessarily harsh in beating the crowd, and had struck and wounded aged people who could not possibly have offered resistance. The same day the Acting Executive wired the Zionist Organization in London reporting the tense situation and urging that the Home Government should be induced to take measures to ensure public security. They also asked the Executive to urge the Revisionist leaders to moderate the extreme expressions which had appeared in the *Doar Hayom* and to restrain the militant attitude which had developed among the Revisionist section of the youth.

Toward the end of the week there was a marked increase in provocation by the Arabs. The press was full of inciting articles and agitators traveled through the country arousing the Arabs and summoning them to Jerusalem. Rumors were spread that the Jews had bombed the Dome of the Rock, had killed many Arabs and were planning an attack on the Aqsa Mosque on Friday, August 23rd. Among these agitators was Subhi Bey al-Khadra, a member of the Palestine Arab Executive, about whom the Commission said: "His general demeanor before us was such that we believe that he would welcome any opportunity of furthering what he regards as the just cause of Arab nationalism in Palestine."<sup>17</sup> In Petach Tikvah nearly all the Arab workers employed in the Jewish orange groves left two or three days before the outbreak. On the day preceding the outbreak, Thursday, the 22nd, a letter purporting to be signed by the Mufti was delivered to the headman of a village near Nablus, reading as follows: "Fighting will take place on Friday next, the 18th Rabia [23rd of August, 1929] between the Jews and Moslems. All who are of the Moslem religion should come to Jerusalem to help."<sup>18</sup> On August 22nd, the Arab paper *Falastin* wrote: "In Jerusalem there is great excitement. The atmosphere is tense, and it is apprehended that tomorrow (Friday, August 23rd)

17. *Ibid.*, pp. 58, 80.

18. *Ibid.*, p. 75.

when many fellaheen assemble for prayers in Jerusalem a substantial answer will be given to these incidents.”<sup>19</sup>

At the suggestion of Mr. Horowitz, a meeting between leading Jews and Arabs took place on the evening of the 22nd of August in the home of Mr. Luke. The Jewish representatives were Mr. Braude, Mr. Ben Zvi—a leader in the Labor Federation and in the *Vaad Leumi*—and Dr. Levi, a Sephardic Jew, long resident in Palestine, and one of the managers of the Anglo-Palestine Bank. The Arab representatives were Jamal Effendi Husaini, Auni Bey Abdul Hadi, Secretaries of the Arab Executive Committee, and Subhi Bey al-Khadra. The meeting was conducted in a friendly spirit. The purpose was not to settle any of the questions definitively, for the representatives had no power to do so, but to prepare a statement calculated to calm public feeling. There was a moment at the meeting when it appeared that agreement had been reached, but at least one of the Arab representatives present refused to sign, holding that on general principles the time had not yet arrived when signatures by representatives of the two peoples could appear on the same document.

On the eve of August 23rd and on the Friday morning which followed, multitudes of Arabs began arriving in Jerusalem armed with heavy sticks and clubs. Police testimony later showed that many also carried pistols and knives. A noteworthy fact was the almost entire absence of women among the *fellahin*, which was unusual and indicated that they were prepared for trouble. The Jewish representatives had asked that the Arabs be disarmed as they came into the city, but the Government did not accede to this request. Disarming of Arabs, which was undertaken by the police on the Jericho side of the city under instructions from Kingsley-Heath, the police officer immediately in charge, was ordered discontinued by Major Allen Saunders, Inspector General of the Palestine Police.

The Arabs gathered in the *Haram* area. During and after the mid-day prayer, speeches were made by the Sheikhs of the Mosque of Aqsa and by the Mufti of Jerusalem. The speeches were moderate, directed to pacifying the crowd. But in accordance with evidence given by an Arab policeman

19. Maurice Samuel, *What Happened in Palestine*, p. 64.

stationed in the area, while Sheikh Hassan Abu Saud was speaking, one of the audience ascended the platform and shouted out that the speaker was telling lies and had spoken in quite a different strain in the previous week when he had made a speech on the occasion of the Moslem demonstration at the Wailing Wall. He cried: "A religious war is inevitable and we will kill all the Jews who wish to take the Burak from us, and once they take it, they will possess our Haram."<sup>20</sup>

After the mid-day prayer the Arabs issued from the Haram area through various gates, brandishing sticks and swords, and there was an attack on Jews in the *Mea Shearim* quarter, a section inhabited mainly by religious Jews. The attacks spread to other parts of the city. Two hours after the beginning of the riots, the order was given to the British police to fire. British Government officers and civilians were enrolled as special constables; arms were issued to eighteen ex-soldiers and staves to sixty-six other British Jews.<sup>21</sup> A request from the Palestine Zionist Executive to arm a greater number of Jews was denied. During the afternoon of the 23rd, the Acting High Commissioner wired to Malta for naval assistance and to the Colonial Office for a battalion of British troops. Early on the 24th, he telephoned the High Commissioner in Egypt for military assistance from that country after the police had advised that they were no longer able to accept responsibility for public security. A small contingent of troops—sixty in number—arrived from Egypt on the same day, but the main body of troops did not reach Palestine until the following Monday.

On Saturday, the 24th, the attacks spread to the outlying districts of Jerusalem and to the agricultural settlements in the southern district—Motzah, Artuf, Hulda and Beer Tuvia—which suffered badly. In the new Jewish settlements the Jewish self-defense units held the Arabs at bay. The worst attacks, as already noted, were on the old Jewish settlements of Hebron and Safed. The Jewish population in Hebron consisted mostly of older people living on *Halukah* (charitable contributions from abroad); there was also a group of young students attending a talmudic academy in Hebron. More than sixty Jews,

20. Horace B. Samuel, *op. cit.*, pp. 9, 11.

21. On the protest of the Arabs, the British Jews to whom arms had been given were later disarmed.

including women and children, were murdered and more than fifty were wounded. The synagogue was desecrated and the Jewish clinic which had provided treatment for Arabs as well as for Jews was attacked and ransacked. There were disturbances in Tel-Aviv and in Haifa on the 25th and 26th. Instances of Jewish reprisals occurred, particularly in the quarters lying between Jaffa and Tel-Aviv, and a mosque in Jerusalem was damaged by Jews. Scattered attacks continued but proved unsuccessful wherever the reinforced military took action and where Jewish self-defense units operated. The disturbances seemed to be under control by Wednesday, August 28th, but a ferocious attack on the Jewish quarter in Safed took place on the 29th; forty-five Jews were killed or wounded and their homes pillaged and burned. Thereafter, except for isolated instances, the country gradually quieted down.

#### *After the Disturbances*

Sir John Chancellor, the High Commissioner, who had been on leave, returned to Palestine on August 29th, just one week after the outbreaks, and assumed responsibility for the government of the country. His first act was to issue on September 1st a proclamation expressing horror at the events that had taken place in Palestine. The proclamation read as follows:

I have returned from the United Kingdom to find to my distress the country in a state of disorder and a prey to unlawful violence.

I have learned with horror of the atrocious acts committed by bodies of ruthless and blood-thirsty evil-doers, of savage murders perpetrated upon defenceless members of the Jewish population regardless of age or sex, accompanied as at Hebron, by acts of unspeakable savagery, of the burning of farms and houses in town and country and of the looting and destruction of property.

These crimes have brought upon their authors the execration of all civilized peoples throughout the world.

My first duties are to restore order in the country and to inflict stern punishment upon those found guilty of acts of violence. All necessary measures will be taken to achieve these ends, and I charge all the inhabitants of Palestine to assist me in discharging these duties.

In accordance with an undertaking which I gave to the Committee of the Arab Executive before I left Palestine in June, I initiated dis-

cussions with the Secretary of State when in England on the subject of constitutional changes in Palestine. In view of recent events I shall suspend those discussions with His Majesty's Government.

In order to put a stop to the mendacious statements that have recently been circulated on the subject of the Wailing Wall, I hereby with the concurrence of His Majesty's Government make it known that I intend to give effect to the principles laid down in the White Paper of the 19th November, 1928, after the methods of applying them have been determined.

On September 2nd, the leading Jewish institutions of Palestine, comprising the National Council of the Jews of Palestine (*Vaad Leumi*), the Chief Rabbinate and the Central *Agudath Israel*, submitted a memorandum to the High Commissioner outlining the course of events since the Wailing Wall incident of the previous *Yom Kippur* and giving expression to their bitter disappointment with the attitude of the Government. The Zionist Executive did not sign the memorandum, probably because they thought the criticism of the Government too extreme. The first paragraph of the memorandum read:<sup>22</sup>

For some considerable time past there has been conducted in the country a systematic propaganda, both secret and open, for an attack upon the Jews, who are engaged in a work of peace and reconstruction. In 1921 the authors of this propaganda spread within the Moslem masses fears and apprehensions as to their land, their possessions and their women-folk. Realizing that on religious grounds they would find it easier to incite the Moslem masses, the instigators have now chosen the Wailing Wall as a starting point. One of the principal instigators of the Jerusalem riots of 1920, who was subsequently privileged to be appointed by the Government as President of the Supreme Moslem Council, the Mufti of Jerusalem, appears now as defender of Moslem sanctuaries against our supposed attacks. The propaganda has now been thoroughly organized. All this was done before the very eyes of the Government on which rests the responsibility for the security of the country and the welfare of its people. The Government has done nothing to suppress this instigation and to anticipate its consequences. This strange indifference on the part of a civilized and strong Government, which knows how to use its force when it wills, strengthens in us the conviction that in Government quarters there are forces which have an interest in this incitement and in the encouragement of disputes between the peoples and communities of this country.

22. Maurice Samuel, *op. cit.*, pp. 150-151.

The Arab Executive on their part sent a protest against the proclamation issued by the High Commissioner and charged the Jews with the responsibility for the disturbances. The statement was as follows:<sup>23</sup>

Palestine Arabs read with astonishment and regret your Excellency's proclamation dated 1st instant. None anticipated that widely known facts admitted by Government that most Jews were self-armed, that Government armed many Jews, that there were no mutilations among Jewish casualties even at Hebron, as British Health authorities declare, that certain Arabs were mutilated by Jews, that Jewish mobs killed isolated women and children, that first murders of women and children were committed by Jews against Arabs, that even disciplined British soldiers shot Arab men, women and children in their homes and beds at Sour-Baher and elsewhere, that troubles in Palestine, past and present, are directly caused by the British Zionist policy, which aimed at annihilating the Arab nation in its own country in favor of reviving a non-existent Jewish nation, facts all of which would be thwarted by a hasty untimely proclamation. Your Excellency knows that Palestine Arabs lost everything to fear the loss of anything; therefore British troops will find them unarmed submitting to any havoc. If there remains any sense of justice to which Arabs are entitled, they insist that an impartial inquiry be made by outsiders, whose sense of justice is not curbed by Zionist influence. In the two previous inquiries made in similar conditions, by unbiased British commissions, Arabs gratefully proclaim they were relieved by having their political agonies and noble national aims unfolded. Arabs strongly believe that a similar inquiry will relate to the world a more truthful story of their condition and these troubles than that depicted in this proclamation issued before giving them any chance to be heard. Then the world will see that Jews, whose aggressions have surpassed political aims to religious ones, whose provocations lately became insupportable, as admitted by Government, whose atrocities do not fall short of this proclamation's accusation against Arabs, were responsible for the present troubles together with the policy supporting them. This proclamation should have succeeded and not preceded such impartial inquiry, and we are sure that reconsideration of the situation will lead your Excellency to a more rightful judgment.

Referring to this memorandum the Shaw Commission commented: "During the course of our inquiry most of the statements contained in the Arab reply were put to official witnesses

23. *Ibid.*, pp. 143-145.



and in almost every case those witnesses replied that the statements were untrue in substance.”<sup>24</sup> At the time, however, the High Commissioner appears to have been impressed by the Arab memorandum. Whether for this reason or because he was irritated by the extreme attack on Government by the Jewish bodies, he later issued another proclamation largely counteracting the effects of the first—this being regarded as a kind of apology for the strong words of condemnation which he had uttered immediately upon his return.<sup>25</sup>

The dispute over the Wailing Wall which had been the immediate cause of the disorders received the attention of the Administration during September. On the basis of evidence concerning the usages under the Turkish regime provisional rules were issued and communicated to the Chief Rabbinate on October 1st. The Regulations were provisional in the sense that they did not “purport to decide as between the claims of the interested communities.”<sup>26</sup> The instructions provided that the Jews could have access to the Wailing Wall for purposes of prayer and devotion at all times, and prescribed in exact terms what appurtenances of worship the Jews were permitted to bring to the Wall. They prohibited the bringing of benches or chairs<sup>27</sup> on the legalistic ground that this had not been customary, and the erection of a screen for any purpose whatsoever. On the other hand, they forbade the driving of animals along the pavement in front of the Wall at specified hours when services were usually held, and also instructed that the door between the pavement and the *Zawiya* should remain locked at certain periods.

The first instance of the application of these rules arose in connection with the blowing of the *Shofar* (ram’s horn) which is an essential part of the ritual on *Rosh Hashanah* (New Year) and *Yom Kippur* (Day of Atonement).<sup>28</sup> In October the Supreme Moslem Council complained that the *Shofar* had been

24. *Report on the Disturbances of 1929*, p. 68.

25. Kisch, *op. cit.*, p. 252.

26. Colonial Office, *Report by His Majesty’s Government to the Council of the League of Nations on the Administration of Palestine and Trans-Jordan*, London, 1930, p. 5. For the Regulations see Appendix I, p. 181.

27. A few benches were sometimes placed near the Wall for the convenience of old or ailing persons.

28. The *Shofar* is blown several times on *Rosh Hashanah* and at the completion of the services on the Day of Atonement.

blown several times during the Jewish New Year's Day which occurred at the beginning of the month and submitted that there was no explicit authority for this practice in the instructions in the Regulations which the High Commissioner had issued. Despite the fact that the blowing of the *Shofar* was an essential part of the services, the High Commissioner ruled that it should be prohibited, evidently on the grounds that the Jews had not produced documentary evidence to the effect that this had always been the custom. As a consequence, on the Jewish Day of Atonement which fell in the middle of October, the congregation at the Wailing Wall had to adjourn to a neighboring synagogue in order to complete the services by the blowing of the *Shofar*.

The Palestine Zionist Executive looked upon this incident as further indication of the Government's tendency to make concessions to the Arabs. The latter, encouraged, continued their campaign in connection with the Wailing Wall. The Shaw Report, referring to a letter addressed to Chief Rabbi Kook by the Society for the Protection of the Mosque of Aqsa and the Moslem Holy Places, makes the following comment: "It is of some importance inasmuch as its contents show that the Moslem campaign in connection with the Wailing Wall was still continuing in November and that some at least of the Moslem religious authorities were then declining to accept the doctrine . . . that the Jewish community in Palestine have an established right of access to the Wailing Wall at all times for the purpose of their devotions."<sup>29</sup>

In January, 1930, the League of Nations Council, responding to proposals made by the British Government, consented to the appointment of an international commission to investigate the rival claims of Jews and Arabs. The Commission received the approval of the League of Nations on May 15, 1930, and proceeded to Palestine where they took evidence during June and July from representatives of the Supreme Moslem Council and from the united Jewish organizations including the Rabbinate, the Jewish Community of Palestine (*Vaad Leumi*) and the Central *Agudath Israel*. The late Dr. Cyrus Adler, president of the Jewish Theological Seminary in New York, prepared a memorandum on the Western Wall which, supplemented by

29. *Report on the Disturbances of 1929*, p. 70.

annotations of a committee of scholars at Jerusalem, stated the Jewish case to the Commission.<sup>30</sup>

At its final session on July 19, 1930, the Wailing Wall Commission indicated that it would prefer a voluntary solution by an agreed settlement between the Jews and the Arabs. But the negotiations proved abortive and the Commission drafted a decision confirming the Jewish rights of access to the Wall for the purposes of worship and accepted the Provisional Regulations of October, 1929, as a satisfactory guide for the practical application of this general principle. The Moslems had declared in advance that they did not recognize the competence of any body except a *Sharia* court to settle a question regarding a Moslem Holy Place, and therefore rejected the ruling of the Commission. The Government, therefore, enacted the decision of the Commission into law by an Order-in-Council and published it on June 8, 1931. Although this compromise satisfied neither the Jews nor the Arabs, it put an end to the question of the Wailing Wall as a disturbing issue.

### THE COMMISSION ON THE PALESTINE DISTURBANCES OF AUGUST, 1929

On September 13, 1929, Lord Passfield, Secretary of State for the Colonies in the newly formed Labor Government, designated a Commission of Inquiry<sup>31</sup> to investigate the cause of the disturbances. The Commission received its formal appointment through a warrant signed by the High Commissioner under a Palestine Ordinance.<sup>32</sup> Sir Walter Shaw, former Chief Justice of the Straits Settlements, was designated as Chairman of the Commission. There were three other members: Sir Henry Betterton, M.P. (later Lord Rushcliffe), Conservative, Mr. R. Hopkin Morris, M.P., Liberal, and Mr. Henry Snell, M.P. (later Lord Snell of Plumstead), Labor. Betterton and Morris had had legal training, and Mr. Snell had been a member of another Imperial Commission of Inquiry.

The terms of reference stated that their task was "to inquire into the immediate causes which led to the recent outbreak in Palestine, and to make recommendations as to the steps nec-

30. Cyrus Adler, *Memorandum on Western Wall Submitted to the Special Commission of the League of Nations on Behalf of the Jewish Agency for Palestine*, Philadelphia, 1930.

31. *Report on the Disturbances of 1929*, p. 3.

32. *Ibid.*, p. 184.

essary to avoid a recurrence.”<sup>33</sup> This limitation of the scope of the investigation was emphasized by the Secretary of State for the Colonies in the original notice of the appointment of the Commission: “In view of the suggestions which have been made in certain quarters, the Secretary of State desires to make it clear that His Majesty’s Government have no idea of reconsidering the British tenure of the Mandate for Palestine and that no inquiry is contemplated which might alter the position of this country in regard to the Mandate or policy laid down in the Balfour Declaration (1917) and embodied in the Mandate, of establishing in Palestine a national home for the Jews. The enquiry now initiated is therefore limited to the immediate emergency and will not extend to considerations of major policy.”<sup>34</sup>

The Commission arrived in Palestine on October 24, 1929, and remained until December 29, 1929, traveling through the country and hearing evidence. There were forty-seven sittings of the Commission in open session and eleven *in camera* devoted to interviews with Government officials. The sittings were usually held in Jerusalem at the offices of the Commission provided by the Government of Palestine. However, special deference was paid to the Mufti of Jerusalem and the three sittings in which his evidence was taken were held at the offices of the Supreme Moslem Council. Although the inquiry was not in any legal sense a judicial proceeding, each of the parties concerned—the Government, the Arabs and the Jews—were represented by counsel<sup>35</sup> who were charged with marshalling and presenting the evidence for their respective sides; cross-examination was also permitted.

#### *Attitudes Disclosed in the Evidence*

The first to be called were the Government officers. In his introduction, Sir Walter Shaw, the Chairman of the Commission, referred to “the presentation of the Government’s case,”

33. *Ibid.*, pp. 3, 184.

34. Norman Bentwich, *England in Palestine*, pp. 191 ff.

35. For the Government of Palestine, Mr. Kenelm Freedy and Mr. R. H. Drayton, the Solicitor-General in Palestine; for the Palestine Arab Executive, Mr. W. H. Stoker, K.C., Mr. Reginald Silley, Auni Bey Abdul Hadi, and Mr. Mogannam; for the Palestine Zionist Executive and the Zionist Organization, Sir Boyd Merriman, K.C., M.P., Viscount Erleigh, K.C., Mr. S. Horowitz, Mr. W. A. Davies, Mr. S. E. Karminski and Mr. L. J. Stein.

but the Government counsel, Mr. Kenelm Preedy, stated that the Government was there to render the official account of the disturbances but not to present a case. Nevertheless, the Government was in fact in the position of a defendant; it was accused of neglecting to heed the warnings given by the Jewish bodies that the disturbances were impending, and that it had failed to take sufficiently quick and forceful action after the outbreak, and that generally it had followed a policy of appeasing the Arabs. A good part of the evidence given by the Administration was designed to clear it of the charge of ineptness and neglect. The tendency of the Government counsel was to place the blame on the Jews who were the chief accusers, by emphasizing their excitement during the Wailing Wall controversy and by playing on the old theme of the unreasonableness of the Jewish demands. The Government also stressed the difficulties of administering the country arising out of the character of the Mandate itself in view of the Arab opposition to the terms which related to the establishment of the Jewish homeland.

The Arabs were called next, before the Jews presented their evidence. This gave them the opportunity of converting their case from one of defense into one of attack. One of the first witnesses who testified on their behalf was Miss Frances Newton, a woman of means and a retired Anglican missionary, resident in Haifa, who had lived in Palestine since 1899. An avowed opponent of Zionism and a sympathizer with the Arab cause, she had accompanied the Arab Delegation to Europe in 1921-1922.<sup>36</sup> She opened her testimony with the charge that Jewish purchases of land, particularly in the Valley of Esdraelon, had led to expropriation of Arabs from lands which they had long cultivated. She was followed by Mr. Saleem Farah, called as an expert by the Arab Executive Committee, who made the statement that 1,746 families had been displaced by Jewish land purchasing transactions.

36. During the period of the military occupation of Palestine, as Miss Newton explained to the Commission, she passed on information received confidentially from Government officers to the Arabs, in order to convince them that despite the Balfour Declaration the Government was defending their interests. Her testimony confirmed the view that some British officers were pursuing an anti-Zionist intrigue during the years before the Civil Administration. See Great Britain, *Evidence Heard during the First Two (47th) Sitzings*, 3 vols. Colonial No. 48, 1930 (Shaw Commission), p. 499 (henceforth referred to as *Evidence*).

The Mayor of Nablus, Haj Tewfik Hanna, gave evidence purporting to speak the mind of the people at large. In reply to a question by Abdul Hadi—acting as one of the Arab counsel—who asked what he thought was the object of Zionism, Tewfik Hanna answered bluntly, “to get hold of Palestine.” He said that he thought the Jews were not sincere in their acceptance of the Churchill White Paper. The Arabs, on their part, could be satisfied only by the establishment of a constitutional, representative government responsible to the Arab majority. He said: “I understand, as all Arabs understand, that the Zionist policy is to dispose of the Arabs in every possible way and to replace them with Jews.” In the early days, the Jews had employed Arab labor, but since the new immigration began, the Jewish employers were replacing Arabs by Jews. The sale of large estates to Jews, he maintained, threw the Arab agricultural laborer and tenant out of work. The Wailing Wall issue was the last drop which had caused the cup of Arab anxiety to overflow. The Jews, the Arabs were convinced, had designs on the Temple area as they had on the whole of Palestine.

The Mufti testified at length concerning the sacredness to the Arabs of *al-Burak*, the name by which the Moslems call the Western Wall, and asserted that he believed that the Jews had designs on the Moslem Holy Places. He referred to the Jewish orthodox belief in the rebuilding of the Temple on its ancient site. In fact, in accordance with his view, the Jews wanted Palestine not for material advantage but because they wished to take the Temple area. During cross-examination, it was brought out that an Arabic translation of the *Protocols of the Elders of Zion* had been spread in Palestine and the Mufti asserted that he as well as others had been influenced by the charges made therein. He said: “I understand from this book that the Jews intend to possess this country, Trans-Jordan and other parts of Palestine and then the work will increase, and that they want to take possession of the *Burak* and to make it a place of public gathering and meetings, and then to take possession of the *Haram* area and then restore the Temple. This is the gist of what I understand the book to mean.”<sup>37</sup>

37. *Evidence*, p. 499. The level to which the Arab defense was ready to descend is indicated by a comment on the part of W. H. Stoker, the Arab counsel. Some of the members of the Commission had not heard of the *Protocols of the Elders of Zion*, and Sir Boyd Merriman, the

When the Jews came to give their testimony they charged the Mufti with the main responsibility for inciting and organizing the disturbances. They accused him of using the religious issue to stir up the Arabs against the Jews and against the Mandate after he had failed to do so through political methods. They pointed to evidence which indicated that he was responsible for propaganda emanating from the Supreme Moslem Council designed to spread the belief among the *fellahin* that the Jews had designs on the *Haram esh-Sharif*. The Jewish witnesses did not think that either the Mufti or any other members of the Arab Executive believed this to be true, but that they were fanning the flames of religious fanaticism for political purposes. As to the issue itself, Rabbi Kook, Chief Rabbi of the Ashkenazic Community, explained the orthodox belief in the restoration of the Temple on its old site as an event that was to take place only with the coming of the Messiah. This would come in God's good time and it was forbidden to do anything to hasten it. Until that day, orthodox Jews are not allowed to enter the area surrounding the Temple, and it was his custom to send out warnings to Jewish visitors not to enter the *Haram* area.

On the economic side, the Zionists adduced much evidence to show that Jewish immigration and development had benefited the Arabs as well as the Jews. Mr. Hoofien, Director of the Anglo-Palestine Bank, emphasized the role of Jewish capital in the development of Palestine after the First World War. Dr. Ruppin pointed out that the Jewish land companies, although not legally obligated to pay such compensation, had voluntarily paid out large sums in order to enable Arab tenants to acquire or lease land elsewhere when the Esdraelon Valley land had been purchased. He denied the view that Palestine could not support a larger agricultural population and saw the solution in a more intensive form of cultivation which, through irrigation, would greatly improve the productivity of the land. Moshe Smilansky, one of the old settlers, universally recognized by the Arabs and Jews as having intimate knowledge of Palestine, cited Rehovoth as an example: thirty-eight years

counsel for the Zionist Organization, had explained that it was known to be a forgery. Stoker, however, termed it a classic and compared it to Shakespeare's plays—"Shakespeare's plays have been published in almost every language, and this is in the same category."

before when the Jews bought the land it was a waste area occupied by a dozen Arabs, now it supported a population of twenty-five hundred persons. The Arabs as well as the Jews had benefited greatly, having used the capital which they had obtained for the sale of part of their land to free themselves of their indebtedness to the *effendis* and to improve their methods of cultivation. By comparison with their former state, they were now enjoying prosperity and a high standard of living.

On political policy, the evidence for the Zionist Organization was given by Mr. Harry Sacher, who was the head of the Political Department at the time. In answer to a question whether he regarded the aim of Zionists to be the creation of a Jewish state, he replied as follows:<sup>38</sup>

I say that what we are concerned with is the establishment of the Jewish National Home. What we are concerned with is that we shall have, as I said before, immigration to which there shall be no artificial restrictions, that we shall be enabled as a Jewish people to put all our energies into making what is to be made of this country so as to enable Jews to come here and create this civilization. We expect and demand under the Mandate of the Government that it shall do its part in facilitating that work. It may be, and I say frankly we hope that one day as a result of this natural process there will be a Jewish majority in this country.

What particular forms this particular community may take I do not know and I do not intend to prophesy. One thing, however, is quite certain, Jews have no intention of dominating or being dominated in respect of any other people in this country. They look upon their own right to create their own civilization as being neither greater nor less than the right of the Arabs to create their civilization.

He further explained, while the establishment of the Jewish national home was the primary purpose of the Mandate, he regarded the part of the Balfour Declaration, which refers to safeguarding the rights of the existing population, as being of equal importance. He thought that the second purpose was thoroughly compatible with the first: the question of religious and civil rights obviously presented no genuine difficulties. Furthermore, he saw no difficulty with reference to political

38. *Report on the Disturbances of 1929*, p. 108.



rights in the ordinary sense of the right to vote in any political institutions established. He admitted that there was a contradiction between the two purposes of the Mandate if the term "political rights" was interpreted to mean the immediate establishment of representative institutions on a national scale which would allow an Arab majority to prevent the establishment of the Jewish national home. With reference to the Legislative Council, he said that while the Zionists had agreed to participate in the 1922 proposal at that time, the recent outbreaks made Jewish cooperation difficult. He expressed no absolute opposition to Jewish participation in a Legislative Council, but took the view that if proposals were made again, they would need to be carefully considered in the light of the new situation—the intransigent Arab opposition and the ambiguous attitude of the Government.

These views represented the official position of the Zionist Organization. Expressing his own personal interpretation of Zionism, he said that he did not regard the establishment of a Jewish state as essential even if the Jews would become a majority. Indeed he did not know what those who insisted on the Jewish state meant by the term. As far as he was concerned, he wanted the British Mandate to be made permanent; the exact parliamentary form to be adopted in Palestine under the British trusteeship should be left to the future. He insisted that it was necessary to meet the problem as it confronted us today and not to attempt to work out a fixed plan for future generations. To a comment made by Mr. Stoker of the Arab counsel, "But we must build for the future," Sacher made the apt retort, "Yes, we must build for the future, but we cannot think for the future."

The Commission had the opportunity of hearing also the Revisionist point of view on two occasions: from Wolfgang Von Weisl, a journalist, who gave evidence before the Commission in Jerusalem, and from Vladimir Jabotinsky, to whom was granted the special privilege of an interview in London after the Commission had returned. Von Weisl stated that the Revisionist aim was large scale immigration designed over the course of twenty-five to thirty years to develop a Jewish majority in Palestine. The Revisionists were opposed to the principle of economic absorptive capacity in the accepted sense, holding that Government had the duty, in accordance with the

Balfour Declaration and the Mandate, of increasing Palestine's absorptive capacity in order to help build the Jewish national home. The Revisionist view was that when the Jews became a majority, the Arab section of the population would enjoy the same rights that Jews expected as a minority: complete equality as individuals and full autonomy in cultural and religious affairs. No parliamentary institutions should be introduced into Palestine until both the Jews and Arabs jointly demanded their introduction.

When Jabotinsky was interviewed in London, he presented an identical conception. He mentioned the figure of 30,000 immigrants per year for the next sixty years as the solution which the Revisionists accepted. His view was that the Palestine Government should "actively promote Jewish colonization with a view, of course, to establishing a Jewish majority." He declared the creation in Palestine of a Jewish state to be the objective of his party. He defined the term Jewish state as follows:<sup>39</sup>

It does not necessarily mean being independent in the sense of having the right to declare war on anybody, but what it means is first of all a majority of Jewish people in Palestine, so that under a democratic rule the Jewish point of view should always prevail, and secondly, that measure of self-government which for instance the State of Nebraska possesses. That would satisfy me completely as long as it is a local self-government, enough to conduct our own affairs, and so long as there is a Jewish majority in the country.

#### *The Shaw Commission Report*

The report of the Commission appeared in March, 1930. It was signed by all its four members, but Mr. Snell made important reservations which will be considered later. The report of the Commission held that "the outbreak in Jerusalem on the 23rd of August was from the beginning an attack by Arabs on Jews for which no excuse in the form of earlier murders by Jews had been established."<sup>40</sup> The attacks were vicious and were accompanied by "wanton destruction of Jewish property." In a few instances Jews assaulted Arabs and destroyed

39. *Ibid.*, p. 109.

40. *Ibid.*, p. 158.

Arab property, but these attacks "though inexcusable were in most cases in retaliation for wrongs already committed by Arabs in the neighborhood in which the Jewish attacks occurred."

This was the only judgment made by the Commission which was unreservedly in accord with the Jewish view of the situation. All the other findings show tendencies in various degrees to make a defense of the Government or to favor the Arab position. Among the general conclusions is the statement that "the outbreak neither was, nor was intended to be, a revolt against British authority in Palestine." The Commission modified this judgment to some degree by saying that "it may well be that, as we were told by one witness, 'given the opportunity of gathering momentum the riots would have become ultimately and necessarily anti-government.'"<sup>41</sup> The fundamental cause of the disturbances, without which the Commission believed the disorders would not have occurred or would have been limited to the character of a local riot, was "the Arab feeling of animosity and hostility toward the Jews consequent upon the disappointment of their political and national aspirations and fear for their economic future."<sup>42</sup>

The Commission found that the outbreak was not premeditated; that the disturbances did not occur with absolute simultaneity in all parts of Palestine, but had spread from Jerusalem to the outlying centers in the course of days. They also expressed the view that the conduct of the Arab Executive afforded no ground for serious complaint, although some of the individual members may have been engaged in exacerbating racial feeling. Mr. Snell excepted, the members of the Commission were particularly solicitous to exonerate the Mufti from the charge of having instigated the disturbances. Although they admitted that the Mufti wanted to annoy the Jews and mobilize Moslem opinion on the Wailing Wall issue, it was their opinion that he had no intention of utilizing the religious campaign to incite disorders. They did not give credence to the Mufti's statement that he really believed the Jews had designs on the Mosque of Aqsa and on the area of the *Haram*, not being able to conceive that any educated person would think that the doctored souvenir pictures brought in evidence could seri-

41. *Ibid.*, p. 149.

42. *Ibid.*, p. 163.

ously be taken as an indication of Jewish designs on the Moslem Holy Places.<sup>43</sup> And yet the report concludes that the Mufti may have reasonably feared that at some future time, if the Jews became politically dominant in Palestine, they would wish to take over the old Temple area. They laid emphasis on the fact that whatever activities the Mufti may have indulged in outside the knowledge of the Government, in public he exerted his influence in the direction of promoting peace and restoring order. They counted this as a point weighing in his favor; it did not seem to occur to them that this is how he would have had to act if he had been the instigator and wanted to cover up his complicity.<sup>44</sup>

In the same way, admitting a good deal of damaging evidence, in the final conclusion they absolved the Administration from blame. The Commission praised the British police and the Jordan frontier force as deserving highest commendation. But they admitted that the policy of reducing the garrison in Palestine had been proven inadequate, and that the Palestinian police could not be relied upon after the firing had begun. Looking back at the situation, they admitted that it would have been a reasonable precaution if Mr. Luke had mobilized the troops within his jurisdiction some days preceding the riots when he was warned of impending trouble. Nevertheless, they concluded too serious criticism could not properly be levelled against him for failing to adopt this line of action. They expressed the view that the disarming of British constables of Jewish extraction was an undeserved affront, but that Mr. Luke was following the best military advice at the time. Referring to the charge made by the Zionist Organization that the

43. There are pictures of Jerusalem with the Mosque of the Dome of the Rock either in the center or in the background. These have been used by Jewish orphan asylums and educational institutions in Palestine as souvenirs in soliciting funds. A Hebrew inscription, generally a quotation from the Bible, is frequently printed on the souvenir. These were brought in evidence by the Arab counsel as an indication of the Jewish designs. In some cases, it appears that the Arab Executive had some of these pictures modified to conceal their identity as emanating from charitable institutions.

44. As a matter of fact, evidence given by Major Harrington of the Police indicates that the Mufti did not always "cooperate." When Major Harrington asked the Mufti to send two sheikhs to pacify the crowd, he sent a fanatical sheikh of the worst type, whose personality would have proven an irritant even though the actual words might have been correct. (See Horace B. Samuel, *op. cit.*, p. 9, and *Evidence*, p. 71.)

Palestine Government had consistently shown a lack of sympathy toward the Jewish national home, and thus had created an environment favorable to the Arab attack, the majority on the Commission turned the attack against the Zionists and maintained that the alleged policy of weakness was due to difficulties in the Mandate, and that the Jewish complaint rested on failure to appreciate the dual nature of the Government's responsibility. "It was our view that the Government did discharge to the best of their ability the difficult task of maintaining a neutral and impartial attitude between two peoples whose leaders have shown little capacity for compromise."<sup>45</sup>

In accordance with the opinion of the Commission, the immediate causes of the outbreak were (a) the long series of incidents connected with the Wailing Wall, the most important contributing to the outbreak being the Jewish demonstration on August 15, 1929, and next in importance, the activities of the Moslem Societies for the protection of their Holy Places; (b) exciting and intemperate articles which appeared in some Arab papers, in one daily paper and in a Jewish weekly published in English; (c) propaganda calculated to incite the less educated Arab people; (d) the enlargement of the Jewish Agency, which increased apprehension among all classes of Arabs, that the Zionist activities in Palestine would be pursued with greater energy and supported by large funds; (e) the inadequacy of the military force and of reliable police; (f) the belief, due largely to a feeling of uncertainty as to policy, that the decisions of the Palestine Government could be influenced by political considerations.<sup>46</sup>

In a manner reminiscent of the judgment of the Haycraft Commission in 1921, the Shaw Commission came to the conclusion that the underlying and fundamental cause of the disturbance was to be found in the Arab opposition to the Jewish national home, and particularly to Jewish immigration and land settlement. Granting that Jewish enterprise and Jewish immigration "have conferred material benefits upon Palestine in which the Arab people share," the Commission nevertheless concluded "that the claims and demands which from the Zionist side have been advanced in regard to the future of Jewish immigration into Palestine have been such as to arouse among

45. *Ibid.*, p. 161.

46. *Ibid.*, p. 169.

the Arabs the apprehension that they will in time be deprived of their livelihood and pass under the political domination of the Jews." They charged "that there is incontestable evidence that in the matter of immigration there had been a serious departure by the Jewish authorities from the doctrine accepted by the Zionist Organization in 1922, that immigration should be regulated by the economic capacity of Palestine to absorb new arrivals." It also objected to the alleged system of the selection of immigrants by the General Federation of Jewish Labor. "In the allocation of certificates supplied to them for this purpose, it is the practice of the Federation to have regard to the political creed of the several possible immigrants rather than to their particular qualifications for admission to Palestine." They recommended a more stringent control of immigration, in accordance with the economic absorptive principle and suggested also that machinery should be devised whereby the non-Jewish interests in Palestine should be consulted.<sup>47</sup>

On the land question, they admitted that no criticism could be leveled directly against the Jewish companies since the purchases had been made in accordance with existing ordinances and with the knowledge of the Government, and that, moreover, the Jews had paid compensation to dispossessed Arabs despite the fact that they were not obligated to do so. Nevertheless, the Commission concluded that the existing ordinances did not check the tendency to dispossess cultivators and that the money compensation was a temptation to the Arab cultivators and aggravated the tendency. They were of the opinion that a landless and discontented class was being created and that this constituted a potential cause of future disturbances. They concluded that "Palestine cannot support a larger agricultural population than it at present carries unless methods of farming undergo a radical change."<sup>48</sup> Even with more intensive cultivation, if this should prove possible, there would be

47. In the section on immigration, pp. 110 ff., they introduced the suggestion of political limitations on immigration. They summarized four graphs prepared by Mr. Mills, the Assistant Chief Secretary to the Palestine Government, which—on the basis of certain assumptions as to natural increase and rates of Jewish immigration—show how long it would take the Jewish population to equal the Arab population. This summary was later reproduced by the Palestine Royal Commission, which investigated the disorders of 1936, and served as a basis for the political limitation of Jewish immigration. See below, Chap. XII.

48. *Ibid.*, p. 162.

room for a number of newcomers only in certain districts. They made the constructive proposal that an inquiry should be made into the possibilities of improved methods of cultivation in Palestine and of its agricultural potentialities. In any scheme of land development adopted as a result of such expert inquiry, regard should be had for the natural increase in the present rural population. Pending the results of such a survey, action should be taken to prevent further dispossession of present cultivators, e.g., by improving the existing ordinances, by the introduction of legislation based on the *Five Fedan Law* enforced in Egypt or by the restriction of the transfer of Arab land to others. They also suggested the provision of agricultural credits for poor cultivators. They recognized that in view of the obligation placed on the Mandatory Power by Article 6 of the Mandate to "encourage close settlement by the Jews on the land," their proposals involved a delicate problem, but they thought a solution of the land question in the interest of the Arab cultivators indispensable for the future peace of the country.

Finally, they called for a clear statement of the policy to be pursued in Palestine. On their reading of the White Paper of 1922, "the primary duty which it laid upon the Palestine Government was one of holding the balance between the two parties in that country. There was no clear direction to assist either party in the fulfilment of their aspirations."<sup>49</sup> There was an ambiguity in the Balfour Declaration and in the Mandate. For this reason it was imperative that the Government issue a "clear definition of policy, backed by a statement that it is the firm intention of His Majesty's Government to implement that policy in full." Such a clear statement should take into consideration the resentment of the Arabs of Palestine, resulting from their disappointment at continued failure to obtain any measure of self-government; and also Arab resentment of the fact that the Jews, through the recognition of the Jewish Agency, enjoy a privileged position. The statement of policy should therefore be particularly careful in defining the meaning of the passage in the Mandate which provides for the safeguarding of the rights of the non-Jewish communities in that country.

49. *Ibid.*, p. 143.

In his note of reservations Mr. Snell expressed a difference of opinion in significant respects. He agreed that the opposition of the Arabs to the Jewish homeland was a fundamental cause of the outbreak. But he thought that their animosity was due to a campaign of incitement and not basically to economic factors, as had been suggested by his colleagues. He attributed to the Mufti a great share of responsibility for the disturbances, blaming him for his failure to make any effort to control the agitation conducted in the name of a religion of which in Palestine he was the head. Similarly, he did not absolve the Arab Executive from responsibility for the activities of the societies which they had created. Nor did he exempt the Government from blame: in the light of the inadequacy of military forces, they should have furnished selected Jews with arms; they should have issued an official communiqué denying that the Jews had designs on the Moslem Holy Places. Moreover, he was unable to associate himself with the criticism in the report with regard to the system of selecting immigrants. Referring especially to the Labor Federation, he said: "The achievements of the Jews in Palestine in the last decade are as significant as anything that has happened in our time." While respecting the desire of the Arab leaders for self-government and recognizing that this desire was a factor that had to be taken into account, he did not believe that the masses of the people were conscious of any serious grievance on constitutional questions. He said: "In my view progress in Palestine—by which I mean the joint progress of the two peoples—is to be looked for not along the lines of political concession but rather through social and economic reconstruction and the establishment of public security."<sup>50</sup>

Stating his general view of the situation, he expressed the opinion that too much importance was attached in the majority Report of the Commission to the excited protests of the Arab leaders and to the impatient criticisms of the Zionists. In his view:<sup>51</sup>

. . . What is required in Palestine is, I believe, less a change of policy in these matters than a change of mind on the part of the

50. *Ibid.*, p. 178.

51. *Ibid.*, p. 174.



Arab population, who have been encouraged to believe that they have suffered a great wrong and that the immigrant Jew constitutes a permanent menace to their livelihood and future. I am convinced that these fears are exaggerated and that on any long view of the situation the Arab people stand to gain rather than to lose from Jewish enterprise. There is no doubt in my mind that, in spite of errors of judgment which may have resulted in hardship to individual Arabs, Jewish activities have increased the prosperity of Palestine, have raised the standard of life of the Arab worker and have laid the foundations on which may be based the future progress of the two communities and their development into one State.

His major reservations have been summarized as follows:<sup>52</sup>

1. That the questions raised by the Jewish National Home policy are neither unique nor insoluble, and that the disturbances were caused by factors of a temporary rather than a permanent character.

2. That a greater share of the responsibility may be attributed to the Mufti.

3. That more serious blame should be attached to the Moslem religious authorities for the innovations introduced in the neighborhood of the Wailing Wall.

4. That the Palestine Government did not maintain adequate military and security forces. Also, that the demonstration at the Wailing Wall on August 15th by Jewish youth should not have been permitted to occur.

5. That in immigration and land policies a change of policy is less needed "than a change of mind on the part of the Arab population who have been encouraged to believe that they have suffered a great wrong and that the immigrant Jew constitutes a permanent menace to their livelihood and future . . . that on any long view of the situation the Arab people stand to gain rather than to lose from Jewish enterprise."

6. That the Jewish authorities are not open to blame in the matter of land acquisition.

7. That Arab constitutional grievances are not as serious as held by some and that progress is to be made by economic reconstruction rather than by political concession.

8. That the problem of race relationships must be viewed in the light of "the impact upon an undeveloped people, fatalistic in their outlook and devoted to their ancient ways, of a highly gifted and progressive race, burning with a great ideal . . ."

52. Research Committee of the League of Nations Association of the United States, *The Palestine Mandate*, Paris, June, 1930, p. 15.

9. That he associates himself with the recommendations of his colleagues, except in two matters pertaining to immigration policy and the constitutional grievances of the Arabs.

10. That "the whole population should be made to realize that the Mandatory Power has been charged by the League of Nations with solemn obligations which it intends to fulfil and that a Jewish-Arab nation is a fact which must be accepted."

*Reactions to the Report of the Shaw Commission*

The Report was received by the Arabs "with jubilation as a vindication of their case against the National Home."<sup>53</sup> The outraged Jewish reaction found expression in the following statement made by the *Vaad Leumi* in a *Memorandum* submitted to the Permanent Mandates Commission: "The Jewish people of Palestine regard the Report of the Inquiry Commission as one of the most unjust documents which our people have had to face in the course of 2,000 years of persecution. Even the enquiries instituted after Jewish pogroms in Czarist Russia displayed more respect for fairness and justice than three of the Commissioners of H. M. Government have evinced in their Report. Every heinous Arab crime is presented in the Report as a mere error of judgment, whilst every Jewish merit is belittled into insignificance."<sup>54</sup>

The Jewish Agency prepared a *Memorandum* on the Report of the Commission, in which the following charges were made: that the Commission had found against the weight of the evidence in its denial that the disturbances were premeditated and in its exoneration of the Mufti and the Arab Executive from responsibility; that the Commission's judgments on the effect of Jewish immigration and land settlement were hasty and had been made without adequate analysis of the facts; that it had gone beyond its terms of reference and permitted itself to make tendentious interpretations of the Mandate and of the Churchill White Paper which were opposed to the policy of the Jewish national home.<sup>55</sup>

53. Hanna, *op. cit.*, p. 100.

54. The National Council (*Vaad Leumi*) of the Jews of Palestine, *Memorandum Submitted to the Permanent Mandates Commission of the League of Nations, June, 1930*, The Jewish Agency for Palestine, London, p. 67.

55. Leonard Stein, *Memorandum on the "Report of the Commission on the Palestine Disturbances of August 1929,"* The Jewish Agency for Palestine, London, May, 1930.

Simultaneously, the Jewish Agency submitted a *Memorandum* to His Majesty's Government<sup>56</sup> in which the problems of defense, immigration, land settlement, industrial development, labor legislation, health work and education were comprehensively discussed in the light of the needs of the development of the Jewish homeland, and in a manner that would redound to the interests of all sections of the population. The *Memorandum* included a statement on Jewish-Arab relations. The view expressed by the Zionist Organization was that understanding between the Arabs and the Jews could be reached only on the basis of the principle of equality, each side recognizing the civil and national rights of the other. They reaffirmed their recognition of the rights of the Arabs in Palestine as a national community whose undisturbed development was part of the task of upbuilding the common home. At the same time, it was emphasized that peace was not possible without a similar recognition of Jewish rights on the part of the Arabs.

The Jewish Agency statement declared that the following three fundamentals must be safeguarded:<sup>57</sup>

1. The recognition of the historical connection with Palestine of Jews all over the world, as contained in the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate, must be maintained.

2. Jewish immigration and colonization must be free and not subject to any restriction on political grounds, being limited only by the desire and ability of the Jewish people to raise financial means for this purpose, and by the development of Palestine and its power of absorption of new immigrants. No limitation upon the ultimate percentage of Jews in the country can be accepted.

3. The Jews in Palestine are to be considered as constituting a united community upon a national basis, on an equal footing with the Arab community of the country, not only as regards language, education and culture, but also as constituting a partner in the political life of the country. Jews in Palestine will never desire to dominate the non-Jewish inhabitants of the country, and will always refuse to be dominated by them.

Asserting that the "Jews who are going to Palestine to rebuild the Jewish national home are not the least enthusiastic

56. The Jewish Agency for Palestine, *The Development of the Jewish National Home in Palestine*, London, May, 1930.

57. *Ibid.*, p. 80.

adherents of the claims of democracy," they charged that the demand for self-government in Palestine was not based on any desire to associate the masses of the people with the government. The demand for self-government in Palestine, they alleged, came from that stratum of the Arab population which desired to keep the Arab masses in political and economic subjugation. Self-government at the present time would not bring democracy, but the very negation of democracy. The establishment of democratic government on a national basis was premature and could only lead to a pseudo-parliamentary system which would give the Arab *effendi* class dominance and provide the opponents of the Jewish national home with pseudo-popular backing. They outlined a series of practical suggestions for Arab-Jewish advisory committees, for the development of local self-government in towns and villages, for promotion of cooperation in industry and trade unions, for the development of cooperative credit societies and for promotion of mutual understanding through education and cultural interchange. They also took the view that in any true democracy "the equality of the Jewish and Arab communities must be made an integral part of the constitutional practice of Palestine." <sup>58</sup>

The Arabs sent a delegation—this was the fourth—to London to present its views. It consisted of four Moslems and one Christian. The delegation arrived in London on March 30, 1930, and undertook negotiations with the Government. Their demands were similar to those presented in the past: cessation of immigration; a declaration that the Arab lands were inalienable; establishment of democratic government immediately, with representation based on population. On May 12th the delegation issued a statement that the British Government had rejected its demands. The next day the British Government declared that the demand for sweeping constitutional changes made by the Arabs was "wholly unacceptable since they would have rendered it impossible for His Majesty's Government to carry out their obligations under the Mandate." <sup>59</sup>

The Government appears to have been in a quandary. British public opinion had been aroused even before the publication of

58. *Ibid.*, p. 83.

59. Royal Institute of International Affairs, *Great Britain and Palestine, 1915-1939*, p. 43.

the Report. A letter appeared in *The Times* on December 20, 1929, over the signatures of Lord Balfour, Mr. Lloyd George and General Smuts—members of the War Cabinet which had issued the Balfour Declaration—in which it was proposed that a special commission be appointed to implement the Mandate. In response to this, the Prime Minister, Ramsay MacDonald, assured the House of Commons several days later, December 23, 1929, that matters of major policy were definitely “outside the terms of reference of the Shaw Commission, and cannot be made a part of its Report.” He repeated this assertion on March 24th, a week before the publication of the Report of the Commission. Nevertheless, all the signs pointed to the contrary and on April 2nd the uneasiness of pro-Zionist British leaders found expression in another letter to *The Times* written by Lord Cecil, Mr. Malcolm MacDonald and others, urging the Government “to reaffirm the adherence of Britain to the letter and spirit of the Mandate.” On the following day, April 3, 1930, the Prime Minister made a statement in the House of Commons. He said that the Government was studying the Shaw Commission’s recommendations and was in the meantime providing adequate police forces to insure public security.<sup>60</sup>

On the question of policy he confined himself to general statements reiterating two points: 1) that the Mandate constituted an international obligation from which there can be no receding, and 2) that a double undertaking was involved, to the Jewish people on the one hand, and to the non-Jewish population of Palestine on the other. The main paragraphs of his statement are:<sup>61</sup>

His Majesty’s Government will continue to administer Palestine in accordance with the terms of the Mandate as approved by the Council of the League of Nations. That is an international obligation from which there can be no question of receding.

Under the terms of the Mandate, His Majesty’s Government are responsible for promoting “the establishment in Palestine of a na-

60. Between January and March the Palestine Police Force was re-organized under the supervision of Mr. (now Sir Herbert) Dowbiggin of the Ceylon Police. Substantial increases were made in the British personnel and steps were taken to protect exposed Jewish settlements. *Ibid.*, p. 44.

61. Great Britain, *Parliamentary Debates, Commons, Fifth Series*, Vol. 313, cols. 1313-1324.

tional home for the Jewish people, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which might prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country."

A double undertaking is involved to the Jewish people on the one hand, and to the non-Jewish population of Palestine on the other; and it is the firm resolve of His Majesty's Government to give effect, in equal measure, to both parts of the Declaration and to do equal justice to all sections of the populations of Palestine. That is a duty from which they will not shrink, and to the discharge of which they will apply all the resources at their command.

Faced by conflicting pressures, the Government evidently decided to delay a general statement of policy until it had received a report on economic conditions and potentialities of Palestine. For this purpose, Sir John Hope Simpson, a retired Indian Civil Service servant and a member of the League of Nations Commission for the Resettlement of Greek Refugees, was appointed on May 6, 1930. The direction toward which the Government was tending is indicated by their action a week later when an immigration schedule of 3,300 labor certificates sanctioned by the Palestinian Administration on May 12th was suspended.<sup>62</sup> It was stated that the issuance of these certificates had been delayed as a temporary measure with a view to insuring that immigration in the intervening period, pending the publication of Hope Simpson's Report, should not be such as to endanger the economic future of the country.<sup>63</sup> The schedule had been suspended two days after the Arab statement referred to above, and the Jews viewed it as an act of appeasement to the Arabs.

The bias of the Government was revealed, also, in a preliminary statement of policy issued on May 27th, which appeared in the form of a speech to be delivered before the Permanent Mandates Commission. It was announced that the recommendations of the Shaw Commission were being favorably viewed; that proposals for a temporary suspension of immigration were being considered; that legislation to prevent expropriation of the rural population was to be introduced; and that the non-governmental status of the Jewish Agency

62. Kisch, *op. cit.*, pp. 292 ff.

63. *Report of the Executive to the Zionist XVIIth Congress, 1931*, p. 166.

would be reaffirmed. These propositions, the Government indicated, would be included in a statement to be issued on the basis of Hope Simpson's report. This declaration, which suggested conclusions in harmony with those of the Shaw Commission and with the major Arab demands, supported the view of the Jewish leaders that the case had been prejudged and that Hope Simpson's report was meant to be merely confirmatory.

At the Seventeenth Session of the Permanent Mandates Commission held in June, 1930, the Palestine question was considered. The Commission had before it various documents which included the *Report of the Shaw Commission*, the *Statement of His Majesty's Government*, the *Memorandum of the Jewish Agency*, and the *Memorandum of the Vaad Leumi*. The Permanent Mandates Commission rejected the conclusion of the Shaw Commission—that the outbreak was unpremeditated and expressed its doubt "whether the kindly judgment passed by the majority of the Commission of Enquiry upon the attitude of the Arab leaders, both political and religious, was fully justified by the report of the enquiry." It also took exception to the view that the outbreak was not directly against the British authority: "All the declarations by persons and organizations representing the Arab section tend to emphasize the fact that the Arab movement was a movement of resistance to the policy of the Mandatory Power solely in its capacity as mandatory." It held that with a reasonable degree of foresight many of the incidents that caused the outbreak could have been avoided.

Its major conclusion was that the Mandatory Power had not done enough to fulfill the purposes of the Mandate. "It is quite clear that . . . the Jewish National Home, so far as it has been established, has in practice been the work of the Jewish organization . . . The mandate seemed to offer other prospects to the Jews." Similarly, not enough had been done for Arab development. The Arab element in the population might have felt its interests better safeguarded if the Government had pursued a policy of agricultural development through the organization of agricultural credit, the promotion of cooperative societies and an organization of educational work to familiarize the *fellahin* with modern methods of working the soil. While such a developmental program might not have al-

together eliminated antagonism, nevertheless it would have probably diminished its force and laid the basis for a successful fulfillment of the purposes of the Mandate.

The objects of the Mandate which were involved in the present controversy, the Permanent Mandates Commission formulated in terms of two major purposes: the establishment of the Jewish national home; the establishment of self-governing institutions. It pointed out that the Mandate fixed no time limit for the accomplishment of these objects and that this was only common sense, since their achievement depended on numerous circumstances. The establishment of the Jewish national home was dependent upon many economic factors and "that political maturity without which the winning of complete *de jure* independence by a people is a mere illusion," could not be attained except in the process of time.

The Permanent Mandates Commission warned against yielding to any demands put forth by those who did not accept the Mandate which was the fundamental charter of the country, and in this connection declared as follows:<sup>64</sup>

To all sections of the population which are rebelling against the Mandate, whether they object to it on principle or wish to retain only those of its provisions which favour their particular cause, the Mandatory Power must obviously return a definite and categorical refusal. As long as the leaders of a community persist in repudiating what is at once the fundamental charter of the country and, as far as the Mandatory Power is concerned, an international obligation which it is not free to set aside, the negotiations would only unduly enhance their prestige and raise dangerous hopes among their partisans and apprehensions amongst their opponents.

## THE HOPE SIMPSON REPORT AND THE PASSFIELD WHITE PAPER

John Hope Simpson reached Palestine on May 20, 1930, and spent a little over two months there studying reports submitted to him and visiting the Arab villages and Jewish settlements. His instructions were "to examine on the spot the questions of immigration, land settlement and development." His major effort was expended on the problem of agriculture, evi-

64. League of Nations, Permanent Mandates Commission, *Minutes of the Seventeenth (Extraordinary) Session*, p. 148.



dently because it was—and perhaps on the theory that it ought to remain—the predominant aspect of the Palestine economy. Among the problems he studied were: the cultivable area of Palestine, the traditional system of land tenure, the Jewish methods of land purchase and settlement, the position of the *fellah* and the effect on him of the Jewish activity and development. He also gave attention to the development of Palestine industry, particularly to the effect of Jewish development on Arab unemployment in the cities. The report was submitted on August 22, 1930, some three weeks after Hope Simpson left Palestine. It was published on October 20th; along with it came the statement of policy called the Passfield White Paper. Since the White Paper is based on Simpson's report, it is appropriate first to summarize the conclusions of the latter.

### *The Hope Simpson Report*

On the question of the total area of Palestine, Hope Simpson accepted the figure supplied by the Director of Surveys of Palestine which was in general agreement with the views of the Jewish authorities and other expert opinion. In accordance with this, the total area of Palestine is about 10,100 square miles, or 26,158,000 dunams. Of this, the area of the Beer Sheba sub-district and the southern desert was, in accordance with the revised estimate of the Director of Surveys, 11,872,000 dunams, and the area of the rest of Palestine in which the Jewish settlements are distributed was 14,286,000 dunams.<sup>65</sup> Dividing the country into its natural divisions, the distribution is roughly as follows: a) the Hill Country of Galilee, Samaria and Judea—8,862,000 dunams; b) the Five Plains (Maritime, Acre, Huleh, Esdraelon and Jordan Valley)—5,424,000 dunams; c) Beer Sheba area—3,200,000 dunams, and the southern desert—8,672,000 dunams.

Hope Simpson's figures thus agreed with the usual estimates as to the total area of Palestine, and differed only slightly on the subdivisions. However, in estimating the cultivable area as distinct from the total area of Palestine, Hope Simpson arrived at a figure much smaller than all former estimates, including that of the Government and the Jewish experts. By means of a novel method of survey by aeroplane, he came to

65. John Hope Simpson, *Palestine, Report on Immigration, Land Settlement and Development*, Cmd. 3686, London, 1930, Appendix 3, p. 159.

the conclusion that the Hill Country contained only 2,450,000 metric dunams of cultivable land instead of 5,376,000 metric dunams estimated a short time previously by the Commissioner of Lands. This low estimate of the cultivable area of the Hill Country, together with other smaller deductions, brought down the estimated total cultivable area of Palestine to 6,544,000 metric dunams, which was about 40 percent of the previous estimate of 10,592,000 dunams, arrived at a few months earlier by the Commissioner of Lands. This figure did not include Beer Sheba which he estimated at 1,500,000 cultivable dunams as against the Land Commissioner's 1,641,000 dunams.

The figure of 6,544,000 dunams became basic for Simpson's conclusions. Deducting from this amount the area of about 1,000,000 dunams already acquired by the Jews, he arrived at the conclusion that there was not enough land in Palestine to maintain the existing Arab rural population on a decent standard of living. According to his estimate, the minimum required for the support of an Arab family was at least 130 dunams, while the amount of land available for the Arabs, divided by the total number of families, would give an average of about 90 dunams. Thus, in accordance with Hope Simpson's estimate, the Arab cultivator in Palestine did not have the *lot viable* required for minimum subsistence. Besides this, on the basis of a Government report, he concluded that 29.4 percent of the Arabs living in rural communities were "landless," i.e., they lived not by cultivating the soil but by other forms of labor either in or outside of the village. He assumed that a portion of these "landless men" were previously cultivators.

His concluding chapter began with the following statement:<sup>66</sup>

It has emerged quite definitely that there is at the present time and with the present methods of Arab cultivation no margin of land available for agricultural settlement by new immigrants, with the exception of such undeveloped land as the various Jewish Agencies hold in reserve.

. . . It is an error to imagine that the Government is in possession of large areas of vacant lands which could be made available for Jewish settlement. In fact free areas are negligible in extent.

66. *Ibid.*, p. 141.

The Government claims considerable areas which are occupied and cultivated by Arabs. Even were the title of the Government admitted, and it is in many cases disputed, it would not be feasible to make those areas available for settlement in view of the impossibility of finding other lands on which to place the Arab cultivators.

Moreover, he found the Arab cultivator in a deplorable condition: in addition to lacking enough land he had no capital, he was heavily in debt, his rent was rising, he paid heavy taxes, and the rate of interest on his loans was incredibly high. The Arab peasant was for the most part illiterate, and did not know how to take advantage of modern methods. The Government had done little to help him. The Jewish settlers, on the other hand, "have had every advantage that capital, science and organization can give them."<sup>67</sup> Moreover, the Arab population "has increased with great rapidity and the land available for its sustenance has meanwhile decreased by about one million metric dunams, which have passed into the hands of the Jews."

The methods of land purchase and settlement employed by the Zionist Organization, the *Keren Kayemeth*, the *Keren Hayesod* and the Palestine Land Development Company diminish the possibilities of further development by the Arab portion of the population. The Jewish authorities "have nothing with which to reproach themselves"<sup>68</sup>—for they have paid high prices for the land and spent considerable amounts to compensate former Arab tenants, which they were legally not bound to do. Nevertheless, the purchase agreements of these organizations provide for the employment of Jewish labor only and for the inalienability of lands that once pass into the hands of the Jewish national organizations. Thus the land in Palestine is being gradually extraterritorialized as far as the Arab is concerned, and he is deprived of employment on the lands which he formerly worked. Hope Simpson's feeling found expression in the following paragraphs:<sup>69</sup>

The above-quoted provisions sufficiently illustrate the Zionist policy with regard to the Arabs in their colonies. Attempts are constantly being made to establish the advantage which Jewish settlement has brought to the Arab. The most lofty sentiments are ventilated at

67. *Ibid.*, p. 142.

68. *Ibid.*, p. 51.

69. *Ibid.*, pp. 54, 56.

public meetings and in Zionist propaganda. At the time of the Zionist Congress in 1921 a resolution was passed which "solemnly declared the desire of the Jewish people to live with the Arab people in relations of friendship and mutual respect, and, together with the Arab people, to develop the homeland common to both into a prosperous community which would ensure the growth of the peoples." This resolution is frequently quoted in proof of the excellent sentiments which Zionism cherishes towards the people of Palestine. The provisions quoted above, which are included in legal documents binding on every settler in a Zionist colony, are not compatible with the sentiments publicly expressed.

The present position, precluding any employment of Arabs in the Zionist colonies, is undesirable from the point of view both of justice and of the good government of the country. As long as these provisions exist in the Constitution of the Zionist Organization, in the lease of the Keren-Kayemeth and in the agreement of the Keren-Hayesod it cannot be regarded as desirable that large areas of land should be transferred to the Jewish National Fund. It is impossible to view with equanimity the extension of an enclave in Palestine from which all Arabs are excluded. The Arab population already regards the transfer of lands to Zionist hands with dismay and alarm. These cannot be dismissed as baseless in the light of the Zionist policy which is described above.

He exempts the Palestine Jewish Colonization Association (PICA) from this drastic charge. He takes the view that the cases where Jewish authorities have established the advantageous effect of Jewish colonization on the Arab relate to colonies established by the PICA organization before the *Keren Hayesod* came into existence. He praises these colonies particularly because they employ a large contingent of Arab labor and he believes that in these cases "the relations between the colonists and their Arab neighbors were excellent."<sup>70</sup> In sharp contrast, he attacks the General Federation of Jewish Labor in Palestine, which dominates the Jewish policy in the colonization work of the Zionist Organization. He knows the arguments usually put forward by the Federation: that the Jews are contributing funds for the settlement of Jews in Palestine, and that these funds would never have been given for the purpose of supporting Arab labor; that it was the business of the Zionist Organization to bring in as many Jews to

70. *Ibid.*, p. 50.

Palestine as possible and if the places were taken by Arabs, there would be so many Jews less; that if agricultural labor were left to the competition of an open market, the standard of living of the Jewish laborer would be liable to fall to the low standard of the Arab. Recognizing the validity of these arguments from the purely Jewish point of view, he nevertheless holds that: "The principles of the persistent and deliberate boycott of Arab labour in the Zionist colonies is not only contrary to the provisions . . . of the Mandate, but it is in addition a constant and increasing source of danger to the country." <sup>71</sup>

Despite his pessimistic view of the extent of the cultivable area of Palestine, and despite his grave charges against the methods of Jewish development, Hope Simpson concluded with a constructive suggestion and a hopeful attitude. The main part of his conclusion was devoted to expounding the idea that a solution of the apparently conflicting duties of the Mandatory Power would be found only through a carefully planned system of intensive agricultural development for both Arabs and Jews. "There can be no doubt that the systematic and methodical development over a series of years will change the whole aspect of agricultural Palestine, and admit of a largely increased population." <sup>72</sup> Favorable conditions for intensive cultivation were to be found particularly in certain areas of the Maritime Plain and in the Beisan District. He stated it as his personal belief that with a thorough development of the country there would be room in Palestine for not less than 20,000 families of new settlers, and it would also be possible to raise the standard of living of the present population to a higher level. <sup>73</sup> This estimate did not take into consideration the Beer Sheba area which lacked an adequate supply of water. If water were found and irrigation developed, Beer Sheba offered an inexhaustible supply of cultivable land which would make easy the solution of the agricultural problem in Palestine. <sup>74</sup>

As to the possibilities of industrial development, however, Hope Simpson was not at all encouraging. He threw a wet blanket on the ideas suggested by the Jewish Agency, that

71. *Ibid.*, p. 55.

72. *Ibid.*, p. 144.

73. *Ibid.*, p. 153.

74. *Ibid.*, p. 20.

Jewish capital, energy and skill could provide an industrial development in Palestine which would make it an important center of commerce and production in the Near East. In the memorandum of the Jewish Agency submitted to him, it had been urged that immigration was in itself a factor in economic development. The fundamental questions in the industrial development of Palestine, it was stated, were not where raw materials were to be obtained or where the markets would be—admittedly important factors—but whether there were Jews in sufficient number prepared to immigrate into Palestine, who would bring with them sufficient capital and business experience if they were encouraged, or at least not discouraged; and whether there were other Jews ready to come to Palestine to supply the skilled and unskilled labor required.

Hope Simpson thought it was a dangerous thing to base the future of Palestine on such intangibles as the human factor and the unknown results of a future Jewish industry in Palestine. He saw no great prospects for a textile industry on the grand scale proposed in the Zionist memorandum, particularly with labor paid at the rates fixed by the General Federation of Jewish Labor. Industry so organized would not be able to compete with the mills of Japan and Bombay which, despite employment of cheap labor, found it impossible to market their goods. While the establishment of industries might offer a temporary mode of employment for the Jewish immigrant, he saw no sound basis in it for a government policy. His view was that industrial development should proceed slowly, utilizing local products. Imported raw materials might be used where the industries already established showed special vitality. He pointed out that indigenous Arab industries existed and that these should be encouraged.

He was inclined to believe that the development of modern methods was causing a certain degree of unemployment among the Arab artisans and laborers. He cited motor transport, largely in the hands of the Jews, as driving the camel and the donkey off the roads, and with them the Arab camel driver and the Arab donkey-man. Another example was the increased use of cement and silicate brick manufactured by Jews, which was replacing dressed stone and similarly diminishing the amount of work left for stone-dressers, stone-masons, and quarrymen. He gave credence to reports made to him by Miss

Margaret Nixon, a Government welfare worker, and by a British police officer who stated that there was a large degree of unemployment among the Arab artisans. Here, too, the Jewish labor policy of the General Federation of Jewish Labor came in for drastic criticism as being a factor in causing Arab unemployment in the cities as well as in the rural communities.

He laid down the principle that in estimating the Jewish labor schedule in the future, the Government ought to take into consideration unemployment among Arabs as well as among Jews. Moreover, the general likelihood of unemployment ought to be considered rather than the amount of unemployment in any half year. In his opinion it was wrong to admit Jews from Poland, Lithuania or Yemen to fill existing vacancies while there were non-Jewish workmen in Palestine capable of filling them. There was, however, one exception, which he was willing to allow, i.e., in the case of opportunities provided by the importation of Jewish capital. In such cases, it was clearly not to the advantage of the Arab population to prevent Jewish capital from entering the country. The Arabs certainly could not lose by this; on the contrary, they might be better off because of the "derived demand," i.e., "the expenditure of that capital on wages to Jewish workmen will cause, ultimately, a demand for the services of a portion of the Arab unemployed." <sup>75</sup>

Finally, coming to the question of immigration, he justified the order of suspension which had been issued in May on the grounds that there were signs of an economic crisis. In his opinion, both Jewish and Arab unemployment were on the increase and further immigration would lead to a reduction of the standard of living among the Arab laboring class. He made the following recommendations for the better control of immigration:

*Preparation of Labor Immigration Schedules:* The labor schedules should be prepared by representatives of the Jewish Agency in consultation with the Government Immigration Department; and with the help of non-official persons acquainted with the economic position of Palestine.

*Immigration Officer in Towns Abroad:* A representative of the Government Immigration Department should be stationed at each of

75. *Ibid.*, p. 136.

the points from which immigrants to Palestine were coming in order to supervise the distribution of labor certificates at the source.

*Expulsion of Illicit Immigrants:* In the case of illicit entry into Palestine, the entrant should "invariably be returned to the country whence he came," and the same procedure should be followed in the case of "pseudo-travelers" who overstay the term of their visas.

*Registration of Unemployment and Labor Exchanges:* Steps should be taken to create machinery for the registration of Arab unemployment and in this connection Government employment exchanges should be created.

*Separate Department of Immigration, Travel and Labor:* The immigration office which is now a section of the Police Department should be constituted a separate department.

The following represent some of the major recommendations designed to improve agriculture in Palestine.

*Acceleration of Land Settlement and Securing Occupancy Rights:* The work of land settlement, i.e., the recording of ownership and the registering of tenancies should be accelerated. Legislation should be introduced to secure the tenant against increases in rent and protect him from ejection in case of the sale of land over his head.

*Partition of Mushaa Holdings:* The *mushaa* system of holding land in common which is generally recognized as being the curse of Arab agriculture should be abolished and the land should be partitioned into permanent individual holdings.

*Redistribution of Taxes:* Agricultural taxation should be reformed by suspending the tithe and redistributing the burden of taxation so that it will fall in accordance with the financial ability of the taxpayer.

*Irrigation and Hydrographic Survey:* Large scale irrigation works should be developed, a hydrographic survey of Palestine should be undertaken and legislation should be passed to regulate present methods of irrigation. Control of all irrigable water should remain with the Government and all surplus water above that on which rights have already been established should become Government property.

*Cooperation and Coordination:* Cooperation between Jews and Arabs in agriculture and industry should be encouraged. The encouragement of Arab cooperatives, particularly of credit cooperative societies is an important feature in development. Furthermore, the development schemes of the Jewish Agencies should be coordinated with those of the Government. It might prove feasible to combine



these two schemes of development in certain areas into one economical plan.

*Agricultural Services and Agricultural Education:* Agricultural services should be on a larger scale: services in fisheries and sericulture should be expanded and distribution of trees at low cost should be generous. Agricultural demonstration plots should be instituted and agricultural education intensified. In the work of scientific research, Government should coordinate its activities with the Jewish Agency and the Hebrew University.

*Increase of Budget for General Education:* The budget for elementary education should be greatly increased, particularly for rural districts. It is useless to expect the Arab to benefit from agricultural education unless he has previously received elementary education. The village schoolmasters should be given short courses at the agricultural school which would enable them to conduct school gardens and demonstration plots.

### *The 1930 Statement of Policy*

At the same time that the Government published Sir John Hope Simpson's Report, it issued the promised Statement of Policy which became known as the Passfield White Paper. Despite Hope Simpson's sharp criticism of the policy of Jewish land purchasing agencies and of the "self-labor" principle maintained by the Federation of Jewish Labor, his Report had the redeeming feature of outlining a constructive program for the development of Palestine. Had this been fairly carried out, it would have redounded to the growth of the Jewish national home as well as to the improvement of the standard of life of the Arab cultivator and worker. The Passfield White Paper, however, emphasized the restrictive elements in Hope Simpson's recommendations of land settlement and immigration, and limited the development plan to raising the standard of the Arab *fellah*. Besides, it was permeated with an unfriendly attitude toward the Zionist Organization, attacking the Jews for having failed to assist the Government in its attempt at a fair implementation of the Mandate. Although it gave the Arabs the same verbal lashing for failure to cooperate with the Government as it did to the Jews, in its practical suggestions the Statement emphasized such elements of the "dual obligation" of His Majesty's Government which curtailed the Jewish national home and favored the Arab demands.

The 1930 Statement of Policy reaffirmed the intention of

His Majesty's Government to continue to administer Palestine in accordance with the terms of the Mandate as approved by the Council of the League of Nations. It rehearsed the Prime Minister's previous declaration that: "That is an international obligation from which there can be no question of receding"; it also called to attention the other statement of the Prime Minister, made at the same time, that "a double undertaking is involved, to the Jewish people on the one hand, and to the non-Jewish population of Palestine on the other." The statement laid the emphasis on the equal weight of the obligation to Arabs and Jews. It recognized the importance of cooperation and consultation between the Palestine Administration and the Jewish Agency, but stressed the fact that the special position of the Jewish Agency in offering advice did not entitle it to share in the Government of Palestine. It indicated the necessity of instituting machinery to ensure that the interests of the non-Jewish section of the community should be fully safeguarded, and of giving opportunity, similar to that afforded to the Jewish Agency, to the non-Jewish sections for consultation with the Palestine Administration. In this and in other points, e.g., the meaning of the expressions "the Jewish national home" and the "economic absorptive capacity," the Passfield White Paper claimed to base itself on the Churchill White Paper of 1922.

Proceeding to practical problems, its major recommendations roughly fell under three heads. *Security*: The Government had accepted recommendations made by Mr. Dowbiggin who had been sent to Palestine to report on the organization of the Palestine police force. Substantial increases were being made in the British personnel and special steps taken to protect exposed Jewish settlements. Two British infantry battalions were to be retained in Palestine, two squadrons of aircraft and four sections of armored cars for the security of Palestine and Trans-Jordan. *Constitutional Development*: Despite the fact that practical efforts to establish a Legislative Council had failed due to the refusal of the Arab population to cooperate, His Majesty's Government, after careful consideration, had decided "that the time has now come when the important question of the establishment of a measure of self-government in Palestine must, in the interests of the community as a whole, be taken in hand without further delay." A

Legislative Council generally along the lines indicated in the Churchill White Paper of 1922 would be set up. The cooperation of all sections of the population would be invited, but His Majesty's Government was determined to carry through the organization of the Legislative Council with or without the consent of any particular community. The High Commissioner would have the authority to appoint unofficial members as spokesmen for the communities which failed to elect representatives.

The third aspect dealt with was *Economic and Social Development*, including land policy, agricultural settlement and immigration. On these questions the conclusions of Hope Simpson's Report were closely followed. The White Paper repeated verbatim Sir John's statement to the effect that under present methods of Arab cultivation there were no reserves of land available for Jewish settlement and that it was an error to suppose that the Palestine Government has large areas of vacant land which can be made available for Jewish colonization. Also, in the matter of the effect of Jewish settlement on the Arab population, it reflected Hope Simpson's skeptical attitude and repeated his invidious distinctions between the activities of the Zionist Organization and the PICA:<sup>76</sup>

It would be unjust to accept the contention, which has been advanced in the course of the controversy regarding relations between Jews and Arabs in Palestine, that the effect of Jewish settlement upon the Arab population has in all cases been detrimental to the interests of the Arabs. This is by no means wholly true, but it is necessary in considering this aspect of the problem to differentiate between colonisation by such bodies as the Palestine Jewish Colonisation Association (commonly known as the P.I.C.A.) and colonisation under Zionist auspices.

The White Paper pointed out that the condition of the Arab *fellah* left much to be desired and that a policy of land development was needed if any improvement in his living condition was to be effected. It also recognized that such a policy of development was necessary for the fulfillment of the Mandatory obligation to encourage close settlement of the Jews on the land, subject to the condition that the position of the non-

76. *Palestine: Statement of Policy by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom*, Cmd. 3692, 1930, p. 17.

Jewish section of the population should not be prejudiced. It pointed out that the Jewish organizations were in possession of large reservations of land which could be used for development and it implied that in the immediate future the major task of the Government would be to assist agricultural development of the Arabs. During the period of proposed development, all disposition of land would of necessity rest with the authority in charge of development and transfers of land would be permitted only in so far as they did not interfere with that authority.

The Statement pointed out that the improvement of agricultural conditions in Palestine would take time and involve considerable expenditure. It emphasized the fact that the general policy of His Majesty's Government was that Palestine should be self-supporting. The finances of Palestine had been severely strained by the necessity of providing for large increases in the defense force. These increases were essential and it was not possible to forecast when the expenditure on this account would be reduced. Such reduction, it was pointed out, would depend upon the extent of the improvement in mutual relations between the Arabs and the Jews. The implication, therefore, was that the development plan must be limited in scope and could be implemented only gradually. Taken together with the emphasis on the great need of helping the Arab peasant, this insistence, and the lack of funds created the impression that while in theory the Government recognized the need of Jewish development, in practice it expected to limit itself to the settlement of Arab families.

On the question of immigration likewise the Statement adhered closely to the conclusion of Hope Simpson with its strictures on the part played by the General Federation of Labor in influencing the character of immigration and on the need of greater control, to insure that Jewish immigration would not cause Arab unemployment. It laid down the principle that the economic capacity of the country to absorb new immigrants must be judged in relationship to the position of Palestine as a whole in accordance with possibilities of permanent, as against temporary, employment. Its view on future Jewish immigration was that:<sup>77</sup>

77. *Ibid.*, p. 22.

Any hasty decision in regard to more unrestricted Jewish immigration is to be strongly deprecated, not only from the point of view of the interests of the Palestine population as a whole, but even from the special point of view of the Jewish community. So long as widespread suspicion exists, and it does exist, amongst the Arab population, that the economic depression, under which they undoubtedly suffer at present, is largely due to excessive Jewish immigration, and so long as some grounds exist upon which this suspicion may be plausibly represented to be well founded, there can be little hope of any improvement in the mutual relations of the two races. But it is upon such improvement that the future peace and prosperity of Palestine must largely depend.

Preceding the issuance of the White Paper, the Zionist leaders had been in touch with the Colonial Office, but they were not fully informed of the Government's intention. The draft of the new statement of policy was shown to them only shortly before its publication. Two days earlier Weizmann had tried to see Lord Passfield, but he was told that the Colonial Secretary no longer had authority to alter the terms of the Declaration to be made. Thereupon Weizmann wrote to him that the White Paper went far towards "denying the rights and sterilizing the hopes of the Jewish people in regard to the Jewish National Home in Palestine," so far as it was in the power of the Government to do so, and that it aimed at "crystallizing the development of the Jewish National Home at its present state."<sup>78</sup> On October 21st, the day after the publication of the White Paper, Weizmann resigned from the presidency of the Jewish Agency and the Zionist Organization, in "emphatic protest against a one-sided and unjust criticism of our work, and my refusal to accept a policy which is in direct contradiction to the solemn promise of the British Nation and the text of the Mandate."<sup>79</sup>

Dr. Weizmann's resignation was followed by that of Mr. Felix Warburg from the Jewish Agency Administrative Committee, and that of Lord Melchett from the chairmanship of the Council. Baron Edmond de Rothschild expressed entire approval of the action taken by the Jewish bodies. Lord Melchett declared: "The grotesque travesty of the purpose of the

<sup>78</sup> *New Judaea*, October, 1930, p. 33.

<sup>79</sup> *Report of the Executive to the XVIIth Zionist Congress*, pp. 170 ff.

Mandate given in the Government's Paper can only be described as an insult to the intelligence of Jewry and a deliberate affront to the Mandates Commission."<sup>80</sup> Dr. Stephen S. Wise characterized the White Paper as a "great betrayal" and in collaboration with Jacob de Haas prepared an analysis and indictment of Passfield's action.<sup>81</sup> The Zionist bodies both in England and America supported Weizmann's protests. The General Council of the National Council of the Jews of Palestine, the *Vaad Leumi*, presented a memorandum of protest to Sir John Chancellor and announced that it would refuse to participate in the proposed Legislative Council. Even the *Brith Shalom*, a Palestinian group of Jewish intellectuals, of which Magnes and Ruppin were prominent members, and which had worked for Jewish-Arab cooperation along the lines of binationalism, let it be known that under the terms of the White Paper its program was no longer practicable.<sup>82</sup>

British statesmen also joined in demanding a reconsideration of the policy indicated by Passfield. Two days after the Paper was issued, Smuts telegraphed to the Prime Minister urging an immediate repudiation. The Conservative leaders, Stanley Baldwin, Sir Austin Chamberlain and Leopold S. Amery wrote a letter to *The Times*,<sup>83</sup> in which they charged that the Government, "without giving either Jewish or Arab opinion an opportunity to express itself or allowing the voice of Parliament to be heard," had laid down a policy contrary to the views of the Council of the League of Nations, in conflict with the whole spirit of the Balfour Declaration, and in violation of the terms of the Mandate. These protests of individual statesmen were accompanied by attacks on Passfield and the Government's policy in both houses of Parliament. Harry Snell and Joseph Kenworthy of the Labor Party were among the prominent dissenters from the Government policy. Sir Herbert Samuel, known for his moderation as well as for his knowledge of Palestine, joined in the attack.<sup>84</sup>

Alarmed by the reaction, the Government began to explain

80. *Ibid.*, October 22, 1930.

81. Stephen S. Wise and Jacob de Haas, *The Great Betrayal*, Brentano's, 1930.

82. *The Times*, October 24, 1930.

83. October 23, 1930.

84. Hanna, *op. cit.*, p. 106.

away the anti-Zionist implications of its statement. MacDonald assured Smuts that there was no intention of crystallizing the Zionist settlement at its existing stage of development.<sup>85</sup> On October 28th, the Prime Minister told Parliament that the Government's statement was intended to mark no change of policy from the position of former governments and that the terms of the Mandate would be strictly observed.<sup>86</sup> On November 4th, Lord Hailsham and Sir John Simon published a letter attacking the Passfield Paper on legal grounds, urging that the proposals restricting land sales and immigration would violate the terms of the Mandate and urging that immediate steps be taken to obtain through the agency of the Council of the League of Nations an opinion from The Hague Court, and that the British Government should not enforce the paragraphs challenged until the Court had rendered an opinion.<sup>87</sup> On November 6th, Passfield replied through a letter published in *The Times*, in which he denied that immigration would be completely suspended or that the intention was to prohibit Jewish labor immigration merely on the basis of any Arab unemployment. On the other hand, in the Parliamentary debate on November 17th, Drummond Shiels endeavored to defend the Passfield White Paper by insisting that the theory of the double undertaking expounded in it rested on the Churchill White Paper. He was forced to say that the Churchill White Paper would be interpreted in the same way as it had been in the past, but the answers he gave to concrete questions did not reassure the pro-Zionist forces.

### *The Jewish Agency Analysis*

At this point we may consider the Jewish objections to the Passfield White Paper as stated in a *Memorandum* issued in November, 1930. In the introduction it summarizes objections under five heads:<sup>88</sup>

(1) The White Paper misrepresents and misinterprets the Mandate.

85. *The Times*, October 27, 1930.

86. Great Britain, *Parliamentary Debates, Commons*, Fifth Series, Vol. 244, col. 24.

87. *The Times*, November 4, 1930.

88. Leonard Stein, *The Palestine White Paper of October, 1930*, Memorandum of the Jewish Agency for Palestine, London, 1930, p. 4.

(2) It lays down principles which in vital particulars modify, to the disadvantage of the Jews, the policy embodied in the White Paper of 1922, and which are incompatible with the normal development of the Jewish National Home as contemplated in the Mandate.

(3) Though it purports to be based on the Report of Sir John Hope Simpson, it gives a false impression of his findings on a number of important points, and, while emphasizing those features of the Report which can be turned to the disadvantage of the Jews, fails to bring out the true nature of the constructive proposals which are the essence of Sir John Hope Simpson's final recommendations.

(4) While ostensibly designed to promote "cordial cooperation between the Jews, the Arabs and the Government," it loses no opportunity of introducing injurious, and in some cases quite irrelevant allegations, of which the effect, if not the purpose, can only be to discredit the Jewish Agency, to disparage Jewish achievements in Palestine, and to encourage the ill-disposed elements of the Arab population.

(5) Quite apart from its specific proposals (which are, indeed, so vague, confused and ambiguous that it is not easy to be sure of their precise significance), the White Paper is conceived in a spirit which is not that of a Government seriously interested in the establishment of the Jewish National Home, and conscious of having in this regard responsibilities implying, not merely a reluctant and grudging acquiescence, but active and positive cooperation.

In elaborating the argument that the White Paper misrepresents the Mandate, the *Memorandum* quotes the extract from the Report of the Permanent Mandates Commission which the White Paper had stated to be the basis of their insistence that a dual undertaking was involved. The pronouncement of the Permanent Mandates Commission in question had stated:<sup>89</sup>

(1) that the obligations laid down by the Mandate in regard to the two sections of the population are of equal weight; (2) that the two obligations imposed on the Mandatory are in no sense irreconcilable. The Jewish Agency accepts this formulation of the obligation, but points out that the statement as mentioned in the White Paper does not define what the two obligations are. It calls attention to the fact that the Permanent Mandates Commission indicated that the major obligations involved were: (1) placing the country under such conditions as will secure the establishment of the Jewish national home, and (2) the development of self-governing institutions.

89. *Ibid.*, p. 8.



The White Paper had suppressed the emphasis on the first point while proceeding to an immediate implementation of the second obligation, despite the fact that the Permanent Mandates Commission at the same session had stated in strong terms that as long as the leaders of one part of the community persisted in repudiating the fundamental charter of the country, negotiations with them must be rejected. It was the contention of the Jewish Agency that the White Paper contradicted the League of Nations' interpretation of the Mandate. The White Paper implied that the undertaking to the Jews was an obligation confined to the local Jewish inhabitants, as one of the two sections of the population of Palestine. The Mandate as confirmed by the Council of the League of Nations clearly stated that the obligation to the Jews referred to the Jewish people as a whole. The White Paper was therefore giving a distorted interpretation of the real significance of the Mandate when it implied that what was involved was mainly a question of balancing the interests of one section of the population of Palestine as against another.

The Agency *Memorandum* went on to point out that the last part of Article 2 of the Mandate on which the second part of the dual obligation—that to the Arabs—is made to rest, namely, the clause “safeguarding the civil and religious rights of all the inhabitants of Palestine,” in reality makes no special reference to Arabs, and simply implies the assurance that the Mandatory shall not discriminate in favor of persons of any one religion or race. This interpretation is supported by a decision rendered by the highest court in the British Empire, made on February 16, 1926, which states:<sup>90</sup>

In their Lordships' opinion, the key to the true purpose and meaning of the sentence quoted from Article 2 of the Mandate is to be found in the . . . words . . . ‘irrespective of race and religion,’ and the purpose of the Article is to secure that in fulfilling the duty which is incumbent upon every Government to safeguard the rights from time to time belonging to the inhabitants of the territory, the Mandatory shall not discriminate in favour of persons of any one religion or race.

The *Memorandum* noted that “it is characteristic of the White Paper that while it is at pains to analyze the Manda-

90. *Ibid.*, p. 13.

tory's obligations in respect of the non-Jewish population of Palestine, it attempts no corresponding analysis of its obligations in respect of the Jewish National Home." <sup>91</sup> On the question of constitutional reform, the Jewish Agency indicated that while they had been disposed to cooperate in the past, the attitude of the Arabs and of the Government had forced it to change its position. "The Jewish Agency could not but view with grave misgivings the establishment, as a sequel to the recent disturbances, of a Legislative Council in which the Jews would be hopelessly outnumbered, coupled with the announcement by His Majesty's Government of a policy which . . . reinterprets the Mandate in a manner highly prejudicial to Jewish interests in the vital matters of land settlement and immigration." <sup>92</sup>

The *Memorandum* of the Jewish Agency stressed that the White Paper gave an unfavorable interpretation of the Churchill Statement of 1922 on which it purported to be based. The earlier document was itself in its time "a somewhat chilly announcement," and did not correspond with the hopes held out to the Jewish people by the Balfour Declaration, but it was loyally accepted by the Zionist Executive as a basis of policy. The present White Paper departed from it in three essentials: 1) The White Paper of 1922, in the spirit of the Balfour Declaration, had spoken in terms of the Jewish people, while the White Paper of 1930 spoke only in terms of the Jewish section of the inhabitants of Palestine; 2) The first White Paper had regarded the existing Jewish community in Palestine as a basis for the development of "a center in which the Jewish people as a whole may take an interest and a pride," and which might "provide a full opportunity for the Jewish people to display its capacities," thus laying emphasis on the growth of the existing Jewish community. The White Paper of 1930 laid all the emphasis on the limitations to be imposed on the Jewish national home in the interests—or supposed interests—of the Arabs; 3) The White Paper of 1922 had required only that Jewish immigration should not deprive the Arabs of employment; the White Paper of 1930 indicated that the Jews must prove that immigration would not prevent un-

91. *Ibid.*, p. 12.

92. *Ibid.*, p. 31.

employed Arabs from obtaining employment, which is quite another thing.

Turning to the question of the cultivable area of Palestine, the *Memorandum* leveled a sharp attack against Hope Simpson's estimates. It points out incidentally that the aerial surveys were made of only one-tenth of the total area, and that this would in any case have been an inadequate basis for estimating the total. The main point of criticism was the unscientific character of the unprecedented method of estimating the cultivability of soil from a flying airplane. While it may be possible to distinguish already cultivated land from uncultivated land by such a method, it is not possible to distinguish the cultivable from the as yet uncultivated tracts. Moreover, areas which are not profitable to cultivate under certain conditions or by certain methods might be cultivable under different conditions. Hope Simpson had himself given examples of successful development in Jewish villages near Jerusalem, "where a hillside which appeared to be hopelessly poor and arid is now covered with gardens containing trees of every kind."<sup>93</sup>

In all of his estimates as to the average area needed for the *lot viable*, the average size of the Arab family, and his estimates of so-called landless families of the rural communities, Hope Simpson strained the figures always in the direction of proving the alleged inadequacy of the available land. The *Memorandum* also raised the question why, if a general plan of development was to be initiated, Trans-Jordan should not be included.

The White Paper, following Simpson, implied that the Zionist policies of land purchase and settlement are, in part, to blame for the low condition of the *fellah*, that his condition has deteriorated as a result of Jewish land purchases. But it is a matter of universal knowledge that the *fellah* has always been in a bad condition and that this is due to long-standing social and economic factors. Among these, as Simpson points out, are heavy indebtedness, usurious rate of interest paid to the *effendis*, heavy taxation, inadequate education, lack of irrigation and the *mushaa* system. To these conditions must be added the drought and locusts, and the very poor price for agricultural products in the years immediately preceding. Instead of dealing boldly with those fundamental causes which depress

93. *Ibid.*, p. 37, quoted from Hope Simpson's Report, pp. 78-79.

the agriculture of Palestine, the Government had sought the easy way of putting the blame on the Jews.

Moreover, the *Memorandum* pointed out that if there has been any change for the worse since 1925 when Sir Herbert Samuel reported on the gradual improvement in conditions of the *fellahin*, it could not be attributed to Jewish land purchases. The total amount of land in possession of the Jewish National Fund at the end of 1925 amounted to 177,000 dunams, whereas according to Hope Simpson's report, it now holds approximately 270,000 dunams. This was a tiny percentage of the cultivable area of Palestine as estimated by the White Paper and could not have been any considerable factor in the land situation. The *Memorandum* mentioned that the principles on which Jewish lands are purchased were well known to His Majesty's Government and to the League of Nations at the time when the Mandate was issued and had been repeatedly referred to in Government documents. As to the question of the employment of Jewish labor, it points out that Government authorities as well as others have recognized that: "The establishment of a Jewish working-class population is one of the best guarantees for the normal development of the colonies in the future."<sup>94</sup>

Finally, the *Memorandum* noted that there was a marked contrast between the outlook of the White Paper and the concluding chapter of the Hope Simpson Report. While the Jewish Agency could not accept the main body of Hope Simpson's conclusions, it recognized that his recommendations with reference to development were worthy of careful consideration. The *Memorandum* pointed out that in his plan for development, Sir John Hope Simpson took it for granted that there would be positive encouragement of Jewish settlement on the land as one of the Government's primary obligations. He made it clear, furthermore, that he did not propose that purchases of land by the Jewish Agency or any of the other Jewish bodies should cease. The White Paper, however, suggested quite different implications. On this matter the *Memorandum* contains the following observation:<sup>95</sup>

94. *Ibid.*, p. 21, quoted from *The Naval Intelligence Manual*, 1919, p. 19.

95. *Ibid.*, pp. 56-57.

A very different impression would have been created if the White Paper had made it clear that one of the main results of the scheme was expected and intended to be the settlement in Palestine of a largely increased number of Jews; that there was every reason to believe that room could be found for a large number of additional settlers; that from the outset Jews would share directly in the benefits of the scheme and in the allocation of any public money which might be available for colonisation purposes; that the authorities in charge of the scheme would work in close cooperation and coordination with the Jewish Agency, and that Jewish interests would be further protected by direct representation on the Development Commission; that there was no intention of placing an embargo on Jewish purchases of land, but only of ensuring that such purchases should be made in harmony with the general policy of the Development Commission, in shaping which the Jews themselves would share. From a Jewish point of view, the scheme might still have had its weaknesses, but, thus set forth, it would at all events have presented the Government's intentions in a very different light. If the chilling words of the White Paper breathe quite another spirit, the Jewish Agency can hardly be blamed for reading some significance into the contrast.

### *The MacDonald Letter*

Several days before the Parliamentary debate on November 17th, the Government had invited Dr. Weizmann—who was carrying on his duties as President of the Jewish Agency—and other representatives of the Jewish Agency, to confer with a special Cabinet committee, of which Arthur Henderson, the Foreign Secretary, was Chairman. The meetings lasted through the winter and culminated in an agreement acceptable to the Zionists. MacDonald refused to issue a new White Paper, but he agreed to incorporate the results of the negotiations in a public letter to Weizmann. The letter, dated February 13, 1931, was published as an answer to a question in the House of Commons, regarding the authoritative interpretation of the Passfield White Paper. Some of the major points, designed to satisfy the Zionist contentions, were as follows:<sup>96</sup>

The Mandate would be carried out in conformity not only with the Articles but also with the Preamble of the Mandate. In this re-

96. Great Britain, *Parliamentary Debates, Commons, Fifth Series*, February 13, 1931, Vol. 244, cols. 749–755.

affirmation, Government recognized a double undertaking: one to the Jewish people as a whole involves promoting the establishment in Palestine of a National Home for the Jewish people; the other, toward the non-Jewish population of Palestine, means, in essence, safeguarding the civil and religious rights of all inhabitants, irrespective of race or religion and applies equally to Jews, Arabs and other sections of the population.

This policy had been made plain in the Prime Minister's address in the House of Commons on the 3rd of April and again on November 17th. It was hereby explicitly reaffirmed in this statement of policy. However, in carrying out the policy, the Mandatory could not ignore the existence of differing interests . . . These were not, in themselves, irreconcilable, but such reconciliation depended on a proper realization that a full solution depended on the ability of the Jews and the Arabs to arrive at an understanding. "Until that is reached, considerations of balance must inevitably enter into the definition of policy."

The White Paper had not intended to make injurious allegations against the Jewish people and Jewish labor organizations. His Majesty's Government recognized that the Jewish Agency "have all along given willing cooperation in carrying out the policy of the Mandate, and that the constructive work done by the Jewish people in Palestine has had beneficial effects on the development and well-being of the country as a whole." His Majesty's Government also recognized "the value of the services of labour and trades union organisations in Palestine, to which they desire to give every encouragement."

The effect of immigration and settlement on the economic position of the non-Jewish community could not be excluded from consideration. "But the words should not be read as implying that existing economic conditions in Palestine should be crystallized. On the contrary, the obligation to facilitate Jewish immigration and to encourage close settlement by Jews on the land, remains a positive obligation of the Mandate, and it can be fulfilled without prejudice to the rights and position of other sections of the population of Palestine."

In referring to "landless" Arabs, it was not the Government's intention to say that all rural Arab families not now cultivating the soil would have preference over Jewish settlers. The reference was to "such Arabs as can be shown to have been displaced from the lands which they occupied in consequence of the lands passing into Jewish hands, and who have not obtained other holdings on which they can establish themselves or other equally satisfactory occupation." The recognition of the prior obligation to this group of landless Arabs, whose numbers must be a matter for careful inquiry,

did not preclude concern for the larger purposes of development which His Majesty's Government regarded as the most effectual means of furthering the Jewish National Home.

It was the intention of His Majesty to institute an inquiry as soon as possible to ascertain what State and other lands could properly be made available for close settlement of Jews, in accordance with Article 6 of the Mandate. The inquiry will be comprehensive and will include the whole land resources of Palestine, and will make provision for both Jewish and Arab interests. In giving effect to the policy of land settlement and development, it was necessary to establish some centralized control of transactions concerning land but it was not intended to prevent transactions which were not inconsistent with the general developmental scheme. However, "the statement of policy of His Majesty's Government did not imply a prohibition of acquisition of additional land by Jews."

It was not the intention of His Majesty's Government, as had been represented, that "no further immigration of Jews is to be permitted so long as it might prevent any Arab from obtaining employment." The Government did not propose to make any departure from the principles enunciated in the Churchill White Paper relative to immigration. It felt, however, that the obligation to safeguard the rights and position of the non-Jewish community made necessary a careful application of the absorptive capacity principle and insistence on proper government control of immigration practices. But this decision rested on economic, and not political, grounds. "The considerations relevant to the limits of absorptive capacity are purely economic considerations."

The Government did not prescribe and did not contemplate any stoppage or prohibition of Jewish immigration in any of its categories. The practice of sanctioning a Labor Schedule would continue; in calculating labor requirements, consideration would be given to undertakings made possible by the import of Jewish capital; the claim of Jewish labor to a due share of the employment available in public and municipal works would be given consideration, and in this connection account would be taken of Jewish contributions to public revenue. The factor of unemployment both among Arabs and Jews would be taken into account, but immigrants would not be excluded on the sole ground that employment cannot be guaranteed for an unlimited duration.

In calculating the absorptive capacity, the policy of the Jewish Agency to employ Jewish labor in undertakings promoted by the Agency will be taken into account. "His Majesty's Government do not in any way challenge the right of the Agency to formulate or approve and endorse such a policy. The principle of preferential and, indeed, the exclusive employment of Jewish labor by Jewish organi-

zations is a principle which the Jewish Agency are entitled to affirm." The Mandatory, however, is bound to give consideration to the matter if in consequence of this policy Arab labor is displaced or existing unemployment becomes aggravated.

British public opinion, which had received the Passfield White Paper unfavorably, welcomed the Prime Minister's letter as a genuine alteration of policy and as an honest reassurance to the Jews that the Balfour promise would be fulfilled and the terms of the Mandate implemented.<sup>97</sup> Among the Jews, opinion was divided. Many were dissatisfied because the Passfield White Paper had not been openly repudiated and saw in this a bad omen for the future; others accepted the MacDonald Letter as an adequate recantation of the hostile attitude evinced in the 1930 Statement of Policy. The Zionist Organization took the latter view, and Dr. Weizmann announced publicly on the 14th day of February that in his opinion the Prime Minister's statement had "reestablished the basis for that cooperation with the Mandatory Power on which our policy is founded." The Arab leaders, on their part, dubbed the new document "the black letter." In a communication addressed by the President of the Palestine Arab Executive to the High Commissioner on the 17th of February, MacDonald's Letter was denounced as a breach of faith with the Arabs and as a complete reversal of policy.

There has been considerable discussion as to whether the MacDonald Letter constituted a modification of policy or merely represented a change in emphasis and in manner. The *Survey of International Affairs* made the following comment at the time: "The difference between the new document and its immediate predecessor in the series lies not in its statements of fact or in its pronouncements upon policy, but in its concentration upon those particular facts and those particular points of policy which were agreeable to Zionists and in its replacement of the phraseology which had given offense to the Jews by a phraseology which was courteous and considerate in its tone towards them, almost to the point of being ingratiating."<sup>98</sup> This may be true, but obviously where the issues were so nicely balanced, such a change of emphasis could make

97. Hanna, *op. cit.*, p. 108.

98. Royal Institute of International Affairs, *Survey of International Affairs 1930*, Oxford University Press, 1931, p. 302.



the essential difference:—from obstructing to facilitating the development of the Jewish National Home.

The Shaw and Simpson reports on which the White Paper was based contained strong hints of limitation of land sales and insinuated the notion of a political high level for immigration. The Prime Minister's letter did evidently prevent an immediate application of these suggestions. Seen in retrospect, the respite was temporary since these restrictive points of policy were later explicitly embodied in the 1939 White Paper. The White Paper of 1930 may be looked upon as containing the germs of repudiation of the Jewish national home policy; and the refusal of the Government to withdraw it may, after all, have had a more fundamental cause than the desire to save face. In any case, regarded as a whole, the series of events beginning with the Wailing Wall disturbances, marked a triumph for the policies of the Mufti; the MacDonald Letter was merely a temporary setback. From the Administration's manner of handling the situation in its entirety, the Arab leaders could not but have recognized that there were strong forces in the British Government which were more than ready to justify the Arab opposition to the Jewish claims. They could have concluded that their case had been advanced by the use of violence and the strategy of intransigence, and that another try at terror might prove successful.

## CHAPTER X

### DEVELOPMENT DURING THE SECOND DECADE: 1930-1939<sup>1</sup>

THE letter sent by Ramsay MacDonald to Dr. Weizmann in February, 1931, remained—in theory at least—the basis of British policy until May, 1939. The intervening years divide sharply into two periods: 1) up to the outbreak of disorders in the spring of 1936; 2) from 1936 to 1939. During the first period, while there were evidences of strong Arab opposition—acts of sabotage, vandalism, and outbreaks of terrorism—the Government had the situation under control. Moreover, under the able direction of Arthur G. Wauchope, who assumed the office of High Commissioner in the fall of 1931, the Government made an honest effort to implement the paragraphs in the MacDonald letter dealing with the Jewish national home. Although the full requests of the Jewish Agency for immigration were never met, the principle of economic absorptive capacity was roughly observed until 1936. At the same time, Government made an effort to improve the lot of the *fellahin*, to promote cooperation between Jews and Arabs on Government committees, and to further the development of self-governing institutions.

The first term of Wauchope's administration, from 1931 to 1936, was characterized by an unprecedented economic development accompanied by a greatly accelerated Jewish immigration. During the peak years, from 1933 to 1936, about 40,000 Jews immigrated into Palestine each year. In one year, 1935, close to 62,000 authorized Jewish immigrants entered the country; there was also a considerable amount of irregular and illegal immigration, both Jewish and non-Jewish. As the Royal Commission, which was sent to Palestine to investigate the 1936 disturbances, declared: "The National Home, in fact, was growing at a pace which in earlier days its most ardent sup-

1. Where statistics for these years are unavailable, a somewhat earlier or later year is used for basis of comparison.

porters can scarcely have expected; and its prosperity was reflected in the mounting revenue of the Palestine Government.”<sup>2</sup>

The Commission agreed that the Arab population had shared in the new prosperity: “wages rose, markets for country products expanded, more roads and bridges and schools were built.”<sup>3</sup> Yet Arab agitation against the Jewish national home continued; in fact, it grew more intense. In the previous decade it had generally been alleged that Arab dissatisfaction arose from the fear of displacement from the land, and of unemployment due to excessive Jewish immigration. Now a new theory was advanced, namely, that the economic improvement was itself a cause of unrest. “With almost mathematical precision the betterment of the economic situation in Palestine meant the deterioration of the political situation.”<sup>4</sup> Hitherto it had not seemed likely that the Jews would constitute a majority in Palestine within measurable time, but now, with the great increase of Jewish immigration, there opened up “the intolerable prospect of a Jewish State—of Palestinian Arabs being ruled by Jews.”<sup>5</sup>

During the second period, from 1936 to 1939, the economic development continued, but the political issues became dominant. Immigration was artificially curtailed despite the rising Jewish need and the growing economic absorptive capacity of Palestine. Arab propaganda and intermittent disturbances during the earlier period eventuated in organized disorders in 1936 and in an open revolt against the British in 1937. Two important commissions of inquiry were sent to Palestine: the Royal Commission, already referred to, headed by Lord Peel; and the Partition Commission, headed by Sir John Woodhead. The latter was appointed for the purpose of devising a plan to implement the Royal Commission’s recommendation to divide Palestine among the Jews, the Arabs and the British. The Woodhead Commission found the idea of partition impracticable, as well as abhorrent to the Arab leaders. The British Government then adopted an alternative policy suggested by

2. Great Britain, *Palestine Royal Commission Report*, Cmd. 5479, 1937, p. 86 (henceforth referred to as *Royal Commission Report*).

3. *Ibid.*, p. 80.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 86.

5. *Ibid.*, p. 82.

the Royal Commission, which involved a drastic limitation on Jewish immigration and land purchases. In 1939, Malcolm MacDonald, as Secretary of State for the Colonies, repudiated the Jewish national home policy which his father, as Prime Minister, had reaffirmed in 1931.

Over the whole second decade of the development of Palestine under the British Mandate lay the darkening shadow of fascism. Even the favorable side of the situation—the economic boom beginning with 1933—was the direct result of the rise of the Nazis to power. A large number of Jews who left Germany and nearby countries found refuge in Palestine and brought with them substantial amounts of capital, as well as skill, knowledge and training. The loss of British prestige in the Near East connected with the Italo-Ethiopian conflict, emboldened the Arabs in their decision to revolt. The disturbances were abetted, if not instigated, by Axis propaganda and supported, in part at least, by funds from Italy and Germany. The final capitulation to Arab violence by the betrayal of the Jewish national home was quite in the pattern of appeasement which marked the general line of policy of the Chamberlain Government. The MacDonald White Paper was issued in May, 1939, a short two months after the invasion of Czechoslovakia.

The development of the Jewish national home and of Palestine as a whole continued throughout the decade; it was disturbed but not suppressed by the events after 1936. Between 1930 and 1939 the population of Palestine increased from about one million to one million and a half. Total per capita production, which increased about 56 percent, developed at a somewhat greater rate than the population; a small lag in the rate of increase of agricultural production (44 percent per capita) was more than made up by the per capita increase in industrial production (64 percent).<sup>6</sup> Both urban and rural sections of the country made progress. The developments and the associated problems may be considered under the following heads: (1) Population Growth through Natural Increase and Immigration; (2) Developments in the Jewish National Home; (3) The Problems of the Arab Cultivator; and (4) Government Aid to Development.

6. D. Horowitz, "Bermuda and Palestine," *Palestine and Middle East*, May, 1943.

## THE GROWTH OF THE POPULATION

Both Jews and Arabs showed large increases in numbers during the decade 1930–1939, but the relative position of the Jews was greatly strengthened. In accordance with the census of 1931, out of a total population of 1,033,314, the Jews numbered 174,606, or about one-sixth. At the end of 1939, out of a total population of 1,501,698, as estimated by Government, the Jews numbered 445,457, or close to 30 percent. This Government estimate took into account only recorded immigration and was admittedly too low. The Jewish population at the end of 1939 was estimated by the Jewish authorities as being close to 500,000 and as constituting about one-third of the population. Thus, in the period of ten years the ratio of the Jewish population to the total population increased twofold.

*Natural Increase and Immigration*

Taking the twenty-year period from 1922, when the first census was taken, to the end of 1942, the population of Palestine more than doubled, rising from 752,048 to 1,620,005. The Jewish increase amounted to about 400,000; the increase in the number of non-Jews—Moslems, Christians, and others—amounted to about 468,000. Thus, the absolute increase of non-Jews was greater than that of the Jews. Relatively, of course, the growth of the Jewish population was much larger: in 1922, the Jews constituted a little more than 11 percent, or about one-ninth of the population, while in 1942, they constituted 30 percent—in accordance with the Government statistics—or about one-third in accordance with the Jewish estimate. As indicated in the following table,<sup>7</sup> three-fourths of the increase among the Jews was due to immigration, while among the Arabs the increase was to the greatest extent due to natural growth.<sup>8</sup>

The high rate of net natural increase among the Arabs of Palestine is a fact of primary social and political significance. It is accounted for by the extraordinary rate of natural increase among the Moslem section of the population. The coun-

7. Government of Palestine, *Statistical Abstract of Palestine 1943*, Jerusalem, 1944, p. 63.

8. There was, however, a larger immigration than indicated by Government statistics, for it was admitted that there was a very considerable illegal immigration of Arabs and others as well as of Jews. See below, p. 680.

POPULATION OF PALESTINE<sup>9</sup>  
(Exclusive of Members of His Majesty's Forces)

Year	Total	Moslems		Jews		Christians		Others	
		Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
1922 Census	752,048	589,177	78.34	83,790	11.14	71,464	9.50	7,617	1.01
1931 Census	1,033,314	759,700	73.52	174,606	16.90	88,907	8.60	10,101	0.98
1931 <sup>10</sup>	1,036,339	761,922	73.52	175,138	16.90	89,134	8.60	10,145	0.98
1932	1,073,827	778,803	72.52	192,137	17.90	92,520	8.61	10,367	0.97
1933	1,140,941	798,506	69.99	234,967	20.59	96,791	8.48	10,677	0.94
1934	1,210,554	814,379	67.27	282,975	23.38	102,407	8.46	10,793	0.89
1935	1,308,112	836,688	63.96	355,157	27.15	105,236	8.04	11,031	0.85
1936	1,366,692	862,730	63.13	384,078	28.10	108,506	7.94	11,378	0.83
1937	1,401,794	883,446	63.02	395,836	28.24	110,869	7.91	11,643	0.83
1938	1,435,285	900,250	62.72	411,222	28.65	111,974	7.80	11,839	0.83
1939	1,501,698	927,133	61.74	445,457	29.66	116,958	7.79	12,150	0.81
1940	1,544,530	947,846	61.37	463,535	30.01	120,587	7.81	12,562	0.81
1941	1,585,500	973,104	61.38	474,102	29.90	125,413	7.91	12,881	0.81
1942	1,620,005	995,292	61.44	484,408	29.90	127,184	7.85	13,121	0.81

9. Adapted from table, "Estimated Population of Palestine," *Statistical Abstract of Palestine 1943*, p. 2

10. The figures for 1931 and following years are as of December 31st of each year.

	<i>Total</i>	<i>Moslems</i>	<i>Jews</i>	<i>Christians</i>	<i>Others</i>
Population, Census 1922	752,048	589,177	83,790	71,464	7,617
Population, 12/31/1942	1,620,005	995,292	484,408	127,184	13,121
<i>Total Increase</i>	867,957	406,115	400,618	55,720	5,504
Natural Increase	526,158	386,100	94,815	40,075	5,168
Increase by Migration	341,799	20,015	305,803	15,645	336

tries neighboring on Palestine, with a predominantly Moslem population, also show a high crude birth rate, but this is largely counteracted by a very high death rate, particularly in the case of infants and young children. In European countries, lower death rates are accompanied by lower birth rates: fewer children die, but fewer children are born. In Palestine, however, the Moslem birth rate has remained high while the death rate has declined during the last twenty years. This decline was partly due to the reduction of the mortality rate among infants and young children, but also in no small measure to improved health conditions for adults. Whereas the population of Palestine was nearly stationary before the First World War, today it has one of the highest rates of net natural increase in the world—indeed, perhaps the highest.

This extraordinarily high rate of natural increase is due to the better conditions resulting from the development of the Jewish national home. A careful study of the fertility and mortality rates in Palestine concludes: "The fall in the Moslem death rate since the early 1920's and the relatively favorable mortality [among Moslems] revealed by the life-table are in all likelihood the result of the improved conditions brought to Palestine by Jewish immigration. The increased expenditure on health services, the physical amelioration of the land through such measures as swamp draining, and the rising standard of education and living, must have had their effect in reducing the toll of death among the indigenous population."<sup>11</sup> The Partition Commission Report summed up the situation as follows:<sup>12</sup>

11. Rita Hinden, "The Fertility and Mortality of the Population of Palestine," *Sociological Review*, Vol. XXXII, 1940, p. 29.

12. *Palestine Partition Commission Report*, Cmd. 5854, London, 1938, p. 27.

AVERAGE ANNUAL BIRTHS, DEATHS AND NATURAL INCREASE  
IN PALESTINE—1922-1940

(Ratio per thousand of settled population)

Annual Average for Years	Moslems		Jews		Christians		Others		Total	
	Average	Ratio	Average	Ratio	Average	Ratio	Average	Ratio	Average	Ratio
1922-1925	26,035	50.20	3,309	33.89	2,663	36.29	349	42.85	32,356	46.36
1926-1930	33,036	53.52	5,297	34.33	3,084	38.48	421	45.90	41,838	48.60
1931-1935	36,366	50.34	6,895	30.19	3,415	35.85	470	44.90	47,146	44.67
1936-1940	40,332	48.86	10,515	25.83	3,732	33.33	540	45.84	55,119	40.60
<i>BIRTHS</i>										
1922-1925	14,003	26.93	1,325	13.70	1,185	16.14	161	19.60	16,674	23.82
1926-1930	17,475	28.34	1,789	11.63	1,431	17.88	227	24.84	20,922	24.34
1931-1935	18,311	25.36	2,100	9.28	1,430	15.00	227	21.53	22,068	20.97
1936-1940	17,506	21.13	3,303	8.08	1,408	12.56	225	19.10	22,442	16.48
<i>DEATHS</i>										
<i>NATURAL INCREASE</i>										
1922-1925	12,032	23.27	1,984	20.19	1,478	20.15	188	23.25	15,682	22.54
1926-1930	15,561	25.18	3,508	22.70	1,653	20.60	194	20.06	20,916	24.26
1931-1935	18,055	24.98	4,795	20.91	1,985	20.85	243	23.37	25,078	23.70
1936-1940	22,826	27.73	7,212	17.75	2,324	20.77	315	26.74	32,677	24.12



We thus have the Arab population reflecting simultaneously two widely different tendencies—a birth-rate characteristic of a peasant community in which the unrestricted family is normal, and a death-rate which could only be brought about under an enlightened modern administration, with both the will and the necessary funds at its disposal to enable it to serve a population unable to help itself. It is indeed an ironic commentary on the working of the Mandate, and perhaps on the science of government, that this result which so far from encouraging has almost certainly hindered close settlement by Jews on the land, could scarcely have been brought about except through the appropriation of tax-revenue contributed by the Jews.

The birth rate among the Jewish population was also relatively high, comparing favorably with countries which have a European standard of civilization. The average birth rate for the years 1926–1930, for instance, was over 34 per thousand, and even in the period of 1936–1940 when the birth rate was relatively low, it was still over 25 per thousand. In overseas English-speaking countries, the average birth rate ranged during corresponding years from 17 to 24 per thousand.<sup>13</sup> Moreover, despite the difficulties of adjusting to a new climate and to a new mode of life, the Jewish death rate was as low as in the most advanced countries in the world. In 1931–1935, the death rate was 9.32 per thousand; in 1936–1940, it was even lower, 8.12 per thousand. In the United States, for instance, it averaged about 11 per thousand, and in Australia something about 9 per thousand. Nevertheless, the natural increase, that is, the difference between the birth rate and the death rate, among the Jews of Palestine was smaller than among the Arabs, and this disparity tended to increase during the second part of the decade of the thirties. As the following table<sup>14</sup> shows, the disparity grew from an average of 3.08 in 1922–1925 to 9.98 in 1936–1940.

<i>Natural Increase</i>	<i>1921–25</i>	<i>1926–30</i>	<i>1931–35</i>	<i>1936–40</i>
Moslem	23.27	25.18	24.98	27.73
Jewish	20.19	22.70	20.91	17.75
	3.08	2.48	4.07	9.98

13. *Ibid.*, p. 26.

14. Government of Palestine, *Statistical Abstract of Palestine 1943*, pp. 6–7.

The lower birth rate among the Jews after 1936 was due, in part, to a change in the composition of the population, which, after 1933, included a greater percentage of middle-aged people. Since both birth rates and death rates depend on com-

BIRTH AND DEATH RATES PER 1,000 OF SETTLED  
POPULATION IN DIFFERENT COUNTRIES<sup>15</sup>

		1921-1925	1926-1930	1931-1935	1936-1940*
<i>Non-European Countries</i>					
<i>Egypt</i>	Birth rate	43.0	44.3	42.9	43.7
	Death rate	25.4	26.2	27.4	27.5
	Natural increase	17.6	18.1	15.5	16.2
<i>Cyprus</i>	Birth rate	26.4	29.0	29.8	32.4
	Death rate	19.9	15.8	14.8	13.6
	Natural increase	6.5	13.2	15.0	18.8
<i>Formosa</i>	Birth rate	42.0	44.0	45.1	44.8
	Death rate	24.0	22.0	20.6	20.1
	Natural increase	18.0	22.0	24.5	24.7
<i>India</i>	Birth rate	32.7	33.3	34.4	34.2
	Death rate	26.0	24.3	23.5	22.8
	Natural increase	6.7	9.0	10.9	11.4
<hr/>					
<i>Overseas Countries with Population of European Origin</i>					
<i>U.S.A.</i>	Birth rate	22.5	19.7	16.9	17.3
	Death rate	11.8	11.8	10.9	11.0
	Natural increase	10.7	7.9	6.0	6.3
<i>Australia</i>	Birth rate	23.9	21.0	16.9	17.5
	Death rate	9.5	9.3	9.0	9.6
	Natural increase	14.4	11.7	7.9	7.9
<i>S. Africa</i> (white popu- lation)	Birth rate	27.1	25.9	24.1	24.8
	Death rate	9.7	9.7	9.8	9.7
	Natural increase	17.4	16.2	14.3	15.1
<i>Argentina</i>	Birth rate	32.4	30.1	26.4	24.1
	Death rate	14.4	13.3	12.1	11.7
	Natural increase	18.0	16.8	14.3	12.4

\* In some cases the averages are for shorter periods.

15. League of Nations, *Statistical Yearbook 1940-1941*, Geneva, 1941, pp. 36-39, and Government of Palestine, Department of Health, *Annual Reports*.

plex factors, including cultural and economic conditions as well as the age structure of the population, the disparity in the rate of natural increase between the Jews and the Arabs may not be as great as indicated in recent years; it may possibly resemble more the average difference in the period from 1922-1935, when it was between three and four per thousand. On a scientific analysis of the probabilities, however, it is more likely that the disparity will continue to be great.

In the article mentioned above, Miss Hinden came to the conclusion that the theoretically "true" rate of natural increase among the Moslems was 21.4 per thousand, while the Jewish rate was only 10.9 per thousand. She warned that the so-called "true" rate is based on present fertility and mortality rates which may, of course, change, and that in any case her calculations would apply only when a "stable" population shall have been reached, which will not happen for some sixty years. Still, her calculations gave a rough estimate of the probable tendency and her main conclusion stands, namely, that if Jewish immigration should cease or be greatly restricted, the ratio of the Jews to the total population of Palestine must show a marked decrease with the passage of time. The Jews will not only remain a minority, but from decade to decade they will become an ever smaller minority.<sup>16</sup>

The rate of natural increase among the Christians in Palestine resembles that of the Jews. While the birth rate is somewhat higher, so also is the death rate, so that the natural increase is about the same as among the Jews. However, it fluctuates less and throughout the period has remained at an average of 20-21 per thousand. The ratio of Christians in the population, however, is gradually but steadily decreasing. In 1922, the Christians numbered 71,464, constituting at that time 9.5 percent of the total population. At the end of 1939, the number of Christians had increased to about 117,000, but their proportion had decreased to 7.8 percent. Since their rate of natural growth is lower than that of the Jews, the Christians are likely to become an even smaller percentage of the population as time passes.

16. As will be indicated in the next chapter, the restricted quota of immigrants recommended by the Palestine Royal Commission was calculated to keep the Jews at a ratio of about one-third in the population, assuming present rates of natural increase amongst the Jews and Arabs of Palestine.

*Authorized Immigration Under the Ordinances*

Until 1930, immigration was still governed by the Ordinance of 1925.<sup>17</sup> In the following years a number of revisions were introduced, ostensibly for the purpose of making certain that immigration should not exceed absorptive capacity. Category A, which provided for the entry of qualified persons possessing capital of £P500, was made more restrictive by increasing the amount to £P1,000. However, the smaller sum was still allowed in the case of persons following a liberal profession and of such other prospective immigrants as could satisfy the Director of Immigration that the amount was adequate for the business or other pursuit indicated by them. There were other changes of an administrative character, and the revisions were embodied in the Ordinance of 1933 which coordinated and unified the earlier regulations.

The Immigration Ordinance of 1933 also retained the main categories of the previous Ordinance, although there was some rearrangement of paragraphs. The categories of the 1933 Ordinance were as follows:<sup>18</sup>

*Category A:* For persons of independent means, popularly termed "capitalist."

*Category B:* For students, persons of religious occupation, orphans, and others whose maintenance was assured.

*Category C:* The so-called "Labor Schedule," for persons who have a definite prospect of employment.

*Category D:* For dependents of permanent residents or of immigrants belonging to the other categories.

SUMMARY OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE  
IMMIGRATION ORDINANCE OF 1933<sup>19</sup>

*Category A*—Persons of independent means who shall be deemed to include:

1. Persons in *bona fide* position and freely disposing of a capital of not less than £P1,000;
2. Persons of liberal professions in possession of a capital of not less than £P500, provided that the need exists in Palestine for additional members of such professions;

17. See Chap. V, above, p. 315.

18. For the sub-headings and other details, see pp. 671-673.

19. *Royal Commission Report*, pp. 283 ff.; see also *Government of Palestine Ordinances*, Annual Volume for 1933, Jerusalem, pp. 102-105.

3. Skilled craftsmen in possession of a capital of not less than £P250, provided that the economic capacity of Palestine allows such persons to be absorbed in their crafts;

4. Persons with a secured income of not less than £P4, exclusive of earned income;

5. Persons in *bona fide* position and freely disposing of a capital of not less than £P500; provided that the settlement of such persons in Palestine will not lead to undue competition in the pursuit which he intends to enter, his capital is sufficient to insure a reasonable prospect of success, and he is physically fit to follow it.

*Category B*—Persons whose maintenance is assured and who shall be deemed to include:

1. Any orphans of less than sixteen years of age whose maintenance by a public institution in Palestine is assured until such time as he is able to support himself;

2. Any persons of religious occupation whose maintenance is assured. Any student who is admitted to an educational institution in Palestine and whose maintenance is insured until such time as he is able to support himself.

*Category C*—Persons who have definite prospect of employment, to be determined as follows:

1. Evidence of definite prospect of employment is to be provided by the prospective employer who guarantees that he is in a position to employ the prospective immigrant at a stated salary and will continue to employ him for a minimum period of one year. For the purpose of making up the Labor Schedule, the Executive of the Jewish Agency is regarded as a collective employer of labor. In collaboration with an officer of the Department of Immigration, a survey is made of the economic, industrial and labor conditions among the Jews.

2. The volume of immigration is controlled by a Labor Schedule prepared for a period of six months ending alternately on September 30th and on March 31st. The Labor Schedule indicates the maximum number of persons by sex, age, industries and other calling who may be admitted with immigration certificates under Category C during the period of the Schedule. The proposals are made by the Executive of the Jewish Agency and submitted to the Director of Immigration who makes his recommendations to the High Commissioner. After the High Commissioner approves the Schedule, it is published in the Palestine Gazette and becomes operative.

3. In preparing its proposals the Jewish Agency makes a survey of the economic and labor conditions of Jewish life in the country. This is done in collaboration with an officer of the Department of Immigration who submits an independent report to the head of the Immigration Department. Furthermore, the Department makes a

rough survey of Arab unemployment and at the same time takes into consideration such factors as movement of freight and consumption of electricity. Thus, before approving the Schedule, the High Commissioner has before him a survey of conditions made by the Jewish Agency and the Department of Migration which takes into account Arab as well as Jewish unemployment.

*Category D*—Dependents of permanent residents or immigrants belonging to Categories A, B, and C. The Immigration Ordinance defines dependents as follows:

'Dependent' means a person who is, or who will on arrival in Palestine be, wholly and directly dependent for maintenance and support upon an immigrant or a permanent resident, and is related to such immigrant or permanent resident as being:—

- (a) his wife, or
- (b) his or his wife's parent or grandparent, or
- (c) his or his wife's daughter or granddaughter, sister or niece, who is either unmarried or a widow or divorced, or
- (d) his or his wife's son, grandson, brother or nephew, who is under the age of eighteen years or, being over that age, is permanently disabled and incapable of supporting himself.<sup>20</sup>

The Immigration Ordinance of 1933 was somewhat stricter than the previous Ordinance, but on the whole followed the same principles, that is, it was framed on the absorptive capacity principle. However, in the fall of 1936, after the cessation of the Arab strike of that year, the regulations were interpreted in a manner that limited the Labor Schedule greatly, so that the total number of immigrants during the following year was reduced to something over 10,500. This amounted to the introduction of the principle of "political high level." In 1938, the Colonial Office sent an instruction to the High Commissioner which explicitly restricted the numbers to be allowed under Category A—so-called "capitalist" immigration—and made other reservations with reference to the Labor Schedule.<sup>21</sup> By this time, although the framework of the 1933 Ordinance was still maintained, immigration was in fact politically determined.

The total recorded immigration into Palestine from 1930 to 1939, inclusive, exceeded 240,000 persons of whom more than 90 per cent were Jews. There was a certain amount of emigra-

20. *Ibid.*, p. 285.

21. Government of Palestine, *Statistical Abstract of Palestine 1948*, p. 13.

RECORDED IMMIGRATION AND EMIGRATION  
1930-1939

Year or Period	Immigration			Emigration			Net Immigration		
	Jews	Non-Jews	Total	Jews	Non-Jews	Total	Jews	Non-Jews	Total
1930	4,944	1,489	6,433	1,679	1,324	3,003	3,265	165	3,430
1931	4,075	1,458	5,533	666	680	1,346	3,409	778	4,187
1932	9,553	1,736	11,289	x	x	x	9,553	1,736	11,289
1933	30,327	1,650	31,977	x	x	x	30,327	1,650	31,977
1934	42,359	1,784	44,143	x	x	x	42,359	1,784	44,143
1935	61,854	2,293	64,147	396	387	783	61,458	1,906	63,364
1936	29,727	1,944	31,671	773	405	1,178	28,954	1,539	30,493
1937	10,536	1,939	12,475	889	639	1,528	9,647	1,300	10,947
1938	12,868	2,395	15,263	1,095	716	1,811	11,773	1,679	13,452
1939	16,405	2,028	18,433	1,019	977	1,996	15,386	1,051	16,437
Total	222,648	18,716	241,364	6,517	5,128	11,645	216,131	13,588	229,719

“x” indicates that emigration was not reported.

tion: very small among the Jews, relatively large among the non-Jews. About 6,500 Jews left the country, this number constituting a little over 3 percent of the number of Jewish immigrants, which was over 222,600. Non-Jewish emigration was over 5,100, or 27 percent of the total number of immigrants which was 18,700. The total net immigration was almost 230,000 persons of whom approximately 216,000 were Jews. The average annual net Jewish immigration for the whole period (1929-1939) was 21,613, almost three times as great as the average annual net immigration from 1920-1929, which was 7,583.

The decade may be divided into three periods: in the first three year period (1930-1932), there was a total net Jewish immigration of 16,227, average annual immigration being 5,409. The second period of four years (1933-1936) was particularly significant with its total Jewish immigration of 164,267 (net 163,098)—an average of 41,067 (net 40,775). A high point was reached in 1935 with a total immigration of 61,854 (net 61,458). During the three years after 1936, there was a total net Jewish immigration of 36,806, with an annual average of 12,269. During the first three year period, from 1930-1932 inclusive, the small amount of immigration was due mainly to economic causes; in the last three years, from 1936-1939, the reduction from the previous high level was due mainly to political restrictions.

To those who believed that a large Jewish immigration to Palestine would be followed by undesirable economic consequences, the situation during the first five years after 1931 seemed a paradox. As the Royal Institute of International Affairs stated, judging by the experience of 1924 and 1926, the first period of large Jewish immigration: "It might therefore have been expected that the economic structure would have shown still more serious signs of strain. In actual fact, however, the second inflow was accompanied by a wave of prosperity without parallel either in the previous history of Palestine or in the contemporary experience of the rest of the world."<sup>22</sup> The paradox was explained in the following way: that the flow of capital was continuous; that it was large in relation to the size of the Labor Schedule; that the heavy im-

22. *Great Britain and Palestine, 1915-1939*, p. 60.



port of capital did not create an external debt and a problem of future payment, because the great bulk of it was provided by the immigrants themselves.<sup>23</sup>

The second period of large Jewish immigration tended to support the view of the Jewish authorities that the earlier depression in 1927–1929 was not caused by excessive immigration during the immediate preceding years, but rather by the subsequent slowing down of middle-class immigration, which cut off the supply of capital required for a continuous development. The experience of the years 1933–1936 lent support to the Zionist thesis that the factors of continuing Jewish need for and interest in Palestine were important elements in increasing the absorptive capacity of the country. The same implication is found in the following statement of the Royal Commission, referring to the large immigration in 1934–1935: "Two new points stood out. First, far more future immigrants were going to be 'absorbed' into industry and urban life than by agriculture and land settlement. Secondly, so far from reducing the 'economic absorptive capacity' immigrants increased it. The more immigrants came in, the more work they created for local industries to meet their needs, especially in building: and more work meant more room for immigrants under the 'labor schedule.' " <sup>24</sup> The Royal Commission saw no reason why the rate of immigration should not go on climbing up and up unless there were some great economic setback or the Government adopted more restrictive policies based on political instead of economic grounds. The Royal Commission, therefore, advised basing immigration on the political as well as the economic factor, a recommendation which, as noted, the Government had already anticipated by administrative action.

### *The Character of Jewish Immigration After the Rise of Nazism*

The character of Jewish immigration into Palestine underwent significant changes in the second decade, particularly from the year 1933 on. Not all the Jews who came to Palestine after that time can be classed as refugees in the strict sense, as were the Jews from Central Europe; but if the immigra-

23. *Ibid.*, p. 66.

24. *Royal Commission Report*, p. 85.

tion from Eastern Europe be included, where anti-Semitism and the threat of fascism were on the increase, it may be said that the large majority of the Jews who found a haven in Palestine during this period came from countries where they were subject to economic pressure and social discrimination. In the years immediately preceding 1933 immigration from Germany and other Central European countries amounted to about 5 percent of the total of Jewish immigrants. From 1933 through 1935 about 18 percent of the immigrants were from these countries. In the years from 1936 through 1939 the proportion increased even more. In 1936 and 1937 almost one-third of the Jewish immigrants came from Germany and Central Europe, and during 1938 and 1939 more than half came from these countries. The other large source of Jewish immigration to Palestine was Poland. In the years before 1933 about two-fifths of the immigrants came from Poland and this continued to be the case, more or less, up to 1938. In that year, however, only 25 percent of the Jewish immigrants came from Poland and in 1939 only something over 10 percent.

As to the different categories, the following facts are worthy of note. In the years 1930-1933, the number of persons admitted on Labor Schedules was 17,545, and the number introduced in Category A, i.e., of "Independent Means," was 4,825. There were three and a half times as many workers as middle-class immigrants. From 1934 through 1936 inclusive, 32,516 persons came in on the Labor Schedule and 15,695 as persons of "Independent Means"; in other words, the heads of workers' families were about twice as many as the heads of middle-class families. In the following years, 1937-1939, the proportion changed on account of the reduction in the Labor Schedule. The total number of heads of families introduced under Category A was practically the same as the number of heads of families entering under the Labor Schedule. However, the total number of those entering under the Labor Schedule was somewhat higher since the number of dependents entering with each worker was greater. During the years 1937-1939, the number of persons belonging to families entering under Category A was 11,968 as compared to 16,642 entering as dependents of those holding Labor Schedule certificates. An interesting feature of the development from 1934 on, is the very much larger number of persons admitted under Cate-

gory B, i.e., orphans, religious persons, and students. The total number of persons admitted under this Category in the six years from 1934 to 1939 was 14,188 as against 975 admitted in the previous six years. Of these, 4,635 came in on the *Youth Aliyah*.

Under the slogan "Youth Aliyah," an important movement was initiated in 1933, aimed at the re-education of German-Jewish youth for life in Palestine. The initiative came from youth organizations and child care institutions in Germany who were faced with the hopelessness of the Jewish situation when the Nazis rose to power. In Palestine, the work was conducted as a coordinated effort in which the Department for the Settlement of the German Youth of the Jewish Agency, the Labor Cooperative Settlements, and the Social Service Department of the *Vaad Leumi* were closely cooperating. As head of the last named institution, Miss Henrietta Szold directed the enterprise. The youth were brought to Palestine in groups organized on the basis of mutual interests and old associations. Strict medical supervision was exercised all along the line until the young people were established in the various cooperative settlements, farm schools, and other institutions which provided proper training and living conditions. The training in Palestine lasted for a two-year period and included work in agriculture or technical education coupled with instruction in the Hebrew language, history and Palestine geography. The day was divided into two parts: a period of four or five hours devoted to work and a study period of the same length; an educational program followed, being generally similar to that in rural Labor schools. At the end of the two years' training, the cooperative colony where the young people received their training generally accepted them as members or helped to establish them in other ways. Between 1934 and 1939, the greater part of the *Youth Aliyah*—as many as 90 percent—came from Germany and Austria, partly because of the need and partly because the Government ruled that the *Youth Aliyah* certificates should be used only for youth of these countries.

The number of Jews who came to Palestine from the time the Nazis seized power in Germany till the outbreak of the War—over 200,000—was larger by far than immigrated into any other country. During the same period 92,133 Jews were

admitted to the United States, which was, next to Palestine, the largest country of Jewish immigration.<sup>25</sup> The third largest area of Jewish immigration, the large South American countries—Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay—together admitted about 50,000 Jewish immigrants.<sup>26</sup> Of the 200,000 Jews who migrated to Palestine, over one-fourth came from Germany, Austria and Italy. During the years 1933-1937, Palestine absorbed more persons coming from the Axis-dominated areas than any other country in the world, including the United States. The figures of German immigration, for instance, show that during this period 25,400 refugees came to the United States, as against 34,000 to Palestine.<sup>27</sup> If the years between the occupation of Austria (March 1938) and the entry of the United States into the War are included, then Palestine ranks second after the United States as far as the absorption of German and Austrian refugees is concerned: approximately 75,000 immigrants from Germany and Austria were admitted to the United States, as compared with about 50,000 who went to Palestine.<sup>28</sup>

In view of the large German-Jewish immigration, the Jewish Agency established a Central Bureau for the Settlement of German Jews in 1933. The Bureau was established with the assistance of the following funds: Central British Fund for German Jews, the Council for German Jewry, the *Arbeitsgemeinschaft fuer Kinder und Jugendalijah*, the Palestine Foundation Fund (*Keren Hayesod*), and the Jewish National Fund (*Keren Kayemeth*). The Central Bureau granted long-term loans to agricultural settlements, rendered financial assistance for construction of buildings in rural settlements, and provided vocational training and social and educational services. From its establishment in October 1933 until the end of 1939, the Bureau expended over a million pounds on these services.

Despite the large Jewish immigration during this decade, the Jewish Agency maintained that the country could have ab-

25. *American Jewish Yearbook*, Vol. 44, Jewish Publication Society, Philadelphia, 1942, p. 439.

26. *Ibid.*, pp. 444-445.

27. Arie Tartakover, "The Jewish Refugees," *Jewish Social Studies*, October, 1942, p. 321.

28. *Ibid.*, *op. cit.*, p. 321.

sorbed an even larger rate of immigration, particularly under the Labor Schedule. During the period 1930 through 1939, the number of Labor Certificates requested by the Jewish Agency amounted to 171,430, while the Government granted only 59,180, or a little over a third. The ratio of certificates granted to those requested differed from year to year: the highest percentage was in 1931, the request being for 3,510 certificates and the number granted, 1,980 (over 56 percent); the lowest was in 1937, when the Jewish Agency requested close to 22,000 certificates, while the Government granted only 2,570 (less than 12 percent). The usual contention of the Government was that its restrictions on Labor Certificates were due to economic reasons, i.e., in their judgment, the country's economic absorptive capacity was less than estimated by the Jewish Agency. Whatever validity there may have been to the Government's position in the early period when the immigration was large, after 1936 the restrictions were mainly due to political factors.

#### *Illegal Immigration*

The figures cited above do not include "illegal" immigration<sup>29</sup> of which there was a considerable amount—both Arab and Jewish. Illegal entry into Palestine was accomplished in one of three ways: 1) by evading the frontier controls; 2) by entering as a tourist or traveler and overstaying the term of the visa; 3) by fictitious marriages. The method of evading frontier controls was practised by both Jews and Arabs. Jews came across the land frontiers from Syria, Trans-Jordan and occasionally from Egypt; or by sea, arriving in specially chartered ships which landed passengers after dark. Evasion of the border controls was relatively more frequent among the Arabs, who passed easily from Syria, Trans-Jordan, and sometimes from Egypt, since their dress and general appearance resembled that of the native populations. In addition to this, persons who were resident in Trans-Jordan might, under the Immigration Ordinance,<sup>30</sup> enter Palestine without passports.

29. Except in the case of illegal immigrants whose position was later legalized.

30. *Immigration Ordinance No. 32 of 1925*, par. 4 (2) and *Immigration Ordinance No. 38 of 1933*, par. (2).

It was theoretically assumed that such immigrants came for seasonal work and returned to Trans-Jordan, but it was well known that many of them stayed on as permanent settlers. The Arabs could also take advantage of the *bon-voisinage* agreement between Palestine and Syria made in 1926.<sup>31</sup> In accordance with this, inhabitants of districts in Syria and Lebanon adjacent to Palestine—the so-called “limitrophic districts”—were free to enter Palestine without special formality if they were in possession of passes which they could easily obtain. Among those who entered the country as travelers and who stayed on as permanent settlers without regularizing their position, there were both Jews and non-Jews, the latter not necessarily Arabs.<sup>32</sup>

A certain number of immigrants came in through fictitious marriages, a practice largely confined to Jews. Under the Palestine Citizenship Order of 1925, the wife of a Palestinian citizen was herself a Palestinian citizen and could not, therefore, be deported. Some women not qualified as immigrants under the Immigration Ordinance took advantage of the citizenship law and contracted formal marriages with Palestinians or permanent residents who were not Palestinian citizens. Such marriages took place in Palestine or outside Palestine. When the marriage took place in Palestine, the woman had generally entered the country as a traveler and had paid a deposit on a traveler's visa, or had entered on a bond to leave the country before a certain date. In other cases, a Palestinian would come to the country of the woman's residence while she was still living abroad and a marriage could be contracted according to the Jewish rite recognized in that country.<sup>33</sup>

There were, of course, no precise figures on the amount of illegal immigration. It was probably quite large in the early

31. League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, Vol. LVI, No. 1324, 1926, pp. 79-83.

32. The Jewish Agency referred to the tourist immigrants as “irregular” rather than “illegal,” since at the time of their entry they were authorized to enter. (Jewish Agency for Palestine, *Memorandum to the Palestine Royal Commission*, London, 1936, p. 109.) Without implying any moral difference, it might be said that the distinction was desirable since the number of irregular immigrants could be approximately known and in any case there was some measure of selective control of this type of immigration.

33. *Royal Commission Report*, p. 290.

years: the Palestine Government estimated that in the two years 1932-1933 the number of unauthorized settlers rose to 22,400.<sup>34</sup> Beginning with September 1933, statistics were available for the number of "travellers remaining illegally" in Palestine as well as for the number of persons deported. Between 1933 and 1939 inclusive, 24,822 travelers remained illegally, of whom 11,248 were Jews and 13,574 were non-Jews. The number of persons who were deported was 11,601, of whom 1,456 were Jews and 10,145 non-Jews.

The record showed, contrary to the general impression, that the number of non-Jewish travelers remaining illegally in Palestine was larger than the number of Jews doing so; and, moreover, judging by the number of persons deported, that the number of illegal immigrants was also probably larger among non-Jews. The disparity was particularly great if we compare the number of illegal immigrants with the total number of immigrants. Among the Jews, the travelers remaining illegally represented a little under 6 percent of the total number of authorized immigrants, while in the case of the non-Jews, the travelers remaining in the country illegally exceeded the authorized immigrants by 719. The figures for deportation showed a similar situation. For the years 1933-1939, the number of persons deported from Palestine was 11,601, of whom 1,456 were Jews and 10,145 were non-Jews. The Jews deported were less than 1 percent of the total of authorized Jewish immigrants, but the non-Jewish deportees were over 80 percent of the authorized non-Jewish immigrants. It was clear that most of the Arabs who came to Palestine from other countries did so through some form of illegal entry. During the period from 1935 to 1939, when the statistics enable us to differentiate between Arabs and other non-Jews, the record shows that of the 10,599 authorized non-Jewish immigrants only 3,170 were Arabs.

The Hauran in Syria and the Trans-Jordanian part of Palestine were probably the most prolific sources of the illicit Arab immigration, although Egypt contributed a share. On August 12, 1934, *La Syrie* published an interview with the Governor of the Hauran in which he stated that from 30,000 to

34. Royal Institute of International Affairs, *Great Britain and Palestine, 1915-1939*, p. 58.

36,000 Hauranese had entered Palestine in the short period of a few months.<sup>35</sup> The British accredited representative to the Twenty-Seventh Session of the Permanent Mandates Commission maintained that the figures must have been grossly exaggerated, and in his opinion few of the Hauranese and Trans-Jordanians remained permanently in Palestine, but he admitted that there were no reliable statistics. Despite the official denial by the Government, it is probable that the number of illegal Arab settlers from neighboring countries was by no means small. On the basis of an unofficial census conducted at Petach Tikvah in February, 1935, it was found that of 3,220 Arabs employed in the colony, 1,470 were Hauranese or Trans-Jordanians. In a count made in and around Haifa, the number of non-Palestinian Arabs in employment on successive days in February was found to average close to 1,800.<sup>36</sup> The Hauranese have built up a "petrol tin town" in the vicinity of the railroad station.<sup>37</sup> All of the non-Palestinian workers may not have come in illegally, but circumstances indicated that most of them did so. These workers provided cheap labor which lowered the standard of the native Arab as well as of the Jewish worker. The Jewish Agency protested against the indiscriminate admission of Arabs from Trans-Jordan and Syria as dangerous to health and to public security, claiming that during the disturbances, low-grade Arab laborers from the Hauran played a leading part.<sup>38</sup>

Beginning with November, 1933, the Government undertook energetic measures to prevent and check illegal immigration. In order to control the irregular immigration due to overstaying travelers, every applicant for a tourist's visa was given a

35. Royal Institute of International Affairs, *op. cit.*, p. 59. Another estimate stated that 20,000 Hauranese entered Palestine in the period from April-November, 1934, that only about one-third of these returned, and that the majority of those deported for illegal entry soon found their way back to Palestine. (E. Epstein, "Notes from a Paper on Present Conditions in the Hauran," *Central Asian Journal*, October, 1926.)

36. Jewish Agency for Palestine, 1934 *Memorandum to the Permanent Mandates Commission*, 1935, p. 152.

37. *Ibid.*, pp. 110, 111. This settlement made of discarded gasoline tins was cited as evidence of "the proletarianization of the Palestinian Arabs," by a certain Prof. W. H. Hancock after a hasty visit to Palestine.

38. Jewish Agency for Palestine, *Memorandum to the Palestine Royal Commission*, pp. 113, 114.



printed warning that he was liable to be prosecuted and deported if he overstayed the term of the visa. Moreover, every person not traveling first class was required to have a return ticket and, in addition, deposit the sum of £P60, which was to be forfeited in case he did not leave the country within a specified time.<sup>39</sup> Deportation orders were issued for every person apprehended as being in the country illegally, exception being made only in unusual circumstances. Beginning with April, 1934, the Palestine Administration began the practice of making deductions from the Labor Schedules on the basis of estimated previous illegal Jewish immigration. To combat irregular entry across the frontiers, police control was strengthened and the assistance of the Trans-Jordan frontier force was obtained. Small immigration control forces were also established in the areas of Jaffa and Haifa.

The measures taken by the Government were only partly effective. Jewish illegal immigration was more easily controlled. The number of travelers who overstayed their visas dropped, and the Labor Schedule was reduced by the number of those who still remained. It was far more difficult to control Arab immigration across the borders. In 1935, the Mandatory introduced a system of identity documents for all Trans-Jordanians who wished to enter Palestine.<sup>40</sup> It appears, however, that the system did not work effectively: the Government in 1936 admitted that "it has not yet been possible to arrange for a reasonably complete record of the movement of people to and from Trans-Jordan."<sup>41</sup> Obviously, as long as the economic situation in Palestine was superior to that in the neighboring countries, Palestine would be a magnet attracting Arabs who could easily pass the frontier. Moreover, as long as Palestine's economic absorptive capacity was greater than that estimated by the Government, it was impossible completely to eliminate Jewish illegal immigration. The main result was to produce a non-selective form of immigration instead of the carefully controlled type made possible with the collaboration of the Jewish Agency for Palestine.

39. Great Britain, *Report on the Administration of Palestine for 1933*, p. 37.

40. Permanent Mandates Commission, *Minutes of the Twenty-Ninth Session*, 1936, p. 141.

41. Government of Palestine, Department of Migration, *Annual Report for 1936*, p. 20.

DEVELOPMENTS IN THE JEWISH  
NATIONAL HOME

The development during the 1930's demonstrated the economic feasibility of the Jewish national home. Public capital derived from the Jewish funds continued to be an important factor, but private capital played an increasingly significant role, e.g., in the extension of citrus cultivation, in the promotion of building operations and in the growth of manufacturing and trade. Both rural and urban areas made progress.

In the eight-year interval from the census of 1931 to the outbreak of the Second World War, the Jewish population increased roughly by 300,000, from 175,000 to 475,000.<sup>42</sup> The estimates for the Jewish rural population vary to some extent: in 1931 it was probably 40,000-45,000, or between 23-26 percent of the total Jewish population and about 4.5 percent of the total population of Palestine, Jewish and non-Jewish. In 1939 the Jewish rural population was probably about 125,000-135,000, about 26-28 percent of the total Jewish population or about 9 percent of the total population.

There was thus a substantial growth in the Jewish rural population. The growth in the agricultural population, however, was not quite so large since a considerable proportion of the Jews in the rural neighborhoods were engaged in other occupations outside of agriculture. In the decade of the 1930's, moreover, some of the larger colonies developed a considerable amount of industry: the introduction of improved transportation facilities—particularly around Tel-Aviv—provided opportunities for the development of centers devoted to a combination of agriculture and industry. The Jewish agricultural population rose from an estimated 25,000 in 1931 to 68,000 in 1941, showing a slight decrease in the ratio of Jews engaged in agriculture to the total Jewish population.<sup>43</sup> Taking the decade as a whole, the Jews engaged in agriculture constituted roughly one-seventh of the total Jewish population.

42. In accordance with the estimate of the Jewish Agency; the official Government figure, which does not include unrecorded immigration is 445,457.

43. Alex Bein, *Development of Zionist Colonization* (Hebrew), Masada, Jerusalem, 1943, p. 429.

*Growth of Jewish Agricultural Settlements*

The number of agricultural settlements more than doubled from 124 in 1931 to 252 in 1939. Most of the development took place in the plains: the coastal plain south of Tel-Aviv and north to Haifa; the Plain of Esdraelon and the Valley of Jezreel; and the Jordan Valley. There was a particularly intensive development in the *Wadi Hawareth* area—in the coastal plain between Jaffa and Haifa; as a consequence of drainage and intensive development work carried out by the Jewish Agency, this malaria-ridden district was made suitable for the settlement of thousands of families. The number of settlements in the hill country also increased: from fourteen to twenty-six in Galilee; from fourteen to twenty-eight in Samaria; and from six to ten in the hills of Judea.<sup>44</sup> The new agricultural settlements developed along the three established modes: the colony or homestead type (*moshavah*); the workers' settlement (*moshav ovdim*); and the communal village (*kvutzah*). The largest increase was in the workers' settlements and communal villages, although in terms of population and individual holdings, the homestead type still predominated at the end of the period.

The table on page 687 shows the types of settlement and population at the end of 1938:<sup>45</sup>

As a result of the establishment of new settlements and the enlargement of the older ones, the area under crops—wheat, barley, oats, forage, etc.—showed considerable increase during the period. A special effort was made to stimulate the development of mixed farming, particularly dairy products, eggs, poultry for the market, vegetables, fruits and honey. The increase in this branch of Jewish agriculture was reflected in the annual turnover of *Tnuvah*, the Jewish cooperative marketing organization for dairy products and juices. In 1931, *Tnuvah* handled some 3,000,000 litres of milk and 1,600,000 eggs: in 1938, the figures had gone to 17,500,000 in each case.

44. Government of Palestine, *Statistical Abstract of Palestine 1941*, p. 44.

45. Jewish Agency, *The Establishment in Palestine of the Jewish National Home*: Memorandum on the Development of the Jewish National Home, 1938 (submitted to the Permanent Mandates Commission), 1939, p. 11.

Type of Settlement	Settlements		Population	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Organized as moshavot (villages in which both land and equipment are private property)	80	34.3	96,772	72.4
Organized as moshavim (small holders' settlements)	71	30.5	16,520	13.6
Organized as <i>kvutso</i> t (communal settlements)	68	29.2	15,315	12.8
Various —schools, training farms, estates, etc.	14	6.0	1,393	1.2
Total	233	100.0	120,000	100.0

This great development in mixed farming was the more remarkable in the light of the fact that Palestine had to compete with duty-free products from Syria, where the wages and standard of living were considerably lower. The fishing industry also made progress: a number of trawlers were acquired for operating along the coast; settlements near Lake Tiberias and Lake Huleh added this branch to the regular agricultural pursuits.

A very extensive development took place in the citrus industry, both Jewish and non-Jewish. The area under cultivation increased from something over 100,000 dunams in 1930 to 300,000 dunams at the end of the decade. Toward the end of the period something more than half of this area was owned by Jews. The export of citrus fruit rose from 2,500,000 cases in 1930 to 15,000,000 cases in 1939; the share contributed to the exports by Jewish crops was about 37 percent in 1930 and 60 percent in 1939. This rapid extension of the area under citrus cultivation was by no means an unmixed blessing. Although Palestine has ideal conditions for the citrus industry and produces a superior type of fruit, it was confronted by a number of difficulties. The feeder road system leading out to the highways connected with the port of Haifa was incomplete; during the disturbances many trees were damaged and irrigation machinery destroyed; and the interruption of commerce as a result of the Italo-Ethiopian war badly affected the export trade. In general, the uncertain market conditions make

orange growing in Palestine a highly speculative industry. Tariff obstacles were a major difficulty: most of the crop went to the United Kingdom, but Palestine had not been admitted to the system of Imperial Preference and had to compete at a disadvantage with South African oranges. The citrus industry is particularly hampered by the provisions of Article 18 of the Mandate, which has in general affected the Palestinian export trade adversely.<sup>46</sup>

Many of the new settlements were established on Jewish National Fund land and supported in the beginning by *Keren Hayesod* funds. PICA (Palestine Jewish Colonization Association) also continued its activities, and in 1938 two new settlements were established. Its main endeavor, however, was concentrated on consolidating and enlarging existing colonies, with special attention to improved water supply and irrigation. Wells were drilled at deeper levels in several of the colonies with gratifying results. In 1936, the EMICA Association was founded as a cooperative effort of PICA and the Emergency Fund.<sup>47</sup> One of the major enterprises of the EMICA was the reconstruction of the colony of Beer Tuvia in southern Judea—which had been destroyed in 1929—as a workers' settlement, devoted to mixed farming. Another new organization was the Rural and Suburban Settlement Company (RASSCO). This was established in 1935 by the Central Bureau for the Settlement of German Jews which was attached to the Jewish Agency, half of the ordinary shares of the company being contributed by the *Keren Hayesod*. Its purpose was to promote colonization of middle-class settlers from Germany. The company established three agricultural settlements specializing in poultry and dairy farming, market-gardening and the cultivation of fruit trees. A new type of settlement developed by this group enables Jewish artisans and businessmen working in Haifa to build homes in the suburbs with small areas devoted to vegetable plots and fruit trees.

During the period under review a number of special organizations supplemented the work of the larger colonization agencies. These included financial institutions, companies for

46. See below, p. 732.

47. The Emergency Fund was raised in connection with the disturbances of 1929; the balance left over after distributing relief was devoted to constructive purposes.

the improvement of water supply and marketing organizations. The main institutions were:

*The Central Bank of Cooperative Institutions:* Founded in 1922 by the Palestine Economic Corporation. It continued to operate in the settlements, granting loans to cooperative credit societies and agricultural cooperatives.

*The Nir Association:* Founded by the Agricultural Workers' Federation to supply members of the latter with long-term credits for settlement purposes.

*The Farmers' Bank:* Founded in 1934 by the Palestine Jewish Farmers' Federation for the purposes of issuing long-term loans to members against mortgages.

*The Jewish Agricultural Trust:* Founded by the Jewish Agency in conjunction with the Anglo-Palestine Bank to issue loans to small agriculturists at a low rate of interest.

*Cooperative Credit Institutions:* There were 18,907 Jewish members enrolled in sixty-four rural credit societies at the end of 1937.

*Tnuvah:* Cooperative marketing institution which distributed milk, dairy products, vegetables, fruit, etc., produced by the Jewish agricultural settlements.

*Yakhin:* Agricultural contracting cooperative affiliated with the *Histadrut*, for the development and management of orange plantations.

*Cooperative Water Societies:* In 1938 there were sixty-one cooperative societies (all Jewish) for the improvement of water supplies.

*Palestine Water Company:* Founded by the Palestine Economic Corporation to extend its irrigation operations. Its activities were centered in the Pardess Hannah-Karkur area of PICA settlements.

*The Mekorot Water Company:* Organized through cooperation of the settlers in the villages concerned and the Jewish national funds (*Keren Hayesod*, *Keren Kayemeth*, Central Bureau for the Settlement of German Jews, the Nir Association). The main purpose was to supply settlements in the Plain of Esdraelon from water resources around Haifa.

*Palestine Agricultural Settlement Association (PASA):* Established by the Jewish Agency in 1936 for the purpose of giving loans at low rates of interest, against good security, to settlements initiated by individuals or groups. The loans are given for the purpose of stabilizing or further developing settlements which in most cases were founded through *Keren Hayesod* resources.

Agricultural research and training were of significance in aiding the development. Most of the schools in the Jewish

settlement have vegetable gardens and demonstration plots. Two children's villages—one at Meir Shefaya, supported by Junior Hadassah in America, and the other at Ben Shemen, founded by a German society—combine a general and agricultural education. The major institutions for agricultural research and training established before and during the 1930's are as follows:

*The Agricultural College at Mikveh Israel:* Founded in 1870 by the *Alliance Israélite*. It provides theoretical and practical instruction in every branch of agriculture in Palestine. From 1919–1937, there were 995 students who completed courses at the school. The graduates included owners of farms and workers in agriculture. In 1938, the school was attended by 390 boys, 80 of whom had come from Germany, Austria and Czechoslovakia.

*The Agricultural Experiment Station of the Jewish Agency at Rehovoth:* Designed to carry on research work on agricultural problems, e.g., intensification of production, diversification of agriculture, development of the hill districts, improvement of citrus production, acclimatization of tropical and subtropical fruits. A model farm attached to the Station experiments with a unit of mixed farming on an irrigated area of twenty to twenty-five dunams. An extension service is conducted with demonstration fields in all parts of the country.

*Daniel Sieff Research Institute at Rehovoth:* Founded by Mr. Israel Sieff, a prominent Manchester Zionist, for scientific research in agriculture, bacteriology, physical chemistry and pharmaceuticals, with the purpose of increasing the productivity of the soil, combating plant and animal diseases and promoting industries based on agriculture. The research institute works in close collaboration with the Agricultural Experiment Station at Rehovoth and the Hebrew University at Jerusalem. The laboratories of the Institute are under the personal supervision of Dr. Weizmann. The experimental research is designed to increase production.

*The Government Kadoorie Agricultural School for Jews:* Established through funds made available under the bequest of a wealthy Oriental Jew, and maintained by the Palestine Government. The school, which is on Mount Tabor, was opened in May 1934. A two-year course in the theory and practice of agriculture is offered. The language of instruction is Hebrew.

*The Girls' Agricultural College at Nahalal:* Maintained by the Women's International Zionist Organization (WIZO). A two-year practical course is given in dairy, poultry, vegetable and tree nursery branches. In 1938 it was attended by 127 pupils, of whom 45 came from Germany. The WIZO also maintains training groups for

agricultural instruction in a number of places throughout the country which were attended by several hundred students.

*Agricultural Training College at Pardess Hanna:* Established in 1934 by the Jewish Farmers' Federation of Palestine. The course lasts five years and combines instruction in agriculture with general secondary education. In 1938 it was attended by 100 boys and girls from the Jewish villages of the *moshava* or private ownership type.

An opportunity for a large-scale agricultural development project in the future was obtained when the Palestine Land Development Company, in 1934, purchased the concession for the Lake Huleh area. The Huleh (the Biblical Waters of Merom) is a triangular strip of land in the north of Palestine above the Sea of Galilee, some forty-four square miles in area. Owing to poorly constructed canals the area is over-irrigated and has been, for generations, the most malarious tract in the whole of Palestine. All investigators agree that the area may become an exceedingly fertile district if properly drained. Its development hitherto was prevented by the fact that the concession for drainage of the lake and adjacent marshes had been given before the War by the Ottoman Government to two merchants of Beirut. In 1918, this concession was transferred to the Syro-Ottoman Agricultural Company. Neither of these concessionaires did any significant work in draining the lake or marshes, utilizing their concession mainly for renting to the tenant cultivators. The Jewish Agency had questioned the validity of the concession on the ground that nothing had been done to carry out the terms on which it had been given. But the rights of the concessionaires were upheld by the Government. The Jewish Agency finally purchased the area with the Government's approval, paying the very high price of £P192,000.

The area of the concession includes about 56,940 metric dunams of which 18,568 are cultivable at present, 21,453 are marshes and 16,919 are lake. The concession was granted on the condition that an area of 15,772 dunams be reserved for Arab cultivators. Moreover, the Jewish company was made responsible for the reclamation through drainage and irrigation of all land within the concession area at the company's own expense, including the area now occupied by Arabs or reserved for occupation by them. A firm of English experts who were consulted by the EMICA, one of the Jewish bodies



concerned in the project, declared that a large area north of the concession would have to be drained and irrigated if pestilential malaria was to be totally eliminated. Including this area, 100,000 dunams of land could be reclaimed, of which two-thirds would be in Arab and one-third in Jewish hands. The total cost of the scheme was estimated at £P933,000, of which £P222,600 would be for works outside of the concession area and would have to be borne by the Government.<sup>48</sup>

The Jews expected to operate the concession through setting up a consortium of all of the Jewish bodies concerned with the colonization, i.e., the *Keren Kayemeth*, the EMICA, the PICA (Baron de Rothschild funds) and the ICA (Baron de Hirsch funds) and the Refugee Economic Corporation of New York. The undertaking would not be profitable in the ordinary sense and the most the Jewish bodies could hope for was the repayment of the capital invested over a long period of years. It was estimated that while the land reserved for Arabs would cost Government something like £P13 per acre, it would cost the Jewish consortium £P110 per acre. In the light of the large Jewish investment which would benefit both Arabs and Jews—indeed, two-thirds of the land benefit would be in Arab hands—the Jewish Agency has delayed the execution of the plan pending a decision on the part of the Government, whether it was ready to invest the share necessary for developing the purely Arab area falling outside of the concession. Although the Palestine Royal Commission commended the enterprise, the Government had not by 1939 defined its obligation; and then the outbreak of the War intervened.

#### *Urban and Industrial Development*

The new Jewish immigrants as well as the old settlers were adapting themselves to agricultural and to rural life. Land settlement, however, was necessarily a slow process and the development in the towns surpassed the growth in the rural districts. All of the major urban centers grew in population. Some places, previously accounted rural, assumed an urban character, e.g., Petach Tikvah, with a population of about 18,000, received the status of a municipality in 1938 when it celebrated its sixtieth anniversary. The number of Jews in Jaffa increased also, although after the development of Tel-

48. *Royal Commission Report*, p. 258.

Aviv it became mainly an Arab town. The growth in Jerusalem, Haifa, Jaffa and Tel-Aviv in total population and in percentage of Jews is indicated in the following table:

City	1931			1942		
	Total Population	Jewish Population	%	Total Population	Jewish Population	%
Jerusalem	90,503	51,222	56.8	143,800	87,400	60.8
Haifa	50,403	15,923	31.5	116,400	58,200	50.0
Jaffa	51,866	7,209	13.9	86,900	24,300	28.0
Tel-Aviv	46,101	45,564	99.0	143,200	142,600	99.6

The most remarkable instance of urban development was that of the all-Jewish town of Tel-Aviv. The population grew from 46,101 in 1931 to 131,700 in 1939. In the year 1937-1938 the income of the municipality was almost £P500,000, exceeding the combined budgets of the other twenty-two municipalities of Palestine. The income of the town was mainly from local taxes, rates and fees; the Government contributed a small subsidy of about £P35,000. Of the expenditures, more than half were on education and health, with about equal amounts expended on each. The development of Tel-Aviv as a center of trade and industry was further stimulated by the construction of a small port at Tel-Aviv for the landing of freight (1936) and passengers (1938), and by the opening of a municipal airport.

It is assumed that between 1933 and 1939, £63,000,000 of Jewish capital were imported into Palestine.<sup>49</sup> Government immigration statistics<sup>50</sup> show that 23,287 Jewish immigrants, with at least £P1,000 capital per family, came into Palestine in the seven year period, 1933-1939. Of course many of these immigrants had larger amounts. It has been estimated that the total amount of capital imported in 1934 was £P10,000,000, and in 1935, £P16,000,000.<sup>51</sup> While a part of this capital was kept in the banks for future use, considerable amounts were invested in industry and served to create a remarkable expansion of the country's machinery of production. The largest part of

49. D. Horowitz, "Bermuda and Palestine," *Palestine and the Middle East*, May, 1943, p. 84.

50. Palestine Department of Migration, *Annual Report, 1939*.

51. Royal Institute of International Affairs, *Great Britain and Palestine 1915-1939*, p. 63.

JEWISH INDUSTRY AND TRADE 1937  
(*Jewish Agency Memorandum to the League of Nations 1938, p. 23*)

	<i>Number of Establishments</i>	<i>Personnel on Census Day</i>	<i>Invested Capital £P</i>	<i>Annual Volume of Business £P</i>
Manufacture and handicrafts	5,606	29,986	11,637,000	9,109,000 (production)
Motor traffic	556	2,831	756,000	1,112,000 (working revenue)
Lighterage and marine transport	10	1,400	400,000	200,000
Retail distribution	7,103	17,545	5,692,000	11,280,000 (sales)
Wholesale distribution	519	2,696	2,241,000	8,342,000 (sales to retailers and consumers)
Trade in citrus fruit	18	318	817,000	2,721,000 (mainly exports)
Total in 1937	13,812	54,776	21,543,000	32,742,000 (including duplicate entries)
Total in 1930	6,100	19,000	4,300,000	11,800,000
Increase during seven years	130%	190%	400%	180%

this capital was introduced into Palestine by immigrants from Germany and Czechoslovakia who brought business experience and special skills as well as financial resources. There was also a large increase of skilled workers and experts in the general industrial field, metal trades, textiles, chemicals, as well as architects and engineers.

The tempo of industrial development may be gauged from the records of the two large concession companies initiated by Jewish enterprise: the Palestine Electric Corporation and the Palestine Potash Co. The Palestine Electric Corporation, active since 1923, had a capital of £P4,500,000 in 1939 and employed approximately 1,500 persons. The quantity of electric power sold for industrial purposes increased more than sevenfold—from 3,239,258 kwh. in 1931 to 25,104,437 kwh. in 1939. The Palestine Potash Company, founded in 1930, which owns large plants at the northern and southern ends of the Dead Sea, in 1939 employed over a thousand workers, Jews and Arabs, between whom good relations continued to prevail despite the disturbances. Between 1932 and 1939 the output increased enormously—from 9,000 tons of potash valued at about £P70,000, to 63,500 tons of potash and 590,000 tons of bromine valued at £P428,000. Industrial production was greatly diversified and now included foods, textiles, clothing, metal goods, machinery, timber products, leather goods, printing and paper products, stone and cement, and electrical machinery.

At the end of 1936, in accordance with the census made by the Jewish Agency, there were 5,606 Jewish establishments engaged in industries and handicrafts.<sup>52</sup> Among these were 540 factories each employing ten or more workers; 1,016 workshops employing five or more; and 4,050 artisans' establishments with the owner the sole worker. The principal groups were: the food group which produced about one-fourth, the stone and cement groups which turned out one-eighth, and the chemical group which turned out one-tenth, of the total product in terms of money value. The tables on page 696 indicate the growth of industrial establishments since 1929 and the distribution in accordance with various types of industry to the end of 1936.

The Jewish industrial development did not compete to any

52. Government of Palestine, *Statistical Abstract of Palestine 1937-1938*, pp. 162 ff.

appreciable extent with the Arab industries since most of the Jewish output was confined to articles not produced or used by Arabs. Exceptions were soap, cigarettes, shoes, and some articles of wearing apparel, but here, too, there was little

JEWISH INDUSTRIAL GROWTH 1929-1937<sup>53</sup>

(Source: Jewish Agency for Palestine)

	1929	1933	1937
Number of enterprises	2,475	3,388	5,606
Workers employed	10,968	19,595	29,986
Capital invested (£P)	2,235,000	5,371,000	11,637,000
Value of annual production (£P)	2,510,000	5,352,000	9,109,000
Consumption of electricity (kwh.)	2,214,000	6,576,000	28,324,000

JEWISH INDUSTRIAL ESTABLISHMENTS<sup>54</sup>

(Jewish Agency Census 1937)

	Establish- ments	Personnel. Owners and Workers on Census Day	Output: Full 12 Months £P	Capital £P
Food	383	3,929	2,305,000	1,651,000
Textiles	116	1,576	377,000	484,000
Clothing	1,207	3,450	546,000	286,000
Metal works	600	2,765	788,000	710,000
Machinery	433	1,476	301,000	255,000
Timber products	657	3,011	806,000	482,000
Leather works	683	1,830	420,000	199,000
Paper products, printing	425	2,821	597,000	583,000
Chemicals	91	2,054	888,000	1,600,000
Stone, cement, etc.	251	3,286	1,069,000	1,322,000
Electrical machinery	122	539	144,000	115,000
Miscellaneous	634	1,879	285,000	249,000
Total	5,602	28,616	8,526,000	7,936,000
Electric plants	4	1,370	583,000	3,701,000
Total	5,606	29,986	9,109,000	11,637,000

53. D. Horowitz, *Industry in Palestine: Achievements and Possibilities*, Economic Research Institute, Jewish Agency, Tel-Aviv, 1941.

54. Government of Palestine, *Statistical Abstract of Palestine 1937-1938*, p. 163.

duplication since the type and quality of articles demanded by the Arabs differed from those required by the Jews. Although the two industrial economies—Arab and Jewish—were quite separate, there was of course some interchange. It has been estimated that about 10 percent of the Jewish industrial output found its way into the Arab market, electricity being the main item.<sup>55</sup> Arab industry, which also grew during the period, penetrated the Jewish market more readily since its products, based on a lower wage rate, were cheaper. There was one important branch, namely the building trade, in which the Arabs had the advantage since they possessed a virtual monopoly in stone quarrying and dressing and in the lime industries. The investment in building was predominantly Jewish, while the supply of materials has largely been in Arab hands. The importance of this may be gauged from the fact that building and the manufacture of building materials constitutes the most important single occupation in Palestine apart from agriculture. In the ten-year period 1930-1939 over £P42,000,000 was spent on building in Palestine. Investments in building expanded with Jewish immigration. In 1929, the amount invested was only £P700,000; in 1930 this had risen to £P2,500,000; it reached a peak in 1935 with close to £P8,500,000. In the five years between 1933 and 1937, years of large Jewish immigration, the investment in building was over £P30,000,000. The curtailment of Jewish immigration after 1936 led to a decline and in 1939 the amount invested was only £P1,800,000.

There was also a development of Arab industry, due partly to the general development of the country and partly to the stimulus of Jewish effort. It is, however, not possible to state exactly to what extent Arab industry expanded since no survey was made after 1928. Palestine's industrial production, both Arab and Jewish, continued to be mainly for the home market. The figure for exports of industrial production increased from £P365,000 in 1930 to £P765,000 in 1939. While this showed a substantial growth, the export of industrial products, even at the later date, represented only 7 percent of the total industrial production. The major exports constituted agricultural products: soap and wine, olive and other edible oils and fruit juices. The main export commodity was citrus fruit, which

55. D. Horowitz, *op. cit.*

constituted about 80 percent of the value of all exports. Next to oranges, potash was the largest single export after 1935.

### *Developments in Education*

The development of the Jewish national home as a self-sustaining community reflected itself in the financial organization of the school system. During the second decade the Hebrew school system became practically "self-supporting," i.e., it ceased to be dependent on contributions from abroad, collected through the *Keren-Hayesod*. In 1929–1930, out of a total expenditure of £P180,000 on the schools maintained by or affiliated with the Department of Education of the *Vaad Leumi*, the Jewish Agency still contributed a substantial proportion, £P76,200, or almost 42 percent. In 1931–1932, this was reduced to £P40,000, and later, in 1934–1935, to £P20,000. In the last-named year the expenditure of the *Vaad Leumi* schools had increased to about £P250,000, and the contribution of the Jewish Agency thus constituted only about 8 percent of the total cost of the Hebrew school system. After 1936, the Jewish Agency's subsidy was again increased in amount, though its proportion to the total expenditure of the Hebrew public school system grew less. In 1938–1939, the Jewish Agency contributed £P30,000 to the *Vaad Leumi* education budget—or about 6.5 percent of a total of £P450,000 expended on the Hebrew public schools.

The Government grant-in-aid to the Hebrew public school system increased in amount but not in ratio. In 1927, when the Government first gave a subsidy to the Hebrew public school system, it was in the form of a fixed grant-in-aid which was based on the proportion of Jews to non-Jews in the general population of that year and remained stationary despite the subsequent increase in population. From 1928 to 1932, the grant amounted to £P20,000, less a sum deducted for inspectorial expense. In 1933, after many representations by the Jewish community, the Government abandoned the principle of a fixed grant and agreed to increase the subsidy annually on the basis of the proportion of Jewish children of school age to the total number of children of school age. In the light of the increase of the Jewish population and the larger amounts spent by the Government on Arab education, the grants to the Jewish schools increased from year to year. In 1933–1934, the

Government grant was raised to £P26,600, and in 1938-1939, it was practically double that amount, i.e., £P52,600. In terms of the proportion of the Government grant to the total cost of the Hebrew school system, however, there was no improvement. The proportion generally amounted to about 11 or 12 percent.

The greatest increase in source of income was from the *Yishuv* itself. In 1929, as noted, the *Yishuv* had contributed some £P78,800 out of a total budget of £P180,000, or approximately 40 percent. This was a considerable improvement over the situation in the earlier years of the decade of the 1920's, when only 10 to 20 percent of the funds required by the Zionist school system were collected from the country. In 1933-1934, when the total budget of the Hebrew school system was close to £P200,000, the *Yishuv* contributed over £P360,000—80 percent—out of a total of £P450,000; other sources were, Government £P52,600, Jewish Agency £P30,000, PICA and other bodies nearly £P5,000. The contribution of the *Yishuv* together with that of the Government amounted to 92 percent; thus by far the greater part of the funds needed to support the school system was derived from the country.

Along with the shift in the major financial responsibility came a transfer of administrative responsibility from the Jewish Agency to Palestine Jewry. In the fall of 1932, after much public discussion, the educational system was transferred from the Jewish Agency, its previous directing authority, to the *Vaad Leumi*, or General Council of the Jewish Community of Palestine. The financial contribution of the Jewish Agency assumed the form of a block grant-in-aid to the *Vaad Leumi*, on which body there now devolved the responsibility of balancing the budget, making the contracts with teachers, and other administrative tasks. The too precipitate curtailments of the grants of the Jewish Agency resulted on a number of occasions in the closing of schools, caused great hardships to the teachers, and at times strained the educational system to the breaking point. In the long run, however, the release from dependence on foreign voluntary sources of income proved salutary. It became possible to make a reliable estimate of income, and this aided in bringing about a more orderly financial administration with consequent improvement in the general management of the school system. Jewish educational



needs still outrun financial resources; a solution of the problem is dependent on the passage of a compulsory education law and the increase of support from Government sources.

In order to raise larger funds from local sources financial decentralization was resorted to. The municipality of Tel-Aviv and other constituted local councils and settlement committees became financially independent, receiving only a relatively small grant-in-aid from the *Vaad Leumi*. The funds at the disposal of the *Vaad Leumi* were given to the elementary school system in the mixed municipalities of Jerusalem and Haifa, where the predominance of Arabs in the municipalities still made it impossible to raise adequate funds for education through local rates.

From another point of view there was a higher degree of unification: the Labor schools, which had heretofore been in the category of "affiliated" schools under the Board of Education, were admitted into the "maintained" class, assuming a position parallel with the *Mizrahi* and General schools in method of administration. A special inspector for the Labor schools was added to the staff of the *Vaad Leumi* Department of Education. The *Vaad Hahinukh* (Board of Education), under which the Hebrew education system had grown up, continued to function. It is composed of the representatives of the three types of schools—General, *Mizrahi* and Labor—and includes representation from the Teachers Association. A representative of the Government Department of Education also attends meetings. At the time of the transfer from the Jewish Agency, a small Executive Education Committee (*Vaad Hamenahel*) was organized for administrative purposes. It consists of a representative of the Jewish Agency and representatives of the *Vaad Leumi*, the Tel-Aviv Municipality, and of certain of the Jewish villages. The actual administration and supervision of the school system is carried out by the Department of Education (*Machlekat Hahinukh*) which includes a Director, Inspectors for the three types of schools, and a clerical staff.

The major expenditure in the Hebrew public school system is on the elementary schools system; kindergarten and secondary schools receive only small grants-in-aid. Even in elementary education, as already noted, the major expenditure falls—in the municipality of Tel-Aviv and other larger local coun-

cils—on the local authorities. The four training colleges associated with the *Vaad Leumi* system continued to develop during the second decade, and semi-private training colleges for kindergartners were established. A Department of Pedagogy for the training of teachers in secondary schools was organized at the Hebrew University through the initiative of an American group of Jewish educators. The four training colleges associated with the *Vaad Leumi* are:

*The Hebrew Teachers College at Jerusalem.* This school is co-educational and is designed for the preparation of teachers in the general schools. Students are admitted after completing the secondary school, and receive a two-year course of professional training. An elementary practice school is attached.

*Women's Training College at Tel-Aviv.* This school, whose pupils have completed elementary school, provides a five-year course for kindergarten, and a six-year course for elementary teachers. This school prepares mainly for teaching in general schools. An elementary practice school and a kindergarten are attached.

*The Mizrahi Training School for Men at Jerusalem.* This school admits pupils who have completed elementary school, and gives a course of five years. Emphasis is laid on Hebrew and Talmud.

*The Mizrahi Women's Training School at Jerusalem.* This, too, admits pupils after completion of elementary school, and gives a five-year course. It has a small boarding section.

The Jewish non-public schools—those not affiliated with the *Vaad Leumi*—as indicated in a previous chapter, comprise several distinct types. Some of the schools—mostly on the kindergarten or secondary school level—are modern, not differing essentially in curriculum from the Hebrew schools under the auspices of the *Vaad Leumi*. They are private simply in the sense that they receive no financial help or supervision from the *Vaad Leumi*. A second type of Jewish non-public school corresponds somewhat to the Christian schools maintained by foreign associations: these include the Evelina de Rothschild School for Girls at Jerusalem, maintained by the Anglo-Jewish Association, and the schools of the *Alliance Israélite Universelle*. The *Agudath Israel*, the ultra-orthodox non-Zionist association, also maintains a number of schools. About two-thirds of the children in the Jewish non-public schools are enrolled in the *talmud torahs* or *yeshivahs*, which give instruc-

tion in the traditional curriculum, the Scriptures and Talmud, with reading, writing and some arithmetic. Yiddish is still used as the language of instruction in some of these schools, but Hebrew has gained considerable ground during the last decade or so.

The Jewish institutions for agricultural education have been mentioned in the previous section. Technical education, less well provided for, underwent a certain amount of development during the second decade. Manual training is given in elementary schools; there are two schools for domestic science, one maintained by the *Mizrahi* Women's Organization, and the other by the Women's International Zionist Organization (WIZO). The new Bezalel School in Jerusalem was reorganized and now provides a two years' course in arts and crafts. In addition to a trade school of elementary grade under *Mizrahi* auspices in Tel-Aviv, the following may be mentioned as the most important institutions for vocational education.

*The Hebrew Technical Institute at Haifa.* Associated with the Institute, which is a school of higher grade, are several vocational courses of elementary and secondary grade: 1) the *Technical High School*, which offers graduates of elementary school a three or four year course combining general education with practical technical training. The course prepares metal workers, automobile mechanics, electricians and cabinet makers; 2) a *Nautical School*, established in 1938 and maintained by the Palestine Maritime League of the Jewish Agency. This school offers courses in navigation, marine engineering, wireless operation and shipbuilding. The purpose of the school is to train officers and technical personnel for the growing Palestine merchant marine; 3) extension activities: evening classes and vocational training for adults designed to teach trades to refugees and to supplement the training of immigrant workers. This includes a technical extension service furnishing instructors for the agricultural settlements.

*Max Pine School in Tel-Aviv.* This school, named after an American Labor Zionist leader, was founded and is maintained by the National Labor Committee associated with the *Histadrut*. It is open to graduates of elementary schools, and offers a two or three years' course of training for automobile mechanics, plumbers, locksmiths and cabinetmakers. Hebrew and general subjects are included in the practical technical training. Extension courses are also given to working youth and to adult workers in Tel-Aviv.

*Ludwig Tietz Training School at Yagur.* This school is situated

in the agricultural settlement near Haifa. It was founded in 1936, being named after a German Zionist leader. It conducts a two-year, post-elementary training course designed primarily to provide training for metal workers and carpenters. The school is used as a center for the training of *Youth Aliyah* children.

The Jewish institutions of higher learning—the Hebrew Technical Institute at Haifa and the Hebrew University of Jerusalem—developed with the rest of the educational system during the second decade. The Hebrew Technical Institute (*Technicum*), which is directed by a joint committee of the Jewish Agency and the *Vaad Leumi*, conducts all its work in Hebrew. It has three departments: Architecture, Civil Engineering, and Industrial Engineering, the last including chemical, electrical and mechanical branches. There were about five hundred students in the second decade, dropping to half that number during the war period, due largely to enlistments in the forces or to service in war industries. The final examinations, which are held under the supervision of the Palestine Government, grant a degree corresponding to a degree of B.S. The teaching staff has been enriched by scientists and engineers of world-wide renown who fled Europe after the rise of the Nazi regime. Graduates are quickly absorbed in Palestine and in neighboring countries, and they were particularly in demand during the war period.

Since 1933, a rapid development of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem has taken place, both in enrollment of undergraduate students and in expansion of research activity. Jewish students barred from universities in European countries find opportunity to continue research work in the University's institutes and laboratories. The main departments are the Faculty of Humanities and the Faculty of Science. Graduation from the full European or Palestinian secondary school course (equivalent to freshman or sophomore grade in an American college) is required for entrance as regularly matriculated students at the University. There are three other groups: non-matriculated, auditor, and research. The course is four years, at the end of which the degree of M.A. or M.S. is granted. Students may then be admitted to the graduate division as research students or as candidates for a Ph.D. degree. Until 1935, the student body averaged two hundred. Since then it

has increased rapidly, and at the outbreak of the Second World War it had over a thousand students. During these years the work of the Hebrew University became more closely related to the life of Palestine in the fields of agriculture, health and sanitation, and in educational work. Since 1934, the University has engaged in adult education, conducting extension courses, lectures and symposia.

Among the developments of particular interest during the second decade were:

*Department of Pedagogy.* As a result of the initiative of a group of American Jewish educators, a Department of Pedagogy was established at the University in 1934 and began to function in the fall of 1935. Courses were given in educational methods and in the principles of education. In cooperation with the *Vaad Leumi's* Department of Education, a practice school of junior high school and high school grade was organized at the Teachers Training School at Beth Hakerem in Jerusalem.

*School of Agriculture.* This works in cooperation with the Agricultural Experimental Station of the Jewish Agency and the Daniel Sieff Research Institute, both in Rehovoth. The school provides a five-year course, the first two years being devoted to the study of natural sciences at the University, the third year to practical work in rural settlements under the supervision of the Agricultural Experimental Station, and the last two years to specialized studies in the laboratories of the Daniel Sieff Research Institute.

*Medical Center on Mount Scopus.* This important undertaking has been made possible by the Hadassah Women's Zionist Organization of America. The buildings were completed in 1939. The Medical Center includes the Meyer de Rothschild Hadassah-University Hospital, the Henrietta Szold School of Nursing, and the Nathan Ratnoff Buildings which house the Department of Parasitology and Hygiene, the Department of Pathological Anatomy, the Cancer Research Laboratory, and the Hormone Research Laboratory.

## PROBLEMS OF THE ARAB CULTIVATOR

Although the proportion of Arabs living in the cities rose slightly during the second decade, they—particularly the Moslem section—remained largely a rural population. Moreover, while a considerable part of the Jewish rural population depended on industry rather than agriculture, the Arab rural population was and remains almost completely agricultural. A

point to bear in mind in this connection is that the Arab towns are to no small extent overgrown villages, and many of the inhabitants engage in agriculture either as the major source of livelihood or as a supplementary means of support. Much of the so-called urban work done by the Arabs is ancillary to agriculture, such as the transfer of citrus fruit and the repair of agricultural equipment.<sup>56</sup> In the light of the importance of agriculture for the Moslem section of the population, the problems of the Arab cultivator deserve particular attention.

The report prepared by Sir John Hope Simpson after the 1929 disturbances had brought the position of the Arab *fellah* into the focus of attention.<sup>57</sup> A careful reading of the report indicates that it attributed the poor state of Arab cultivation to long-standing causes: a heavy burden of debt, an outmoded system of land tenure, neglect and misuse of natural resources. However, the conclusion implied in the preceding Shaw Report,<sup>58</sup> i.e., that the position of the Arab cultivator was being endangered by Jewish land purchases, remained an undercurrent in the Government discussions of the lot of the Arab cultivator. To deal with these questions, several investigations were made by the Palestine Administration with the purpose of protecting and improving the position of the Arab *fellah* and of resettling any Arabs who might have been displaced by Jewish purchases.

### *Mushaa, Tithe and Debt*

The first of these investigations was conducted by a local committee appointed by the High Commissioner in April, 1930, and included as Chairman, Mr. E. T. Johnson, the Government Treasurer, and Mr. R. E. H. Crosbie, the Assistant District Commissioner for the Southern District, and an Arab officer of each district investigated. The observations and statistical data submitted by this committee confirmed the views of other expert investigators, i.e., that the causes of backwardness in the Arab cultivator were rooted in the social history of Palestine.

The committee reiterated Hope Simpson's condemnation of

56. Government of Palestine, *Statistical Abstract of Palestine 1943*, p. 48.

57. See above, Chap. IX, p. 654.

58. *Report on the Disturbances of 1929*.

the *mushaa* system of cultivation, which he had described as follows:<sup>59</sup>

In villages where this system prevails, the whole of the property held in the village is held in common. Each shareholder owns a fractional share in the village, but has no separate parcel of land allotted to him in proprietary right. The village as a whole belongs to the body of the proprietors as a whole. The individual's share is usually expressed in terms of various measures; a sharer may own a fedan (an area so large that a pair of cattle can plough it in one day), or a karat, that is 1/24th of the whole, or a fraction of the whole, called a sehem. But none of these represent defined plots or parcels of the village; they represent an undivided share of the total.

In the Mesha's villages there is usually a permanent distribution among the Hamulahs—the tribal divisions of the village. Within these large areas individual shares are as a rule divided every two years, with the result that no development at all is possible. No cultivator will proceed to manure or improve his holding, which he knows will pass to some other cultivator in the course of the next two years.

The Johnson-Crosbie Committee found that the *mushaa* system was practiced in something like half the area of the country and characterized it as "the greatest obstacle to agricultural progress in Palestine."<sup>60</sup> It declared that wherever the system was maintained, "It is useless to expect that land will be weeded or fertilized, that trees will be planted, or, in a word, that any development will take place."<sup>61</sup>

The second hindrance to the improvement of Arab cultivation was the burden of debt, which had been aggravated by drought and locusts, low prices for agricultural products, and to some extent, by lack of thrift. The main factor in increasing the debt, however, was the accumulation of interest paid to the *effendis* on loans needed for tiding over the cultivator from harvest to harvest. The Report stated that a rate of 30 percent per annum was the most common, but that 50 percent for three months—i.e., a rate of 200 percent per annum was not unusual.

59. John Hope Simpson, *Palestine, Report on Immigration, Land Settlement and Development*, Cmd. 3686, London, 1930, p. 31.

60. Government of Palestine, *Report of a Committee on the Economic Condition of Agriculturists in Palestine and the Fiscal Measures of Government in Relation thereto*, Jerusalem, 1930, p. 44.

61. *Ibid.*, p. 45.

A third cause for the impoverishment of the peasant was the system of taxation which discriminated against the agriculturist in favor of the urban dweller. The agricultural producer had to pay the *verko* tax on land and buildings, as did the urban dweller; in addition, he paid the tithe which in Turkish times amounted to about one-eighth of the crop collected in kind. Although under the British, the tithe had been commuted to a fixed amount, this sometimes bore even more heavily on the cultivator since the amount he paid no longer varied with the quantity and price of the farmer's products. The animal tax—which the Committee referred to as “primitive”—originally imposed to obtain revenue from cattle and sheep graziers who did not own land and paid no other tax—was an additional burden. The Johnson-Crosbie Committee estimated that while the urban owner of immovable property paid about 10 percent of his rent, the taxes paid by the peasant cultivator amounted to about 34 percent.<sup>62</sup>

The situation was summarized as follows:<sup>63</sup>

The cultivable land of Palestine is impoverished, and the cultivator has not the necessary means to undertake its improvement. Moreover, the present system of farming seems to be designed primarily to meet the needs of the farmer's own family, and does not attempt to cater either for the local or the foreign market. To effect any radical change would be a matter of time and careful direction. The principal difficulty here, as in most other countries, is the general lack of organization of cultivation and of marketing, and the reluctance of credit institutions to finance agriculturists. There is great need for the training of cultivators in simple and economical methods of cultivation. Intermittent efforts in a small way have been made by Government in this direction by establishment of experimental stations and village plots, and Jewish training institutions have done much; but their influence over the bulk of the country is not felt. Little has been done in spite of the example of Jewish societies to consolidate or create markets for local produce. The cultivator has no credit facilities to save him from the necessity to resort to moneylenders. In consequence, he is unable to choose and to await the best market, because the bulk of his crop is seized by the moneylender as soon as it appears on the threshing floor, in settlement of loans at usurious rates of interest.

62. *Ibid.*, p. 43.

63. *Ibid.*, p. 41.



Besides urging the compulsory partition of *mushaa* villages as soon as possible, the Committee made the following recommendations:

1) Ultimate replacement of the *werko* and tithe by a low land tax supplemented by a progressive income tax on higher incomes; and as an interim measure, reduction of the commuted tithe and proportionate increase of the urban property tax to meet the deficit.

2) Provision by Government of credit facilities for villages through cooperative groups; and as a special emergency measure for 1930 the issuance of short term loans to enable small owners to tide over the season.

3) Negotiation of reciprocal treaties with neighboring countries to permit the entry of Palestinian agricultural products; and in some extreme cases the imposition of import duties—even the occasional prohibition of certain imports—to protect the native agricultural production.

4) Appointment of an Advisory Marketing Board to assist the farmer in selling his products, and introduction of educational measures and experimental work for the improvement of agriculture in the villages.

A similar analysis was made by Mr. C. F. Strickland—an officer of the Indian Civil Service and a leading authority on cooperatives—who was directed in July 1930 to proceed to Palestine to study the economic position of the *fellahin* with the special purpose of suggesting a system of cooperative credit. The recommendations made by him<sup>64</sup> were in general accord with the findings and conclusions of the Johnson-Crosbie Report, but Strickland laid the major emphasis on the *fellah's* debt. In explaining the debt, he referred to causes already mentioned, stressing perhaps more the part played by illiteracy and lack of thrift in increasing the load of indebtedness. The major factor was "the lack of control over the credit which he has received, at cruel rates of interest, from the merchants and professional money lenders."<sup>65</sup> The Report contains many keen observations on the interplay of economic,

64. Government of Palestine, *Report by C. F. Strickland of the Indian Civil Service on the Possibility of Introducing a System of Agricultural Cooperation in Palestine*, Jerusalem, 1930, p. 1.

65. *Ibid.*, p. 2.

psychological and social factors, and lays great emphasis on the importance of education in cooperative methods.

Strickland concluded that the rates of interest and the amount of debt were even higher than those indicated by the Johnson-Crosbie Report which had disclosed the average debt per family was about £20. Strickland reported that he found that the debt ranged from £10 to £1,000. There were a few cultivators who were entirely free of debt, but there was a far larger number who were altogether insolvent. Although the law—continued from Turkish times—prohibited a rate of interest in excess of 9 percent, the actual rate paid to the Arab *effendis* was enormous, even exceeding the range of 30-200 percent mentioned in the Johnson-Crosbie Report. Notes could easily be drawn so as to evade the law, e.g., a note might show that the borrower had obtained a larger sum than he had actually received, or a fictitious sale of goods might be included. Evidently the parties to these transactions were not without a sense of humor. The Report gives the following instance: "The case of a cat, which carried two tablets of soap across a table from the creditor to the debtor, who thereupon agreed to buy for £50 'the load of soap borne by this animal,' may be mythical but indicates a common method of evading the law."

To the load of debt, Strickland ascribed the reluctance as well as the inability on the part of the peasant to improve his methods of cultivation. The following is one of several descriptions of the effect of indebtedness on the Arab cultivator:<sup>66</sup>

The Arab cultivator of Palestine is a man similar in temperament, standard of life and agricultural practices to many of the Muslim cultivators with whose conditions I have been familiar in the north-west of India. He appears, however, to enjoy a slightly higher percentage of literacy and a very acute intelligence. He may be compared favourably in the latter respect with certain of the peasant classes in Southern Europe. *Prima facie* there is no reason why he should not attain the same level of prosperity and adopt equally progressive methods of agriculture. His trouble, however, is his debt; so long as a small cultivator sees the burden of his debt to be so great and the rate of accruing interest so high, that not only the present produce of his fields but even the increased amount of pro-

66. *Ibid.*, pp. 1 ff.

duce which he may hope to secure by minor agricultural improvements are insufficient to pay off his creditors, he will make no sincere attempt to alter his plan of cultivation. If his present crops allow him only to pay one-half of the interest upon his debt, there is little inducement to make such improvements as will enable him to pay three-quarters of the amount. The benefit will fall entirely into the hands of his creditors, while he will only labour the harder without hope of reaching freedom.

### *Recommendations on Credit Facilities*

Strickland made suggestions for the protection of the Arab cultivator against the usury practiced by the Arab *effendis*, but his major recommendations dealt with the problem of providing credits. He differentiated sharply between short-term credits required for seasonal operations, and long-term credits for further development or repayment of old debts. For short-term credit he urged the organization of cooperative societies in the villages, to be financed by small subscriptions of the members and through gradually built-up capital. In the beginning, however, assistance would be necessary in the form of a loan from Government or from commercial banks. He was opposed to the idea of the agricultural bank, which the Arabs in Palestine hailed as a panacea. He maintained that the cooperative credit society was, to begin with, more effective for short-term credits; but he was particularly interested in its potentialities for building up habits of thrift and good social attitudes.

Strickland regarded the village cooperative as the best means for promoting agricultural education, public health, and above all, for developing the concept of cooperation itself. For this reason he urged that the functions of the Registrar of Cooperatives be conceived in broad social terms:<sup>67</sup>

He is not merely relieving the peasants from debt but is undertaking a reconstruction of their lives and of the future of the country. He must aim at adult education and at the teaching of citizenship in a community in which these ideas are at present almost unknown. He cannot succeed in isolation but will need the help of every Department, and in his turn will make himself and his societies a means for carrying out the objects at which the other Departments aim. A co-operator has first to relieve the rural population from debt, but having done so, he proceeds to his real task, which is to serve the pur-

67. *Ibid.*, pp. 23-24.

poses of other people. . . . One of the first allies of the Registrar is the schoolmaster, and the special class for schoolmasters now projected at the Tulkarm Agricultural School should provide him with men qualified and ready to work with him for the general welfare of the village.

Strickland found that the Jewish cooperatives were on the whole well organized, that they were ready to admit Arabs, and that Arabs belonging to Jewish cooperatives were unwilling to consider the idea of separate societies. Nevertheless, he believed that the differences of cultural level and outlook made it necessary in the rural districts to organize separate credit societies for Jews and Arabs. On the other hand, he thought that there were opportunities for Arab-Jewish cooperation in the field of marketing, particularly since there was little hope that the Arab societies would be able to set up marketing organizations of their own in the near future. There was also a sphere for cooperation with Jews in the case of urban credit for town-dwelling Arabs of small means, and he offered the opinion "that in the interest of communal harmony and of the unity of labor, some of the Jewish urban societies will be willing to finance Arab societies of producers."<sup>68</sup>

Turning to the question of long-term credits, Strickland again opposed the agricultural bank "as commonly demanded by the articulate Arabs of this country."<sup>69</sup> In the first place, such a bank would not, under Palestine conditions, be able to raise capital without a Government guarantee. But a more important reason was that such a bank would do more harm than good. He cited the experience of Kenya, Egypt and Trans-Jordan, to show that such a bank was not suitable for the *fellahin* typical of these countries and of Palestine. On the one hand, the illiterate cultivator did not recognize the obligation of prompt payment to a distant wealthy town institution; on the other hand, the commercial bank was forced to foreclose in the case of non-payment. In Trans-Jordan, four percent of the properties mortgaged to the agricultural bank were foreclosed every year, and he expressed the opinion that such a rate of foreclosure in Palestine would "provoke political and possibly racial feeling of the most dangerous kind."<sup>70</sup> Ultimately,

68. *Ibid.*, p. 27.

69. *Ibid.*, p. 32.

70. *Ibid.*, p. 33.

long-term credits should be given through separate mortgage institutions organized on the cooperative principle, a system which would take a long time to develop. Until that stage should be reached, he recommended the establishment of a Government Loan Fund as the only desirable method for the Arab section of the population. In the case of the Jews, Strickland suggested a special mortgage bank or a consortium of existing Jewish credit institutions in which Government should be ready to invest half of the debentures up to a certain maximum.

Long-term credits were to be used mainly for two purposes: 1) repayment of old debts; 2) development of lands in the plains, which might be made more productive by irrigation. Preference should be given to the latter purpose, and loans for the repayment of old debts should be, wherever possible, combined with development. At the same time he warned against too rapid a development of irrigated land for intensive agriculture—particularly against over-investment in orange crops—since this might lead to a fall in prices. As a major solution for the problem of the repayment of old debts, Strickland suggested that the cultivator should sell part of his land or lease it for a term of years. He realized that his suggestion would be unpopular in certain circles in Palestine, but he nevertheless declared: "There is in general much to be said for encouraging the *fellah* to sell a part of his irrigable land through the agency of the Loan Fund Committee, and to repay the reasonable claims of his creditors from the sale proceeds and develop the remainder of his irrigable land with any surplus remaining and with such additional money as the Fund will advance."<sup>71</sup>

Strickland paid a second visit to Palestine in 1933 to give advice on the first practical steps to be taken for the formation of Arab societies and for the improvement of the already well-established Jewish cooperative movement. It was largely on the basis of his recommendations that a new Cooperative Societies Ordinance was enacted. Between 1933 and 1935 more than two hundred Arab villages were initiated into cooperative practice. Strickland hoped that the development of cooperatives, strengthening the economic position of the Arabs and reducing their feeling that they were fighting against superior

71. *Ibid.*, pp. 36-37.

economic odds would prove a factor in reducing antagonism to the Jewish development. He thought that if the Arabs felt themselves gaining ground in the economic sphere they might divert their energy from political action and violence into the channels of social and economic self-improvement. The Royal Commission, commenting on this idea, thought that many years would have to pass before the Arab cooperative societies could have such an effect and that in any case such a result could be achieved not by the provision of credit alone, but by a process of education, self-discipline, and cooperative practice.<sup>72</sup>

### *Resettlement and Development*

About a year after Strickland's investigation, on June 26, 1931, Mr. Lewis French was appointed Director of Development for Palestine for the purpose of carrying out His Majesty's Government's policy with reference to agricultural development and land settlement of the country. The major objects of the policy which the Director was instructed to consider included the following: 1) the resettlement of landless Arabs as defined in instructions issued; 2) the ascertainment of what state and other lands could be made available for close settlement by Jews; and 3) the improvement of the hill country to secure a better standard of living for the *fellahin*. The Director's investigation also was to include the questions of 1) the feasibility of providing credits for Arab cultivators and Jewish settlers, and 2) proposals for draining, irrigating and otherwise reclaiming land at present not fully cultivated.<sup>73</sup> His first task was concerned with the problem of resettlement of the "landless" Arabs who were defined as those "who can be shown to have been displaced from the lands which they occupied in consequence of the lands falling into Jewish hands and who have not obtained other holdings on which they can establish themselves or other equally satisfactory occupation."<sup>74</sup>

When Mr. French was appointed, it was contemplated that he should have the assistance of a Jewish and an Arab adviser. The Arab Executive declined to enter into any discussion of

72. *Royal Commission Report*, p. 278.

73. Lewis French, *Reports on Agricultural Development and Land Settlement in Palestine*, Jerusalem, 1931-1932, p. 5.

74. *Ibid.*, p. 5.

the problem of development unless the Government first disavowed the principles embodied in the Prime Minister's letter to Dr. Weizmann. The Jews, on their part, took no steps to appoint a representative, mainly because they regarded the French investigation not as a continuation of the objective type of inquiry illustrated in the Johnson-Crosbie and Strickland reports, but as a sequel to the three previous documents, i.e., the Shaw Commission, the Hope Simpson Report, and the White Paper of October 1930. These were considered as biased by a tendency to show that Jewish immigration and land settlement threatened the well-being and future development of the Arab peasantry.

Two reports were published by Mr. French: a First Report on December 23, 1931, and a Supplementary Report on April 20, 1932. In these he brought together much data and made a comprehensive and intensive survey of the problem of resettlement and development. He declared that before any large scheme of development could be considered in detail, Government must define a policy with reference to five major problems:

- 1) Acceleration of survey and of settlement operations.
- 2) Acceleration of partition of village lands held in common (*mushaa*).
- 3) Establishment of a land administration agency.
- 4) Government control of lands in the areas coming under development.
- 5) Government control of water in such areas.

This statement confirmed the views of the previous investigators. However, in his analysis and conclusions, Mr. French tended to emphasize the difficulties, rather than the possibilities of development, stressing the difficulties not as obstacles to be overcome but as reasons for not pursuing an active development plan. Mr. French reported that detailed investigations of the state domains proved that there were no further lands available for resettlement of Arabs or colonization of Jews, and the only way of obtaining land for these purposes was by purchase from existing owners. Though he agreed that there were lands available for intensive development in the Coastal Plain, Beisan, Huleh, the Jordan Valley, and—provided that

adequate quantities of water would be found—also in the Beer Sheba District, he pointed out that no Government funds were available; but even if there were, he thought the developments would be too costly and uneconomic at the stage of agricultural development in Palestine at the time. He did not look with favor on a proposal made by the Jewish Agency for the establishment of a Jewish Agricultural and Settlement Bank—along the lines suggested by Strickland—for the purpose of new colonization.<sup>75</sup> The only definite proposal he made for immediate action was to resettle one or two hundred of the “landless” Arabs, with the idea that if this proved successful other “landless” Arabs should be provided for.

In a chapter on “preventive measures” he made much of the danger of expropriation of Arab tenants and small owners by the *effendi* class who subsequently sold the land to Jews. He recommended that a “limited restriction” be imposed on the further alienation of land so that the occupiers of land be left in undisputed possession of a minimum area. He described the power of the Arab moneylender in the collection of debt as greater than that of the Government in the collection of taxes. In one area where there were fourteen Government tax collectors, one Arab moneylender employed twenty-six mounted debt collectors, and this case was not unique. He did not hope for a rapid development of the plan of village cooperative credit societies advocated by Strickland, and he could discern no practical method for ameliorating the debt situation except by severely contracting the credit of the cultivator. To secure the small owner, he would make some portion of his land inalienable, and he suggested two Draft Ordinances: 1) the Homestead Protection Ordinance to guarantee a *lot viable* for every cultivator; and 2) an Occupancy Tenants Ordinance to guarantee security of tenure.

At the time that the Reports were issued the register of landless Arabs was incomplete and Mr. French refused to make any precise estimate of their number, although he stated as a conjecture that the number would fall between 1,000 and 2,000. Like Hope Simpson, he emphasized the possible future

75. The share capital of this bank was to be provided partly by Jewish bodies and partly by the proceeds of the proposed Government loan for development, or, failing the loan, by sale of debentures to the public with Government guarantee for payment of interest and repayment of principal over a course of years.



displacement in the light of the high rate of natural increase of the Arab population rather than actual displacement that had already taken place in the past. The danger of displacement or inadequate supply of land for the Arabs arose, in his opinion, from two sources: 1) expropriation by the Arab *effendi* or capitalist landlord; and 2) unrestricted transfer of land to Jews. Although there was a tendency in Mr. French's Report to emphasize the latter, the evidence presented by him indicated that the expropriation by Arab capitalists was the graver of the two evils. He agreed that in purchases made by Jews, particularly in the Coastal Plain, money received by former Arab proprietors had enabled them to improve the type of cultivation in those parts of the land which they retained. Mr. French noted that this would not be the case in the hill country, and pointed out that in one district in the hill country, thirty percent of the land in the previous decade had passed from Arab peasants to Arab capitalists.<sup>76</sup> However, as the Jewish Agency has indicated, purchases by Jews of land in the hill country have been very small. Of seventy-one applications of Arabs in the hill district claiming to be landless, sixty-eight were, at the time of Mr. French's investigation, rejected, while the remaining three were pending.<sup>77</sup>

Mr. French resigned at the end of 1932, and the British explanation was that his resignation was due to failure on the part of either the Arabs or the Jews to accept his proposals. The Jewish Agency, however, pointed out that the proposals were essentially restrictive and contained no genuine plan for development; by participating they would have been confined to purely non-constructive functions.<sup>78</sup> The true reason for Mr. French's resignation as Director of Development appears to have been the lack of Government interest in any large scale development plan. On November 17, 1930—when His Majesty's Government was still under attack as a result of the Passfield White Paper—an announcement was made that the British Government would guarantee and service a loan of £P2,500,000 designed for the improvement of agriculture,

76. *French's Report*, p. 19.

77. Jewish Agency for Palestine, *Agricultural Development and Land Settlement in Palestine*, London, 1933, p. 47.

78. Jewish Agency for Palestine, *Observations on French's Reports*, pp. 28, 29.

while £P250,000 were to be reserved for the settlement of Arab families.<sup>79</sup> The loan was never floated according to British opinion, because of a subsequent financial crisis.

### *The Question of Arab Displacement*

The main interest of the Government was in the problem of the so-called "landless" Arab who had allegedly been displaced through Jewish purchases. This part of the investigations was not completed by the time Mr. French resigned, but the inquiries which he had initiated effectively disposed of the charge that any large class of Arabs were displaced through Jewish purchases of land. According to a later report issued by the Government,<sup>80</sup> up to January, 1936, the total number of applications for admission to the register of landless Arabs was 3,271, with not many more expected. Of these, 2,607 applications had been disallowed on the ground that they did not come within the category of landless Arabs as defined in the terms of reference. Valid claims were recognized in the case of 664 heads of families, and of these, 347 heads of families took advantage of the offer of resettlement by Government.<sup>81</sup> The refusal to accept resettlement by the others was attributed by Government to the fact that many of the families had found satisfactory employment in the neighboring orange groves and in the towns.<sup>82</sup> Another reason indicated by some was that they were not accustomed to the climate of the new areas or to irrigated cultivation.<sup>83</sup>

The figures on Arab displacement as estimated by the Jewish Agency did not differ greatly from the Government report, although the number of tenants left unprovided with land was, in its calculations, somewhat smaller. According to estimates submitted by the Jewish Agency, 688 tenants had been displaced during the period 1920-1930 as a result of the sale of lands to Jews. Of these, however, some 400 had found other

79. Royal Institute of International Affairs, *Great Britain and Palestine, 1915-1939*, p. 53.

80. Great Britain, *Memoranda Prepared by the Government of Palestine*, London, 1937, Colonial No. 133, p. 37.

81. The Government purchased lands at a cost of £72,240 for the settlement of these approved displaced Arab cultivators.

82. Government of Palestine, *Annual Report on the Administration of Palestine*, 1934, col. 1935, p. 58.

83. *Royal Commission Report*.

land, so that the total number of displaced Arab families was 288.<sup>84</sup> Commenting on the Government figure of 664 families, the Jewish Agency pointed out that 204 were not settled cultivators of the ordinary type, but Bedouins who may have enjoyed traditional grazing rights, but who had not owned land previously. The Jewish Agency did not argue that these should not be provided for in a resettlement plan, but indicated that the figure of 664 was too large rather than too small on a strict interpretation of the term "landless" as defined for the investigation.

The Royal Commission, on the other hand, thought that the terms of reference under which Mr. French conducted the investigations were unduly restrictive: for instance, sales by Arabs to Arab moneylenders with subsequent sales to Jews by the latter were not recorded. Moreover, the Commissioners expressed regret that the inquiry included only those who had lost their lands as tenants and cultivators, and did not consider the hired laborers. In this connection they pointed to the fact that the Jews restricted the employment of Arab labor on lands held by them. They indicated that in 1935, sixty percent of the labor in Jewish-owned groves was Arab, and that this had been reduced to forty percent in 1937. The validity of the Royal Commission's view on both grounds is open to question. In the first instance, previous foreclosure by an Arab landowner could hardly with justice be attributed to Jewish purchases, since such operations had been going on for generations and are by no means limited to Palestine. In the second instance, i.e., the employment of Arab labor, account should be taken of the fact that Jewish orange growers were less inclined to employ Arabs during periods of disturbances. Moreover, although the percentage of Arab labor in Jewish-owned groves was smaller, the actual number may not have been smaller—or much smaller—since the area of Jewish-owned groves had greatly increased during the period.

However, whether the Government figure should be enlarged or reduced, it is obvious, when all facts are taken into consideration, that Jewish land purchases did not lead to any general displacement of the Arab cultivator, although there may have been individual cases of landlessness so caused. As already noted, the rural Arab population in Palestine greatly increased

84. *Ibid.*, p. 240.

during the first decade, and the same is true during the second decade. The non-Jewish rural population increased by 160,000 between 1931 and 1942, and the percentage of the non-Jewish rural population to the total non-Jewish population decreased only slightly. There was evidently no forcing of the rural population into the towns, although some of the villagers may have been attracted to the cities by opportunities for higher wages. The Royal Commission agreed with the conclusion indicated in all previous reports, namely, that insofar as there was a land problem, it was due to the rapid increase of the Arab population, and this was itself largely due to better conditions introduced by the Jews. The Commission had been forced grudgingly to admit: "The shortage of land is, we consider, due less to the amount of land acquired by Jews than to the increase in the Arab population as a result of the causes to which we have referred." They added:<sup>85</sup>

The Arab charge that the Jews have obtained too large a proportion of good land cannot be maintained. Much of the land now carrying orange groves was sand dunes or swamp and uncultivated when it was purchased. Though to-day, in the light of experience gained by Jewish energy and enterprise, the Arabs may denounce the vendors and regret the alienation of the land, there was at the time at least of the earlier sales little evidence that the owners possessed either the resources or training needed to develop the land. So far as the plains are concerned, we consider that, with due precautions, land may still be sold to Jews.

The Partition Commission again confirmed the view that the problem of the Arab cultivator did not arise from Jewish immigration or Jewish land purchases. It concluded that Palestine could support a larger agricultural population if better methods of cultivation were adopted, if the area under irrigation could be extended, and if markets for the increased products could be found. It pointed out that without such improvements, if the Arab rural population continued to increase, pressure to leave the land would be intensified quite apart from any further acquisition of land by Jews. In fact, it declared that an amelioration of the situation of the Arab cultivator was possible only if Jewish immigration were stimulated, since what was particularly needed was capital for improvement

85. *Ibid.*, p. 242.

and since it was likely that such capital would be invested in Palestine only by the Jews. It arrived at the conclusion that the future of the Arab population was menacing unless Jewish immigration and Jewish imports of capital were allowed to continue.

The view of the Partition Commission was summarized as follows:<sup>86</sup>

We are aware that the Shaw Commission, reported in 1930, recommended, and indeed thought it most important, that "the Government of Palestine in deciding the rate at which newcomers are to be admitted to agriculture, should have regard to the certain natural increase of the present population" (Cmd. 5530, p. 123). But whatever may have been the position then, we believe that to act in such a way today, even as regards agricultural settlement, and *a fortiori* as regards immigration in general, would be an unpractical and indeed a short-sighted policy. So far as settlement on the land is concerned, we are convinced that the only practical rule is to have regard solely to the population existing at any given date. The Arabs would be no better off with a larger population than to-day on the same amount of land, unless they learn to cultivate their land more intensively and unless in addition they can find supplementary employment in the towns. And neither of these two things can be brought about without the assistance of Jewish taxable capacity and Jewish capital.

All the investigators agreed that although there was no general displacement of Arabs, the ordinances should be strengthened so as to eliminate the loopholes which permitted violations of the law, even in individual cases. The Jewish Agency wholeheartedly agreed that protection should be afforded the tenant, but it also pointed out that fictitious claims were frequently advanced by Arab cultivators, through lawyers engaged by them, which were designed primarily to harass purchasers of land, frequently with the object of creating a nuisance, to be relieved of which the purchaser would be willing to pay a price.<sup>87</sup> The Royal Commission appears to agree with the complaint advanced by the Jews that the Protection of Cultivators Ordinance, as it stands, and the methods under which it is administered, "affords too great an opportunity for bogus claims and puts a premium on trespassing, with the

86. *Partition Commission Report*, p. 30.

87. For some examples see Jewish Agency for Palestine, *Memorandum to the Royal Commission*, Appendix V.

result that endless delays and great expense are incurred in resisting and buying off these claims before a clear title and undisputed possession of land can be obtained.”<sup>88</sup> The Royal Commission was critical of the dilatory proceedings of the Land Settlement Department, of the long delay in completing the cadastral survey, and of the lack of vigor in promoting the partition of *mushaa* lands.

In its realization that the problem of providing for the growing rural population could be solved by constructive measures and not by restrictions on Jewish endeavor, the Royal Commission considered favorably a proposal placed before it—evidently on the part of a Jewish body—for the creation of special Public Utility Companies for comprehensive schemes of development in the interests of both the Arab and Jewish communities, under the close supervision of and in active cooperation with the Government.<sup>89</sup> The Public Companies would undertake exploration of sub-surface water resources, promote drainage, rationalize the distribution of water and contribute financial assistance. It would place proposals before the Government and its experts. If the project were approved, land would be leased to both Arabs and Jews: the Arabs would obtain their leases directly from the Government, the Jews from the Company. Government would retain control of the water rights, its distribution and price. In this way a scheme could be developed to improve the lot of the Arab through the modernization of his farm. Moreover, by consolidation of Arab and Jewish holdings in contiguous areas, the chance of friction would be diminished. The plan would help to avert land speculation and both Arabs and Jews would benefit from the development of roads and from cooperative marketing methods.

The Palestine Administration urged objections: the peasants would be reluctant to leave lands which they had cultivated for a long time; the Arab cultivator was loath to change his methods; he was not trained to farm irrigated land; and a habit of dependence on Government might be induced;<sup>90</sup> the Palestine Government would have to assume a certain direct responsibility for the welfare of each cultivator and might be

88. *Royal Commission Report*, p. 243.

89. The proposal followed the lines suggested for the Huleh development discussed below, p. 1075.

90. *Royal Commission Report*, pp. 248-249.

subjected to many calls for relief by way of remission of rent or taxation, and "at times by way of granting seed and possibly food and money." Government Department of Agriculture also made a point of the difficulty of determining the minimum area required for the *lot viable*. Finally, the political undesirability of such a plan was emphasized: "Any such proposal would place in the hands of Arab agitators a weapon against which logical arguments as to the advantages of the scheme would be an ineffective defense."<sup>91</sup>

The Commissioners did not find these arguments sound. They agreed that great care should be exercised in any resettlement of Arabs from one part of the country to another, and detailed inquiries made before the *lot viable* was determined. But they declared: "The acceptance of the first two arguments advanced by the Palestine Government against the proposal, namely, the aversion of the peasant to change of location or method of agriculture, combined with his dislike of continuous work, means a sheer negation of progress, and would render it impossible for the Mandatory Power to fulfil its difficult obligation to encourage close settlement on the land." They added that: "If the Mandate is to continue and the Mandatory Power is to discharge its obligation, the pace of progress must not be determined by factious agitators." They expressed the view that where land was available and the cultivator indicated a willingness to sell, and satisfactory arrangements protecting him could be devised, a planned development scheme under Government supervision and control as outlined, "should not be held up by calculated obstruction."<sup>92</sup>

## GOVERNMENT POLICY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

### *Aid to Agriculture, Education and Revenue Policy*

The several investigations—the Johnson-Crosbie, Strickland, and French Reports—and the analysis of the Royal Commission, all pointed in one direction: that the backwardness of the Arab cultivator and whatever little danger of displacement existed, were due primarily to social factors of long standing, and that his situation could be improved and the

91. *Ibid.*, p. 249.

92. *Ibid.*, p. 250.

growing population provided for only through a large constructive program, which would include changes in the system of land tenure, provision of credit facilities, vigorous prosecution of cooperatives and education, and a bold scheme of reclamation, drainage and irrigation. The Government, however, did not inaugurate any large development scheme; it adopted some of the more conservative ameliorative recommendations suggested in the various reports.

Beginning with 1930, short-term loans were made annually by Government. From 1933 on, such loans were issued by Barclay's Bank under a Government guarantee, and branches of the Bank were opened in Arab villages such as Nazareth, Acre, Nablus, Hebron and Gaza. In 1935, the Rural Property Tax Ordinance, which abolished the inequitable incidence of the old tithe and the *werko*, was enacted. Under the new tax system, the reduction of the tax load on the agriculturist was quite substantial, amounting in some cases up to 70 percent.<sup>93</sup> In 1932, the Protection of Cultivators Ordinance was amended to protect sub-tenants as well as tenants, and in 1933, a new Ordinance under the same title was enacted and then amended in 1934. This Ordinance created the category of a "statutory tenant" and provided that "any such tenant, who has occupied and cultivated a holding for a period of not less than one year, shall not . . . be ejected therefrom unless he has been provided with a subsistence area approved by the High Commissioner. Such subsistence area is to be so far as possible, in the vicinity of the land from which he has been displaced."<sup>94</sup> In 1932 and 1934, Land Disputes (Possession) Ordinances were passed with a view to accelerating the procedure in disputes regarding land, water or grazing rights. In 1933, a Cooperative Societies Ordinance was enacted to facilitate the formation of rural cooperative credit societies. The number of Arab village credit and thrift societies rose from fourteen in 1933 to 121 in 1937, with a total membership of 5,121.<sup>95</sup> The number and standard of the Arab cooperatives still fell far behind those organized by the Jews, which in 1937 numbered 1,003 with 243,327 members, but some progress was made, and the Regis-

93. *Ibid.*, p. 224.

94. *Government Memoranda*, p. 56.

95. Registrar of Cooperative Societies, *Report on Developments during the Years 1921-1937, Cooperative Societies in Palestine*, Jerusalem, 1938, p. 21.



trar stated in his report that "the villagers have not been slow in realising its advantages and possibilities and the individual members have shown much loyalty and ample intelligence in the management of their societies." <sup>96</sup>

The Government introduced a number of the recommendations made by the reports with reference to assistance in the development of agriculture; the establishment of school gardens and demonstration farms; distribution of selected seeds and the conduct of experiments to determine the most remunerative crops and the best method of cultivation. In 1937 there were as many as 192 Arab village school gardens and six agricultural and horticultural stations. Instruction was introduced to promote the development of poultry keeping, dairy farming, apiculture, fruit and vegetable growing. The Department of Agriculture encouraged the increase of the area under maize cultivation and it rose from 23,374 dunams in 1931 to 86,286 dunams in 1937. The Government also attempted to stimulate the cultivation of potatoes, largely a new crop for Palestine. It imported seed potatoes and sold them to growers at cost price and arranged demonstration plots in order to promote proper cultivation. The plant protection and veterinary services introduced in the first decade were continued and improved.

An important influence for the improvement of agriculture came from the Agricultural School at Tulkarm. This was established with funds from a bequest from Sir Ellis Kadoorie, a philanthropic Jew from Bagdad and Shanghai. (An agricultural school for Jews was also established from the same fund.) An additional wing was added to the school at Tulkarm by a gift from the private purse of Sir Arthur Wauchope. The school provided for seventy residential students with practical and theoretical courses in agriculture. Despite the constructive work done, the gardens and Agricultural School at Tulkarm had to be closed during the disturbances, being subject to attacks by Arab armed bands, which, as the *Palestine Government Report for 1938* stated, "took the form of periodical destruction and burning of crops, shooting of mules and the demolition of buildings." <sup>97</sup>

96. *Ibid.*, p. 48.

97. Government of Palestine, *Report to the League of Nations for 1938*, p. 277.

The excess revenue of the Government permitted it to extend its social and educational services. All investigators had urged that more extended educational facilities and a higher standard of education were prerequisite for any real advance in the situation of the Arab rural masses. Nevertheless, the additional amounts expended on education, though adequate to keep pace with the growing population, were not enough to permit any larger proportion of the Moslem Arab children to attend schools. The Jewish and Christian children were fairly well provided for through contributions made by the local authorities or foreign organizations. At the end of the decade about 90 percent of the Christian and Jewish children of school age were receiving some—though not always adequate—elementary education. Among the Moslem Arabs, who depended largely on Government to provide education, only about 25 percent of the children between the ages of 5 and 15 were attending schools. The situation in the rural communities, where most of the Arab population lives, was particularly backward. In the towns, about 85 percent of the Moslem Arab boys and 52 percent of the girls received some schooling either in religious or in modern schools. In the villages, only 60 percent of the boys and only 5 percent of the girls received any schooling whatsoever.<sup>98</sup> A considerable distinction is made between urban and rural education. Urban elementary education comprises two stages—a lower stage consisting of five classes, and a higher stage of two classes. Manual training is an important feature in all boys' schools, while in the girls' schools special attention is paid to needlework and domestic science. The village schools offer a course of four years; provision is made for higher classes in larger villages where a demand exists. Many of the village schools have small plots of land where practical instruction in agriculture is given.

An education ordinance was passed in 1933, requiring every school and every teacher to be registered with the Department of Education of the Government. This ordinance also legalized the imposition of an education ratio by municipalities or other local authorities. The ordinance was taken advantage of by Jewish towns and villages but did not lead to any great increase in Arab education. Except in the secondary schools

98. Government of Palestine, *Statistical Abstract of Palestine 1943*, p. 35.

where a small fee is charged, education in Arab Government schools is free. In rural communities the village must provide the building and equipment—with at times some aid from Government—while the cost of maintenance and teaching staff is provided by the British Administration. The Government also maintains a secondary school in Jerusalem which gives a four-year course, and conducts four training centers for teachers: a Government Arab College for Women, a Women's Training College at Jerusalem, and two Rural Teachers Training Centers, one for women and one for men. In addition to administering the schools under Government control or supervision, the Department of Education has organized a Board of Higher Studies. This Board conducts public examinations for matriculation in universities. The examinations are given in English, Arabic and Hebrew.

The Arab non-public schools consist mainly of two quite distinct types. First may be mentioned the schools maintained by missionary organizations which provide for the educational needs of the Christian Arabs. In these, Arabic is generally taught, but the chief medium of instruction is the language of the country where the association originated. These schools include secondary as well as elementary education. The other type of Moslem school is the *kuttab*, where instruction is confined to the Koran and the teaching of reading and writing. The Supreme Moslem Council also controls a few schools and an orphanage. With the exception of two small schools—one at Jerusalem and the other at Nablus—all the non-public Moslem schools are of elementary type and the language of instruction throughout is Arabic except in the higher classes of the two secondary schools where English is taught. The number of boys in these schools greatly exceeds the number of girls. The Arab non-public schools constitute some 40–45 percent of the total enrollment in Arab schools, the Christian schools comprising some 25–30 percent, and the Moslem schools about 15 percent.

In 1931 the Government of Palestine changed the system of tithes which was reactionary in its economic implications and at the same time failed to produce much revenue.<sup>99</sup> A land tax was introduced based on the area and type of cultivation but not dependent on the actual crop. Although the new land tax brought about a certain improvement, the tax still favored the

99. Abraham Granovsky, *Land Problems of Palestine*, Foreword.

large landowners since it freed uncultivated land from any tax whatsoever. Freed of taxation, the large Arab landowners could keep their land uncultivated, holding it for higher prices. At the same time, land under irrigation, which required considerable investment and considerable risk, was burdened with extremely high taxes; the maximum was demanded from banana and citrus plantations, which in Palestine are taxed more heavily than in any other country in the world. Thus, even after partial reforms in the tithes system and in the *werko* tax, which as noted above was modified in its application through the Rural Property Tax Ordinance of 1935, Palestine's system of taxation compared unfavorably with the progressive tendencies in modern countries.

The Government slowly followed out the policy, initiated at the end of the first decade, of affording some protection to local manufacturers by the imposition of specific duties and exempting of some raw materials from import duties. In some cases this redounded to the benefit of industries based on agriculture and local raw materials. Among the items afforded protection were cement, oil and soap, wines and spirits. In 1931, sugar for the manufacture of citrus juice for export was exempted. A great degree of protection was also afforded to agricultural products: in 1930, the duty on wheat and flour was increased; in 1934, the impost on imported potatoes was trebled; in 1937, customs duties on poultry and eggs were introduced. The Arab leaders were opposed to the introduction of all protective tariffs and the Government moved slowly. The Arabs complained that the protection favored Jewish concerns and the increased cost of commodities fell on Arabs who formed the mass of rural population. The Royal Commission, however, pointed out that if the Arab population had to pay more for certain commodities, they got better prices for their agricultural products. Moreover, the Government had gained greatly through the customs duties on imported Jewish goods and had thus been able to meet the cost of services which improved the standards of health and education in the country; this had an indirect effect on the improvement of agriculture and life in the rural communities as well as in the cities.<sup>100</sup>

Revenue of the Government from agrarian taxes became less important. In 1922-1923, revenues collected from tithes and

100. *Royal Commission Report*, p. 213.

animal tax amounted to about 14 percent of the total revenue of Government; in 1939-1940, the revenue from the same sources was very small, amounting to 0.5 percent.<sup>101</sup> The revenue from customs, on the other hand, greatly increased in amount and in proportion during the second decade. In the middle of the first decade (1926-1927), the total income from customs, port and marines was £790,618 out of a total of £2,390,082, or about a third. In 1936-1937, the total income from the same source was £2,119,745, constituting about 45 percent of the total revenue of £4,640,821. The following table shows the sources of income for the middle and end of the decade:

## REVENUE COLLECTIONS BY MAIN HEADS

*1935-36 and 1938-39*<sup>102</sup>

<i>Heads of Revenue</i>	<i>1st April to 31st March</i>	
	<i>1935-36</i>	<i>1938-39</i>
	<i>£P</i>	<i>£P</i>
Customs	2,751,246	1,854,602
Port and Marine	107,597	143,206
Licenses, Taxes, etc.	1,082,427	796,435
Fees of Courts and Offices, etc.	913,027	639,856
Posts and Telegraphs	418,896	556,959
Revenue from Government Property	23,952	34,814
Interest	141,279	86,067
Miscellaneous	154,021	115,132
Land Sales	18,874	8,067
Total Ordinary Revenue	5,611,319	4,235,138
Grant-in-Aid	140,345	1,689,516
Colonial Development Fund	18,793	12,626
Total Revenue	5,770,457	5,937,280

During the years of large Jewish immigration the Government had a considerable surplus of revenue over expenditure and by the end of the fiscal year 1935-1936, a surplus of £P6,627,810 had been accumulated. In the following years, due

101. Government of Palestine, *Statistical Abstract of Palestine 1943*, p. 59.

102. Government of Palestine, *Statistical Abstract of Palestine 1942*, Jerusalem, 1942, p. 93.

in part to the decrease of revenue derived directly or indirectly from Jewish immigration but mainly to the additional expense involved in maintaining public security, the surplus decreased until on March 31, 1939, it stood at £P2,533,265. This reduction took place despite the fact that in 1938-1939 His Majesty's Government made a large contribution of over a million and a half pounds for military services, a practice which was continued in the following years.

### *Foreign Commerce*

The most striking economic development in Palestine was the growth of foreign trade. The value of exports increased more than two and a half times between 1930 and 1939, rising from about £P2,000,000 to £P5,000,000. Imports increased at an even greater rate, from about £P6,000,000 in 1931 to a high of about £P18,000,000 in 1935, thereafter dropping somewhat. In 1939, imports amounted to roughly £P14,600,000. In relation to the size of the country, population and national income, the foreign trade of Palestine, especially on the side of imports, loomed unusually large. In 1936, for instance, when the national income of the country was estimated at approximately £P33,000,000, exports amounted to £P13,000,000. Import and export figures taken together add up to an amount equal to one-half of the national income.

The comparison of import and export figures showed a large and persistent excess of imports over exports, that is, an "adverse balance" of commodity trade. This was due to several factors. First, it reflected the inadequacy of Palestine's agricultural production, still largely in Arab hands, in satisfying the food requirements of the country. More than one-fourth of Palestine's imports consisted of foodstuffs. A second factor was the large demand for manufactured consumer goods on the part of the European, particularly the Jewish, section of the population. A third factor in the trade deficit arose out of the import of raw materials, equipment and machinery required for the growing industries. As Professor S. Cudmore, the Palestine Government statistician, has pointed out, industrial and agricultural machinery accounted for a large part of the import trade after 1933, and other items, e.g., iron bars, tubes and pipes, electrical goods, wood for building purposes,

## PALESTINE'S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, 1930-1939

(Figures are in £P millions unless otherwise stated)

<i>(April to March 31)</i>	<i>Imports</i>	<i>Exports</i>	<i>Excess of Imports over Exports</i>	<i>Overseas Shipping Tonnage Cleared (in mil- lions)</i>	<i>Railway Goods Traffic (in mil- lion ton kilometres)</i>	<i>Sales of Electricity for Indus- trial Pur- poses (in KWH millions)</i>	<i>Govern- ment Revenue</i>	<i>Government Expenditure</i>	<i>Government Surplus of Revenue</i>
<i>Year</i>	<i>Imports</i>	<i>Exports</i>	<i>Excess of Imports over Exports</i>	<i>Overseas Shipping Tonnage Cleared (in mil- lions)</i>	<i>Railway Goods Traffic (in mil- lion ton kilometres)</i>	<i>Sales of Electricity for Indus- trial Pur- poses (in KWH millions)</i>	<i>Govern- ment Revenue</i>	<i>Government Expenditure</i>	<i>Government Surplus of Revenue</i>
1930	7.0	1.9	5.1	1.9	82	2.2	2.5	2.6	-0.1
1931	5.9	1.6	4.3	1.9	66	3.2	2.4	2.4	—
1932	7.8	2.4	5.4	2.0	73	4.1	3.0	2.5	0.5
1933	11.1	2.6	8.5	3.2	86	6.6	4.0	2.7	1.3
1934	15.2	3.2	12.0	4.2	103	9.9	5.5	3.2	2.3
1935	17.9	4.2	13.7	5.5	132	17.2	5.8	4.2	1.6
1936	14.0	3.6	10.4	5.0	129	18.7	4.6	6.1	-1.5
1937	16.0	5.8	10.2	4.9	139	20.3	4.9	7.3	-2.4
1938	11.4	5.0	6.4	5.2	97	20.2	5.9	5.8	0.1
1939	14.6	5.1	9.5	4.4	120	25.1	6.9	6.0	0.9

and cement, are indicative of the rapid industrial development.<sup>103</sup>

The large excess of imports over exports, a consistent feature of Palestine's economy, has often been cited as indicative of the unsound economic basis of the Jewish development. However, as economists recognize, an adverse trade balance is not under all circumstances abnormal. It may, in fact, be a sign of economic development: an excess of imports over exports is in all countries a concomitant of industrialization in its early stages and was associated with the development of Great Britain and the United States during the nineteenth century. As already noted, this accounts in part for the increase of the adverse trade balance in Palestine in the years after 1933. Palestine, moreover, presents an economic situation which makes the disparity between imports and exports less serious than the figures might indicate, and less detrimental in its effect than the "adverse" balance of trade in Syria and Iraq where there are also large excesses of imports over exports.

Because of the character of Jewish immigration into Palestine, the excess of imports over exports is not financed by borrowing as is usual in other countries. It is financed by the capital that the immigrants bring with them. Thus the excess of imports does not create a foreign indebtedness payable in foreign exchange. As is noted by the Royal Institute of International Affairs, "In the normal course of events dependence upon such heavy imports of capital would be exceedingly dangerous, since these would involve a large addition to the external debt and a serious problem of future repayment. But the case of Palestine is unique, in that the great bulk of capital imported is being provided by the immigrants themselves."<sup>104</sup> In the second place, Palestine receives large subsidies in the form of what is sometimes called "invisible exports."<sup>105</sup> These include receipts from tourists and religious pilgrims who pay with foreign funds for services or goods produced in the country, and contributions received from abroad to religious, educational and charitable institutions. Similar in its effect in

103. Government of Palestine, Office of Statistics, *Trade Bulletin No. 1, 1936*. Professor S. Cudmore, Dominion Statistician of the Canadian Government, was called to Palestine during 1936 to organize the Government Department of Statistics.

104. *Great Britain and Palestine, 1915-1939*, p. 66.

105. *Ibid.*, p. 64.



helping to cover Palestine's deficit in the balance of payments is the very substantial income of the Zionist Organization and other Jewish national funds.

Over a long period of time, of course, imports and exports should tend to balance. As the requirements of new factories become satisfied imports of machinery for these establishments will fall off; new imports will be required only as long as there is a continuous industrial development. The increase in production of foodstuffs through the improvement of agriculture and the increasing satisfaction, through local production, of the demand for manufactured articles, will further decrease the need of imports. The main factor, however, to be looked forward to in lessening the adverse balance of trade is an increase in exports. Larger markets are essential if Palestine is to make progress in the direction of industrialization and enable the country to absorb an expanding population.<sup>106</sup>

In this connection the tariff policy followed by the Palestine Government has not been helpful. In most countries, young industries invariably enjoy considerable tariff protection without which they would never manage to get on a sound financial footing. Even ardent advocates of free trade have recognized and justified the protectionists' argument when applied to the so-called "infant industries." As previously noted, however, the Palestine Administration has been reluctant in according tariff protection to Palestinian industry. In some cases, after considerable pressure, a moderate tariff protection for industries based on agricultural products or local raw materials has been introduced. But, generally speaking, the attitude of the Government has not been friendly to the principle of protective tariffs. Another factor which hampers the development of foreign exports results from Article 18, to which brief reference was made in connection with the export of citrus fruit. Article 18 reads in part as follows:

The Mandatory shall see that there is no discrimination in Palestine against the nationals of any State Member of the League of Nations (including companies incorporated under its laws) as compared with those of the Mandatory or of any foreign State in matters concerning taxation, commerce or navigation, the exercise of industries or professions, or in the treatment of merchant vessels or civil aircraft.

106. *Royal Commission Report*, pp. 214, 216.

Similarly, there shall be no discrimination in Palestine against goods originating in or destined for any of the said States, and there shall be freedom of transit under equitable conditions across the mandated area.

This principle was inspired by the belief that the Treaty of Versailles would usher in an era of free trade, or at least of equal treatment to all nations in international commerce. However, nearly all of the countries of the world soon resorted to extreme protectionism accompanied by mounting tariffs. Despite this change in the general situation, Great Britain scrupulously adhered to the provisions of the Mandate in respect to Article 18, and Palestine was thus placed at a serious disadvantage in the conduct of trade relations. It became an open market for dumping of foreign goods and Article 18 prevented it from retaliation or arranging mutually advantageous trade agreements with particular countries. Even under normal conditions, Article 18 was not conducive to flexible arrangements, but under the conditions of economic nationalism it became an instrument for Government oppressing the industrial development of Palestine. The Royal Commission pointed out that the application of the principle of the open door to mandated territories as required by Article 18 was self-contradictory, in that it had an injurious effect on the well-being and development of the mandated territories. It urged that the provisions of Article 18 were "out of date" and recommended that "negotiations should be opened without delay to put Palestine's trade upon a fairer basis."<sup>107</sup> Article 18 was particularly burdensome in the case of the citrus crop which constituted the major export. As the Royal Commission pointed out: "Italy, Spain, the United States, and other citrus-producing countries can make their bargains and commercial treaties, while Palestine alone is stretched on the rack of the non-discriminating injunction of the Mandate—bound by a rigid adherence to the policy of the open door."<sup>108</sup>

It is questionable whether the Palestine Administration has done as much as it might have to ameliorate the situation within the framework of Article 18. In 1936, the Jewish Farmers Federation of Palestine and Jaffa Citrus Exchange brought

107. *Ibid.*, p. 217.

108. *Ibid.*, p. 214.

the matter up before the Permanent Mandates Commission of the League of Nations and made certain suggestions for the interpretation of Article 18 which would have given some relief. On this occasion, His Majesty's Government expressed themselves "in sympathy with the petitioners' complaints," but they were "not satisfied that they [the amendment offered] would not infringe on the non-discriminatory provisions of the Mandate." If the suggestions were modified to bring them within the terms of Article 18, His Majesty's Government argued that they were not likely to be of any great benefit to Palestine's trade. The net result was that nothing was done.

Similarly, in the matter of "imperial preference," no help was given. It was explained that as an "A" Mandate, Palestine could not be regarded as a part of the British Empire but as a "foreign state," and that any preference given to her in respect to citrus fruit exports would have to be "granted also to Spain or to any other country entitled to most favored nation treatment." Thus it was a "heads I win, tails you lose," proposition. Palestine lacked the advantages that might have accrued from the position of a foreign state separate from the British Empire, and it missed the benefits that it might have had as a part of the Empire. Aside from the legal objections, it appeared that the British Government was influenced by the opposition of the South African orange growers, who questioned "the propriety of this extension [of "imperial preference"] to foreigners, whether it took the form of preference, or a grant representing the amount of the duty."<sup>109</sup>

Moreover, the Palestine Government went beyond the literal provisions of Article 18 of the Mandate, in accordance with which equality of trade was limited to members of the League—and by the Convention of 1924, to the United States. The Palestine Administration continued to accord this privilege to German and Japanese goods, even after the departure of these countries from the League. The British Government was rigid in adhering to the same policy even when it was to the detriment of British interests, e.g., when exports subsidized by foreign governments displaced goods formerly imported into Palestine from the United Kingdom and the Empire. A typical

109. *Ibid.*, p. 215.

instance was the heavily subsidized Latvian imports of butter which quickly displaced non-subsidized Australian commodities. Palestine became the dumping ground for foreign merchandise; Palestine producers were compelled to compete against goods forced on the export market by the industrial policies of the small post-Versailles nations and by the Axis powers aiming to obtain foreign exchange for armament purposes. While the imports of subsidized products brought consumers the temporary advantage of low prices, they added handicaps to the young Palestinian production, both agricultural and industrial.

There is general agreement that Palestine has enormous possibilities for the development of commerce and that it has, during the last decade or so, begun to be restored to its historic position as a center of trade between continents.<sup>110</sup> The development of land, sea and air transportation moving from East to West and North to South is making Palestine an *entrepôt* of great importance in the Middle East. The new harbor at Haifa, the third largest harbor in the Eastern Mediterranean, was formally opened on October 31, 1933. The Haifa branch of the Iraq Petroleum Company's pipeline to the Mediterranean coast was opened in January, 1935. Imperial Airways started a service from Cairo to Basra in 1927. The Royal Dutch Line began operating between Amsterdam and Batavia via Palestine in 1930. The Misr Air Line connecting Egypt-Palestine-Iraq, a Polish company "Lot," and the Italian Ala Littoria, established stations in 1937. A local company—Palestine Airways Ltd.—began operations between Ludd and Haifa in 1937. There are now three large airports in Palestine—at Ludd, Haifa and Gaza—besides a small airport at Jaffa. Arnold J. Toynbee has given a vivid description of the destiny of Palestine as a great center of commerce between Europe and the countries of Asia, in the following passages:<sup>111</sup>

The effective opening up, for the first time in history of the direct trans-desert route between Iraq and the Mediterranean coast of Syria was one of the most important developments in world com-

110. Royal Institute of International Affairs, *Great Britain and Palestine, 1915-1939*, p. 68.

111. *Jewish Agency Memorandum 1936*, p. 215.

munications in the post-war age; and while considerations of distance told in favour of the port of Tarabulus (Tripoli) in the French mandated territory of the Lebanon, as against the port of Haifa in the British mandated territory of Palestine, the scales were in fact inclined to Haifa's advantage by the economic impetus of the Zionist Movement and by the link maintained between Palestine and Iraq through their common British connection.

Nor were the prospects of Palestine as an *entrepôt* confined to the trade between Europe and the Middle East. The Anglo-Persian Oil Company was moved to contemplate incurring the expense of constructing a long pipe-line to a Palestinian port on the Mediterranean . . . because this would enable it to eliminate the time and cost exacted by the circumnavigation of Arabia; and this advantage of short-circuiting Arabia as well as Africa had already made Palestine a station on an air-route, competing with the Suez Canal sea-route, between Europe and Indonesia. This air-route seemed destined to be prolonged in the near future from India north-eastward to China and Japan, and from Indonesia south-eastward to Australia; and this probability revealed the possible destiny of Palestine as an *entrepôt* between two out of the three great focuses of population and activity in the Westernized world of the twentieth century: that is to say, Europe on the one hand, and on the other hand the focus embracing India, Indonesia, the Far East and Australasia. On this showing, Palestine held a key position in the twentieth century world, which was not incomparable to the position of Great Britain as the *entrepôt* between Europe and the Americas. . . . Here was a Palestinian asset of enduring value.

#### *Comment on British Administrative Policy*

The first term of Sir Arthur Wauchope's tenure of office (1931-1936) is instructive in that it illustrated British policy in Palestine at its best. There was no change in the underlying theory from that previously held: British responsibility was conceived in terms of a "dual obligation" to Jews and Arabs, and not in the sense of a primary obligation to secure the establishment of the Jewish national home. Moreover, even under Wauchope's administration, which was far more vigorous in the promotion of Palestine's economic progress than the previous administrations, government policy was conservatively ameliorative rather than directed toward comprehensive and thorough solutions. The larger projects for a planned development of Palestine's agriculture, suggested by the investigators, were not put into practice. As illustrated in the

Lake Huleh concession, the burden of large-scale developmental effort was still left to the Jewish bodies. The moderate advances made in providing social services for the Arab section of the population were made possible by using surplus revenues derived from Jewish activity; the wealthy Arab class was not called upon to bear due share of the costs of development. The Jewish demands—of significance for general progress as well as for Jewish development—i.e., for protective tariffs, public security, social legislation protecting the worker, adequate support for education, were met only in the minimum degree.

Despite these limitations, Jewish development made great advances and the Jewish Agency accepted the Government's policy as at least a minimum fulfillment of the British obligation. The experience of the first five years of the decade of the 1930's proved that given a favorable attitude on the part of the Colonial Office and a cooperating and constructively-minded High Commissioner, the Articles of the Mandate—even as modified by the 1922 White Paper and as further limited by the idea of two obligations equal in weight—allowed a minimally satisfactory implementation of the national home policy. The difficulty did not rest primarily with the provisions of the Mandate—although those would have gained by clearer statement—but in the method of carrying them out.

The requisite factor for the successful working of the Mandate also was support from the Jewish side. The capital, the labor, and the technical skill required for the establishment of the Jewish national home had to come from the Jews themselves. Adequate support of the Jewish national home by Jews was forthcoming only when great need was combined with idealistic motivations. It is not a criticism of the Jews to point out that in the first decade no small measure of the slowness of progress was due to the failure on the part of the wealthier and established classes of the Jews in Germany, Great Britain and the United States to support the Zionist effort. It is rather a general commentary on human affairs to say that great political and social adjustments are not the product of the abstract idealism of a few, but a response to the pressure of concrete human needs. It was only when aspiration was joined with necessity that the development of the Jewish national home gained adequate support.

Experience during the second decade exploded the theory that economic progress in Palestine would lessen the political tension and lead to a moderation of the Arab opposition. Support was added to the thesis that a political guarantee of Jewish rights in Palestine was prerequisite to secure the establishment of the Jewish national home. While a favorable attitude on the part of the High Commissioner was an indispensable element, the main lines of policy were not determined by him or by the local administrators. While Wauchope's estimate of the political situation may have been over-optimistic, and the validity of his insistent policy of establishment of a legislative council may have been open to question, there can be no doubt of the sincerity of his attitude and of his vital interest in the development of Palestine in harmony with the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate.

The policy of the Palestine Administration was obviously controlled by the general policy of the Colonial Office and this was in turn conditioned by the general British policy in the Middle East and by events shaping themselves in Europe and in the world at large. Although Palestine was in theory administered under a mandate entrusted to Great Britain by the League of Nations, it was in fact a British possession over which His Majesty's Government exercised virtual sovereignty. All that the Permanent Mandates Commission of the League of Nations could do was to offer a post-mortem analysis of British policy. The character of British policy, moreover, appears to have been determined administratively by the Colonial Office, and Cabinet approval came largely to confirm decisions already made. This was true in the case of the 1922 White Paper. It was largely true of the 1939 White Paper, for the immigration restrictions imposed by it had been in effect since the fall of 1936. It is not too much to say that, despite the international character of the Mandate, the British Colonial Office was legislator and executor, as well as final authority, of the policy under the Mandate. The paradox of it was that the Jewish national home could be carried out only with the help of the British but, being thus dependent, it became subject to the exigencies of British imperial policy.

## CHAPTER XI

# POLITICAL EVENTS AND POLICIES 1931-1936

IN THE discussion of the economic situation the period of 1930-1939 was treated as a whole. In dealing with the political aspect, it will be necessary first to analyze the conditions and events that led up to the disorders of 1936.

## THE POLITICAL SCENE AMONG THE BRITISH, ARABS AND THE JEWS

### *British Policy*

Ramsay MacDonald remained Prime Minister until June 7, 1935, although the Labor Government had given way to a National Government in the summer of 1931. The Cabinet which had sponsored the unfortunate White Paper of 1930 fell on August 22nd; its author, Lord Passfield, was succeeded by Mr. J. H. Thomas (Laborite) as Colonial Secretary, and Dr. Drummond Shiels by Sir Robert Hamilton, as Under-Secretary. Both Thomas and Hamilton had a sympathetic appreciation of the Jewish position in Palestine. Sir Robert Hamilton had been associated with Colonel Wedgwood <sup>1</sup> when the latter launched the "Seventh Dominion League" which aimed at the recognition of Jewish Palestine as a new British dominion. The general elections of October, 1931, resulted in the return of a National Government of a more conservative tinge in which Sir Philip Cunliffe-Lister (Conservative) took the place of Mr. Thomas at the Colonial Office, while the latter retained the position of

1. The late Josiah Clement Wedgwood was born on March 16, 1872. He belonged to a well known family of potters, and also of humanitarian politicians. He was a member of the House of Commons from 1906 to 1941, when he was made a Baron and entered the House of Lords. He began his political career as a Liberal but later changed to the Labor Party; in both parties he retained his individual freedom of action, exercising it most notably in behalf of oppressed groups all over the world, and particularly in the British Empire. For the latter he felt great pride and devotion, because he saw in it an instrument for the advancement of mankind.



Secretary of the Dominions. Cunliffe-Lister displayed a keen interest in Palestine and an understanding of the problem of the Jewish national home.

Lieutenant-General Sir Arthur G. Wauchope, who became High Commissioner in the fall of 1931, had previously been the Commanding Officer of His Majesty's Forces in Ireland. He possessed an unusual combination of qualities: the discipline of a soldier, artistic sensibility, and a quick intelligence. In his first address he indicated the lines of a policy which included: 1) maintenance of public security; 2) assistance to all sections of the inhabitants in furthering their economic development and encouraging good will among the various sections of the population through cooperation in the economic field; and 3) increase of the feeling of trust and confidence between the people and the Government.<sup>2</sup> Sir Arthur based his policy on the thesis that the Mandate involved a "double undertaking" as enumerated by the Permanent Mandates Commission and by the British Government, i.e., that it involved the development of the Jewish national home, on the one hand, and the development of self-governing institutions, on the other.

It was his conviction that these two purposes were reconcilable and that a policy of rapprochement between the Jews and the Arabs would win out in the end, if steadily pursued. An essential part of his plan was a program for economic development with special regard for raising the standard of life of the *fellahin*. Cooperation between Jews and Arabs, he thought could best be promoted by getting them to work together for the improvement of the economic life of the country. A first step in cooperation would be the participation of Jews and Arabs in Government committees such as the Agricultural Committee, the Road Board, and the Committee on Commerce and Industry. The development of local self-government should go hand in hand with economic cooperation; by learning to work together in economic activities sponsored by Government and in mixed Municipal Councils. Sir Arthur hoped that the population would be prepared to cooperate in a representative Legislative Council, the establishment of which would be the crowning achievement of his administration.

2. Permanent Mandates Commission, *Minutes of the Twenty-Second Session*, Geneva, 1932, p. 80.

He explained his program to the Permanent Mandates Commission when he appeared before it in the fall of 1932, after his first year of office in Palestine. He dwelt particularly on the questions of public security, the state of the *fellahin* and the problem of obtaining the cooperation of the Arabs. While the public security had not been endangered, the year 1931 had been marred by a number of murders, highway robberies and agrarian crimes, which he attributed to the fact that the unhappy memories of 1929 had not yet been effaced. In view of this situation, he thought it was necessary to maintain the defense and police forces on a full basis. His attitude toward the possibilities of immigration was hopeful, and he took a favorable view of the general economic situation. The impoverished condition of the *fellahin*, however, he asserted, required special attention: they were suffering from a succession of bad seasons, as well as from the burden of debt which had long rested upon them. He reported progress in his effort to promote cooperation between the Jews and the Arabs on Government committees, but he also mentioned the fact that several Arab members had recently resigned.

In one case, the reason given was refusal to cooperate with the Government; in other cases—the Road Committee—because certain proposals seemed to the member in question as favoring Jewish villages to the detriment of those of the Arabs. He was forced to say: "I fear that the number of Arabs who refuse to cooperate is increasing and will continue to increase until the time arrives for the association of the people and the Government of the country."<sup>3</sup>

This was an introduction to his broaching the question of the Legislative Committee, with reference to which he made the following statement:<sup>4</sup>

As regards the establishment of a Legislative Committee, the intention of the Government remains unchanged, and we shall take steps toward the formation of a Legislative Council when the new local Government Ordinance which is now in preparation has been brought into working order. The draft of the local Government ordinance has been communicated to the representatives of various municipalities and we are awaiting their observations. I hope that it will be possible, early in 1933, to enact this legislation, the object of

3. *Ibid.*, p. 82.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 82.

which is to extend and to facilitate the participation of local representatives in municipal government. I am hopeful that moderate opinion will prevail and that, when proposals for the Legislative Council are put forward, they will be accepted by the leaders of both parties.

These proposals will necessarily contain definite safeguards, so that, under no circumstances, can the peace and security of the country be endangered or the carrying out of the Mandate hampered.

The members of the Permanent Mandates Commission were impressed by the steps he was taking in the way of the economic development of the country, but some of them appeared to be dubious about Arab cooperation. It was pointed out that Sir Arthur himself had indicated instances of refusal to cooperate. The Chairman (the Marquis Theodoli) said that he had assisted in the supervision of the Mandatory administration for eleven years and he still wondered whether the Arabs were disposed to collaborate in the form of self-government at present proposed. Sir Arthur Wauchope repeated his belief that "when the Arabs were convinced that His Majesty's Government would fulfill its promises, at a reasonably early date, to set up a Legislative Council, they would be far more willing to cooperate with it." In answer to a question by M. Rappard, whether there were any racial or psychological obstructions to cooperation, Wauchope replied that the difficulties arose only when political questions were involved. Another member (M. Merlin), however, pointed out that in accordance with Wauchope's testimony in the matter of the Road Board, the economic questions soon became political questions. Sir Arthur always returned to the same theme: "He was convinced that with the passage of time, the Arabs and the Jews would see that it was to their mutual advantage to work together."

### *Zionist Policy*

Weizmann's policy had been vindicated by the MacDonald Letter, but he found himself under attack from many sides when he came to the Seventeenth Zionist Congress which met in Basle in 1931. He had long been criticized for his efforts in bringing non-Zionists into the work of Palestine and for his conciliatory attitude toward the Mandatory Power. The failure of the non-Zionist group to produce the large funds which

had been expected from the *mariage de convenance*, the Shaw Commission Report, and the Passfield White Paper had added strength to these criticisms. In Palestine, Professor Joseph Klausner of the Hebrew University, a noted student of Jewish history and literature and one of the old leaders of Russian Zionism, who had previously been friendly to Weizmann, published a virulent attack against him in May, 1931.<sup>5</sup> He accused Weizmann of degrading the Zionist movement through concessions and compromises on basic principles—by joining with assimilationists and with the ultra-orthodox *Agudists*, who were enemies of the national ideal, and by using such phrases as “a bi-national state” which obscured the political goal of Zionism.

The opposition to Weizmann's leadership was also growing among many groups in the United States, Germany and Poland. This movement was particularly strong in Poland where the slogan, *grosszionismus*—“maximalist Zionism”—became the order of the day. This platform demanded full realization of the Basle program within the historic limits of Palestine including Trans-Jordan; large scale and rapid economic development with a view to increasing the absorptive capacity of Palestine; and a leadership determined to carry out the “maximalist program” in its political as well as economic aspects. A group headed by Dr. Nahum Goldmann broke away from the General Zionists and organized a new party under the name of Union of Radical Zionists. It advocated an aggressive policy instead of a policy of cautious compromise, emphasized the role of private capital and middle-class immigration into Palestine, and urged the floating of an international loan for the expansion of economic work in Palestine on a large scale. Dr. Goldmann opposed the candidacy of Weizmann for President of the Zionist Organization because his election would make impossible united action with Revisionists and other maximalist groups.

In his opening address at the Congress, Weizmann defended his policy as correct in principle and as the only practical strategy possible. He pointed out that when the White Paper of 1930 had left no ground for constructive cooperation with His Majesty's Government, he had forthwith resigned. But he

5. Joseph Klausner, “Revaluating Values” in *New Palestine*, Vol. 20, May 1, 1931, p. 119.

felt that the MacDonald letter had put things to rights again and restored a basis of cooperation. He pointed out that the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate obtained with Britain's help had given the Zionists their opportunity for the upbuilding of Palestine. He admitted that the Churchill White Paper was not entirely satisfactory from the Zionist point of view, but held that it had provided a basis for work on a scale larger than the Jews had utilized. The Jews themselves, he said, should carry a share of the blame for having failed to make the most of the opportunity given. They had not furnished "the golden key" needed to unlock the gates of Palestine. He urged a continuance of his policy of cooperation with the British Government and of rapprochement with the Arab peoples.

In his address he gave a résumé of his views of Jewish-Arab policy. Following are several of the main paragraphs:<sup>6</sup>

When we entered upon our work of building up our National Home in Palestine, neither we nor His Majesty's Government lost sight of the interests of the Palestinian Arabs. But it was assumed in 1916-1921 that the national sentiments of the Palestinian Arabs would centre in Baghdad, Mecca and Damascus, and find their natural and complete satisfaction in the Arab Kingdoms which resulted from the Peace Treaty settlement in the Near East. It was assumed, therefore, that all that was required as regards the Arabs of Palestine was to ensure that their civil and religious rights as individuals should not be impaired as a result of the establishment of the Jewish National Home, and for this protection the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate made ample provision. But the question has proved to be more complex than was anticipated.

. . . In the midst of the War, when a victorious English Army was in occupation of Palestine, and when the Balfour Declaration and the declarations of the Allied Governments had promised us active support—at a time, too, when it was a temptation to accept the support of the European Powers as entirely sufficient—I considered it one of the primary duties of the Zionist Commission in Palestine to establish direct contact with the Arab peoples. In those early days I sought out the man who was at that time the leader of the Arab movement of liberation—the Emir Feisal, now King of Iraq. With him we eventually closed a treaty of friendship to which I hope we

6. Jewish Agency for Palestine, *Memorandum to the Palestine Royal Commission*, pp. 87-89.

have remained true up to today. Many years have passed since then, but in all these years, I have never neglected an opportunity, whenever one offered itself, whether in Palestine in London or elsewhere, of coming into touch with Arab and Moslem leaders, and of exploring for myself all possible avenues of cooperation.

At the present time, when great bitterness prevails, and when the body politic of Palestine is poisoned, it is difficult to speak of the roads by which this purpose of peaceful cooperation with the Arabs could be achieved. But one thing seems to be abundantly clear. The Arabs must be made to feel, must be convinced by deed as well as by word, that, whatever the future numerical relationship of the two nations in Palestine, we, on our part, contemplate no political domination. But they must also remember that we, on our side, shall never submit to any political domination. Provided that the Mandate is both recognized and respected, we would welcome an agreement between the two kindred races on the basis of political parity. It is our duty to explain our aims and ideals clearly and without ambiguity to the Arab peoples, and to neglect no opportunity of coming into touch with them, and no channel of communication which may help towards a mutual understanding . . . .

Only in this way shall we succeed in cooperating with the Arab peoples, who themselves are struggling towards the light, and now after many centuries are entering anew the political arena of the world. With a strong National Home in Palestine, built up peacefully and harmoniously, we may expect in cooperation with the Arabs, also to open up for Jewish endeavor the vast areas which, for their development, need intelligence, initiative, organization and finance; we shall, with mutual benefit to the two races, contribute towards the establishment of a belt of flourishing countries stretching from the Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean, where the two races, which stood together at the cradle of civilization, may cooperate in peace and harmony. Surely this is an ideal worthy of an ancient race. It is not merely Zionism in the narrower sense; it is a large and human conception, and one which must enlist the sympathies of thinking people.

Jabotinsky, who spoke as the leader of the Revisionist Party, denounced Great Britain and the policy of the Zionist leaders and attacked the MacDonald letter because it had not explicitly repudiated the White Paper of 1930. His major emphasis was on the necessity of defining the ultimate aim—the *Endziel*—of Zionism. He found the word *Heimstätte*—used in the Basle program—inadequate because vague. It had been employed at

the time in order not to irritate the Turkish Sultan. The true aim of Zionism was the establishment of a Jewish state. He admitted that the term "state" was also ambiguous, though better than the term "homeland." In defining "Jewish state," he emphasized two indispensable elements: 1) a majority of the Jewish component in the population of the country; and 2) self-government in internal affairs. Of these two terms, the latter, self-government was elastic. The one "absolute" that he set down as indispensable for the establishment of the Jewish state was the achievement of a numerical majority. He said, "The country will be a Jewish land as soon as it will have a Jewish majority." He added, "Our conception is, first a majority, then, of course, parliamentary institutions in which the majority is decisive." <sup>7</sup>

The Mizrahi party as well as rightist groups from among the General Zionists joined the Revisionists in their demand for a clear definition of the ultimate aim of Zionism in the terms of a majority and a Jewish state. However, Menahem Ussishkin, generally considered an extremist, opposed formulating the *Endziel*. He said, "I always have been and am also now a great opponent of every paper-definition of our ultimate aim. I thought so thirty-four years ago with regard to the definition of the Basle program; I am an opponent of the definition given yesterday by Weizmann; I am an opponent of Jabotinsky's definition." <sup>8</sup> His opposition was based upon his belief that all definitions limit the ideal of a full renaissance of the Jewish people. He thought that even a majority was no guarantee against catastrophe. He concluded his address rather vaguely, "There is only one thing in this world, and that is the will and the faith of the nation. We do have it and we need it."

Among those who attacked Dr. Weizmann at the Congress was Dr. Stephen S. Wise. He caused a stir by his violent denunciation of Great Britain and he taunted the Jewish Labor Federation of Palestine for their trust in the Labor Government which had betrayed the British promise to the Jewish people. He took the position that the MacDonald letter was not a sufficient basis for further cooperation. He laid emphasis on the need of a change of administration, taking the position

7. *Protokoll der Verhandlungen des XVII. Zionistenkongresses*, 1931, p. 143; *New Judaea*, Vol. VII, 1931, p. 210.

8. *Protokoll der Verhandlungen des XVII. Zionistenkongresses*, p. 178.

that if Weizmann were left in office, it would signify an assent to the White Paper.

Despite the attacks, Weizmann did not budge from his position. He went so far as to express opposition to the demand for a Jewish majority in Palestine as an "absolute," holding that such a demand, at the present time, would be interpreted by the enemies of Zionism as a desire on the part of the Jews to drive the Arabs out of Palestine. Furthermore, he felt that a numerical majority would not in itself constitute a guarantee for the security of the national home. The safety of the national home could be secured only through political guarantees by the Powers, and through establishing friendly relations with the non-Jewish inhabitants of Palestine, on the basis "of complete parity without regard to the numerical strength of either people."<sup>9</sup>

The opposition to Weizmann prevailed. He was reprimanded for a statement which he had made to the press in which he had cast doubt on the validity of the idea of a Jewish majority, and the principle of parity which he had espoused found no explicit support. Nevertheless, in formulating the aim of Zionism, the Congress did not introduce the terms "Jewish majority" or "Jewish state" as the Revisionists and other maximalist groups had proposed. The political resolution was couched in very general terms and stated:

In view of the repeated attempts to misrepresent the essence of Zionism, the XVIIth Congress declares:<sup>10</sup>

Zionism is a national movement to secure the freedom of the Jewish people. It adheres firmly and unalterably to its aim, as laid down in the Basle programme, to bring about in Erez Israel the solution of the Jewish problem. . . .

The homeless and landless Jewish people, which is compelled to migrate, strives to overcome its abnormal political, economic, and spiritual condition by re-establishing itself in its historic homeland through an uninterrupted immigration and settlement, and by recreating in Erez Israel its national life with all the essential features of a people's normal existence.

The Jewish Agency was now composed of non-Zionists as well as Zionists and from the formal point of view the Council of the Jewish Agency was its highest organ. A meeting of the

9. *Ibid.*, p. 305; *New Judaea*, Vol. VII, 1931, p. 214.

10. *Protokoll der Verhandlungen des XVII. Zionistenkongresses*, p. 386.



Council was held on July 17, 1931, immediately after the close of the Zionist Congress. Its resolutions approved the action of its representatives in the discussions which had led to the MacDonald letter, and expressed appreciation of the assurance given in the letter "to allay grave misgivings of the Jewish people aroused by the White Paper of 1930." The Council held that the MacDonald letter was a basis for further discussions between the Jewish Agency and the Mandatory Government, and called attention particularly to the problems of the purchase of land by Jews, to Jewish immigration and the employment of Jewish labor in public works in Palestine. The Council placed on record its "earnest desire for the creation of a durable understanding between Jews and Arabs in Palestine on the basis of mutual confidence and respect, and its conviction that Jews and Arabs have a common interest in the peaceful development of Palestine." It re-echoed the Zionist thesis that harmonious relations between Jews and Arabs must be based "on the acceptance by both parties of the principle that neither is to dominate or to be dominated by the other."

Weizmann was replaced as President of the Zionist Organization and head of the Jewish Agency by Nahum Sokolow, who served for a period of four years until Weizmann's reinstatement in 1935. The Zionist half of the Executive of the Jewish Agency elected with Sokolow consisted of a coalition of the Labor Party, the Mizrahi, and General Zionists, with the Labor group achieving a dominant position. Dr. Chaim Arlosoroff, one of the ablest leaders of the Labor Party, was entrusted with the political portfolio. The change in the presidency and in the composition of the Executive gave expression to a certain stiffening of attitude and reflected the growing strength of the minority opposition parties, but did not indicate any basic modification of the Zionist policy with reference to collaboration with the Government or desire for rapprochement with the Arabs. Although more critical of Great Britain than Weizmann had been, Arlosoroff's policy, in the main, differed in method rather than in principle. Nahum Sokolow, rooted in the traditional Zionist policy and one of those who had been instrumental in obtaining the Mandate, also followed the lines of moderation. Stating the program of the newly elected Zionist Executive, he declared one of its main purposes

to be:<sup>11</sup> "To take active measures in the economic, social and political spheres with a view to furthering friendly relations and establishing a rapprochement between Jews and Arabs in Palestine, starting from the basic principle that, without reference to numerical strength, neither of the two peoples shall dominate or be dominated by the other."

The policy of the New Executive, now led by the Labor Party instead of by the middle-class General Zionists, was thus a continuance of the Weizmann policy. Arlosoroff, writing in 1932, decried the attitude of non-cooperation with Great Britain advocated by the Revisionists, as a policy of despair lacking in constructive suggestions. He believed that the accession of a new High Commissioner indicated a change for the better.<sup>12</sup> He reported his views to the meeting of the General Council of the Zionist Organization, held in London, July 28-August 8, 1932. His position was attacked by Meir Grossman of the Revisionists who held that a mere change of personnel in Jerusalem was inadequate and the problem was that of a new policy.

The relations between the Revisionists and the Labor Party were now becoming acute. The followers of Jabotinsky had organized the Union of Zionist Revisionists in 1925 and since then the party had steadily grown in strength. In 1925 when the Fourteenth Zionist Congress was held, they had elected 4 delegates. At the next Congress in 1927, this had increased to 10 delegates, and in 1929 to 21. In 1931, at the Seventeenth Zionist Congress, they had elected 52 delegates and had been a decisive factor in the opposition to Weizmann. The Labor Party, the mainstay of Weizmann's policy, became the target of their attack. There was a social angle to the opposition, for the Revisionists were drawn from the middle class and were supported by the depressed petty bourgeoisie and intellectual class of Poland. Moreover, in Palestine a group of younger Revisionists of Eastern European origin began to practice a style of opposition marked by disorders and personal assaults.

Shortly before the Eighteenth Zionist Congress, on the night

11. Jewish Agency for Palestine, *Memorandum to the Palestine Royal Commission*, p. 97.

12. Chaim Arlosoroff, "Our Position in Palestine," in *New Judaea*, Vol. VIII, April, 1932, pp. 87-92.

of June 16, 1933, Arlosoroff, while walking with his wife on the beach in Tel-Aviv, was shot by two men. He never regained consciousness and died a few days later. Revisionists were generally believed to have been the assailants. Two men well known to be connected with the Revisionist group were tried and condemned but later acquitted on appeal because the identification made by Mrs. Arlosoroff was not adequately supported by other evidence. Toward the end of 1934 a truce was negotiated by a provisional accord between Jabotinsky and Ben-Gurion.

However, this accord was not ratified by the Labor Federation and relations grew more strained in 1935. In June the Revisionists held a referendum, with an overwhelming majority favoring secession from the Zionist Organization. They boycotted the Nineteenth Zionist Congress held in 1935 and soon afterwards organized their own convention at Vienna where they established the New Zionist Organization.

### *Arab Policy in the Middle East*

In considering Arab policy during the decade of the 1930's full account must be taken of various developments in the Middle East.<sup>13</sup> First, there was an increasingly active connection between the countries of the Middle East and the Western world, both in the political and economic sense. The closer political association is illustrated by the fact that during the years 1931-1934 three new Middle Eastern countries, Iraq, Turkey and Afghanistan, were admitted to membership in the League of Nations. Including Persia, which had been admitted earlier, there were now four Middle Eastern countries in the League. Moreover, the two countries bordering on Palestine—Egypt and Syria—were prospective candidates for admission to League membership. In the economic development the major factor was the "entry of the Middle Eastern countries in Palestine's hinterland into the world's mineral oil production business on the grand scale."<sup>14</sup> During these years the oil fields of Iraq, Kurdistan and Bahrein in the Persian Gulf, as well as the oil fields of Southern Persia, became profitable ventures and arrangements were made for opening up fresh fields in other

13. Arnold J. Toynbee, ed., *Survey of International Affairs 1934*, pp. 95 ff.

14. *Ibid.*, p. 97.

areas—Persia, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia. An agreement for the exploitation of oil resources in the eastern part of its territory was signed in 1933 by the Saudi Government and the Standard Oil Company of California. Along with this went a growing tendency on the part of the Arab governments to drive harder bargains with foreign oil interests. Moreover, they were no longer content to take a handsome share of the profits; they began to insist that the local unskilled labor should be employed and that local talent should be trained as rapidly as possible to qualify in the higher positions of engineering and business administration.

Progress toward the goal of sovereign independence was made by the Arab countries formerly under the Ottoman Empire. Yemen, which had retained its independence since the war, signed a treaty of friendship and mutual cooperation with England in 1934. Ibn Saud consolidated his conquest of the Nejd and Hejaz by constituting them as Saudi Arabia in 1932, and in 1934, after a seven-weeks' war with the Imam Yahya of Yemen, added the border land of Asir to his dominions. Iraq had signed a treaty of alliance with Great Britain simultaneously with her admission to the League of Nations in 1932. In Syria and Lebanon, efforts to establish independence at first appeared abortive: the constitution granted the Lebanon in 1926 was shelved in 1932; in Syria a new constitution was promulgated in 1930, but the Parliament elected in 1932 was suspended in 1933. However, the powerful undercurrent of nationalism continued to grow and in 1936 France signed treaties with the Syrian and Lebanese Republics which provided that within three years of the ratification of these treaties, these countries would become independent along with admission to membership in the League. In Egypt, too, there was apparently a temporary recession, but in the fall of 1936 an advanced degree of independence was achieved.

The progressive political emancipation of the Arab territories was accompanied by a growing sense of solidarity among the Arabic and Islamic countries. One expression of this was the Moslem Congress held in Jerusalem during December, 1931. Another was the reaction of sympathy on the part of a number of the surrounding countries for the Arab cause during the disturbances in Palestine, concretely evidenced by the concerted intervention of Iraq, Trans-Jordan

and Saudi Arabia in Palestinian affairs at the time of the general strike in 1935 and after the disturbances in 1936. The generosity shown by Ibn Saud toward the Imam of Yemen in the Treaty at Taif in May, 1934, is cited as a third instance of consensus among the Arab states.<sup>15</sup> It is noteworthy that the pact was entitled a "Treaty of Islamic friendship and Arab brotherhood." In the preamble, the contracting parties declared their desire "to establish concord in the Arab-Moslem people, to raise its dignity, and to safeguard its honor and independence"; and their aspiration to "act as a single unit in face of emergencies and to constitute an edifice, one and indivisible, for the preservation of the integrity of the Arabian Peninsula."<sup>16</sup>

The steadily growing nationalism was characterized by an increasing truculence, particularly after the rise of the Nazis to power in Europe. In their treatment of minorities, the Arab countries, imbued with the nationalist Pan-Arab ideal, were less tolerant than the Ottoman regime. Referring to the tragedy of the Assyrian minority, the *Survey of International Affairs* noted that "the newly fledged Iraqi-Arab nation applied—it is true, under some provocation—the Western principle of *Gleichschaltung* by Middle Eastern methods of barbarism."<sup>17</sup> In a later volume the *Survey* asserts: "In the Arab World, a triplex blend of Fascism—anti-French, anti-British with anti-Jewish—was running like wild fire across North Africa, and Southwest Asia, from Morocco and Algeria and Tunisia through Egypt and Palestine and Syria to Iraq."<sup>18</sup>

From the point of view of its impact on Palestine, the most significant of all of the developments of the Near East is "the reemergence of 'Iraq, under British tutelage, from a seven-hundred-year-long economic and social eclipse."<sup>19</sup> This de-

15. *Ibid.*, p. 318. Another explanation of the restraint shown by Ibn Saud, heretofore not distinguished for tenderness in dealing with enemies, is suggested by Margret Boveri (*Minaret and Pipe-Line*, p. 310): "Unfortunately no 'indiscreet' accounts exist as yet to tell us what negotiations took place in those days between Ibn Saud and England's envoys. The situation is further complicated by the fact that Italy chose Yemen as its first sphere of interest in Arabia. Italy's 'interest' was shown by the dispatch of a man-of-war to Hodeida, the chief port on the Yemen coast."

16. *Ibid.*, p. 319.

17. *Survey of International Affairs 1934*, p. 97.

18. *Survey of International Affairs 1936*, p. 24.

19. *Ibid.*

velopment in Iraq is closely linked with the economic development of Palestine as a commercial *entrepôt*, to which reference was made in the preceding chapter. The first of the developments linking the two countries together lay in the shift in trade routes from the long passage by sea through the Suez and around the Arabian Peninsula to the land route across the desert. This began to be accomplished in the years preceding the period under review by the commercial development of aviation between Palestine and Iraq and by the improvement of the roads from Haifa and Bagdad which made motor traffic and regular bus service possible. The opening up of the harbor of Haifa, October 31, 1933, connected the overland system of transportation from Iraq with the Mediterranean Sea to the West. The association of these developments with the exploitation of the oil resources in the Mesopotamian Valley is indicated in a number of ways. On October 18, 1933, a convention was signed at Jerusalem regulating the conveyance of oil through Palestine by the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. One of the main items in the Palestine Development Loan of 1934 was the construction of an oil berth at Haifa; at the same time, the Iraq Petroleum Company was engaged in building the pipe line from the Kirkurk oil fields, the Haifa branch of which was opened in January, 1935. The Iraqi Petroleum Company enjoys the following privileges in Palestine: freedom from all duties on transit of its petroleum and petroleum products; exemption from duties on all imports it requires; special railroad rates for its freight; complete exemption from "property tax, income tax, or any levy or fiscal charge of any sort." These close connections of Iraq with the Port of Haifa must be borne in mind when we come to consider the proposals made by the Iraq Government for a solution of the Palestine problem.

The admission of the Kingdom of Iraq to membership in the League of Nations on October 3, 1932, was an event of importance. On the surface it represented an apparent reversal of British imperial policy which had been at work for two centuries beginning with the establishment of the East India Company's control in Bengal in 1765. An extraordinary feature of this event was that the Mandatory Power and prevailing British public opinion were in agreement with Iraq in pressing for an early liquidation of the Mandate. This might appear

even more remarkable in the light of the fact that the Permanent Mandates Commission hesitated to agree to so early a declaration of independence for Iraq; in finally consenting, they made it clear that the moral responsibility for the liquidation of the Mandate rested with Great Britain and not with the League.

The paradox disappears, however, if we bear in mind that when the Mandate was terminated the Iraqis signed a treaty with Great Britain by which the latter maintained effective control over such interests in Iraq as she was concerned with. At the same time the liquidation of the Mandate relieved Great Britain of the responsibilities for administering the country with a view to its welfare and for safeguarding the rights of minorities. In effect, therefore, the change in British policy from that of old style imperialism was not without its benefits. The development of nationalism amongst the Arab peoples had made it more difficult for Great Britain to exercise control by means of the old suppressive methods. The upkeep of military forces was expensive and the nervous strain in attempting to harmonize imperialist ambitions with the Western slogans of self-determination became too heavy. It was found more convenient and respectable to maintain the same interests through collaboration with the native ruling classes who were ready—at least as a first step in obtaining full independence—to cooperate with the British and with the not less formidable Powers represented by the Iraq Petroleum Company.

The hesitation of the Permanent Mandates Commission was due to their doubt as to whether Iraq had advanced far enough for self-government. The major problem with which they were concerned was the question as to what would happen to the non-Arab minorities in a completely emancipated Iraq. The situation that confronted the League has been lucidly described as follows:<sup>20</sup>

The defence of a minority's rights against an aggressive majority's Nationalism, and not the defence of a subject nationality against an aggressive foreign Imperialism, was thus the cause which the Mandates Commission found itself called upon to champion; and this was a sign of the times in an age when, throughout a Westernized

world, the totalitarian national state was taking the place of the multi-national empire as the standard form of parochial political organization. The Assyrians in Iraq were the victims of the same turn of the political wheel as the Germans in Poland or the Jews in Germany; and from the humanitarian standpoint the change was not for the better; for the subject nationalities of the old regime had not been faced with that prospect of the total suppression of their national individuality which was the prospective doom, under the new regime, of the alien minorities. This particular change for the worse was world-wide; but it was aggravated, in non-Western countries like Iraq, by the fact that here Nationalism itself was not a native disease but an exotic infection whose ravages were the greater inasmuch as the patients had not been inoculated against the germ.

As a result of the pressure of the League of Nations, the Declaration made by the Kingdom of Iraq on the occasion of the termination of the Mandatory regime included articles designed to safeguard the equality of rights of all religious groups and of the minority nationalities.<sup>21</sup> These articles provided among other things, that the electoral system would give equitable representation to minorities; that adequate facilities would be given to those whose mother tongue was not Arabic for the use of their language before the courts; that Iraqi nationals belonging to minorities would enjoy the same rights as other Iraqi nationals to establish control over religious, charitable and educational institutions; and that non-Moslem minorities would be permitted to settle questions of family law and personal status in accordance with the usages of the communities to which they belonged. Special provision was made for recognizing Kurdish and Turkish as official languages side by side with Arabic in certain districts where the Kurds or the Turks predominate.

Unfortunately, the record of Iraq in the treatment of minorities did not justify the expectations that might have been aroused by these generous provisions. Even before the admission of Iraq to the League, a case occurred which indicated the future trend. The Shiite community of Bagdad, by threatening

21. The Declaration followed the lines of a statement made by Albania when that country was admitted to the League, and the Albanian declaration was itself based on the Polish Minorities Treaty of 1919. (See *Palestine Partition Commission Report*, Cmd. 5854, 1938, pp. 152 ff.; pp. 298 ff.)



a disturbance of the public peace, prevailed upon King Faisal to issue an order evicting the Bahai Church from houses which they had occupied and used for religious purposes for a number of generations. After the case had passed from court to court and had come before the Court of Appeal at Bagdad, the four native members—against the opinion of the British presiding judge—decided in favor of the Shiite plaintiffs. In its comment on the petition submitted by the Bahai community to the Permanent Mandates Commission, the British Government characterized the judgment as unsustainable in law and as vitiated by the suspicion of having been influenced by political considerations. As a result of the intercession of the Permanent Mandates Commission, a compromise was reached about the time when Iraq was admitted to the League. This compromise was unfavorable to the Bahai interest, but as a weak and peace-loving community, they felt forced to accept it. Yet the compromise was, for one excuse or another, never carried out, and the property remained in the hands of the Shiite community.

*The Survey of International Affairs* makes the following comment:<sup>22</sup>

This affair was particularly deplorable inasmuch as the Baha'is were a small and weak community which could not under any circumstances have menaced the security of the 'Iraqi state, even if its members had not been bound by their religious tenets to be good citizens. If the Baha'is were the victims of so flagrant an injustice before 'Iraq was emancipated from British mandatory control, it seemed unlikely that the Chaldaeans, Armenians, Jews, and other weak minorities could depend upon either the moral courage or even the good will of a completely sovereign and independent 'Iraqi Government in the event of their becoming targets for the animus of one or another of the dominant communities in the country. In the case of the Baha'is, the pressure of the Shi'i Arab community in 'Iraq had prevailed upon the highest executive and judicial authorities in the kingdom to fly in the face of the British Government and of the League of Nations in persisting in a course of action which they must have known to be morally indefensible from first to last.

The strong and turbulent Kurdish minority presented a more difficult problem to the Iraqi Government. The Kurds liv-

22. *Survey of International Affairs* 1934, p. 122.

ing in Iraq were part of a larger Kurdish population divided among Persia, Turkey, Syria and Iraq. The fraction of it living in Iraq had been brought in when the League of Nations, in the settlement of 1925, had decided in favor of the British and awarded Mosul to Iraq. One of the provisions of the settlement was that the British Mandatory would be continued for a period of twenty-five years and that the Kurds would be assured local autonomy. The Prime Minister of Iraq, speaking in the Chamber of Deputies at Bagdad in 1926, had declared that the officials in the Kurdish districts of Iraq should be Kurds and that the language of the local administration and of the schools should be Kurdish. However, the practical steps taken to implement these promises were not satisfactory. In 1929, when the British Government announced their decision to liquidate the Mandatory regime in Iraq by the year 1932, the Kurds grew restive. A number of petitions were addressed to the League of Nations by the Kurdish notables, demanding the formation of a Kurdish Government under the supervision of the League of Nations, in the event that the Mandatory regime in Iraq would be brought to an end. These petitions did not receive attention and in the meantime outbreaks occurred among the Kurds which led to an intervention by Iraq and a clash with the Iraqi police and army. In one of these encounters a serious reverse was sustained by the Iraqi Army, and one column was saved from annihilation only by the intervention of the British Air Force which bombed the encampments and villages of the recalcitrant Kurdish tribesmen. After this revolt, a more conciliatory attitude was taken by the Iraqi Government and measures were introduced to meet the demands for autonomy for local administration and for the development of the Kurdish language in the schools.

The degree to which the Iraq Government was willing to honor its promises to respect the rights of minorities was evidently related to the degree of physical resistance that the minority could offer. A tragic solution to the minority problem occurred in the case of the *Hakiyari* Assyrians who were Nestorian Christians, descendants of a once powerful community. These Assyrians were refugees who had been driven from their homes by the Turks in 1924 and given shelter in Iraq by the British authorities. Their main source of livelihood was pay drawn by those who had enlisted in a separate levy under

the British Crown. The relations of the Assyrian refugees to the Moslem inhabitants of the districts of Iraq where they were squatting were far from friendly, and the attitude of the Arab National Government in Bagdad was likewise inauspicious. An Arab intrigue was afoot in Bagdad to set the Kurds against the Assyrians with the idea of liquidating the two most formidable non-Arab minorities. There was also the difficult problem of finding proper land in Iraq for settlement of the Assyrians, and the Turks, on their part, refused to allow them to return to their previous homes which were now in Turkish territory.

Under these conditions the refugee Assyrians also grew restive when the negotiations began toward liquidating the Mandatory regime. The Assyrians wished either to be permitted to settle in some country under the rule of the Western nations or to be established as a *millet* in Iraq, not merely as a religious community. There were prolonged negotiations and discussions lasting over several years with unsatisfactory results. The Assyrians followed an obstructive policy and the Iraqi Government retaliated by retaining Mar Shimun, the head of the community in Bagdad, against his will. In the summer of 1933, five hundred armed Assyrians attempted to cross into Syria at the junction of the Sufan Dere and Tigris rivers. The Assyrians were permitted to enter French territory after surrendering their arms, but it was understood that if they left Syria their arms would be restored. Later, they began to move back to the Iraqi side. On the eastern shore the Iraqi Army was stationed to prevent their return. Shots were fired and an attack by the Assyrians followed. In this case, however, the Iraqi Army fought reasonably well and the Assyrians were forced back to the Syrian side. They made no further attempt to offer resistance.

After this, the Iraqi Army took matters into its own hands and carried out a "methodical massacre" of all men and boys who could be found in the nearby Assyrian villages; six defenseless women and ten children were also deliberately killed. "The blackness of this crime was deepened by the fact that the Assyrian population of the district had taken refuge at Simel from the villages round about in order to be under the protection of the local Iraqi police post."<sup>23</sup> Not content with butcher-

23. *Ibid.*, p. 164.

ing the Assyrians, the police and the military authorities called in the Kurds and some Arab tribes from across the Tigris to loot the Assyrian settlements. About six hundred Assyrians lost their lives, the majority killed in cold blood by the Army.

At Geneva the Iraqi delegation condemned the murders as irresponsible acts of the military who had gotten out of hand; at home the officers concerned were praised and promoted. However much the Iraqis may have deplored the excesses, there was a feeling of satisfaction that "the Assyrians were 'settled.' " <sup>24</sup> Much to the surprise of the Iraqis themselves, the official British policy was to whitewash the incident and to help the Iraqi Government put the best possible face on the situation at Geneva. The British implied that they did this because they were anxious to avoid precipitating further massacres of the Assyrian and other Christian minorities in the Mosul vilayet. There is, however, good authority for another view of the motives which actuated the British statesmen, as the following statement indicates:<sup>25</sup>

Both the British Government and certain powerful British business concerns had interests in 'Iraq which they were eager to preserve. The Government wished to maintain the air-bases on 'Iraqi territory which were links in the chain of the military and commercial air route from Great Britain to India and Australia; the 'Iraq Petroleum Company wanted to enjoy the benefit of the concession which it had received from the 'Iraqi Government. In the nineteenth century, such considerations might have led a British Government to jump at the pretext offered by the Simel massacre for reversing the policy of 1929, and perhaps even the policy of 1920, and virtually annexing 'Iraq to the British Empire; but this form of Imperialism—as practised, for example, during the nineteenth century, in India—required the employment of military force; and in 1933 this force was not at the British Government's command; for the British voter and taxpayer, as has been remarked above, no longer saw any glamour in the exercise of political dominion over Oriental countries; and he had only acquiesced in the British Government's assumption of mandatory responsibilities in 'Iraq on the tacit understanding that these responsibilities should be liquidated at the earliest opportunity and, in the meantime, should involve the Government's constituents in the United Kingdom in no appreciable liabilities, either military, political or financial.

24. *Ibid.*, p. 165.

25. *Ibid.*, p. 166.

The early granting of political independence to Iraq was not conducive to the development of internal democracy. Dr. Ireland, in his summary of the elements of progress and retrogression in Iraq points out that "no adequate class existed from which responsible and public spirited officials could be drawn, nor was there a substantial body of literate and informed citizens with which to work the democratic institutions as provided in the constitution."<sup>26</sup> There was in general a lack of social consciousness and of a sense of loyalty to the state and nation which might surmount the differences between the tribesmen and the townsmen, between the *Sunni* and the *Shi'i*, and between the Moslem and minority communities. To a large extent politics meant personal opportunity, and "patriotism still denoted independence without obligations to the State."<sup>27</sup> The principal value attached to official position was its effectiveness in securing financial gain and class advantage. Ireland characterizes the results of the parliamentary regime in Iraq as follows:<sup>28</sup>

Examination of the statute books of 'Iraq, not only from 1925 to 1932 but also to the present date, seems to suggest that the deputies have not failed to make free use of their position. Many of the financial measures granting remission of arrears in revenue and of other financial legislation, while passed by the Chamber for the benefit of 'Iraq as a whole, particularly after the agricultural crisis of 1931, have especially favored the land-owning class which has been predominant in Parliament. Other evidence seems to point to the exercise by the deputies of their influence outside of Parliament, either to secure preferential treatment from revenue officials or to obtain appointments for their protégés.

The parliamentary system of Iraq adopted from foreign models was unsuited to conditions and needs of Iraq. Elections to the Chamber of Deputies were rigidly controlled by the Government and frequently influenced by pressure from the British, just as before the granting of independence. Among the administrative officials there was a general sense of insecurity, since ministerial changes were always likely to lead to dismis-

26. Philip W. Ireland, *Iraq, A Study in Political Development*, Macmillan, 1938, p. 424.

27. *Ibid.*, p. 425.

28. *Ibid.*, pp. 432-433.

sals. There developed "an aversion amounting in individual cases to fear, which most officials have evinced towards the assumption of responsibility and initiative."<sup>29</sup> This insecurity and flight from responsibility were particularly marked among Jewish and Christian officials against whom there was widespread prejudice. As early as 1921 there was opposition to the employment of foreigners and of any but Iraqis professing Islam, and this tendency grew worse as time went on.<sup>30</sup> In general, after the death of Faisal in 1933, the Government came more and more under the control of the Palace and the Cabinet, and finally resulted in a military dictatorship after the coup d'état of October 29, 1936.<sup>31</sup> Thus the net result of the granting of independence was a wave of skepticism as to the value of parliamentary institutions, and Iraq easily fell prey to the growing fascistic tendencies in Arabic countries.

### *Arab Policy in Palestine*

The world Islamic Congress held at Jerusalem in December, 1931, served as a link between the movement toward rapprochement among the Arab countries and the political ambitions of Haj Amin al-Husaini, the Mufti of Jerusalem, in Palestine. The MacDonald letter to Weizmann had completely negated the political victory which the Mufti had achieved in the Shaw and Simpson reports and in the White Paper of October, 1930. The Report of the Commission on the Wailing Wall, rendered in June, 1931, was likewise unsatisfactory to the Supreme Moslem Council. The Mufti attempted to exploit the occasion by issuing a call for a world Islamic Congress in association with Shawkat Ali, the leader of the Indian Caliphate Committee. The beginnings of collaboration between the Mufti and Shawkat Ali went back to the Wailing Wall disturbances in

29. *Ibid.*, p. 435.

30. Jews and Christians were not infrequently employed in the financial and technical departments, and Sasun Haskail, a Jew, and Yusuf Ghanima, a Christian, served as Ministers of Finance. In June, 1936, however, promotions of Jewish employees made by the Directors of the Government railway were cancelled by order of the Minister.

31. It is not irrelevant to our discussion to mention that the coup d'état was carried out by General Bekr Sidqi, who led the Iraqi forces in the massacre of the Assyrians in 1933, as the result of which he won great popularity. A campaign in 1935 carried out against revolting tribes added to his reputation for military ability and ruthlessness. (See Ireland, *op. cit.*, p. 426, n. 3.)

August, 1929. Both men, moreover, were concerned with the re-establishment of the caliphate which had been vacant since the overthrow of King Husain by Ibn Saud in 1924.<sup>32</sup> The Mufti had some claim to descent from the Prophet, and like other ambitious leaders in the Moslem world, he undoubtedly hoped to strengthen his position through obtaining the Caliphate.<sup>33</sup> There was a movement on foot also to enlarge the importance of Jerusalem in the mind of the Moslem world. In January 1931, the body of Muhammad Ali, the former leader of the Indian Caliphate Committee, was interred in the precincts of the *Haram esh-Sharif*. This policy of strengthening the attachment of Moslems all over the world to the sanctuary of Jerusalem was pursued again a few months later when the body of Husain, former King of the Hejaz, was buried in close proximity to Muhammad Ali.<sup>34</sup>

The announcement of the Congress received a mixed reception.<sup>35</sup> It met considerable opposition in Egypt. King Fuad had been disappointed when the Islamic Congress in 1926 failed to choose him as Caliph; he had not given up his hope for this office and he now evidently suspected Haj Amin of the same ambition. Moreover, one of the principal objects of the present Islamic Congress was the establishment of a University of al-Aqsa at Jerusalem, but the *ulema* (scholars) of the University of al-Azhar in Cairo were strongly opposed to this. Egypt had for a long time aspired to be the religious center of Islam and the cultural center of the Arab world; its books and newspapers were read throughout the Islamic and Arabic world. Cairo now looked askance at the attempt of the Mufti to create a rival center at Jerusalem. Nevertheless, Egypt permitted delegates from Moslem associations and from *Wafdist* societies to attend, although the Government did not send any

32. In 1924, Kemal Pasha abolished the Ottoman Caliphate; whereupon King Husain declared himself Caliph. The Moslem world, whose pilgrims were plundered by Husain's people when they came to Mecca raised a great protest. "It was on this wave of protest that Ibn Saud was carried to the throne of the Hejaz." (Margret Boveri, *op. cit.*, p. 388.) Ibn Saud, who probably hoped that he would be chosen Caliph at the Pan-Islamic Congress which was held in Mecca in 1926, was, as a Wahabi, unacceptable to the majority of Moslems composed of Sunnites or Shiites.

33. *Ibid.*, pp. 388 ff.

34. Husain died at Amman in Trans-Jordan, June 6, 1931.

35. H. A. R. Gibb, "The Islamic Congress at Jerusalem in December 1931," *Survey of International Affairs* 1934, p. 102.

official representatives. Turkey, dedicated to a renaissance on a modern, national basis, refused to participate. The Imam of Yemen was the only head of an Arabic state to give an immediately favorable response to the invitation to participate. Nevertheless, when the Congress assembled, Faisal and Abdullah associated themselves with it, and Ibn Saud nominated a representative, who, however, failed to reach Jerusalem in time. Despite the mixed reception from the Moslem states, there appears to have been a wide popular response to the call for a Congress; delegates came from many countries—from Persia, India and the Far East, and from the countries of North Africa.

In marked contrast to the rather favorable response from the outer Islamic world, Moslem opinion in Palestine itself indicated sharp hostility toward the Congress. The long standing rivalry between the Nashashibis and the Husainis flared up in an undignified spectacle of disunity. The proponents of the Congress were accused of organizing it in order to strengthen the personal influence of the Mufti and Shawkat Ali against their local rivals in Palestine and India, respectively. Immediately after the assembly of the Congress, the Mufti's opponents led by Ragheb Bey Nashashibi convened a counter-conference at Jerusalem at which resolutions were passed demanding a reform in the constitution of the Supreme Moslem Council and expressing lack of confidence in the Mufti as its president.

The principal recommendations adopted by the Congress related to its own constitution and to the establishment of a Moslem University at Jerusalem. Despite the agreement made with the Palestine Government that the political policy of friendly Powers would not be discussed, the Congress protested against mandates in general and expressed itself strongly against Zionism. Care was taken that the political discussions should have a Moslem religious rather than a nationalist Pan-Arab form. One of its resolutions provided for "the protection of the Holy Places in Palestine by boycotting Zionist goods and creating an agricultural association to purchase and exploit Palestinian lands."<sup>36</sup> The presence of many delegates from the Arabic speaking lands was utilized to hold an "Arab Congress" and to formulate an "Arab Covenant." This took place on December 13, 1931; the meeting was held in another building and

36. *Ibid.*, p. 106.



technically its action was not associated with the Islamic Congress. The terms of the Covenant were as follows:<sup>37</sup>

1. The Arab lands are a complete and indivisible whole, and the divisions of whatever nature to which they have been subjected are not approved nor recognized by the Arab nation.

2. All efforts in every Arab country are to be directed towards the single goal of their complete independence, in their entirety and unified; and every idea which aims at limitation to work for local and regional politics must be fought against.

3. Since colonization is, in all its forms and manifestations, wholly incompatible with the dignity and highest aims of the Arab nation, the Arab nation rejects it and will combat it with all its forces.

An Executive Council of twenty-five was elected by the Congress, widely representative of Arab and Moslem countries. Branches of the Congress were formed in various countries and the Council followed the usual method of sending petitions to the League of Nations and to the governments of various Arab countries. In 1933, the Mufti, accompanied by the Egyptian *Wafd* ex-Minister, Alubah Pasha, was sent to Iraq and India to collect contributions.<sup>38</sup> However, no report was ever made of moneys collected and the project for an Arab university at Jerusalem was never initiated. In 1934, a delegation headed by the Mufti participated in the discussion which led to the Peace Treaty between Ibn Saud and Imam Yahya. To what degree the delegation influenced the treaty is not known, but the effort was designed to promote Arab-Islamic unity. The Congress no doubt did something in the way of strengthening the relations between the Arab and Moslem leaders of various countries and increasing the interest of the Arab world in the problem of Palestine. Most of all, it contributed to the prestige of the Mufti as a figure in the Arabic and Islamic world outside of Palestine. However, the third Islamic Congress at Jerusalem failed to choose a Caliph or to create a permanent world Moslem organization.

The political policy of the Palestine Arab leaders was, in 1931, still directed by the Arab Executive which derived its

37. *Ibid.*, p. 107 n. The meeting proposed to convene a Pan-Arab Congress in Bagdad in the autumn of 1932 but this meeting never took place. See below, p. 773.

38. It appeared that the relations between the Mufti and Shawkat Ali had become strained. (*Ibid.*, p. 108, n. 7.)

authority from the Seventh Arab Congress of June, 1928. This had established a façade of unity between the Nashashibi and Husaini partisans. The Mufti remained in control, however, and internal difficulties between the factions continued. Ragheb Bey had no success in weakening the Mufti's position. The first breach in the completeness of the control by the Husainis came from another side—the nationalist extremist Auni Abdul Hadi, one of the three secretaries of the Executive. Under his leadership the *Istiqlal* (Independence Party) was organized in 1932. The *Istiqlalists*, who were not hampered by the fear of losing the benefits of public office, as were both the Husainis and Nashashibis, were free to pursue a more openly anti-British policy. They formulated a program of opposition to Britain as the main foe of the Arab aspiration for an independent Palestine: once the British were dealt with, it would be easy to take care of the Jews.

The newly formed party represented a continuation of one of the secret nationalist societies of the pre-war period.<sup>39</sup> Auni Abdul Hadi was the link between the new Palestine branch of the *Istiqlal* and the old organization. He had been a member of one of the Syrian secret societies which later developed into the *Istiqlal*, and after the First World War he served as one of the secretaries of the Arab Delegation to the Peace Conference which was headed by Faisal. The *Istiqlalists* were responsible for the ill-starred crowning of Faisal as King of Syria; their insistence on maximalist demands had furnished the excuse for the French attack on Damascus which resulted in Faisal's expulsion. For the *Istiqlalists*, Faisal remained the personification of the dream of a Pan-Arab union, and when he became King of Iraq many of the leading members of the old *Istiqlal* were given positions of importance in the government. One of the purposes of the new *Istiqlal*, which was founded in the summer of 1932, was to cooperate in the creation of an All-Arab Conference at Bagdad in connection with the admission of Iraq to the League of Nations as an independent power in that year. The death of Faisal in September, 1933, led to the abandonment of the plan and to a weakening of the Palestine *Istiqlal*.

Another indication of growing extremism—of another kind, however—was the formation of a youth organization under the Arab Executive for the purpose of encouraging the partici-

39. For the origin of the *Istiqlalists*, see Antonius, *op. cit.*, p. 292, n. 1.

pation of young Arabs in political activities. The organization was to be non-partisan—that is, neither Husaini nor Nashashibi-led. It was to be an instrument of the Executive in mobilizing Arab youth. The youth were organized through boy scout groups;<sup>40</sup> among their activities were such duties as enforcing the boycott against the Tel-Aviv Levant Fair organized by Jews in 1932, patrolling the shores of Palestine for Jewish illegal immigrants, combating land sales to Jews by appealing to the peasants in mosques and villages, encouraging land claims by Bedouins, and engineering land suits against Jews to delay the utilization of land already purchased. Other activities of the youth organization consisted of providing honor guards for pilgrimages to Moslem shrines and for visiting Moslem notables from abroad, enforcement of boycott against Jewish products and propaganda for Arab products. There were some athletic activities but these were secondary to the political purpose.

The leader of the youth organization and its Executive was Yacoub Ghussein, a wealthy orange grower, “the Bey of *Wadi Hanin*,” who had held a position of importance in the Turkish period. It is possible that the weakness of the Executive and the inability of either the Husainis or the Nashashibis to achieve complete domination encouraged him to aspire to a leading position in Arab politics. He recognized that his power as a youth leader lay in being more extreme than the Husainis and he advocated non-cooperation with the Government to enforce Arab demands. Later, he moderated his position—perhaps because Auni Bey had taken the wind out of his sails—and he joined Ragheb Bey in favorable consideration of the Legislative Council.<sup>41</sup>

In contrast to the growing intransigence among the politically minded Arabs of Palestine, there were evidences during this period of a willingness on the part of the Arabs of Trans-Jordan to cooperate with the Jews. In January, 1933, the Jewish Agency completed negotiations with the Emir of Trans-Jordan for the leasing of 17,500 acres of land in Trans-Jordan

40. These were not affiliated with the Baden-Powell Scouts which were organized in connection with schools and headed by the Director of Education, Mr. Bowman.

41. Michael Assaf, *op. cit.*, p. 47; also *Haaretz*, “Annual Survey,” September 16, 1936.

for a thirty-three year period, renewable for two more similar periods.<sup>42</sup> The land was to be used for colonization and it was expected that fifteen hundred Jewish agricultural families could be settled. This whole area had been presented by the British Government to Abdullah some eighteen months previously. Abdullah explained, in making the lease, that his purpose in giving the concession was to stimulate Jewish enterprise and capital in Trans-Jordan "to give his country a chance to be developed by an active element along the same prosperous lines as Palestine."

The Palestine Administration had not been informed of the transaction before its consummation. After it became known, the Government began to exert pressure both on the Zionists and on the Emir to cancel the agreement. The *Istiqlalists* arranged a meeting in Jerusalem to take steps against Abdullah. They threatened to have him deposed if he carried out his agreement with the Jews. The meeting submitted a petition to Sir Arthur Wauchope, the High Commissioner, requesting him to intervene and prevent the leasing of land in Trans-Jordan to Jews. A cabled request for intervention was also sent to Mr. Charles Crane, who was now head of an Institute of World Affairs in the United States. In their telegram to Crane, the Arabs asked for financial assistance to enable them to purchase back Abdullah's land.<sup>43</sup> The Mufti of Jerusalem visited the Emir and also brought pressure to bear on him. As a result, Abdullah announced that he was cancelling the agreement and authorized the Arab press to say that he did not intend to lease his land to foreigners in the future.<sup>44</sup>

The Arab sheikhs of Trans-Jordan on their part did not oppose the transaction. In fact, they met with the Zionist leaders in Jerusalem soon after at the King David Hotel, together with Dr. Weizmann who happened to be in Palestine, and Dr. Arlosoroff, other members of the Executive and some representatives of Palestine Jewry who were prominent in Arab-Jewish relations. They made speeches in which they urged the Jews to come to Trans-Jordan and to come quickly. On April 2nd, the

42. *The New York Times*, January 18, 1933.

43. *Ibid.*, January 24, 1933.

44. As a matter of fact, the option was not cancelled, although no steps were taken on the part of the Zionists to develop or settle the land due to the opposition of the Government.

British Administration attempted to get a bill passed by the Trans-Jordan Legislative Council prohibiting the sale or lease of land to non-Trans-Jordanians. During the discussion the Government representatives, foreseeing defeat, urged that the bill be deferred, but the majority insisted on an immediate vote and the bill lost by 13 votes to 3. The debate made it clear that the members of the Legislature knew quite well that the question of Jewish settlement in Trans-Jordan was involved. While the agreement between the Jewish Agency and Abdullah did not lead to lifting the ban on Jewish penetration into Trans-Jordan, it had the important political effect of showing that the British opposition to Jewish settlement, though in line with the standpoint of the political extremists in Palestine, did not have the support of the Arabs of Trans-Jordan.

### POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS FROM 1933 TO 1936

On January 30, 1933, the National-Socialist regime was established in Germany, and almost immediately a stream of immigrants from Germany and other parts of Central Europe began to pour into Palestine. The situation of the Jews of Poland and Rumania was also becoming increasingly worse. As the Royal Commission Report states: "It was the blackest crisis the Jewish people has had to face in modern times—blackest because more widespread and in some respects more painful than the crisis of the Russian pogroms before the war."<sup>45</sup> This large new wave of Jewish immigrants had the effect of arousing the Arab Executive to a renewal of anti-Zionist propaganda. In March, it issued a manifesto to the Arab Nation declaring that "the general tendency of Jews to take possession of the lands of this holy country and their streaming into it by hundreds and thousands through legal and illegal means has terrified the country."<sup>46</sup> It charged that the Government's policy was "to pave the road for driving the nation away from its homeland for foreigners to supersede it." The manifesto announced that a meeting would be held in Jaffa to call on the people "to get ready for the serious acts which will be imposed by the resolutions of this assembly." The proposed meeting was held in Jaffa on March 26th and was at-

45. *Royal Commission Report*, p. 81.

46. *Ibid.*, p. 83.

tended by some five or six hundred Arabs, including representatives of the different factions, mayors of the Arab towns, villages, as well as townsmen. Resolutions were passed adopting "the principle of non-cooperation"; receptions and other forms of social intercourse with Government were to be avoided, invitations to act on Government boards were to be refused, British and Zionist goods were to be boycotted. These were to be the immediate steps; a committee was appointed to study ways and means for a wider application of non-cooperation.

On their part the Jewish Agency Executive protested against restrictions on immigration. They complained that the Government had reduced the request for 12,750 certificates on the Labor Schedule to 5,500 without offering any reason for the reduction. Although the number of certificates was larger than in previous years, the Executive maintained that it was not sufficient in the light of the remarkable progress made in Jewish economic activity in Palestine on the one hand, and the German-Jewish catastrophe on the other. The Agency also objected to a revision of the Immigration Ordinance which increased the minimum amount required for entry under category A, usually called "Capitalist," from £P500 to £P1,000. The Eighteenth Zionist Congress, meeting in Prague in August, 1933, demanded that the Jewish national home should be "built as speedily as possible and on the largest scale." In its resolution on immigration, the Congress declared that the existing Immigration Ordinance, both in its fundamental provisions and in the manner of its administration, was contrary to the basic principle of the absorptive capacity of the country. The resolution read as follows:<sup>47</sup>

The Congress protests against the system of the constant restriction of immigration, which is manifested particularly strongly in the present period, in which the Jewish masses of the Diaspora find themselves in a serious economic and political crisis, in which German Jewry is being ruined, and in which at the same time Eretz Israel is rapidly developing through the labor and capital that the Jewish people has provided for the upbuilding of the country, so that the shortage of Jewish workers during the last two years has become a constant phenomenon in the country.

47. *Protokoll der Verhandlungen des XVIII. Zionistenkongress, Vienna, 1934*, pp. 546, 547.

The Congress declares itself in favor of the abolition of the system of immigration restriction, which has found expression in the existing Immigration Ordinance, and calls upon the Executive of the Jewish Agency to demand from the Government the transfer of responsibility for Jewish immigration into Eretz Israel, in accordance with the provisions of the Mandate, to the Jewish Agency.

The Congress demands that until the time when this request is fulfilled, those provisions in the present Immigration Ordinance shall be amended which particularly impede Jewish immigration.

The Zionist Congress also proclaimed anew the desire of the Jewish people "to create relations of peace and cooperation with the Arab people in Palestine and in neighboring countries on the basis of the unrestricted progress of Jewish immigration and settlement in Palestine." The resolution on Arab-Jewish relations proceeded to state:<sup>48</sup>

The Congress points out that there is not only no antithesis between the endeavors of the Jewish people and the vital interests of the Arab masses, but also that the Jewish colonization is the fundamental factor in the development of the country, which promotes the welfare of large sections of its non-Jewish population. The striking contrast between the west of Palestine, whose development shows rapid progress, and Trans-Jordan, which is suffering economic stagnation, affords testimony to the better condition of the territory that enjoys the advantages of Jewish development activity. The Congress expresses its sympathy with the endeavors of the inhabitants of Trans-Jordan for the improvement of their conditions of life and regards with satisfaction the first tokens of recognition on their part that the economic redemption of Trans-Jordan will be achieved by Arab-Jewish cooperation in that region.

The already virulent Arab press steadily became more inciting. The newspapers were warned by the Government but with little or no effect. In the early autumn, charges against the Government were being printed to the effect that it was deliberately "flooding the country with Jews with the object of displacing Arabs from the land and depriving them of the employment" and that a "mass immigration of Jews was being allowed and encouraged by Government so that when the Legislative Council was introduced the Jews would be in a majority."<sup>49</sup> Reports were spread that as many as ten thousand

48. *Ibid.*, p. 554.

49. *Ibid.*, p. 83.

Jewish illegal immigrants had recently entered the country. At a Moslem festival early in September, Musa Kazem Pasha, the President of the Arab Executive, made a violent speech against Jewish immigration and telegraphed to the High Commissioner demanding its immediate cessation. Public meetings were organized by the *Istiqlal* Party, the Moslem Young Men's Association and the Moslem Christian Association. Moslem and Christian Arabs were again, it appears, sinking their differences in opposition to Jewish immigration.

Early in October, the Arab Executive, urged on by the Arab newspapers, announced that a "general strike" would be declared on October 13th and that a demonstration would be held at Government Offices in Jerusalem. The Government prohibited the demonstration but an attempt was made to hold it nevertheless, and the crowd was not dispersed until the police had used their batons. In the course of the next few weeks outbreaks occurred in Jaffa, Nablus, Haifa and again in Jerusalem. Public buildings were attacked and police were stoned, 27 persons were killed, including one policeman, and 234 were injured, of whom 56 were police. On a number of occasions during these outbreaks the police had been forced to fire in self-defense. The disorders were put down and 18 leaders were tried for complicity. In their trial, which lasted ten months, the lawyers claimed that they were merely spectators during the demonstration. Among those accused of inciting the disorders were Jamal Husaini, Yacoub Ghussein and Auni Abdul Hadi. The Government offered them the alternative of going to jail or promising to abstain from participation in politics for a period of three years, which they agreed to do. One of the leaders, Sheikh Muzaffar, a religious fanatic and aid to the Mufti, defied the Government and went to jail. The Mufti himself was absent from Palestine during the disorders on his mission to Iraq and India to collect funds for a Moslem university in Jerusalem. The peasants had generally failed to respond to the agitation in 1933. There were no Holy Places at stake as in 1929; moreover, the government had helped in the remission of taxes, extension of loans and in other ways, and it may be that this had some effect. The agitation had largely been conducted in the urban districts, and the city mobs played a large part in the demonstrations.

From the time of the suppression of the disorders at the end



of 1933 there were few disturbances to the peace, but the hostility to Jewish purchases of land and Jewish immigration on the part of the Arab political leaders continued without let-up. Within the limits of loyal adherence to the Mandate and to the MacDonald letter, the High Commissioner did all he possibly could to reckon with the Arab demands in the hope of winning over the elusive "moderate Arab." On January 12, 1934, a Municipal Corporations Ordinance was enacted extending the degree of self-government. The development of local self-government was attended with some success and at the end of the year twenty Councils were in operation, but there were no signs that local self-government would insure cooperation between the Jews and Arabs in national affairs. Although in principle committed to the formula of economic absorptive capacity, the High Commissioner nevertheless cut down the Jewish Agency's half-yearly estimate of labor certificates from 20,100 to 5,600. In a friendly way he counseled the Agency to be satisfied with a moderately large and continuous immigration and not to insist on too rapid a development. On one occasion, in writing a personal note to an officer of the Jewish Agency, he called Francis Bacon to his aid and quoted a passage from the essay "On Plantations": "Cram not in people, by sending too fast company after company . . . but so as the numbers may live well in the plantation, and not by surcharge of penury."

The outbreak of 1933 had brought into the open the underlying friction between the Husainis and the Nashashibis who had opposed the new anti-British orientation and the use of violence. Only some non-salaried participants in Government advisory posts had resigned from Government service, and the Nashashibi opposition took pleasure in exposing the failure of Husaini followers to carry out the non-cooperative principle when Government jobs were involved. The Nashashibis called upon Haj Amin to resign his Government post as President of the Supreme Moslem Council, and derided as deserters the leaders of the Arab Executive who had disowned responsibility for the 1933 demonstrations, and who had so easily complied with the Government's demand to refrain from political activities. When the Local Government Ordinance was promulgated in January, 1934, Musa Kazem, on his part, called on Ragheb Bey and other mayors in the Opposition to resign in protest against the inadequacy of the Ordinance. Though each

side called on the other to resign Government office, neither obliged with any action.

### *Arab Political Parties*

In March, 1934, Musa Kazem, who had been the President of the Arab Executive since its inception, died, and with him passed away an important unifying influence which had kept the Executive together despite its inner rivalries. The Opposition scored a victory at first by having one of its representatives, Yacoub Faraj, a vice-president of the Executive, appointed to carry on until a new president was elected. The Opposition also succeeded in blocking the election of Jamal Husaini as president. There followed a period of mutual recrimination. The Husaini press charged Yacoub Faraj with selling land to Jews, and the Opposition countered by calling the Mufti a deserter of the people in times of trouble, referring to his absence from Palestine during the period of the disorders. In August, 1934, in the face of the bitter inter-factional conflict and inability to agree on a new president, the Executive discarded its opposition to the organization of separate parties. A resolution was passed calling for the formation of parties and allowing six months for organization with a view of convening an Eighth Congress at the end of that period.

As a result of the continuous internal strife, the Arab Congress was not called, but the resolution of August, 1934, had the effect of a virtual dissolution of the old Arab Executive. Factional strife reached a high point in the spring of 1935, when, on April 19th, two Palestine Arab newspapers, *Falastin* and *al-Jamiah al-Islamiyyah*, at that time supporting the Nashashibis, published a photostat of a letter dated Geneva, February 20, 1935, addressed to the Mufti and signed by Emir Shekib Arslan, the exiled Druse nationalist head of the "Syrian Palestinian Delegation" at Geneva. Both the Mufti and Arslan were under attack at the time by the Arab newspapers for not following a more aggressive policy against Great Britain. In the letter (see page 774), Arslan attempted to persuade the Mufti to exploit Britain's embarrassment in the Ethiopian conflict by starting propaganda in the Arab countries in favor of Italy. He counselled the Mufti against relying further on the British and warned him that if he continued to do so he would lose his influence with the Palestinian and

other Arabs. He indicated that he had had negotiations with the government at Rome on the Arab question and had received assurances of help from Mussolini personally.

#### ALLEGED LETTER OF EMIR SHEKIB ARSLAN TO MUFTI AMIN EL-HUSSEINI

About ten days ago, upon my return from the trip which you know, I wrote you an answer with observations on the attacks against you in the Palestine press because you have not shown a hostile attitude toward England. Don't be offended if I tell you that I agree with those papers rather than with you in this respect.

With the English neither praise, nor corruption nor politics is of avail; nobody can outwit them, because they are of all men the best tricksters, and remain unmoved by sentiments and arguments. Softness is for the English a language they do not understand; the only language they understand is resistance. Therefore, I am convinced that your attachment to the friendship of that people will make you lose not only your influence on your fellow Palestinians, but also that on other peoples. And although this is only a small pretext for your opponents, it would be preferable not to play their game. You understand what I mean.

I do not know whether our friend Ihsan Bey-alJabiri has informed you about what was concluded between me and the men of the Government at Rome on the subject of our interview of Mecca\* and on our Jerusalem understanding. Now I want you to know that as far as I am concerned I am satisfied with the last parley and with the assurances which Mussolini has given personally. I am confident that Italy will not treat us as England and France have treated us. If you can send here brother Jemal (el-Husseini) during his voyage to London, I will inform him on what cannot be expounded here.

In any case the agreement was concluded to give a start to the propaganda in favor of Italy in the Arab countries as soon as possible, because he (Mussolini? ed.) says that he fears a World War, and if till that time things are not ready, the advantages which we hope to obtain will be lost. I have already taken some preliminary steps as you will see from the next issue of the review "La Nation Arabe." I maintain that we have to take the opportunity of the conflict between Abyssinia and them to expose the wrongs of the Abyssinians against the Moslems.

Perhaps the Ministry of Propaganda at Rome will send to our newspapers some notices for publication; I have given them already the

\* Shekib Arslan and Amin el-Husseini met in Mecca during the peace conference between the Yemen and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

addresses of *al-Jamiah al-'Arabiya* and of *al-Wahda al-'Arabiyyah*,\* but not the address of *al-Jami'ah al-Islamiyyah*, since our friend Jemal has given me your message of the volte face of its editor. I have written to Riyad Be (es-Sulh) so that he should take up matter in Syria and I have asked him to see you so that you may give him the necessary instructions.

Mussolini has questioned me on your personal relations with the Emir Abdallah; but I did not think it convenient to enter into this matter and I told him that the Emir is a creature of the British and that we cannot expect anything good from him, especially since I saw from the Palestinian newspapers that he has turned to the circle of Raghib (Bey-en-Nashashibi) and his supporters.

I'll write you another time in more detail on other important questions.

God's peace and His Mercy may be with you.

Your brother (friend) Shékib Arslan

The publication of the letter aroused violent discussion in the Arab press, accompanied by mutual recriminations, charges and countercharges. The Nashashibi newspapers declared that the Mufti was involved in the intrigue with Mussolini, that only on this basis could the articles in praise of Italy, which had appeared shortly before in the Mufti's newspaper, *al-Jamih al-Arabiya*, be understood. (In the past the Mufti, in common with all Moslem leaders, had been denouncing Italy for its cruel treatment of the Moslems in Tripoli.) The denials, however, were not effective; at any rate, the ideas expressed were undoubtedly indicative of a trend of thought of some Arab leaders.

During the course of the year, however, internal dissensions were submerged. The differences of outlook were permitted expression and by the autumn of 1935 six groups, usually referred to as "political parties," came into being with the following designations: 1) the Palestine Arab Party (Husaini); 2) the National Defense Party (Nashashibi); 3) the *Istiqlal* (Independence) Party, with Auni Abdul Hadi as its outstanding personality; 4) the Youth Organization or Youth Executive of Yacoub Ghusseini; 5) the Reform Party formed around Dr. Husain Khalidi; 6) the National Bloc or National League of Abdul Latif Bey Salah of Nablus.

\* The Palestinian paper which was published in English; it has ceased publication.

*Palestine Arab Party.* This party was dominated by Haj Amin al-Husaini, the Mufti of Jerusalem and President of the Supreme Moslem Council. The titular head of the party, however, was Jamal Husaini, the former secretary of the Arab Executive. The vice-president of the newly formed party was an old ally of the Husainis, Alfred Rock (or Roche), an Arab merchant and an orange grower, the outstanding member of the Roman Catholic Church in Palestine. His presence in the Arab party served a number of purposes: to personify the appeal to the Holy See for the protection of the Holy Places from Jewish encroachment; to demonstrate Arab Moslem-Christian solidarity; to show that the Husainis were not Moslem fanatics and that not all Christians were with the Nashashibi group.

In its program the party followed the pattern previously set by the Arab Executive. Its formal objectives were: to maintain the Arab character of Palestine; to resist the establishment of the Jewish national home; and to improve the social, economic and political conditions of the Arabs of Palestine.<sup>50</sup> The main activity of the party consisted in a stream of provocative protests and memoranda to the British Government and to the Permanent Mandates Commission. Contacts were maintained with the Catholic world through Alfred Rock; and Jamal and Haj Amin maintained relations with the Moslem countries through travel and correspondence. During these years the Mufti was developing contacts with Ibn Saud. As already noted, when war broke out between Saudi Arabia and Imam Yahya of Yemen in 1934, the Mufti headed a peace mission organized by the Executive of the 1931 Islamic Congress and participated in the negotiations which led to the treaty of peace at Taif on May 20th. Ibn Saud was an excellent prospective ally for the Mufti in the light of his outstanding position in the Arab world and lack of ambition to reign over Palestine.

*The National Defense Party.* This was the familiar Nashashibi Opposition, only now organized as a party. It was headed by its old leader, Ragheb Bey, who at the end of 1934 had experienced the most severe setback of his whole career, having been defeated in the 1934 mayoralty elections in Jerusalem by a coalition of the Husainis and the Khalidi family. The decisive factor in his defeat was the vote cast against him by the Jews

50. M. E. T. Mogannam, *op. cit.*, p. 241.

who had grown tired of the corrupt municipal administration, and who believed that Khalidi would follow a moderate policy. Nashashibi's defeat was all the more galling to him, since the Opposition Party had shown considerable strength in the municipal elections throughout the country with nearly all of the mayors elected being anti-Husaini candidates.

The party's vice-president was Yacoub Faraj, a Greek Orthodox Christian, former vice-president of the Arab Executive, a deputy-mayor of Jerusalem. Two secretaries were elected: Sidki Dajani, a municipal councillor of Jerusalem, an enterprising lawyer who had led the joint Arab-Jewish motor strike in the 1920's; and Mogannam E. Mogannam, a talented Christian lawyer of Syrian origin who was a competent organizer. The Central Committee of the party contained a number of Arab mayors, the most outstanding personality being Suleiman Bey Toukan, Mayor of Nablus. The Central Committee included Isa al Isa, the owner of the most popular Arab daily, *Falastin*, which became the party's organ.

The constituent meeting of the new party held in Jaffa in December 1934 adopted the following objectives: independence in national government; non-recognition of international obligations calculated to culminate in foreign predominance; promotion of economic, educational, social and agricultural development of the country, assistance in improving the condition of the *fellah* and Arab worker.<sup>51</sup> There was no essential difference between the Palestine Arab Party and the National Defense Party as far as stated objectives were concerned, except for the mention of the Arab *fellah*. The difference between the two parties was similar to that between the Mejlisin and the Muaridin of the previous decade and reflected the personal struggle between the Nashashibi and the Husainis. The immediate purpose of the party was to destroy the Mufti's reputation in Palestine and abroad, to discredit him with the Government, and to win the urban Arab labor and the youth to the Nashashibi side. In its foreign relations, the Nashashibi Party allied itself with the Emir Abdullah, being ready to support his claim to rule over Palestine as part of a united Trans-Jordan and Palestine. In return for this support, the Nashashibi group expected to be the dominant element in Emir Abdullah's projected kingdom.

51. *Ibid.*, pp. 236-238.

*The Istiqlal Party.* The *Istiqlal*, which had become quiescent after the death of Faisal in 1933, was revived at this time, still under the leadership of Auni Abdul Hadi. His collaborators consisted mostly of professional people and intellectuals, including Izzat Darwazeh, an associate of the Mufti and director of the Moslem *Waqfs*, Ajaj Nuwaihed, a Druse newspaper man, owner of the *Istiqlal's* organ, *El Arab*, and Nabih Bey Admeh, called the "Arab leader of Damascus."<sup>52</sup> An important member, particularly from the point of view of financial support, was Ahmed Hilmi Pasha, a Director of the Arab Bank. The party was the Palestine branch of the Pan-Arab *Istiqlal* movement and represented a point of view rather than a cohesive organization.

From the outset, the Palestine *Istiqlal* took the position that Great Britain was the main foe of Arab aspirations, and demanded that the method of resort to violence which had been successful in Iraq and Egypt should be followed in Palestine. From 1933 on, this anti-British outlook began to turn into a pro-Axis orientation, accompanied by a growing anti-Jewish feeling along Occidental anti-Semitic lines. *Ad-Difa*, the paper which expressed the *Istiqlal* viewpoint, was edited by Ibrahim Shanti, who had presided over Arab Student Congresses in Europe and who had admiringly studied Nazi theory and practice. The paper was transparently pro-Nazi; its illustrated section was devoted mainly to the achievements of the new Germany, and was largely composed of material supplied by the German Propaganda Ministry.

The *Istiqlalists* became the virtual representatives of Iraqi expansionist ambitions. Shortly before his death, Faisal, under the influence of the *Istiqlalists*, had submitted a plan to Britain for the union of Iraq, Trans-Jordan and Palestine, with the promise of Jewish minority rights in the new state. Through the union with Iraq the *Istiqlalists* hoped to achieve four goals at one stroke: 1) to lay the cornerstone for a greater Arab Federation which would eventually include Syria; 2) to insure Iraq an outlet to the Mediterranean through Haifa; 3) to end Emir Abdullah's ambitions to extend his rule over Palestine; 4) to liquidate once and for all the Jewish national home policy.

*The Islah (Reform) Party.* This Party was organized in

52. *Ibid.*, p. 235.

1935 at a meeting which took place in Ramallah, north of Jerusalem. It was a family affair of the wealthy Khalidi clan of Jerusalem and was headed by Dr. Husain Khalidi, a physician formerly in Government service. Dr. Khalidi was now the Mayor of Jerusalem, having been successful against Ragheb Bey in the municipal elections of 1934. The supporters of the party—some mayors, notables and Government employees—were members of the Nashashibi led by the Opposition before 1934, who were dissatisfied with the leadership of Ragheb Bey or who expected him to lose his influence after his defeat. The Khalidis themselves had been allies of Nashashibis for many years and had deserted only when the Mufti had tempted them with the offer of support in the mayoralty campaign of 1934.<sup>53</sup>

There was nothing in the new party's platform to justify the name "Reform." Its stated objectives were the same as those of the other parties, only with greater emphasis on the relations of Palestine with other Arab countries and the inclusion of Palestine in an Arab Federation.<sup>54</sup> The main purpose of this new organization was to satisfy the ambitions of its leader, Dr. Khalidi. Without a party, Dr. Khalidi would have been forced into the role of a Husaini follower and would have alienated those of his supporters who were opposed to the Husaini control of the Supreme Moslem Council. There are some evidences, however, that in its policy it was, at least at times, ready to follow a more moderate line, when it thought that such a line was supported by the British Government.

*Congress Executive of Nationalist Youth.* This was headed by Yacoub Ghussein, whose name was well known in the country, thanks to his father's wealth and important position in the Turkish days. He indicated a greater interest in the economic situation of the rural districts than the other Arab political leaders. At one time he participated in the attempt to promote the establishment of a company in Egypt for the purchase of land in Palestine as a means of preventing its sale to Jews. During the economic crisis in September, 1925, he sat in the offices of the Arab Bank in Jerusalem appealing to the patriot-

53. Since the Husainis would not have been able to elect their candidate, their hope of beating the Nashashibi lay in splitting the Nashashibi camp by running a former Nashashibi adherent. The veteran politician of the new party was Shibly Jamal, a Christian, who had been the secretary of the first Arab Delegation to London in 1922.

54. Mogannam, *op. cit.*, pp. 243-244.



ism of the depositors to dissuade them from withdrawing funds. His earlier extreme course, in which he advocated non-cooperation with the Government, had at this time given way to the more moderate policy of the Nashashibis. He now favored cooperation with the Administration in the establishment of a Legislative Council for Palestine. After the organization of the Arab parties, his influence weakened because each one of the parties started recruiting its own youth following. The so-called Youth Organization became less and less youthful and more of a personally financed instrument of its leader.

*The Nationalist Bloc.* Even less important than the *Islah Party* was the Nationalist Bloc or Nationalist League, headed by Abdul Latif Bey Salah, a Nablus lawyer, and a former member of the Supreme Moslem Council, who managed to obtain the endorsement of a few prominent Arabs not heretofore or thereafter engaged in politics. The party gave expression to the strong parochial spirit of Nablus, but its objectives did not differ from those of other parties. Its main function was to give a political standing to its president and make him a national leader. Like the Husainis' Arab Party, it greeted the Legislative Council offer with indignant demands for stoppage of immigration and land sales. But it was finally willing to accept the plan *in toto*, like the Nashashibis' Defense Party and Khalidi's Reform Party.

In addition to these bona fide Arab groupings, there was also a sub rosa Communist Party with a number of Arab members. While the majority of the small group of Communists in Palestine were Jews, the Executive Committee of the Comintern, after the 1929 riots, had issued instructions that the Central Committee of the Palestine party must contain an Arab majority. At the Seventh Congress of the Comintern, the Palestine Arab delegates announced that Arabization would go on, "while keeping the reliable and honest Jewish comrades in the party ranks."<sup>55</sup> Although Arabs never constituted a majority, the Palestine communists played a provocative role—anti-Jewish and pro-Arab. This unsavory task imposed on the Jewish group was dictated by Soviet Russia's

55. *International Press Correspondence*, December 2, 1935, p. 1618; quoted in Bezalel Sherman, *The Communists in Palestine*, The League for Labor Palestine, New York, 1939.

pre-war policy which aimed at weakening the British Empire in the Middle East from within. As in other instances, the principles of socialism and communism were temporarily abandoned with the idea of fishing in the troubled waters of the Near East.<sup>56</sup> The Palestine Communist Party stood close to the left wing of the extremist-nationalist *Istiqlal*.

After the suppression of the 1933 disturbances, there were few breaches of the peace, but political activity against the Government and hostility to the Jewish purchase of land and immigration continued without let-up. Under the direction of the Supreme Moslem Council, Arabs accused of selling lands to Jews were denounced in the mosques, as well as in the press, and attempts were made through factitious litigation to prevent Jews from settling on land already purchased. Despite all measures taken by the High Commissioner in the direction of restraining the rapid development of the Jewish national home, or of improving the lot of the Arab people, no progress was made in tempering the Arab opposition. As the *Royal Commission Report* states: "On the contrary, the attitude of the Arab leaders became more hostile to the Government and the tone of the Arab press more bitter."<sup>57</sup> In the autumn of 1934, the Arab Executive had submitted to the High Commissioner a formal protest against Jewish immigration and land purchase, stating their view that the safeguards of Arab interests embodied in the Mandate were being violated. The High Commissioner defended his policy on the ground that the number of immigrants had not exceeded the absorptive capacity of the country and that he was doing all that could be done to protect Arab cultivators and increase the productivity of the land. This answer by no means satisfied the Arab Executive.

Throughout 1935 the extremist Arab nationalist forces were gaining ground. The nationalist movement penetrated young men's societies, sport clubs and scouts' organizations, pervading them with a chauvinistic spirit. Yet the High Commissioner did not give up his faith in the policy of conciliation. On the occasion of the King's birthday on June 3rd, he announced that fourteen prisoners who had been convicted for participation in the disturbances of 1929 would be released

56. Michael Assaf, *op. cit.*, pp. 62-63.

57. *Royal Commission Report*, p. 86.

immediately, and that twenty-two other prisoners whose death sentences for murder had already been commuted to life imprisonment would be released in 1936. At the same time he pressed the project of the Legislative Council. It seemed unlikely that any type of Council could be devised which would be acceptable to both Jews and Arabs. Nevertheless, when Wauchope went to London for his vacation, he worked out a definite plan in cooperation with the Colonial Office, and it was decided to appoint him for an additional five year term, so that he might, while continuing his program for economic development, also implement his cherished plan of Arab-Jewish co-operation through a Legislative Council.

### *The Legislative Council Proposal*

Before the plan was ready for publication, however, the Nineteenth Zionist Congress, meeting in Lucerne from August 20 to September 4, 1935, definitely expressed opposition to the establishment of a Legislative Council so long as the Arabs did not recognize the obligations of the Mandate with reference to the Jewish national home. Since the disturbances of 1929 Jewish opposition to plans for a Legislative Council had been growing. In an exchange of views in 1930 between the Jewish Agency and the Colonial Office, Dr. Weizmann, then President, had strongly deprecated a too early re-introduction of the Legislative Council plan. In 1932, on the occasion of Sir Arthur Wauchope's visit to London en route to the Permanent Mandates Commission, Mr. Sokolow had expressed the view that "it would be prejudicial to the interest of everybody, Jews and Arabs alike, if the question of the Legislative Council should be raised in such a manner as to suggest that it was a matter of immediate imminence."<sup>58</sup> Nevertheless, at the Eighteenth Zionist Congress in 1933, although the general tone of the Congress was in opposition to the Legislative Council, there was no general demand to oppose the Council absolutely, and the opinion of the labor groups particularly did not appear to be as yet unanimous or definitive.

At the Nineteenth Congress in 1935, however, the opposition to the Legislative Council had become crystallized, and the note of antagonism was sounded by David Ben-Gurion, who de-

<sup>58</sup>. *Report of the Executive of the Jewish Agency for Palestine Submitted to the Third Meeting of the Council*, London, 1933, p. 17.

clared: "Any attempt to transfer legislative power, formally or actually, to those elements who do not recognize the obligations of the Mandate and the rights of the Jewish nation to its land; any attempt which will reduce the hopes of attaining a sincere and trustworthy Arab-Jewish understanding, any such attempt will meet the strongest and most determined opposition from the Jewish people."<sup>59</sup> Opposition to the Council was echoed by speakers from all parties and points of view. Dr. Weizmann, who returned as President of the Jewish Agency after this Congress, joined in explicit opposition to the Legislative Council, although at the same time he warned the Congress against turning "our non-participation in the Legislative Council into a general policy of non-cooperation with the British Government."<sup>60</sup> The Congress represented a widespread feeling in the Zionist movement that the institution of a Legislative Council with an Arab majority, when that majority had rejected the basic principle of the Jewish National Home and Mandate, would not be conducive to any real cooperation, and that the Legislative Council would be used merely for providing a forum for anti-Jewish propaganda.

This view was incorporated in the following resolution:<sup>61</sup>

The Nineteenth Zionist Congress heard with great anxiety about the Mandatory Government's intention of establishing a Legislative Council in Palestine. The Congress sees in that step a move against the very spirit of the Mandate in which there is the recognition that the fate of Palestine is the concern not only of the Jewish community living in Palestine, but of the entire Jewish nation. Any legislative institution which would be based on the present composition of the Palestine population, and thus reduce the Jewish community in Palestine to the status of a minority, undermines the basic right of the Jewish people. The granting of the legislative authority to those elements of the population who openly reject the Mandate and oppose the National Home is but a refutation of the Mandate. Without a clear recognition of the Mandate on the part of the representatives of the non-Jewish population in Palestine and without a real understanding between the Jews and the Arabs, any institution of the sort prepared by the Government is bound to endanger the growth of the

59. *Hakongress Haziyon Hatishah Asar* (The Nineteenth Zionist Congress), Jerusalem, 1935, xxxiv-xlii, p. 52.

60. *Ibid.*, p. 326.

61. *Ibid.*, pp. 506-507.

Jewish National Home, and prevents the efforts of upbuilding the land which brought benefits to the Arabs as well as to the Jews. Such an institution will be a source of friction and antagonism between the two sections of the population of Palestine, and will destroy the hopes of common united cooperation between the population and the Government. The erection of such an institution is also a false step in considering the low state of municipal self-government in the land.

Therefore, the Congress reiterates its opposition to the establishment of a Legislative Council in the present stage of development of the country, and sees itself forced to reject without qualifications the plan of the Government.

Among the Arabs there appeared to be stronger differences of opinion but acceptance also appeared unlikely. In the midst of these discussions the war between Italy and Ethiopia broke out (October 3rd), and a tense situation was created in the Middle East—in Egypt and Syria, as well as in Palestine. At this point, a large shipment of arms and ammunition concealed in a consignment of cement was accidentally discovered in unloading a cargo in Jaffa. The consignment was addressed to a person in Tel-Aviv with a Jewish name, and the Arab press hailed this as definite proof that the Jews were arming on a large scale. On October 23rd, an Arab delegation to the High Commissioner demanded confiscation of government arms entrusted to Jewish colonies, searches of arms among the Jews and permission to organize Arab patrols to watch the shores and frontiers.<sup>62</sup> The demand to disarm the Jews was considerably weakened by the discovery of a quantity of arms in an Arab village in the Tulkarm the week before. Early in November, a terrorist band became active in the hills of Galilee under Sheikh Izzed Din al-Qassam, a political refugee from Syria with a reputation as a religious preacher. The band was caught by the police and the Sheikh was killed in a fight along with three others. The bodies were found with copies of the Koran on them. A great crowd attended the funeral at Haifa and the Arab newspapers hailed the Sheikh as a martyr to his nation and his faith.

On November 25th, a united delegation of five out of the six Arab parties—the *Istiqlal* abstaining—presented a memorandum to the High Commissioner. The Arab representatives

62. M. Medzini, "A Year of Riots," *Haaretz*, September 16, 1936.

took the position that the violence was a direct result of the Government policy of furthering the establishment of the Jewish national home. They presented a memorandum in which they made the following demands:<sup>63</sup>

1. The establishment of democratic government;
2. Prohibition of the transfer of land to Jews and the enactment of a law similar to the Five Feddan Law in Egypt;
3. (a) Immediate cessation of Jewish immigration and the formation of a competent committee to determine the absorptive capacity of the country and to lay down a principle for immigration;  
(b) Legislation to require all lawful residents to obtain and carry identity cards;  
(c) Immediate and effective investigation into illicit immigration.

The High Commissioner referred the Arab memorandum to London, and in the meantime promoted his proposal for the Legislative Council which he thought would win support of moderates in both Jewish and Arab ranks. The plan was formally presented on December 21st and 22nd, first to the representatives of the Arab parties and then to those of the Jewish organizations, the Jewish Agency and *Vaad Leumi*. In introducing his plan, Wauchope stated: "We propose to throw open to the Council a wide field for debate and to impose on its deliberations such restrictions only as are essential to enable the High Commissioner to discharge his responsibilities and to fulfill the international obligations of His Majesty's Government."<sup>64</sup> He proposed a Legislative Council of twenty-eight members. Of these, twelve would be elected delegates; eight Moslems, three Jews and one Christian; eleven would be nominated representatives, three Moslems, four Jews, two Christians and two representatives of foreign commercial interests; five were to be officials. Thus, there would be eleven Moslems, seven Jews and three Christians (of which one might be an Arab); the officials and the two representatives of commercial interests would also probably be Christian. In addition, there was to be a president, an impartial person appointed from outside of Palestine. The High Commissioner was to retain an

63. Royal Institute of International Affairs, *Great Britain and Palestine, 1915-1939*, p. 74.

64. Great Britain, *Parliamentary Papers 1935-1936*, Cmd. 5119, London, 1936.

absolute veto, full control over immigration, and the authority to enact laws when the Council failed to pass necessary legislation. Six members of the Council were to form a quorum and the High Commissioner was to have the power to appoint persons in place of elected delegates if any of the communities refused to cooperate. No action was to be taken by the Council which, in the opinion of the President, called into question the validity of the Mandate or suggested that it should be annulled or disregarded. The following schedule summarizes the composition:<sup>65</sup>

	<i>Moslem</i>	<i>Jews</i>	<i>Christians</i>	<i>Commercial</i>	<i>Officials</i>	<i>Total</i>
Elected	8	3	1			12
Nominated	3	4	2	2		11
Official					5	5

The Jewish Agency rejected the proposals outright on the basis of the resolutions of the Lucerne Conference. The members of the Agency as well as the *Vaad Leumi* recognized that the High Commissioner was attempting to safeguard the basic principles of the Mandate, but in the light of the constant Arab hostilities, the Jewish representatives were apprehensive that the Arab group in the Council together with pro-Arab British officials who might at some time be appointed would unite to undermine the Jewish national home. The Arab leaders requested time to deliberate. The rivalries among the leaders were still smoldering and there were differences of opinion with reference to the advisability of accepting the Legislative Council, although all parties criticized the Government proposals as they stood. In January, 1936, four of the five parties all but the *Istiqlal*, submitted their views in writing. According to the Government memorandum to the Royal Commission: "While they subjected the proposals for a Legislative Council to a varying degree of criticism, none rejected them outright."<sup>66</sup>

As the discussion developed among the Arab parties, the

65. Great Britain, *Memoranda Prepared by the Government of Palestine*, London, 1937, Colonial No. 133, p. 87.

66. *Ibid.*, The Palestine Royal Commission interpreted this failure "to reject it outright" as an acquiescence in the proposed Legislative Council. But this interpretation hardly bears examination. (*Report*, pp. 361-362.) In a previous section (*Report*, p. 90) the Commission indicated that one of the main reasons for Arab acquiescence was the vehemence with which

following positions emerged.<sup>67</sup> Dr. Khalidi, the Mayor of Jerusalem, who had leaned toward a policy of cooperation with Government, appears to have been a genuine supporter of the Legislative Council. Ragheb Bey Nashashibi was also definitely in favor of accepting the Legislative Council; he saw in it a means of attaining a position of importance in the national life of Palestine and of strengthening his position with the Government. Moreover, he had a score to pay off against the Jews who had used their voting strength to oust him from his long-held position of Mayor of Jerusalem. In January, 1936, the Mufti's party and the youth organizations, after some discussion, decided to reject the Government plan. The *Istiqlal* Party, which had stood aside from cooperation all along, was, of course, for complete rejection. The Arab extremists were encouraged by the Italian successes in Ethiopia and the failure of League sanctions. The disorders in Egypt and Syria appeared to be producing results, and the Palestine Arabs went on strike for one day in sympathy with the forty-five day long strike in Syria. Early in February 1936, storm troops called "Green Shirts" were organized by the Mufti group.

On January 29, 1936,<sup>68</sup> the Colonial Office delivered—through the High Commissioner—its formal reply to the memorandum which the Arab Delegation had presented the previous November. The offer of the new constitution made in December, 1935, represented what the Government regarded as the first practical step toward democratic government. As regards the sales of land, Government intended to enact a law

the Jews opposed the proposals. In the light of the fact that the Arab parties had consistently been opposed to recognition of the Balfour Declaration in any form and had demanded the immediate cessation of immigration, it is not likely they would have agreed to any Legislative Council except on the basis of a repudiation of the Jewish national home policy. It may, of course, be possible that the Arab political leaders had received intimation from Government circles that if they would accept the Legislative Council the British Government would keep immigration at a level which would prevent the increase of the Jewish ratio in the population. In such form the Arab political leaders would probably have accepted the Legislative Council, but that is not what the proposal purported to be.

67. The analysis follows M. Medzini, "A Year of Riots," *Haaretz*, September 16, 1936. Mr. Medzini, now editor of *Haaretz*, is well known as a reliable and well balanced reporter. See also *Great Britain and Palestine, 1915-1939*, pp. 74-75.

68. *Great Britain and Palestine, 1915-1939*, gives the date as February 1, 1936.



which would prevent any land transfer unless the Arab landowner retained "the viable minimum." As to immigration, the High Commissioner declared, "There can be no question of the total stoppage of Jewish immigration into Palestine."<sup>69</sup> But he added that the rate of Jewish immigration was being carefully gauged according to the economic capacity of the country, and that a new Statistical Bureau was being established for this purpose.

In the meantime, the Legislative Council was being warmly discussed in Government circles in England and in Parliament. Lord Snell, now leader of the Labor Opposition in the House of Lords, strongly opposed it, and the debate which he precipitated indicated a generally unfavorable opinion.<sup>70</sup> A month later, Wedgwood raised the question in the House of Commons and said that the Labor Party opposed the legislative scheme because, far from being a step in the direction of democratic control, it would, under existing conditions, merely increase the power of the *effendis* over the illiterate masses and provide a source for the further embittering of Arab-Jewish relations. Winston Churchill and Leopold Amery, who had in times past served as Colonial Secretaries and who were acquainted with the Palestine situation, roundly denounced the plan. However, J. H. Thomas, the Colonial Secretary at this time, though sympathetic to the Zionist cause, was one of the few who defended the proposal. Those who opposed the Legislative Council did not all do so because of friendship for the Jewish side. Many of the members felt that more time must elapse in training for local self-government before a genuinely democratic legislature on a national scale could be introduced. The lamentable experience with democratic institutions in Iraq no doubt influenced some, and the reluctance to grant independence to India was also a factor in the situation.

The Colonial Office, disturbed by the opposition in Parliament, hesitated to proceed with the Legislative Council, but it did not wish to abandon the plan since the Arabs had not made a definite rejection. In an attempt to find a way out of the dilemma, the question was reopened, and on April 2nd the High Commissioner informed the Arab leaders that the Colonial

69. Great Britain, *Palestine Report*, 1936, col. 129, pp. 20-21.

70. Great Britain, *Parliamentary Debates, Lords*, Vol. 99, cols. 750-795, February 26, 1936, and cols. 926-940, March 5, 1936.

Secretary, who had recently granted an interview to a Jewish delegation, would be ready to receive the Arab leaders and to discuss with them modifications of the project. The Arabs consented to do so, but the rival factions found difficulty in reaching an agreement as to the composition of the delegation. The Mufti wanted to retain control and suggested the reappointment of the same persons who had composed the 1930 delegation. But Nashashibi, the leading proponent of accepting the Legislative Council in some form, wanted above all to prevent continued control by the Husaini faction. Before they could reach a conclusion, grave disturbances broke out in Palestine.

The proponents of the Legislative Council had been inclined to regard the disturbances of 1936 as a consequence of the attack against it by the Jews and by Parliament. It is clear, however, that factors in the international scene provided the major causes. Hitler had moved toward the Rhine. The nationalist bloc had come to the fore in Egypt, and on March 2, 1936, negotiations began for the recognition of Egypt as a sovereign independent state. A day before, on the 1st of March, the French Government had also announced its decision to negotiate a treaty with the Syrian nationalists, who had just finished a fifty day strike. The following formulation by the Palestine Royal Commission is to the point:<sup>71</sup>

While we think it important thus to emphasize the serious effect on Arab feeling of the rejection of the Legislative Council scheme, we must once more enter a *caveat* against exaggeration. The rejection was not the cause of the trouble that ensued. It aggravated the cause of it. It helped to bring it to a head. But in our considered judgment, if Parliament had accepted the Legislative Council scheme, it would not have satisfied the Arab nationalists for any length of time. To support that it would have done so is to ignore the "external factors." For, just as the pressure of European Jewry on Palestine was now at its strongest, so also was the influence of events in neighboring lands. This very winter of 1935-36 witnessed a recrudescence of nationalist agitation in Egypt and in Syria so vigorous and effective that in both countries, within a few months it attained its final objective, the concession of national independence.

These happenings in Egypt and Syria, their character and timing, must be carefully borne in mind in treating the course

71. *Royal Commission Report*, p. 92.

of events in Palestine. In Egypt, the shadow of Mussolini over the Suez Canal had strengthened the hand of the nationalists against the British protectorate and against the Palace Government of King Fuad. The situation was tense with strikes and student riots. In November, 1935, a violent anti-British demonstration in Cairo followed a speech by Sir Samuel Hoare in London, in which, in attempting to prove that Britain was helping Egypt to move toward independence, he succeeded in conveying exactly the opposite impression. At the public funeral of a student who had been killed in the riots, the outstanding public leaders of Egypt, Mahmud Pasha, Sidqi Pasha, and Nahas Pasha, formerly at odds in their political orientations, indicated their united opposition to Britain by participation. In December, 1935, King Fuad felt forced to reinstitute the democratic constitution of 1923, which had been replaced by a less liberal instrument of government in 1930. In March, the British agreed to enter into discussions with the object of concluding a treaty of alliance with Egypt as an independent state. The death of Fuad in April, 1936, removed a shrewd and skillful antagonist of the *Wafdists* and strengthened the hands of the nationalists. In the Parliament elected in May, the *Wafdists* had a majority in both Houses. An agreement on the terms of the proposed Anglo-Egyptian treaty was reached on August 26, 1936, and approved in London and in Cairo during the month of November.

In Syria, the underlying tension discharged itself in a series of disturbances which lasted from January 11th to March 1st. These disturbances were characterized by new features in Syrian political life. In contrast to the past when revolts and agitation drew their strength from the rural masses or from the tribal organizations, the strike movement centered in the towns. The educated youth played a leading part in organizing processions and imposing discipline on the movement of protest giving to it a quasi-military formation. Another feature of the new situation was some tendency toward fraternization between the different Moslem sects and between Moslems and Christians. The particularly outstanding example of this was an exchange of courtesies between the Christian village of Zahlah and the adjoining Moslem village of al-Muallaqah—two communities which had hitherto been poles apart. The village

of al-Muallaqah was one of the districts that had been forcibly incorporated into the Lebanon by General Gourand in 1920. Despite this tendency toward rapprochement, as soon as the French showed signs of serious intention to reach an understanding with the nationalists, the latent territorial controversies emerged.<sup>72</sup>

At first the French attempted to use half-hearted measures of repression. By the end of February, however, they had decided to come to terms with the Syrian nationalists and on March 1st an understanding was achieved between the French High Commissioner and the Syrian nationalist bloc. A short time later, the Maronite Patriarch made a public pronouncement in which he demanded special provisions for the protection of the minorities in Syria in the projected Franco-Syrian treaty and at the same time declared that the Lebanon had no interest in the Pan-Arab movement and would be content with nothing short of complete independence. There were manifestos and counter-manifestos on the part of the various minorities and nationalist groups. From March 15th and throughout the summer negotiations were conducted between the Syrian delegation and the French Government at Paris.

72. The following quotation gives an excellent idea of the complexity of the term "nationalist" as applicable to the Syrian situation. "The term 'Syrian nationalist' perhaps requires closer definition. In the conflict of views and aims between the Syrian nationalists and the non-nationalist minorities in Syria, it sometimes seemed as though Syrian nationalism went with being a Sunni as opposed to being a Shi'i or an 'Alawi or a Druse or a Christian. Yet any purely sectarian or 'communal' analysis of the Syrian nationalist of this date would be misleading; for while it might be true that all Syrian Sunnis (at any rate, all belonging to the younger generation) were nationalists, it was by no means true that, conversely, all nationalists were Sunnis. The Syrian Nationalist Bloc also included Christian (and especially Orthodox Christian) adherents who were as wholehearted in their nationalism as the Coptic members of the Wafd were in Egypt. And among the Sunni majority of the nationalists in Syria, as in Egypt, the spring of political action was now not religious but secular—though it was not inconceivable that in these and other Arab countries the triumph of a secular political movement among the urban minority of the population might open the way for a subsequent revival of Islamic feeling among the peasantry. The state of religious and political feeling in Syria in 1936, was, however, markedly different from the contemporary state of feeling in the Lebanon, as the sequel will show. In the Lebanon in 1936 the Maronites and Sunnis, at any rate, were still feeling and acting on the 'communal,' pre-nationalistic lines of the old Ottoman *millet* system." (*Survey of International Affairs 1936*, p. 752.)

At first the negotiations proceeded with difficulty, but the election of the Blum government on June 4th smoothed the way for better understanding. On September 9, 1936 a treaty was signed by the French and the Syrians. The Franco-Syrian treaty conformed closely to the Anglo-Iraqi treaty of 1930. It differed essentially in that it included more stringent regulations with reference to the protection of minorities. As in the case of Iraq, the grant of independence to Syria was made conditional on its entrance into the League, which was to be secured within three years by the ratification of the treaty.

#### *Disorders of 1936*

The Palestine disorders had their beginning in hold-ups of Jews on the Tulkarm-Nablus road on the way from Tel-Aviv to Haifa. On the night of April 15th, Arab highwaymen held up ten automobiles and robbed the passengers; then they selected three Jews, put them together in a truck and shot them in cold blood. One was killed immediately and another died of his wounds later. On the following night, two Arabs were found murdered near the town of Petach Tikvah. On the occasion of the funeral of one of the victims of the Tulkarm outrage, an anti-Arab demonstration took place and a series of assaults on Arabs in the Tel-Aviv district began. On the 19th of April, incited by rumors that Arabs had been killed by Jews, Arab mobs in Jaffa began attacking Jews and succeeded in murdering three persons. Order was restored with difficulty: curfew was imposed on Jaffa and Tel-Aviv, and emergency regulations, under the Palestine Order in Council, were brought into force by proclamation of the High Commissioner.

Following the tactics which were being successfully employed at the time by the Egyptian and Syrian nationalists, an Arab national committee was organized on April 20th at Nablus. It was resolved that a general strike should be declared throughout the country and maintained until Arab demands had been conceded. On the 25th of April, a meeting of all Arab parties established a supreme Arab committee, subsequently known as the Arab Higher Committee. It consisted of the following: Haj Amin al-Husaini, Mufti of Jerusalem (President), Auni Bey Abdul Hadi (Secretary), Ahmad Hilmi Pasha (Treasurer), Ragheb Bey Nashashibi, Jamal Bey al-Husaini,

Abdul Latif Bey Salah, Dr. Husain E. Khalidi, Yacoub Ghusein, Yacoub Faraj and Alfred Rock. It will be noted that the *Istiqlal* Party was now prominently associated with the others, being represented by Auni Bey Abdul Hadi, and Ahmad Hilmi Pasha. Representing the Christian Arabs were Yacoub Faraj and Alfred Rock, members of the Greek Orthodox and Roman Catholic communities, respectively.

The new committee adopted a resolution to continue the general strike until the British Government changed its present policy in a fundamental manner, "the beginning of which is the stoppage of Jewish immigration."<sup>73</sup> They reiterated the demands made on November 25th: 1) the prohibition of Jewish immigration; 2) the prohibition of the transfer of Arab land to Jews; 3) the establishment of a national government, responsible to a representative council. The third demand contained a clearer definition of the Arab claim than "the establishment of democratic government" demanded the previous November.

By this declaration the Arabs in effect rejected the proposed Legislative Council. The High Commissioner, however, still refusing to give up his theory of winning over the moderates through a policy of conciliation, attempted to deal with the Arab leaders on the basis of the Legislative Council proposal. He advised them to send the promised delegation to London and warned them against continuing or encouraging illegal acts. In their reply the Arabs expressed regret that violence was accompanying the strike, but they refused to end the strike or to go to London until the Government suspended Jewish immigration. This, the Administration refused to do. On May 13th, Wauchope made another attempt. He informed the Arab Committee that the Mandatory would establish a Royal Commission to investigate the Arab grievances, just as soon as order was restored, but this had no effect. The Government, nevertheless, proceeded with the plan for a Royal Commission, and on May 18th, the Colonial Secretary informed the House of Commons that it had been "decided, after order is restored, to advise His Majesty to appoint a Royal Commission which, without bringing into question the terms of the Mandate, will investigate causes of unrest and alleged griev-

73. *Ibid.*, p. 97.

ances either of Arabs or of Jews.”<sup>74</sup> To avoid the appearance of having made a concession to violence, the Colonial Secretary declared that order would have to be restored before the Commission would proceed to Palestine; and on the same day the High Commissioner published a Labor Schedule of 4,500 certificates for the period of April to September, 1936.

The Arab strike continued and spread. It had begun with the shopkeepers in Jaffa and Jerusalem and it had spread to other towns. A manifesto issued by a committee of Arab car owners and drivers also urged the non-payment of taxes as part of the strike and called on the Arab Higher Committee to bring the Arab Government officials into the strike. The strike was accompanied by intermittent local demonstrations and Jews were assaulted and stoned. The disorders spread also to the rural districts. The *fellahin* attacked the police and the Jewish colonies and small organized bands carried on guerrilla warfare from the hills. The sale of arms was prohibited, but the Arabs seem to have been supplied with pre-war and war rifles which had never been surrendered, and with stocks which had been obtained from Trans-Jordan.

The High Commissioner had asked for additional troops and military reinforcements began to arrive on May 10th. The Government extended the curfew, imposed collective fines and interned Arab agitators in concentration camps, but it did not exercise its military force with full effect, evidently hoping that the Arabs might still be won over to peaceful negotiations. On May 23rd, more than sixty Arab agitators were placed under police supervision. In June, some of the more prominent leaders, including Auni Abdul Hadi and Ibrahim Shanti of the *Istiqlal*, were interned in concentration camps. But this did not appear to help either. At the end of June, the senior Arab Government officials felt bold enough to present a memorandum which blamed the disturbances on the feeling of despair caused by “loss of faith in the value of official pledges and assurances for the future.”<sup>75</sup> They protested against the Government’s policy of using force and urged the stoppage of immigration as the only way out of the deadlock. This memorandum was signed by 137 Arab senior officials and judges, including highly placed officers in the political as well as the

74. *Ibid.*, pp. 97-98.

75. *Ibid.*, p. 99.

technical departments of the Administration. The police officials were the only exception. A similar memorandum was submitted several weeks later by 1,200 Arab officials in the junior division of the public service. In the middle of July, the judges of the Moslem *sharia* courts, responsible to the Supreme Moslem Council, presented another memorandum which was "more mutinous than that of the others."<sup>76</sup> It described the Government's policy in extremely abusive terms and warned the British authorities of the "revenge of God Almighty."

The armed revolt also became more serious during the summer months. The bands in the hills were augmented in number and supplied with arms and ammunition, and were joined by trained guerrilla leaders from outside Palestine. One of these was Fawzi ed-Din el Kauwakji, a Syrian who had served with distinction with the Turkish army during the First World War and was decorated with the *légion d'honneur* for his work as intelligence officer for the French, after the occupation of Syria. At the outbreak of the Syrian revolt in 1925, he had joined the rebels and had been sentenced to death, but he had escaped to the Hejaz where he became military adviser to King Ibn Saud. Later he received a commission in the Iraqi army but resigned so that he might help organize the Palestine disorders. In Palestine, he appointed himself generalissimo of the rebel forces. Under his leadership, the bands were drilled in trench-warfare, and they engaged in direct encounters with the British troops. Meanwhile murder and sabotage increased. The oil pipe-line running from Iraq to Haifa was punctured on the Plain of Esdraelon, roads were mined and railways frequently damaged, in one case causing derailment and loss of life.

During the period of the disturbances the *Yishuv*, guided by the official bodies—the Jewish Agency, the *Vaad Leumi* and the *Histadrut*—followed two lines of policy indicated in the concepts *haganah* (self-defense) and *havlagah* (self-restraint). The first principle—i.e., *haganah*—meant that the Jews would defend themselves and their settlements against attacks, using arms to do so when necessary. The second principle, *havlagah*, meant they would not engage in indiscriminate reprisals against the Arabs, and they would not allow themselves to be provoked to counterattacks. This principle

76. *Ibid.*, p. 99.



was maintained firmly and with great endurance despite systematic provocation on the part of Arab groups and vehement denunciation by the Revisionists. The iron self-restraint of the Jews evoked the praise of the British Administration. From 1936 on, the Government helped in the defense of the villages by arming an increasing number of Jews, enrolling them as supernumerary police.

During the summer the British Government had also attempted to obtain the assistance of Arab rulers in British-dominated territories to help them find their way out of the impasse. On June 16th and again on August 4th, Emir Abdullah met members of the Higher Committee in Amman in Trans-Jordan and tried to induce them to end the strike and accept the offer of the Royal Commission, but he failed. The Government then turned to the King of Iraq, and Nuri es-Said, now Foreign Minister, came to Jerusalem. It was said that he had the support of King Ibn Saud and of Imam Yahya of the Yemen.<sup>77</sup> There was a widespread rumor that Nuri Pasha had a proposal which the British Government would accept and which included the suspension of Jewish immigration.

The British attitude appears to have been stiffened by a serious encounter which took place on September 3rd between British troops and Arabs near Tulkarm. Arab hopes were shattered by the announcement made by Ormsby-Gore, in reply to Dr. Weizmann, that Nuri Pasha had never been authorized to give the Arabs any assurances regarding the suspension of immigration, and that his terms had never been accepted by the British Government. Furthermore, the Government announced that it was cancelling the maneuvers of the First Division and was preparing to reinforce the military garrison in Palestine. On September 8th, the British Government issued a statement of policy.<sup>78</sup> After describing the course of the disturbances, it declared that the use of force was unavoidable. At the same time it restated the British purpose of maintaining good relations with the Moslem peoples and reiterated the views of the League of Nations in 1930 that the two obliga-

77. *Great Britain and Palestine, 1915-1939*, p. 79.

78. Palestine Royal Commission, p. 101; *Report to the Council of the League of Nations on the Administration of Palestine and Transjordan for the Year 1936*, col. no. 129, p. 19.

tions, to the Arabs and to the Jews, were of equal weight and in no sense irreconcilable.

The Arab leaders found themselves in a difficult position. Although the strike had held out well for almost a half year, the business classes were losing their enthusiasm. The prospect of the loss of the orange season was particularly disturbing. On September 12th, Wauchope warned the members of the Higher Committee that a drastic military action was planned and the Arabs knew that they could not hold out against the superior force of the British. There were now about 20,000 troops in Palestine. In this situation, the Arab Higher Committee, which had been in touch with the Arab rulers in neighboring countries, found a way out by accepting appeals of peace couched in identical terms which came from the three Arab princes, King Ibn Saud, King Ghazi of Iraq and Emir Abdullah of Trans-Jordan. The appeals asked the Arab Higher Committee to end the strike and to "rely on the good intentions of our friend, Great Britain, who has declared that she will do justice."<sup>79</sup> On October 11th, the Arab Higher Committee published a letter from the Arab Kings and announced that with the unanimous agreement of the national committees, they had decided "to respond to the appeal of Their Majesties and Highnesses the Arab Kings and Amirs, and to call upon the noble Arab nation in Palestine to resort to quietness and to put an end to the strike and disorders."<sup>80</sup> Work was generally resumed on the next day. The guerrilla bands, on which the British troops were now closing in, were permitted to escape. Fawzi ed-Din el Kauwakji got away to Trans-Jordan, and no effort was made to disarm the Arab population. Cases of sniping and other forms of attack still occurred here and there, but the organized disturbances ceased.

The calling off of the strike made possible the departure of the Royal Commission for Palestine. It sailed on November 5th. On the same day, it was announced that the Government had rejected, on economic grounds, the view that immigration should be suspended. However, the Labor Schedule for the next six months was approved at a figure of 1,850, about forty percent of the number approved the previous April. The Jews had asked for a quota of 10,695 persons and looked upon the deci-

79. *Royal Commission Report*, p. 101.

80. *Ibid.*, pp. 101-102.

sion as little more than a token grant to indicate that the principle of continued immigration was acknowledged. The Arab Higher Committee, however, announced, that as long as Jewish immigration was permitted, no representative of the national movement would appear before the Royal Commission. In a certain sense the Arab leaders had already won their case. On the basis of the Government's Labor Schedule immigration into Palestine, including other categories, was unlikely to exceed 15,000 per annum which the Administration had fixed in its mind as the number which could be admitted without changing the ratio of the Jews to the Arabs in the population.

## CHAPTER XII

# THE ROYAL COMMISSION AND THE PROPOSAL OF PARTITION

THE Royal Commission, headed by Lord Peel, arrived in Palestine on November 11, 1936. Both public and private sessions were held, the latter sometimes at the wish of the witnesses. In contradistinction to the procedure followed by the Shaw Commission, counsel were not admitted; the witnesses gave their evidence directly to the Commission. The Government supplied material in the form of carefully prepared memoranda on various aspects of the problem, as did also the Jewish Agency and the *Vaad Leumi*.<sup>1</sup> At the outset, the Arabs boycotted the Commission because immigration had not been stopped. Shortly before the inquiry was completed, however, the Arab leaders changed their minds and yielded, to save face, to an "appeal" from the Arab princes, as they had done in ending the strike some time earlier. The Commission completed its investigatory work about the middle of January and the members were back in London by the end of the month. The report, published in July, 1937, was the most complete and thorough-going of the reports on Palestine. Before summarizing its recommendations, a brief statement of the Jewish and Arab positions as presented to the Royal Commission may be given.

## THE PRESENTATION OF THE CASE

### *The Jewish Position*

The Jewish Agency, both in the *Memorandum* which it presented and in its evidence before the Royal Commission, took its stand on the Mandate, adhering to the view that the

1. Great Britain, *Memoranda Prepared by the Government of Palestine*, London, 1937, Colonial No. 133. Jewish Agency for Palestine, *Memorandum to the Palestine Royal Commission*, London, 1936. *Vaad Leumi* (the General Council of the Jewish Community of Palestine), *Memorandum to the Palestine Royal Commission*, Jerusalem, 1936.

interests of the Jews and the Arabs in Palestine were inherently reconcilable. It enunciated this thesis in the Introductory Note of the *Memorandum*: "Notwithstanding the unhappy events of the present year, Jews and Arabs can reach a *modus vivendi*." <sup>2</sup> It also reaffirmed its acceptance of the Churchill White Paper of 1922, emphasizing that: "The Balfour Declaration in no way contemplates the disappearance or subordination of the Arab population, language or culture in Palestine." <sup>3</sup> The *Memorandum* repeated the formula of the Carlsbad Resolution of 1921: "Our determination to live with the Arab people on terms of concord and mutual respect, and together with them to make the common home into a flourishing commonwealth, the upbuilding of which may assure to each of its peoples an undisturbed national development." To this it added: "That there is no question of a 'wholly Jewish Palestine,' or of a Palestine in which the Arabs are reduced to a status falling short of full equality, is implicit in the emphatic assertion on the Jewish side of 'the basic principle that, without reference to numerical strength, neither of the two peoples shall dominate or be dominated by the other.'" <sup>4</sup>

As far as the Jewish interest was concerned, the *Memorandum* emphasized three terms used in the Preamble of the Mandate: "Jewish people," "historical connection," and "reconstituting." The significance of these terms was interpreted as follows: <sup>5</sup>

The Mandate is concerned with the Jews, not as individuals, but as a people. What is contemplated is not merely a scheme of colonisation for the benefit of individual Jews, but the provision of a home—a national home—for the Jewish people as a whole. The reference to the "historical connection" of the Jewish people with Palestine and the use of the expression "reconstituting" are clearly intended to indicate that in establishing their national home in Palestine the Jews are to be regarded, not as an alien element imported into Palestine and dwelling there on sufferance, but as a people returning to the

2. Jewish Agency for Palestine, *Memorandum to the Palestine Royal Commission*, p. 5. (Henceforth in this chapter to be referred to as *Jewish Agency Memorandum*.)

3. *Ibid.*, p. 30.

4. From the statement of policy by the newly elected Zionist Executive at the Seventeenth Congress, Basle, 1931. (See above, Chap. XI, p. 747.)

5. Jewish Agency *Memorandum*, p. 34.

soil from which it sprang, there to rebuild the fabric of its national life.

In giving his evidence, Weizmann made an impassioned plea to the Commission to remain true to the British policy of the Balfour Declaration and thus help to solve the Jewish problem, which he defined as "the homelessness of a people." He dwelt on the destruction of German Jewry and the steady attrition of the position of the Jews in Poland. He recounted the efforts made by the Zionist Organization to cooperate with the British Government in the pursuit of a policy of moderation and conciliation. He repeated the basic points of his policy: that if in due course Jews should form a majority in Palestine, no veto should be placed on Palestine becoming a Jewish state; that the Jews respected the rights of the Arabs and their need for development; that Jews did not wish to dominate the Arabs any more than they wished to be dominated by them. The Jews were, therefore, prepared to adhere to the principle of parity: "If a Legislative Council were now established and if the present Jewish minority were given an equal number of seats thereon with the Arab majority, the Jews, on their part, would never claim more than an equal number, whatever the future ratio between the Arab and Jewish population might become."<sup>6</sup>

David Ben-Gurion, political leader of the Palestine Executive of the Jewish Agency and an outstanding figure in the Labor Party, expressed himself in equally moderate terms. He pointed out that when the aim of Zionism was first formulated in political terms at the Zionist Congress at Basle in 1897, the Zionists used almost the same words as appeared in the Balfour Declaration, namely, "to create in Palestine a homeland for the Jewish people." He emphasized the fact that the Basle program used the word, *Heimstätte*, to which the nearest English equivalent was home, and that it said "in Palestine," and not "Palestine as a National Home." The Zionists did not aim to make Palestine a Jewish state for three reasons:<sup>7</sup>

6. *Palestine Royal Commission Report*, Cmd. 5479, London, 1937, p. 143.

7. *Palestine Royal Commission, Minutes of Evidence Heard at Public Sessions*, London, 1937, Colonial No. 134, p. 289. Henceforth referred to as *Minutes of Evidence*.

Our aim is to make the Jewish people master of its own destiny, not subject to the will and mercy of others, as any other free people. But it is not part of our aim to dominate anybody else. If Palestine were an empty country, we could say a Jewish State, because the Jewish State would consist of Jews only and our self-government in Palestine would not concern others. But there are other inhabitants in Palestine who are here and, as we do not want to be at the mercy of others, they have a right not to be at the mercy of the Jews. It may be the Jews would behave better, but they are not bound to believe in our good will. A state may imply, though not necessarily, it may imply—since there are two nationalities—domination of others, the domination by the Jewish majority of the minority, but that is not our aim. It was not our aim at that time and it is not our aim now . . .

The second reason is that a state means a separate unit. A Jewish National Home may also mean that, but not necessarily so. On the contrary, we should like this country to be attached to a greater unit, a unit that is called the British Commonwealth of Nations. For the solution of the Jewish problem, for our free national future, it is not necessary that Palestine should constitute a separate State and we should be only too glad if in the future, when the Jewish National Home is fully established, Palestine shall be eternally and completely free, but that it should be a member of a greater unit, that is the British Commonwealth of Nations.

There is a third reason why we do not use the formula of a Jewish State. There are Holy Places in Palestine which are holy to the whole civilized world and we are unwilling and it is not in our interest that we should be made responsible for them. We recognize that they should be placed under a higher supervision, under some other international body, as is laid down in the Mandate.

Jabotinsky, who now appeared as the representative of the New Zionist Organization,<sup>8</sup> urged the Jewish State concept when he was granted a special interview before the Commission after its return to London. He described British policy in Palestine as planless—a mere muddling through. The epitome of it was: "We have appointed a man on the spot, let him do it, and we shall wait and see." He charged that the officials were not selected on the basis of their sympathy to Zionism, and accused the local administration of being weak and dilatory in

8. The New Zionist Organization developed from the Revisionist Party which had withdrawn from the Zionist Organization in 1935. See above, Chap. XI, p. 750.

dealing with the outbreaks. The attacks during the previous year he characterized as "a revolt by leave," and demanded that in the future the British Government allow the Jews a legal self-defense organization as in Kenya Colony where every European is trained for self-defense. He defined the aim of Zionism in terms of making Palestine a Jewish State, and explained that "Jewish State" meant "some indispensable amount of self-government and a majority of Jews," and that "Palestine" meant "both sides of the Jordan." While he respected the spiritual and cultural aims of Zionism, for him, its primary objectives were: to save the Jews of Eastern and Central Europe from a disaster of historic magnitude, and to release the Jews from being a minority everywhere, a condition which he believed to be the root of anti-Semitism.

He called for a constructive ten year plan which would include agricultural development, reform of the Palestine civil service, and revision of the fiscal policy of the Government, admission of Jews to Trans-Jordan, and assurance of public security through establishment of a Jewish contingent in the British Army and legalization of Jewish self-defense organizations. Such a policy, in his opinion, would by no means bring Great Britain into conflict with the world of Islam. Given a firm resolve, made clear to the Arabs as well as to the Jews, a policy of development in Palestine could be carried out smoothly in the same way that any other large constructive colonization enterprise could be effected. On the Arab problem he made the following statement of position:<sup>9</sup>

I have also shown to you already that, in our submission, there is no question of ousting the Arabs. On the contrary, the idea is that Palestine on both sides of the Jordan should hold the Arabs, their progeny, and many millions of Jews. What I do not deny is that in the process the Arabs of Palestine will necessarily become a minority in the country of Palestine. What I do deny is that that is a hardship. That is not a hardship on any race, any nation possessing so many National States and so many more National States in the future. One fraction, one branch of that race, and not a big one, will have to live in someone else's State; well, that is the case with all the mightiest nations of the world. I could hardly mention one of the big nations, having their States, mighty and powerful, who had not one branch living in someone else's State. That is only normal and

9. Palestine Royal Commission, *Minutes of Evidence*, p. 370 ff.



there is no "hardship" attached to that. So when we hear the Arab claim confronted with the Jewish claim—I fully understand that any minority would prefer to be a majority: it is quite understandable that the Arabs of Palestine would also prefer Palestine to be the Arab State No. 4, No. 5, or No. 6—that I quite understand—but when the Arab claim is confronted with our Jewish demand to be saved, it is like the claims of appetite *versus* the claims of starvation . . .

There is only one way of compromise. Tell the Arabs the truth, and then you will see the Arab is reasonable, the Arab is clever, the Arab is just; the Arab *can* realise that since there are three or four wholly Arab States, then it is a thing of justice which Great Britain is doing if Palestine is transformed into a Jewish State. Then there will be a change of mind among the Arabs, then there will be peace.

### *Views on Immigration and Land Settlement*

The Jewish Agency laid major emphasis on immigration. As in its political policy, the Agency took its stand on the Mandate and on the Churchill White Paper of 1922 in which the principle of economic absorptive capacity was first formulated. The Agency submitted that it was a direct obligation of the Mandatory not only to permit Jewish immigration but to facilitate it, and that the question of immigration was the most vital element in the Balfour Declaration and in the Mandate. The historical connection of the Jews with Palestine implied not only that the Jews *are* in Palestine as of right and not on sufferance, but that they may *come* to Palestine as of right and not on sufferance:<sup>10</sup>

Not only the Jews, but the world at large took it for granted that it was of the essence of the Balfour Declaration that Jews who desired to settle in Palestine should be enabled to do so to the full extent to which room could be found for them. The Balfour Declaration was, after all, an undertaking to facilitate the establishment in Palestine of a Jewish National Home. As has been pointed out by one of the principal authors of the Declaration (General Smuts), "you cannot talk of a National Home if the Jewish people cannot get back into Palestine as their National Home. A home is a place to which you come back."

The Jewish Agency agreed that this right might be limited by economic factors but insisted that such factors were the

10. Jewish Agency *Memorandum*, p. 29.

only valid limitations. It pointed out that its acceptance of the Churchill White Paper of 1922 was conditioned by this understanding and that the MacDonald Letter of 1931 had unequivocally reaffirmed that "the considerations relevant to the limits of absorptive capacity are purely economic considerations."<sup>11</sup> The Jewish Agency maintained that the allotment of immigration certificates on the Labor Schedule had not been in accord with the country's growing economic absorptive capacity in recent years. Moreover, the Government's failure to explain their relatively low estimates suggested that the discrepancies were due to political motives and not to economic reasons. Grievances were submitted also with reference to other immigration categories: the rulings in regard to dependents were harsh; the provisions for skilled artisans and professional persons with small capital were now practically inoperative; the deduction from the Labor Schedule of permits assigned to young students from Germany was unfair; the estimate of the country's absorptive capacity failed to take into account the share due to Jewish labor on public works and services.<sup>12</sup>

Another complaint of the Jewish Agency related to the irregular and illicit immigration of the Arabs from Trans-Jordan who were allowed to enter Palestine without passports, ostensibly for seasonal work, but who settled permanently. Moreover, the right of free entry into Palestine, legally limited to Trans-Jordanians, was taken advantage of by others, particularly by Hauranese. Many Arabs from the Hauran also came into Palestine through the "right of freedom of unrestricted passage across the frontier" enjoyed by the inhabitants of Syria and the Lebanon. Illicit immigration was a danger to the peace and security of the country as well as a cause of the depression of wage rates of both Arabs and Jews in Palestine. The belief was expressed that in the outbreak at Jaffa, which marked the beginning of the disturbances of 1936, a leading part was played by Arab laborers from the Hauran.<sup>13</sup>

The Jewish Agency admitted that there was also a considerable amount of unauthorized immigration of Jews. However,

11. See above, Chap. VIII.

12. *Royal Commission Report*, p. 293.

13. *Jewish Agency Memorandum*, p. 114.

it made a distinction between "irregular" and "illegal" immigration. By irregular immigration was meant the overstaying of permits by persons legally admitted to Palestine as travelers. In some cases these "travelers" had later been legalized and most of them had been economically absorbed in the country. While the Jewish Agency did not condone the practice of overstaying permits, it pointed out that under the desperate conditions prevailing in many parts of Europe and in the light of the Government's underestimation of the economic absorptive capacity, such immigration was not morally reprehensible and was a natural result of the Government's failure to estimate properly the economic absorptive capacity. The Jewish Agency did not dispute the fact that under the pressure of the need to escape persecution and death in Europe, illicit immigration had assumed large proportions. It had done all it could to warn against illegal entry into Palestine, but, under the circumstances, it could not prevent it entirely. The Agency agreed, nevertheless, with the Government that every effort should be made to check illicit immigration, but underscored the necessity of applying controls to Arab as well as to Jewish immigration.

In estimating the economic absorptive capacity of the country, the Jewish Agency emphasized the fact that the economic situation in Palestine had been stable and sound over a period of years. Palestine had been able to weather the storms of economic crisis seriously affecting Europe and America, and all signs pointed to a continuance of the favorable condition. Attention was drawn to the growing industrial development of Palestine, and reference was made to Arnold J. Toynbee, who had prophesied a great future for Palestine as a result of its rehabilitation through an inflow of Jewish enterprise under the aegis of Great Britain. Palestine was becoming a meeting place of steamship lines, of air routes, of oil pipe lines and railways; a development which augured "the possible destiny of Palestine as an *entrepôt* between two out of the three great focuses of population and activity in the Westernized world of the twentieth century: that is to say, Europe on the one hand, and on the other hand the focus embracing India, Indonesia, the Far East and Australasia. On this showing, Palestine held a key position in the twentieth century world which

was not incomparable to the position of Great Britain as the *entrepôt* between Europe and the Americas.”<sup>14</sup>

On the land question the Jewish Agency criticized British policy for its failure to implement the clauses in the Mandate (Article 11) which imposed upon the Administration of Palestine the responsibility of introducing a land system to promote close settlement and intensive cultivation. Little as had been done for the general population, even less had been accomplished for the Jews, despite the provision in Article 6 that the administration of Palestine should encourage, “in cooperation with the Jewish Agency . . . close settlement by Jews on the land, including State lands and waste lands not required for public purposes.” They made reference to the statement of Professor Rappard at the Seventeenth Session of the Permanent Mandates Commission (1930) to the effect that “the Government had practically done nothing concrete . . . to encourage close settlement by Jews on the land. The Government had not prevented it, but he did not see that they had taken any positive action to encourage it.”<sup>15</sup>

In defending itself against this charge, the Government had taken the position that the cultivable land of Palestine was not sufficient in area for intensive new settlement, and that they could not encourage Jewish settlement without detriment to the position of the existing Arab cultivators. The Agency maintained that in order to strengthen its view the Government had continuously underestimated the cultivable area of Palestine. The estimate of Sir John Hope Simpson had already been admitted to be unscientific. But even in the current Government estimates, there was a tendency to minimize the cultivable area available. The present estimates of the Government which amounted to 8,760,000 dunams—almost 718,000 metric dunams more than Simpson’s estimate—were based on crop returns made by *mukhtars* and other village representatives. Since the village registers were the basis of taxation the tendency was always to underestimate the cultivable land. The Agency pointed out at least one case, in the Beer Sheba sub-district, where the actual area under cultivation during

14. *Ibid.*, pp. 214–215, quoted from Arnold J. Toynbee, ed., *Survey of International Affairs 1934*, pp. 264 ff.

15. *Ibid.*, p. 137.

1934–1935 was greater than the area which the Government described as cultivable. Dr. Hexter in his evidence before the Royal Commission pointed out what the Government estimates excluded:<sup>16</sup>

. . . all or nearly all land not under cultivation; secondly, it excludes all or nearly all land requiring considerable capital outlay; thirdly, it excludes all land under water, such as Huleh; fourthly, it does not distinguish between quality and productivity of the soil; fifthly, the figures are still estimates; sixthly, their present basis seems to us no more final than the estimates which they displace; and lastly, the definition is unrelated to realities, because it omits, as it shows by its very contents, technology, capital, education, skill and markets.

The main point of attack, however, was the vague and inaccurate use of the term “cultivable.” The Government appeared to have two meanings in mind when it used the word cultivable: 1) sometimes it used it merely as a synonym for land at present under cultivation; 2) at other times it used the definition offered by Simpson, “land which can be brought under cultivation by the application and the financial resources of the average Palestinian cultivator.” Since the average Palestinian cultivator labored under well-known disabilities, the two Government definitions of cultivability amounted to the same thing and really meant the amount of land already under cultivation by methods at present used by the *fellahin*. This begged the whole question: the problem of the development of Palestine was essentially that of introducing better methods of agricultural productivity and of changing from a system of extensive to intensive cultivation. As to the amount of cultivable land in Palestine, Dr. Hexter, who testified on this subject, refused to give a fixed figure. He pointed out that the conditions were so different in various parts of Palestine that it would be necessary to make a careful estimate on the spot in each case. He said: “My point is simply that in any development possibilities in this country, one must go from one place to another literally to see what can be done.”<sup>17</sup> Dr. Hexter was convinced that the Government definition underestimated the future possibility of rural development in Palestine. As to the

16. *Ibid.*, p. 236.

17. *Royal Commission Report*, p. 235.

definition of cultivable land, he offered the following carefully prepared statement:<sup>18</sup>

The word "cultivable" does not describe an inherent or absolute attribute of land which determines the use to which it can be put. "Cultivability" is not the independent determining factor, but is itself determined by the inter-action of the physical properties of the land (including availability of irrigation waters), and the economic factors of production which are applied to it and modify it. To what extent factors of production can be applied depends on the economic progress of the country as a whole, including possibilities of special products, and can only be forecast from time to time. Land will be taken into cultivation or subjected to a more intensive or different form of cultivation as and when the supply of capital, labor, skill and available markets warrant it . . . For the purpose of determining whether particular land is cultivable or whether, if cultivated, it is capable of more intensive cultivation, it is necessary to have an analysis of each particular project in relation to the particular area in question.

*Jewish Land Purchase and the Arab Cultivator*

Another question dealt with at length by the Jewish Agency was whether Jewish purchases of land tended to deprive the Arab rural population of the possibility of continuing their agricultural pursuits. The Jewish Agency pointed out that up to June 30, 1936 the total amount of land held by Jews was 1,394,456 metric dunams, of which 1,040,070 were cultivable. This represented only 11.87% of the total cultivable area of Palestine, even if the small official estimates of this area were accepted as a basis.<sup>19</sup> Jewish purchases of cultivable land in the postwar period amounted only to 546,000 metric dunams, or 6.23% of the cultivable area of Palestine. It could not be seriously maintained that such purchases had displaced the Arab. But small as the figure was it gave an erroneous impression; during the period under discussion more fallow land had been brought under cultivation than the Jews had purchased. Furthermore, the land purchased by the Jews included considerable areas which were formerly swamp land or otherwise

18. *Ibid.*, p. 237.

19. If the Jewish estimate of cultivability were taken as a basis, i.e., about 15,000,000 dunams, the total amount purchased by the Jews would amount to only about 7 or 8%.

uncultivable, or not cultivable by the methods and with the means available to the Arab *fellah*. The effect of Jewish purchases had been to increase both the cultivated and cultivable area in Palestine.

The Agency pointed out further that most of its purchases were from wealthy proprietors who had surpluses. It quoted the Strickland Report to the effect that "broadly speaking, the disappearance of this class (the class of large proprietors) from whom the Jews make large purchases is for the public good." The same investigator had fully recognized that an advantage was often derived by the *fellah* when he sold surplus land because this permitted him to obtain the capital required for the intensive cultivation of the remainder.<sup>20</sup>

There is in general much to be said for encouraging the *fellah* to sell a part of his irrigable land through the agency of the Loan Fund Committee (i.e., the Committee administering the proposed Government Loan Fund) and to repay the reasonable claims of his creditors from the sale proceeds and develop the remainder of his irrigable land with the surplus remaining, and with such additional money as the Fund will advance.

With reference to the effect of Jewish activity on the position of the Arab cultivator, the Jewish Agency *Memorandum* made the following points:<sup>21</sup>

(i) Taking the Arab rural population as a whole, there is no reason to believe that since the War its position has changed for the worse.

(ii) There is reason to believe that in some respects its position has improved.

(iii) There is also reason to believe that the improvement is in part at least attributable to the direct or indirect results of Jewish immigration and settlement.<sup>22</sup>

Turning from the past to the future, the Jewish Agency stated that it did not object to land legislation, the purpose of which was to protect the bona fide tenant cultivator. In the

20. Jewish Agency *Memorandum*, p. 154, quoting C. F. Strickland, "The Possibility of Introducing a System of Agricultural Cooperation in Palestine" (1930).

21. *Ibid.*, p. 154.

22. The Jewish Agency, *Palestine—Land Settlement, Urban Development and Immigration*, 1930, p. 35.

*Memorandum* submitted to John Hope Simpson in 1930 it had said: "As regards the problem of settling the landless tenant, it need only be said that the Jewish Agency accepts the principle that on the purchase of land from effendis, the economic position of such tenants should not become worse than before the purchase." However, the Agency pointed out that the ordinances which aimed to protect the cultivators were open to abuse in their present form and that the Arabs were encouraged by unscrupulous persons to harass purchasers of land with fictitious claims. They quoted the observations of the Statutory Commission in the case of the Kubab village lands: "The Commission have difficulty in giving serious consideration to the evidence called by the complainants. It is a matter of some surprise to the Commission that these individuals were able to repeat, parrot-like, the block and parcel numbers of the lands in which tenancy rights were claimed, and were disputed by the respondents, yet were unable to state the block and parcel numbers owned and occupied by themselves in the same village." <sup>23</sup>

While not objecting to legislation which protected tenant cultivators, the Jewish Agency expressed its doubt as to the validity of certain new proposals for imposing restrictions on the sale of land by small owners. The proposed legislation, in accordance with official statements, provided that with the exception of the sub-district of Beer Sheba, urban areas and citrus land, "no landowner shall be permitted to sell any of his land unless he retains a minimum area which is sufficient to afford a means of subsistence to himself and his family." <sup>24</sup> The Jewish Agency pointed out that saddling small owners with certain inalienable areas might, as a matter of fact, work to the detriment of the owner, as illustrated in the Egyptian Five Feddan Law of 1912. Legislation of the kind proposed was open to a variety of objections: by binding the small owners to their holdings, it would tend to create a class of *adscripti glebae*; on the death of successive owners of small properties, heirs might find themselves with minute strips of inalienable and worthless land; the ability of the small owner to obtain mortgage loans would be impaired. The Jewish Agency wished to see the small owner as well as the tenant protected, but

23. Jewish Agency *Memorandum*, Appendix V, p. 302.

24. *Ibid.*, p. 145.



thought that the proposed legislation was worse than the disease which it intended to cure. Instead of preventing owners from selling their land, the Agency proposed that the effort be expended on improving cultivation, for if small proprietors were able to work their land profitably they would not be forced to sell. The attitude of the Jewish Agency toward the Arab cultivator and its conception of the proper remedy was indicated in the following statement by Dr. Arthur Ruppin, made before the Royal Commission:<sup>25</sup>

There is no tendency on our part to oust Arab farmers from their holdings. The few cases where Arab tenants were displaced, which I mentioned yesterday, by Jewish purchases, are negligible in comparison with the much bigger number of Arab farmers who have become landless by foreclosure of their holdings owing to debts to Arab creditors. Our aim is to improve agricultural methods, especially by irrigation, and to create new possibilities for settlement of Jews without prejudicing in any way the livelihood of the previous Arab cultivators. I am also of opinion that the Arab farmer will have a better income . . . from an irrigated and intensive farm of 20 dunams, than from 100 dunams of unirrigated land as it is in its present form. We accept, and have accepted since the time of Sir John Hope Simpson, the formula that in all cases of purchases of land by Jews the Arab cultivators should remain on the land and that their economic situation should not be worse, and I hope it will be better, than it was before. We agreed to measures of control by the Government in respect of the fulfillment of these conditions, but in order to carry out a programme which will create new possibilities for Jewish settlement without doing harm to the Arabs, a much more active participation of the Government in the development activities is indispensable.

In stating its constructive proposals, the Jewish Agency listed recommendations under the following headings<sup>26</sup> in line with suggestions made by the Johnson-Crosbie, Hope Simpson and French Reports :

- i) Cadastral survey and land settlement.
- ii) The *mushaa* system of land tenure.
- iii) Water resources.
- iv) Rural credit.
- v) The Bedouin problem.

25. *Royal Commission Report, op. cit.*, p. 241.

26. *Jewish Agency Memorandum*, p. 174.

In presenting their case, the Jews took a moderate and conciliatory line. They reaffirmed the view that "there is room in Palestine both for Arabs and Jews and that there is nothing to prevent the two peoples from living side by side on the footing that neither now nor at any future time is one of them to dominate or be dominated by the other."<sup>27</sup> To give this idea political embodiment the Jewish Agency indicated their willingness to accept the principle of parity, provided that the Arabs and the British Government would also accept this as a basis for present as well as future plans for a legislative council. In general, it may be said that the Jewish leaders were satisfied with a minimum in the way of political safeguards, and laid the emphasis rather on the agricultural and industrial development of Palestine as a means of solving the problem of the apparent incompatibility of Arab and Jewish interests.

### *The Arab Evidence*

The Arab spokesmen, however, took an entirely different line:<sup>28</sup> they outdid themselves in denunciation of the Jewish National Home and a note of anti-Semitism crept into some of their references to the Jews. They enlarged upon the happiness of the Arabs under the Turks in times past and on the contentment prevailing in other Arab countries at the present time: they denied that the British Administration or the Jewish development had done anything but lead to a decline in the condition of the Arabs. They set forth the same grievances as on previous occasions: Jewish immigration was a detriment to the country; the cost of living, the rate of wages, and taxation had risen excessively as a result of Jewish activities. Acquisition of land by Jews was displacing Arab cultivators and bringing about the destruction of villages; refusal of Jews to employ Arabs was leading to unemployment; and modernization was violating the sanctity of sacred places. The Government had imposed protective tariffs in order to favor Jewish industry and public concessions had illegally been granted to Jews; the employment of Britons and Jews in Government positions excluded Arabs from posts which they enjoyed under Turkish rule. The recognition of Hebrew as an official tongue was an unnecessary and expensive luxury and the use of the

27. Jewish Agency Memorandum, p. 5.

28. *Royal Commission Report*, p. 148.

term *Eretz Israel*, written in Hebrew characters on stamps and public documents as a designation of Palestine, was offensive to the Arabs. A complaint of a different order was that Government expenditure on Arab education was inadequate.<sup>29</sup>

As always, the failure to develop self-governing institutions headed the list of grievances but the issue was stated more bluntly. As one of the witnesses said, "there was one big grievance that swallowed up all the rest," namely, the demand for Arab independence. The charge was that the British had promised the Arabs national independence during the First World War, but the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate for Palestine made it impossible for Britain to fulfill its promise previously given to the Arabs. The Arab representatives demanded the abolition of the Mandate and its substitution by a treaty with Great Britain which would secure for them national independence. This direct demand for national independence was a reversion, in a more extreme form, to the Arab position before 1928. In that year, at the Seventh Arab Congress,<sup>30</sup> they had emphasized the theme of "representative institutions" as an indirect way of getting the Mandate abrogated.

The Mufti—Haj Amin al-Husaini—appeared as the chief witness for the Arabs, a role which he had played at the Shaw Commission after the 1929 disturbances. At the Shaw Commission he appeared as President of the Supreme Moslem Council, but now he came as President of the Arab Higher Committee.<sup>31</sup> There was a reminiscence of his former role in his appeal to religious sentiment on the grounds that the Jews had trespassed on the sanctity of sacred places in Palestine through modern developments and cited as an example the Rutenberg Concession near Lake Tiberias. But in the main he now emphasized the Arab national ideal. He put the issue in a nutshell: "The Arab case in Palestine is one which aims at national independence. In its essence it does not differ from similar movements amongst the Arabs of other Arab territories."<sup>32</sup> In all the other countries which had been severed from the Turkish Empire, Arab national governments were set up and the Mandates replaced by treaties of alliance and friendship—with

29. *Ibid.*, p. 365.

30. See Ch. VII, p. 487.

31. Palestine Royal Commission, *Minutes of Evidence*, p. 92.

32. The Arabs appeared as a unit in behalf of the Arab Higher Committee and all parties were represented.

England in Iraq and with France in Syria and the Lebanon. The Arabs in Palestine, similarly, aspired to self-government, but the British, under pressure of the Jews, had frustrated the Arab aspirations. Great Britain had permitted the Jews to gain control of the economic future of the country, to increase their numbers by immigration, to acquire tracts of land, making it possible for them to realize their ambition "of establishing a national home for the Jews in those Arab territories which are surrounded by an Arab ocean on all sides and . . . held in the highest degree of veneration by the Arab and Moslem worlds . . ." <sup>33</sup>

The Mufti's proposal for solution was as follows: <sup>34</sup>

1. The abandonment of the experiment of the Jewish National Home, which originated in the Balfour Declaration and which has proved to be a failure, and the reconsideration of all the consequences which resulted from this experiment and which prejudiced the rights of the Arabs and imperiled their national existence.

2. The immediate and complete stoppage of Jewish immigration.

3. The immediate and complete prohibition of the sale of Arab land to the Jews.

4. The solution of the Palestine problem on the same basis as that on which were solved the problems of Iraq, Syria and the Lebanon, namely, by the termination of the Mandate and by the conclusion of a treaty between Great Britain and Palestine, by virtue of which a national and independent government in constitutional form will be established, on which national elements will be represented, and which will guarantee justice, progress, and prosperity to all.

In the course of giving his evidence, the Mufti was questioned as to what the position of the Jews would be in case Arab independence were granted and, as he suggested, a treaty signed with Britain. The colloquy reads as follows: <sup>35</sup>

*Question:* . . . If the Arabs had this treaty, they would be prepared to welcome the Jews already in the country?

*Mufti:* That will be left to the discretion of the Government which will be set up under the treaty and will be decided by that Government on the considerations most equitable and most beneficial to the country.

33. Palestine Royal Commission, *Minutes of Evidence*, p. 297.

34. *Ibid.*, p. 297.

35. *Ibid.*, p. 298.

*Question:* Do you think the Jews would be satisfied with that settlement?

*Mufti:* . . . Many thousands of Jews are actually living under Arab rule in Iraq and Syria, accepting the same obligations as the Arabs and enjoying the same rights as the original inhabitants of the country.

*Question:* Does His Eminence think that this country can assimilate and digest the 400,000 Jews now in the country?

*Mufti:* No.

*Question:* Some of them would have to be removed by a process kindly or painful as the case may be?

*Mufti:* We must leave all this to the future.

Auni Abdul Hadi testified in similar vein but with no pretense of urbanity. To him the Jews were foreigners coming into the country against the will of the rightful owners. The invasion should be resisted by all means possible, including force. Jewish settlement in Palestine, he alleged, was in all respects detrimental to Arab life. The cost of living had gone up, wage rates for labor were high and the cost of government exorbitant, due to the employment of highly paid Jewish labor. "The cost of living in other Arab countries is very low and everybody is happy."<sup>36</sup> He implied that the great burden of debt under which the *fellaḥ* lived was due to Jewish money lenders. "I think the Jews . . . are more usurious than any other people in any other part of the world."<sup>37</sup> His attitude toward Jews was revealed in the following remark: "In Germany 70,000,000 Germans who are cultured and civilized and have all the necessary means of Government cannot bear 600,000 Jews."<sup>38</sup> His conception of Arab-Jewish relations was indicated in the following remark:<sup>39</sup>

As far as our rights are concerned, we utterly refuse to meet at the same table with any persons who call themselves Zionist Jews . . . As a distinct Jewish group and as an Arab group, we refuse to meet.

We don't accept the formula laid down by the Jews that there should be no domination by Jews over Arabs or by Arabs over the Jews . . . We want a national Palestine Government which shall

36. *Ibid.*, p. 307.

37. *Ibid.*, p. 312-315.

38. *Ibid.*, p. 310.

39. *Ibid.*, p. 314.

make a treaty with Great Britain for full freedom of all interests of all inhabitants of Palestine.

Frankly speaking, we object to the existence of 400,000 Jews in the country.

*Chairman:* They are not to be driven out and yet there are too many of them. What happens then?

*Abdul Hadi:* A large number of them are not Palestinians.

*Chairman:* Auni Bey says that he does not want to drive them out but he says there are too many and I want to know how he would reduce them.

*Abdul Hadi:* That is not a question which can be decided here.

Jamal al-Husaini, formerly secretary of the Palestine Arab Executive in the early years and now president of the Mufti's Arab Party, represented himself as a farmer.<sup>40</sup> He said: "I am a farmer and I hope to give you evidence from the point of view of the man of the village, the more or less enlightened farmer." Despite this introduction, he began his testimony with a long legalistic argument on Article 22 of the Mandate, which led the Chairman to remark: "What was passing through my mind was that whether you are a farmer now, you must have been a lawyer at some time." Jamal replied: "I said at the beginning that I would be touching on these points in order to show that even farmers now understand these points quite well." However, in the discussion of the problem of protecting the tenant farmer he became evasive and insisted: "I said I am speaking as a farmer. I am not a lawyer, and therefore cannot deal with the law."

His main economic point was that agriculturalists had to pay direct taxation, while the business and industrial groups in the cities, which, he alleged, were "mostly Jewish companies, Jewish firms, Jewish industries and Jewish professional men, who are reaping golden harvests and are being given undue protection by the government and escape all direct taxation." He complained that the Zionists had prevented the Palestine Administration from introducing an income tax. He also repeated previous grievances expressed by the Arab Executive against the Rutenberg and Novomeisky concessions, claiming that the Arabs derived no benefit from these. Although throughout his testimony he had maintained that the economic position of the Arabs was being ruined by the Jews, he de-

40. He was the wealthy owner of a large banana plantation.

clared at the end: "Supposing that the fellaheen and all the Arabs of Palestine are now enjoying, under the present policy, a prosperous economic situation, will that affect their rights and position in the social and political life, or does such a situation relieve the government from the duty of safe-guarding this position, by not allowing an alien race to encroach in any way on the situation, nationally if not economically." <sup>41</sup>

Fuad Effendi Saba, Secretary of the Arab Higher Committee, also testified on the economic situation. He was an accountant, and was brought in to discuss taxation. He emphasized that Arabs felt it of paramount importance to explain that the causes of the unrest in the country were not only political but to a large extent economic: "I am voicing the feelings of all Arabs when I say that the policy of the Mandatory has always been, and if continued in the future, will be directed towards the economic annihilation of the Arabs." He also stressed the need for an income tax, but he laid himself open to embarrassment when he stated that Mr. Huntington, the Government expert, had reported in its favor. The members of the Commission, who had read the report, pointed out that Mr. Huntington had opposed the introduction of the income tax. With similar disregard of commonly known facts, he maintained that the government had followed a policy of industrialization protecting Jewish industries particularly and totally neglecting Arab industries. Finally, he said: "We are not after the protection of industries because we believe that this country is not an industrial country; and if any small measure of protection is adopted, it should be only for industries bearing on agriculture. Frankly, our contention is that the government has adopted this industrial policy for political ends." <sup>42</sup>

All the evidence of the Arabs boiled down to a demand for a liquidation of the Jewish national home policy, the immediate establishment of an Arab state in treaty relation with Great Britain, leaving it to the Arab majority to determine the place of the Jews. Some of the expressions indicated Nazi influence in the attitude assumed toward the Jews. Both the Mufti and Auni Bey seemed to imply that recent immigrants who had not established citizenship in Palestine might be deported.

41. *Ibid.*, p. 324.

42. *Ibid.*, p. 334.

## CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION

### *General Analysis of the Situation*

Before giving their own analysis of the underlying causes of the disturbances, the Commissioners, in their Report, first summarized the views expressed by the Arabs and the Jews.<sup>43</sup>

The Arab Higher Committee expressed the desire to abolish the Mandate, as a primary cause of the disturbances. They evinced a fear of Jewish domination, political and economic. The allegation was that the Arabs were afraid of the Jews—of their pertinacity, their wealth, their ability and their growing numbers. They viewed with particular mistrust the amount of land that had already passed into the hands of the Jews and they feared that their Arab fellow-countrymen would not be able to resist the temptation of high prices, and that more land would pass on to the Jews. They noted that land once acquired by the Jewish National Fund could never be resold. They feared that the Jewish development would lead to the destruction of village life and to the decay of the social structure based on it. Their fears for themselves were multiplied when they thought of coming generations whose future seemed to be threatened by the tide of Jewish immigration. Among the less educated Arabs, the Commission believed, there was a widespread fear that Jewish domination might affect the Holy Places, and thus influence the freedom of religious observance.

The Jewish witnesses, according to the Commission's Report, agreed that the underlying causes of the disturbances were political in nature, but they doubted that Arab nationalism was as strong as it might seem to be on the surface. In any case, the Arab opposition, the Jews argued, would have been restrained and its expression in violence discouraged, if the Mandatory Government had shown greater sympathy for the policy of the Jewish national home, and greater determination in carrying it into effect. The Government's attitude had helped to foster a belief in the Arab mind that if Arab resistance to the National Home policy would be sufficiently obstinate and forceful, the Mandatory Power might be worried or frightened into giving it up. The Jewish witnesses stressed

43. *Royal Commission Report*, pp. 106 ff.



the Government's failure to maintain law and order, its hesitation to use Jewish help in the police force, its toleration of inflammatory attacks in the Arab press and its permitting Palestine to become a center of Pan-Arab and Pan-Islamic propaganda.

After summarizing the views of the two parties to the controversy, the Peel Commission stated as its definitive conviction, on which they had no doubt, that, "the underlying causes of the disturbances" were:

- (i) The desire of the Arabs for national independence.
- (ii) Their hatred and fear of the establishment of the Jewish National Home.

The Commissioners made the following comment on these two "underlying causes." First, that these were the basic causes which brought about the disturbances of 1920, 1921, 1929 and 1933. Secondly, that the two causes were interlinked. In the first instance, and at the very outset, the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate involved a denial of national independence for the Arabs in Palestine. However, if the Jewish National Home had not made great progress and the Arabs had remained in a large majority, then the Arabs might have won national independence in the end. However, the growth of the Jewish national home precluded such a possibility and "its further growth might mean the political as well as the economic subjection of the Arabs to the Jews so that, if ultimately the Mandate should terminate and Palestine become independent, it would not be national independence in the Arab sense but self-government by a Jewish majority."<sup>44</sup>

The two causes mentioned above, the Arab desire for national independence and their fear of the growth of the Jewish national home, the *Report* went on to say, were the "only 'underlying' causes."<sup>45</sup> All other factors were complementary or subsidiary, aggravating the other causes or helping to furnish the time and occasion on which the outbreak occurred. These subsidiary factors, here stated in somewhat abbreviated form, are:<sup>46</sup>

44. *Ibid.*, p. 111.

45. The Summary made by the Royal Institute of International Affairs, *Great Britain and Palestine, 1915-1939*, fails to bring out this emphasis. From their statement (p. 85) the reader might get the impression that the secondary aggravating factors were the main clauses.

46. *Royal Commission Report*, pp. 111-112.

(i) The effect on Arab opinion in Palestine of the attainment of national independence first by Iraq, to a less complete extent by Trans-Jordan, then by Egypt and lastly by Syria and the Lebanon.

(ii) The pressure on Palestine exerted by world Jewry in view of the sufferings of the Jews in Central and Eastern Europe. The consequent high figures of Jewish immigration from 1933 onwards, gravely accentuated Arab fears of Jewish domination over Palestine.

(iii) The Arab belief that the Jews could always get their way by means denied to the Arabs. This belief was based on the status of the Jewish Agency both in Jerusalem and in London, and was greatly strengthened by Mr. MacDonald's letter to Dr. Weizmann in 1931 and the Debates in Parliament on the Legislative Council in 1936.<sup>47</sup>

(iv) The growth of Arab distrust of the ability or will of His Majesty's Government to carry out promises made to the Arabs dates back to the time of the McMahon pledge and the Balfour Declaration.

(v) Arab alarm at the continued purchase of Arab land by the Jews.

(vi) The intensive character of Jewish nationalism in Palestine; the "modernism" of many of the younger immigrants; the provocative language used by irresponsible Jews and the intemperate tone of the Jews as well as the Arab press.

(vii) The general uncertainty accentuated by the ambiguity of certain phrases in the Mandate as to the ultimate intentions of the Mandatory Power. This uncertainty has: a) stimulated the Jewish desire to expand and consolidate their position in Palestine as quickly as may be, and b) made it possible for the Arabs to interpret the conciliatory policy of the Palestine Government and the sympathetic attitude of some of its officials as proof that the British were not determined to implement the Balfour Declaration wholeheartedly.

Turning to the question of the practical development in Palestine, the Commission stated: "Twelve years ago the National Home was an experiment: today it is a 'going concern.'" They recounted the progress made in agricultural and urban development, in industrial expansion and in cultural advance resulting from the Jewish effort. Reviewing the situation in the

47. It is not quite clear from the method of formulation whether the Royal Commission itself believed that there was inequality of opportunity as between Arabs and Jews in putting their case before His Majesty's Government or whether they mentioned this as a belief held by the Arabs. It should be clear that, as a matter of fact, the Arabs had all the opportunity they wanted for presenting their case. The same ambiguity, that is, whether the Commission is expressing its own view or that of the Arabs, applies to points (iv) and (vi).

Arab sector of the population they pointed out that progress has also been made there. The most striking fact, in their view, was the remarkable growth in the Arab population of Palestine. They noted that during the period of seventeen years since the beginning of the civil administration in Palestine, the Arab population had increased by 50 per cent, a remarkable figure, particularly in view of the fact that under the Ottoman regime the Arab population in Palestine had been stationary. It was the impression of the Royal Commission, furthermore, that the Arabs of all classes were better off than before the days of the British occupation. The *effendi* class of landowners had sold substantial pieces of land at figures far above the pre-war prices. The capital thus acquired had been invested profitably in citrus plantations, in residential buildings and industrial enterprises. Some of the older Arab industries, like the Nablus soap enterprise, were suffering as a result of the effects of the more modern Jewish and Egyptian industrial development. But, taken as a whole, the development of new industry among the Arabs was considerable, as indicated by the increase of bank deposits.

The *fellahin* had not benefited as much as the *effendi* class but they were, on the whole, better off than in 1920. The standard of living was still low: like other agricultural communities throughout the world, they had suffered from the fall in agricultural prices and from the various natural and social causes described in the various reports. But the Government had done much to help them: their burden of debt had been eased, the tithe had been reduced and later replaced by more equitable taxes on property, and a beginning had been made in co-operative societies and in the introduction of better methods of cultivation.

Examining the claim that the general advance in Palestine was largely due to Jewish effort in the establishment of the Jewish national home, the Commission came to the following conclusions:<sup>48</sup>

- (i) The large import of Jewish capital into Palestine has had a general fructifying effect on the economic life of the whole country.
- (ii) The expansion of Arab industry and citriculture has been largely financed by the capital thus obtained.

48. *Royal Commission Report*, p. 129.

(iii) Jewish example has done much to improve Arab cultivation, especially of citrus.

(iv) Owing to Jewish development and enterprise the employment of Arab labour has increased in urban areas, particularly in the ports.

(v) The reclamation and anti-malaria work undertaken in Jewish "colonies" have benefited all Arabs in the neighborhood.

(vi) Institutions, founded with Jewish funds primarily to serve the National Home, have also served the Arab population. *Hadassah*, for example, treats Arab patients, notably at the Tuberculosis Hospital at Safad and the Radiology Institute at Jerusalem, admits Arab country-folk to the clinics of its Rural Sick Benefit Fund, and does much infant welfare work for Arab mothers.

(vii) The general beneficent effect of Jewish immigration on Arab welfare is illustrated by the fact that the increase in the Arab population is most marked in urban areas affected by Jewish development. A comparison of the Census returns in 1922 and 1931 shows that, six years ago, the increase percent, in Haifa was 86, in Jaffa 62, in Jerusalem 37, while in purely Arab towns such as Nablus and Hebron it was only 7, and at Gaza there was a decrease of 2 percent.

The Commissioners held that "the equipment of Palestine with social services is more advanced than that of any of its neighbors, and far more advanced than that of an Indian province or an African colony."<sup>49</sup> They said, furthermore, that the public services, had been made possible by the Jewish contribution to the Government revenue, and that it was indisputable that the share of taxation borne by the Jews was disproportionately large. It was this surplus revenue which had made it possible to render superior public services to the Arab portion of the population. Their conclusion was that "broadly speaking, the Arabs have shared to a considerable degree in the material benefits which Jewish immigration has brought to Palestine. The obligation of the Mandate in this respect has been observed. The economic position of the Arabs, regarded as a whole, has not so far been prejudiced by the establishment of the Jewish National Home."<sup>50</sup>

A similar conclusion was drawn on the questions of land policy and agricultural development: "Up till now the Arab cultivator has benefited on the whole both from the work of

49. *Ibid.*, p. 128.

50. *Ibid.*, p. 130.

British administration and from the presence of Jews in the country. Wages have gone up: the standard of living has improved: work on roads and buildings has been plentiful.”<sup>51</sup> The Arab charge that the Jews had obtained too large a proportion of the good land could not be substantiated, that much of the land now carrying orange groves had been sand dunes or swamp land when purchased. However, they took the view that there would be a shortage of land in Palestine for Arabs in the future, but this would be due less to the acquisition of land by the Jews than to the rapid increase in the Moslem population. They held, furthermore, that “a long view” of the situation necessitated the consideration of the interests of the next generation and the effect on agrarian development thirty years hence.

The Commission’s recommendations on development were similar in certain respects to those proposed by the Jewish Agency and by the earlier British Reports. Regret was expressed that the more constructive aspects of the Hope Simpson and French reports had not been implemented with sufficient rapidity and determination. However, the recommendations of the Peel Commission differed significantly from those made by the Jewish Agency. Besides being in general more conservative and cautious, the proposals of the Commissioners were directed toward a moderate improvement of the lot of the Arab cultivator, rather than the extensive development required for the establishment of the Jewish national home. They appeared to view the improvement of the lot of the Arab cultivator not as something desirable in and of itself, so much as a means of assuring peace and public security. This was brought out in their defense of their constructive suggestions against the objections raised by the Palestine Government that the proposed development scheme would involve large financial outlays.<sup>52</sup>

If exception is taken to these proposals on the ground of expense, the reply must be that a contented tenantry and peasantry will in the end be much cheaper to govern, and that the absence of disputes regarding land, the prevention of trespass and the security of title conferred by these operations should conduce to the general pros-

51. *Ibid.*, p. 241.

52. *Ibid.*, p. 232.

perity and development of the country. Uncertainty regarding the land and rights therein creates disputes, encourages trespassers and promotes a feeling of insecurity, which in turn demands an ever larger police force and results in increased litigation.

*Recommendations for Restriction of Land Purchase and Immigration*

In the light of this "contented tenantry and peasantry" approach to the problem of agricultural development, it is not surprising that the Commission was not very optimistic about the possibility of close settlement of Jews on the land. The Commissioners were dubious of the Jewish Agency view that there were considerable areas of state land and waste land capable of improvement and productivization. Although they expressed enthusiasm in regard to the Jewish colonization efforts in the hill country, they felt that such developments would require an amount of capital beyond the financial resources of the Arab proprietors, and they were not hopeful of increasing the cultivability of those areas through irrigation, as the Jewish Agency proposed. Only with reference to the plains, did the members of the Commission believe that "with due precautions, land may still be sold to Jews."<sup>53</sup> Thus despite their favorable analysis of Jewish economic advance and achievement, and its effect on the country, their recommendations with reference to land policy were not, in essence, very different from those of the Shaw Commission and the Hope Simpson report.

The members of the Commission emphasized the need for restrictions on Jewish land purchases in order to provide for the growing Arab population—if not of this, then of the next generation. Their report on economic advance was punctuated by remarks to the effect that while the economic condition may be favorable now, we cannot be sure of the future. But even this was not their main point, for they were frank enough to say that in the last analysis, it was the political issue which must be determinative. They underscored the fact that the economic advance was insecure as long as there remained a constant threat of boycott and bloodshed. Their main point was that the Arabs did not wish to have the country developed if this meant losing control over the land. They were convinced

53. *Ibid.*, p. 242.

that even if the Arabs could be persuaded to admit the economic advance, it would not essentially lessen their antagonism. The *Report* described the Arab answer to the argument of economic improvement as follows: "You say we are better off: you say my house has been enriched by the strangers who have entered it. But it is *my* house, and I did not invite the strangers in, or ask them to enrich it, and I do not care how poor or bare it is if only I am master in it."<sup>54</sup>

The Commissioners recognized that immigration was the crux of the whole policy. They admitted that the Jews had demonstrated that they could enlarge the economic absorptive capacity of the country,<sup>55</sup> and that immigration might itself, under certain conditions, be a means of increasing the absorptive capacity.<sup>56</sup> They further indicated that the increased economic pressure on the Jews in Poland and the rise of the National Socialist Government in Germany together with the drastic restrictions of immigration to the United States, necessitated a larger immigration into Palestine.<sup>57</sup> In other words, they agreed with the Jewish position that the need for Jewish immigration was greater than at the time of the Mandate and that the Jewish effort had proven that Palestine could absorb a larger number of immigrants than most observers had expected.

From these premises, one might have believed that the Report would recommend that the gates of Palestine be opened wide to Jewish immigration. But the Commission propounded a "revolutionary" recommendation, as it has been called.<sup>58</sup> This "revolutionary" recommendation of the Commissioners consisted in the paradoxical conclusion that a very drastic limitation of immigration was required. They proposed the abandonment of the economic absorptive principle and the institution of a new principle—that of the "political high level." Their main point was that the continuance of the principle of economic absorptive capacity would allow the Jews to grow in ratio to the Arab population. This, it was imperative


54. *Ibid.*, p. 131.

55. *Ibid.*, p. 300.

56. *Ibid.*, p. 285.

57. *Ibid.*, p. 289.

58. Royal Institute of International Affairs, *Great Britain and Palestine, 1915-1939*, p. 86.



FORECAST OF FUTURE POPULATION TRENDS





to prevent, in order to eliminate the "hostility between the two peoples." Their summary of this argument was as follows:<sup>59</sup>

We may say that the principle of economic absorptive capacity, meaning that considerations of economic capacity and those alone should determine immigration, is at the present time inadequate and ignores factors in the situation which wise statesmanship cannot disregard. Political and psychological factors should be taken into account.

To determine the limits of the political high level the Commission had tables prepared which indicated—given certain rates of immigration and making reasonable assumptions about natural increase—in what year the Jewish population would equal and begin to surpass the Arab population.<sup>60</sup> The forecast was that if the rate of Jewish immigration were as large as 20,000 per annum, the Jews would begin to surpass the Arab population within a generation or so. The following table summarizes the situation should the Jewish immigration be 30,000 or more:<sup>61</sup>

<i>Annual rate of Jewish immigration</i>	<i>Year in which Jewish population would equal Arab population</i>	<i>Total population when Arabs and Jews would be equal</i>
30,000	Mid 1960	1,560,000
40,000	Early 1954	1,390,000
50,000	Early 1950	1,280,000
60,000	Mid 1947	1,210,000

As a result of the study of these figures, the *Report* came to the conclusion that the political high level of Jewish immigration covering all categories should be fixed during the next five years at 12,000 per annum. During that period under no circumstances should a larger number be permitted to enter Palestine; the figure of 12,000 might be reduced, however, at the discretion of the High Commissioner if economic conditions should prove unfavorable. From the graph shown on page 827, it will be seen that this figure was chosen because it

59. *Ibid.*, p. 300.

60. A suggestion of this already appeared in the Report of the Shaw Commission. See pp. 624–625.

61. *Ibid.*, p. 232.

would maintain the existing proportion between the Arab and the Jewish populations. It would crystallize the position of the Jewish and the non-Jewish inhabitants in the ratio of 3:10—making the Jews a permanent minority.

*Supplementary Recommendations on the Arab Agency,  
Local Self-Government, Public Security, and Education*

In addition to its major recommendations on limitation of land sales and immigration, the Royal Commission made a number of other suggestions in case the Mandate continued in operation. The most important of these were proposals for creating an Arab Agency, for insuring a greater degree of public security in Palestine, and for improving the relations between Arabs and Jews through modification of the educational system.

The Commission reviewed the proposal made by His Majesty's Government in 1923 for the establishment of an Arab Agency in Palestine which would occupy "a position exactly analogous to that accorded to the Jewish Agency under Article IV of the Mandate." The Commission pointed out that the Arab Agency which had been proposed was not "exactly analogous" to the Jewish Agency: the Jewish Agency represented the Jewish people as a whole throughout the world, whereas the Arab Agency was to have represented only the Arabs of Palestine. The Commission thought that there was too great a discrepancy between the Jewish Agency and the proposed Arab Agency and that the bodies should be more similarly constituted if an agreement was to be reached. It suggested, therefore, that an Arab Agency should be formed in London and Palestine to include not only Arabs of Palestine but also representatives of the neighboring countries—Trans-Jordan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and perhaps Egypt. Questions of policy which involved differences between the Arabs and the Jews would first be brought up before the two Agencies, Arab and Jewish; if they could not agree, the Government would act as a court of appeals to decide the issues.

The Commissioners recognized serious objections to their plan. First, there was "a substantial difference between a body like the Jewish Agency, which represents minority communities scattered over various parts of the world, and an enlarged Arab Agency drawn only from a compact body of neighboring

states.”<sup>62</sup> Moreover, the Arab states already had accredited ministers to His Majesty’s Government who carried on regular official business at Whitehall. The difficulties of working out a method of representation for an Arab Agency and finding means for its support were also noted. It was agreed that no contribution could be made by the Government of Palestine to the Arab Agency since it did not subsidize the Jewish Agency. The Commission recognized that the Jews would object to the plan as an unwarranted intervention of the Arab states in the affairs of Palestine, but thought that the Jews might accept the plan in order to “soften anti-Semitic feeling.” Although the Arabs did not accept the original offer, in 1923, of an Arab Agency, and had since then “roughly rejected” any suggestions for holding round table conferences with the Jews, the Commission thought that the new plan would receive serious consideration. It thought that the *Istiqlal* Party (Pan-Arab Nationalists) might be attracted by the scheme because it was a step in the direction of Arab unity.

The Commission did not recommend reviving the project of a Legislative Council. It came to the conclusion that in the peculiar circumstances of Palestine under the Mandate, parliamentary institutions on a representative basis could not be successful and that the plan of the Government to develop such institutions, which it had pursued since 1922, had not been “the right track to pursue.” The main reason was that representative government, in the opinion of the Commission, required a greater degree of homogeneity than existed in Palestine—that the differences of cultural level between the Arab and the Jewish populations and the national antagonisms would prevent a harmonious working of representative government. The Commission declared:<sup>63</sup>

Unless there is common ground enough between its different groups or classes to enable the minority to acquiesce in the rule of the majority and to make it possible for the balance of power to readjust itself from time to time, the working basis of parliamentary government or democracy as we understand it is not there. The most patent example of this in present-day politics is the impossibility of uniting all Ireland under a single parliament; and the gulf between Arabs

62. *Ibid.*, p. 184.

63. *Royal Commission Report*, p. 361.

and Jews in Palestine is wider than that which separates Northern Ireland from the Irish Free State.

The plan of parity suggested by the Jewish Agency was also rejected. The Commission pointed out that government by parity was not representative government as understood in the democratic world and that analogies drawn from the United States and from European history did not fit the Palestine situation. Nor did the Commission believe that parity would lead to more amicable relations between Arabs and Jews: conflicts were more stubborn when the two sides were equally matched. If at all workable as a system of government, it was possible only on the assumption of some measure of compromise between the two peoples involved, and such an attitude of reconciliation was exactly what was missing in Palestine. But quite apart from all these theoretical speculations on the validity of parity, the plain fact was that the Arab leaders, moderate and extremist alike, rejected the principle out of hand. "It implies what they refuse to admit—the potential right of the Jews to an equal share with them in the government of Palestine. It contemplates what they are determined to prevent—the attainment by the Jews of a majority of the population. And, while, it deprives them of a real present advantage, it offers in return an advantage which, however sincere the Jewish undertaking may be, is only prospective and will only materialize in circumstances which they (the Arabs) will do their best to preclude." <sup>64</sup>

However, if the Mandatory system was to continue, it was desirable for the Government to have some regular means of sounding out public opinion on policy. The Commission therefore advised enlarging the Advisory Council by the addition of unofficial members. The unofficial members might be elected and might even constitute a majority, but they should have power only to make representations to the Government; they should not be empowered to decide on budgetary matters or to enact legislation. The Commission realized that the Arabs would not accept such a legislative council, but still thought the plan worth exploring. However, the Commission's section on self-governing institutions ended in a pessimistic vein: it came to the conclusion that the Mandate was self-contradict-

64. *Ibid.*, p. 361.

tory and that "real 'self-governing institutions' cannot be developed, nor can the Mandate ever terminate, without violating its obligations, general or specific." <sup>65</sup>

The Royal Commission devoted a special chapter to the discussion of the problem of public security which it regarded as one of the weakest spots in the administration of Palestine. It said: "Today it is evident that the elementary duty of providing public security has not been discharged. If there is one grievance which the Jews have undoubted right to prefer it is the business of security. Their complaints on this head were dignified and restrained." <sup>66</sup> The problems of achieving security were many: the low pay of the native police; the difficulty of providing adequate barracks and living quarters for the men and their families; the lack of an *esprit de corps* in the police force; and not least, the national antagonisms. While the Arab rank and file in the police force could be depended upon in peace times, it could not be relied upon during the disturbances or in periods of special strain. Quite apart from their sympathy with their own people, they were subjected to intimidation and in the rural communities often found it difficult to obtain food. The Jewish police acted better under strain, but also, the Commission alleged, showed greater loyalty to the Jewish side than to the Government. One witness, in speaking of the relations between Jewish and Arab officials in the police force, graphically described the situation as follows: "In peace time they work quite well, but in times of disturbances they sit opposite each other and glare; neither addresses the other." <sup>67</sup>

The major difficulty that faced the Government in maintaining security in Palestine was that the Arabs possessed a large supply of illicit arms. These were regularly brought across the border from Trans-Jordan where the inhabitants were allowed to carry arms freely. The Commission also reported that a witness had said that arms were coming in from Saudi Arabia, which had an enormous supply, and from Syria and Bagdad which had their own arms factories. The Commission pointed out that the Jews were also, with good reason, suspected of possessing large supplies of arms and munitions. Though it

65. *Ibid.*, p. 362.

66. *Ibid.*, p. 201.

67. *Ibid.*, p. 196.

was only on rare occasions that any Jew resorted to the use of unauthorized firearms, there was a potential danger in the situation. They were informed that the Jews could place in the field 10,000 well-trained and well-armed combatants, with a second line of 40,000. While objecting to arming one section of the population to defend itself against the other, the Commission nevertheless admitted that the isolated position of many of the Jewish settlements demanded more adequate protection and that the Palestine Administration had hitherto proved ineffectual in the protection of the Jewish settlements. In addition, the intelligence division and the communications system were faulty. Accurate information of impending attacks could not be obtained in advance or quickly, and the telegraph lines could easily be cut, preventing prompt transmission of instructions.

In the light of this situation, the Commissioners recommended that if there should be another outbreak, martial law should be immediately instituted. Despite the extraordinary difficulties attending such an operation, an attempt should be made to disarm the population: that the Arabs, if still the aggressors, should first be disarmed, then on completion of Arab disarming, the Jews should be disarmed with equal thoroughness. However, if complete disarmament of the Arabs proved impossible, the system of Jewish voluntary police, which had been instituted in 1936 for the defense of the settlements, should be continued and made part of the Government's security arrangements. Long-range measures for the improvement of the security situation should include: the establishment of an efficient patrol force along the frontier to prevent the smuggling of arms; a large increase in the British police; the construction of barracks and family living quarters with due regard to the different needs of Moslems, Christians, and Jews; an extension of wireless telegraphy; and the retention of a strong British military force. The entire cost of maintaining such a security service could not be met from the resources of the Palestine Administration as formerly; the Commission recommended a grant-in-aid from the government of the United Kingdom.

The Commission severely criticized Government for the inadequacies of existing provisions for Arab education. It recommended a generous increase in the Education Department

budget, urging that the Administration should regard education's claims on the revenues as second in importance only to those of security. However, the Commission was critical of the nationalist attitude which it charged imbued both the Jewish and the Arab systems of education. It regarded the Jewish school system, directed by the *Vaad Leumi* and subsidized to some extent by Government, as, on the whole, efficient, and praised the Hebrew University of Jerusalem as a center of research in science and cultivation of the humanities. However, it considered the work in the Jewish schools as too much concerned with the national aspects of culture in the teaching of Hebrew, Jewish history and literature.<sup>68</sup> In the secondary schools, too, it felt there was an over-emphasis on ancient Jewish history and literature, and commended the provision in the secondary schools for instruction in Arabic. It recognized that among the faculty of the University, the political side of Zionism was regarded as subordinate to its spiritual and cultural ideals. Nevertheless, it judged that the University had too deep a national imprint: all the teaching was in Hebrew, the students were practically all Jews, and among the student body, as distinct from the faculty, the nationalist spirit predominated.

Even severer criticism was directed against the Arab school system despite the fact that it was maintained and supervised by Government. The Commission pointed out that the Government schools "have become seminaries of Arab nationalism; that the schoolmasters are for the most part ardent nationalists; and that during the disturbances of last year practically no work was done in the Government school."<sup>69</sup> Despite this, the Arab schoolmasters felt that the Government schools were not nationalist enough and that though the Arab schools were maintained by Government, they should enjoy the same autonomy as the Jewish schools, maintained largely through Jewish funds. One of the teachers interviewed stated that what the school teachers wanted was an Arab government which would conduct the Arab school system in Palestine in the same "patriotic" spirit as in Iraq.

68. It failed, however, to note that the subjects of literature and history in the Jewish schools included the study of the Bible and the early period of Jewish history, which may be regarded as universal as well as national.

69. *Ibid.*, p. 340.



The Commission was not very hopeful of any radical improvement in the educational system under the conditions imposed by the Mandate. Theoretically, it favored a system of bi-national curricula which would be imposed on Arab and Jewish schools alike. It realized, however, that the Jewish community would vehemently resist any attempt to deprive them of their educational autonomy, and that the Arabs, on their part, would be no less strongly opposed to a bi-national system; that a proposal to teach Hebrew in Arab schools, for instance, would provoke fierce indignation. Besides, the Commission admitted that any attempt at educational imposition of this sort would be contrary to Article XV of the Mandate which provided that each community might conduct schools in its own language and retain educational autonomy.

The Commissioners thought that something could be done to minimize the separatist tendencies in the schools by promoting mixed education, such as was given by some of the private schools. In such schools the main instruction would be given in English. This system would be particularly applicable, they believed, to new technical and trade schools which they proposed should be established by Government. Their most concrete suggestion was the founding of a British University in Jerusalem to meet not only the needs of the Arabs in Palestine, but of the Middle East generally. They thought that such a school would be attended by Jews as well as Arabs in Palestine and in the neighboring countries. Such a British University would not compete with the Hebrew University but would supplement its work, and there could be an exchange by which the graduates of one university might attend the other for postgraduate courses and research work in certain fields. The Commissioners thought that in the long run such an institution would have far-reaching influence in moderating national antagonism in the Near East and in promoting ideals of international cooperation between Europe and the Orient.

### THE REPUDIATION OF THE MANDATE AND THE PLAN OF PARTITION

The proposal to limit immigration drastically for political considerations, condemning the Jews to a status of a permanent minority, amounted to a repudiation of the Jewish national home policy which the Commission frankly recognized

to have been the primary obligation of the Mandate. But the Commission regarded even this draconic measure as no more than a palliative which would not solve the essential problem of the conflict between Arab and Jewish interests. It would not allow the Jews to make any further progress in the development of the Jewish national home nor would it remove the "grievance" of the Arabs or "prevent its recurrence." In the eyes of the Arabs the Jewish national home was already too big. The crux of the matter was in the Mandate itself. "The difficulty has always been, and, if the Mandate continues, will continue with it, that the existence of the National Home, whatever its size, bars the way to the attainment by the Arabs of Palestine of the same national status as that attained or soon to be attained, by all the other Arabs of Asia." <sup>70</sup>

*The Difficulties Inherent in the Mandate*

The introductory section<sup>71</sup> of the *Report* contained an analysis of the Mandate based on a close study of the texts and the evidence given at the hearings, and indicated what in the view of the Commission were the main points to be taken into consideration. The Preamble provided that Palestine was to be entrusted to a Mandatory "for the purpose of giving effect to Article 2 of the Covenant." This imposed on the Mandatory the obligation of securing "the well-being and development of the existing population," and implied, furthermore, that the principle of self-determination should be carried into effect as soon and as far as possible. At the same time, paragraph 2 of the Preamble, which recited the Balfour Declaration, made the establishment of the Jewish national home an inseparable and indispensable part of the Mandate. The Commission pointed out that the third paragraph of the Preamble added an important rider to the Balfour Declaration, for it declared that the principal Allied Powers gave recognition to "the historical connection of the Jewish people with Palestine and to the grounds for reconstituting their national home in that country." <sup>72</sup>

From this analysis of the Preamble the *Report* concluded that while the Mandate for Palestine involved obligations to

70. *Ibid.*, p. 307.

71. *Ibid.*, pp. 34-42.

72. *Ibid.*, p. 37.

the existing population, it was of a different type from the Mandates for Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq, generally referred to as "A" Mandates. The other Mandates provided that the government should be based on an organic law which would take into account the wishes as well as the rights of all the inhabitants and that measures were to be enacted to facilitate the progressive development of these countries as independent states. In the Palestine Mandate on the other hand, Article 1 vested "full powers of legislation and of administration"—within the limits of the Mandate—in the Mandatory Power. The *Report* rejected the argument of the Arab witnesses that the Palestine Mandate violated Article 22 of the Covenant. It pointed out that provisional recognition as independent nations of "certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire" was permissive and not obligatory; that Article 22 of the Covenant provided that in case of necessity the degree of authority to be exercised by the Mandatory should be defined by the Council of the League; that "the acceptance by the Allied Powers and the United States of the policy of the Balfour Declaration made it clear from the beginning that Palestine would have to be treated differently from Syria and Iraq, and that this difference of treatment was confirmed by the Supreme Council in the Treaty of Sèvres and by the Council of the League in sanctioning the Mandate."<sup>73</sup>

Of the specific obligations imposed on the Mandatory, the *Report* regarded four as of major importance: "(i) the obligations under Articles 2 and 6 with reference to the Jewish National Home; (ii) the obligation in the same articles to safeguard the rights of all the inhabitants of Palestine and in particular those of non-Jews; (iii) the obligation in Articles 2 and 3 to develop self-governing institutions and encourage local autonomy; (iv) the obligations undertaken with regard to the Holy Places in Article 13."<sup>74</sup> These articles involved obligations to Jews, Arabs, and to many other peoples of the

<sup>73</sup> *Royal Commission Report*, p. 38. The *Report* also noted that the area in which the Jewish national home was to be established was understood at the time of the Balfour Declaration to be the whole of historic Palestine. It uncritically accepted the British asseveration that the separation of Trans-Jordan from Palestine, under Article 25 of the Mandate, was necessary "in obedience to the McMahon pledge." On this, see above, Chapter II, p. 176.

<sup>74</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 38, 39.

world. But the *Report* went on to say significantly: "Unquestionably, however, the primary purpose of the Mandate, *as expressed in its preamble and its articles*, is to promote the establishment of the Jewish National Home." <sup>75</sup>

The Commission stressed the point that the case of Palestine was different from the other ex-Turkish provinces. "It was, indeed, unique both as the Holy Land of three world-religions and as the old historic homeland of the Jews. The Arabs had lived in it for centuries, but they had long ceased to rule it, and in view of its peculiar character they could not now claim to possess it in the same way as they could claim possession of Syria or Iraq." <sup>76</sup> In defense of this position, the *Report* cited Lord Milner's oft-quoted statement in the House of Lords on June 27, 1923. Lord Milner, who was a strong supporter of Britain's pro-Arab policy and who believed in the ultimate formation of an Arab Federation, had said: "Palestine can never be regarded as a country on the same footing as the other Arab countries. You cannot ignore all history and tradition in the matter. You cannot ignore the fact that this is the cradle of two of the great religions of the world. It is a sacred land to the Arabs, but it is also a sacred land to the Jew and the Christian; and the future of Palestine cannot possibly be left to be determined by the temporary impressions and feelings of the Arab majority in the country of the present day." <sup>77</sup>

After making this analysis the Commission went on to emphasize the point that when the draft Mandate for Palestine had been confirmed, it was believed that the obligations undertaken vis-à-vis the Arabs and Jews would not come into conflict. Although the Arab leaders had already displayed their hostility to the Mandate, the hope was that the opposition would weaken and die away. The same basic idea of the reconcilability of the two obligations underlay Churchill's 1922 Statement of Policy. It was assumed that the Zionist endeavor would revivify the country and that as the Arabs benefited from the development, their fears and prejudices would give way to a spirit of cooperation.

The Commission pointed out that if the assumption of the reconcilability of the Arab and Jewish interests had not been

<sup>75.</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 39.

<sup>76.</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 40.

<sup>77.</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 41.

made, the whole question of the Mandate would have assumed a different aspect.<sup>78</sup>

To foster Jewish immigration in the hope that it might ultimately lead to the creation of a Jewish majority and the establishment of a Jewish State with the consent or at least the acquiescence of the Arabs was one thing. It was quite another to contemplate, however remotely, the forcible conversion of Palestine into a Jewish State against the will of the Arabs. For that would clearly violate the spirit and intention of the Mandate System. It would mean that national self-determination had been withheld when the Arabs were a majority in Palestine and only conceded when the Jews were a majority. It would mean that the Arabs had been denied the opportunity of standing by themselves: that they had, in fact, after an interval of conflict, been bartered about from Turkish sovereignty to Jewish sovereignty. It is true that in the light of history Jewish rule over Palestine could not be regarded as foreign rule in the same sense as Turkish; but the international recognition of the right of the Jews to return to their old homeland did not involve the recognition of the right of the Jews to govern the Arabs in it against their will. The case stated by Lord Milner against an Arab control of Palestine applies equally to a Jewish control.

This way of stating the situation revealed a radically new approach. All other analyses of the question, from the very beginning, had assumed that the two undertakings—the obligation to the Arabs and the obligation to the Jews—were reconcilable. The essence of the Royal Commission's conclusion was that they were not. In the endeavor to accentuate the irreconcilability of the two obligations, the *Report* represented the situation as an "irrepressible conflict" between two communities profoundly different in constitution and in ideas.<sup>79</sup>

An irrepressible conflict has arisen between two national communities within the narrow bounds of one small country. About 1,000,000 Arabs are in strife, open or latent, with some 400,000 Jews. There is no common ground between them. The Arab community is predominantly Asiatic in character, the Jewish community predominantly European. They differ in religion and in language. Their cultural and social life, their ways of thought and conduct, are as incompatible as their national aspirations. These last are the

78. *Ibid.*, p. 42.

79. *Ibid.*, p. 370.

greatest bar to peace. Arabs and Jews might possibly learn to live and work together in Palestine if they would make a genuine effort to reconcile and combine their national ideals and so build up in time a joint or dual nationality. But this they cannot do. The War and its sequel have inspired all Arabs with the hope of reviving in a free and united Arab world the traditions of the Arab golden age. The Jews similarly are inspired by their historic past. They mean to show what the Jewish nation can achieve when restored to the land of its birth. National assimilation between Arabs and Jews is thus ruled out. In the Arab picture the Jews could only occupy the place they occupied in Arab Egypt or Arab Spain. The Arabs would be as much outside the Jewish picture as the Canaanites in the old land of Israel. The National Home, as we have said before, cannot be half-national. In these circumstances to maintain that Palestinian citizenship has any moral meaning is a mischievous pretense. Neither Arab nor Jew has any sense of service to a single State.

The conflict between the Jews and the Arabs, the Commission declared, necessitated the continuance of the Crown Colony type of government in Palestine:<sup>80</sup>

The Government of Palestine is of the Crown Colony type, unsuitable in normal circumstances for governing educated Arabs or democratic Jews. But it cannot evolve, as it has elsewhere evolved, into a system of self-government, since there is no such system which could ensure justice both to the Arabs and to the Jews or in which both the Arabs and the Jews would agree to participate. The establishment of a Legislative Council or even of an enlarged Advisory Council in which both races would cooperate is thus impracticable. Nor are other methods of consultation and collaboration with the representatives of both races feasible. Jewish cooperation, it is true, is required by the Mandate, and is forthcoming sometimes to an embarrassing extent. But Arab cooperation, in any regular and continuous form, is unobtainable. Thus a bureaucratic Government must continue in being unmodified by any representative institutions on a national scale, and unable to dispel the conflicting grievances of the dissatisfied and irresponsible communities it governs. Nor will the Government be able to count on any inborn sense of allegiance to the Crown. It is the national leaders, not the Mandatory Government, who make the first claim on the loyalty of their compatriots.

To continue to govern Palestine on the present basis, without the consent or acquiescence of the governed—so the Com-

80. *Ibid.*, p. 372.


mission averred—was a task “for which the British people have little heart.” Great Britain earnestly desired to honor its obligations in Palestine, each of which taken separately was in accord with British sentiment and British interest. British public opinion was wholly sympathetic with the Arab aspirations for a new era of unity and prosperity in the Arab world. Likewise, there was a strong British tradition of friendship for the Jewish people, and nowhere was there a greater desire to help the Jews in their present tragedy; nowhere was Zionism better understood. The British would like to maintain relations of friendship with both peoples; but if the present situation continued, it would mean a gradual alienation of two peoples who were traditionally friends of the British and lead moreover to a steady decline of British prestige.

“Manifestly,” the *Report* went on to say, “the problem cannot be solved by giving either the Arabs or the Jews all they want.” The Commissioners did not think that any fair-minded statesmen would propose that Britain hand over the 400,000 Jews already in Palestine to Arab rule. Without questioning the humanity of the intentions of the Arab leaders, the *Report* remarked: “We cannot forget what recently happened, despite treaty provisions and explicit assurances, to the Assyrian minority in Iraq; nor can we forget that the hatred of the Arab politician for the National Home has never been concealed, and that it has now permeated the Arab population as a whole.”<sup>81</sup> Neither did the Commission think that it would be fair if the Jews became a majority and that “a million or so of Arabs should be handed over to their rule.” Under these circumstances, the Royal Commission saw only one way out of the dilemma; to divide Palestine and let each people rule a part of it. In conclusion, the Commission wrote:<sup>82</sup>

“Half a loaf is better than no bread,” is a peculiarly English proverb; and, considering the attitude which both the Arab and the Jewish representatives adopted in giving evidence before us, we think it improbable that either party will be satisfied at first sight with the proposals we have submitted for the adjustment of their rival claims. For Partition means that neither will get all it wants. It means that the Arabs must acquiesce in the exclusion from their

81. *Ibid.*, p. 141.

82. *Ibid.*, p. 394.



PROVISIONAL SCHEME OF PARTITION AS PROPOSED BY THE  
 PALESTINE ROYAL COMMISSION, 1937





sovereignty of a piece of territory, long occupied and once ruled by them. It means that the Jews must be content with less than the Land of Israel they once ruled and have hoped to rule again. But it seems to us possible that on reflection both parties will come to realize that the drawbacks of Partition are outweighed by its advantages. For, if it offers neither party all it wants, it offers each what it wants most, namely freedom and security.

### *The Proposal of Partition*

Before presenting its own plan for a partition of Palestine, the Commission gave brief consideration to another proposed method of dividing Palestine advocated under the name of "cantonization."<sup>83</sup> This plan involved the definition of areas within which Jewish acquisition of land and close settlement would be encouraged, while other areas would be reserved for the Arab population. The cantonization plans generally envisaged the division of Palestine into three zones, a Jewish canton, an Arab canton, and an enclave under direct Mandatory control consisting, on the one hand, of the Christian Holy Places (Jerusalem and Bethlehem) and the Port of Haifa, on the other. The government of each canton would be completely autonomous in such matters as public works, health, education and general administration including control of land sales and immigration; while the central government, which would be the Mandatory, with the advice of representatives of the cantons would retain control over foreign relations, defense, customs, railways, posts, telegraphs, etc. The choice of official languages would be left to each canton.

The Commission analyzed some of the constitutional, administrative, fiscal and defense difficulties involved in cantonization. Its main point was that cantonization did not settle the question of national self-government. The degree of autonomy possible under a cantonization scheme would not satisfy the demands of Arab nationalism, for it would not raise the status of the Palestinians to the level enjoyed, or soon to be enjoyed, in neighboring Arab countries, nor would it give the Jews full freedom to build up the national home, nor offer them the prospect of realizing a Jewish state even on a small scale. "And in the background, still clouding and disturbing the situation

83. Archer Cust, "Cantonization: A Plan for Palestine," *Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society*, Vol. XXIII, p. 206.

from year to year, still intensifying the antagonism between the races, would remain the old uncertainty as to the future destiny of Palestine.”<sup>84</sup> The Commission believed that cantonization presented nearly all the difficulties involved in partition without the one supreme advantage they believed partition would offer, namely, the possibility of a lasting peace.

The Commission did not regard it as its function to work out a detailed scheme of partition; but in order to make their proposal concrete enough to serve as a basis for consideration, they presented a plan together with a map indicating boundaries. According to the plan, Palestine and Trans-Jordan were to be redivided into three regions: 1) A Jewish State, including the coastal region of Palestine from a point midway between Gaza and Jaffa to Megiddo in the Valley of Esdraelon, there turning east to include the Valley of Esdraelon and Galilee to the northern boundaries between Palestine and Syria; 2) An Arab State, which would include all of the rest of Palestine south and east of the Jewish State and also the whole of Trans-Jordan; 3) A British Enclave, under permanent Mandate, which would include Jerusalem and Bethlehem for reasons of Christian tradition and Lydda and Ramleh and a corridor to the sea at Jaffa for military and economic reasons.<sup>85</sup>

In drafting their plan the Commission also had to consider many questions involving great technical difficulties. A new League of Nations Mandate would have to be drafted for the Jerusalem district and the corridor; a treaty would have to be arranged between the Jewish Agency and a body representative of the Palestine and Trans-Jordan Arabs; provisions would have to be made for the protection of minorities in each state; military alliances with Great Britain would have to be made. It was further suggested that Nazareth, the Sea of Galilee, and an area at the head of the Gulf of Aqaba, though territorially separated by considerable distances from the British Enclave, would have to be permanently attached to it; Safed, Tiberias, Acre and Haifa, which fell under the Jewish State, would nevertheless remain temporarily under the British Mandate; Jaffa, though in the Jewish district, was to be

84. *Ibid.*, p. 379.

85. A more detailed description of the partition plan proposed by the Royal Commission is given below, Chap. XV, pp. 1150 ff.

attached to the Arab State, although it would be separated from it by the British corridor and by Jewish territory. In addition, the Arab State, deprived of Jewish revenue and made poorer by the inclusion of poverty-stricken Trans-Jordan, was to receive compensation from both the Jewish State and from the British: from the Jewish State an annual subsidy and from the British Treasury an outright grant of two million pounds. Finally, since, in accordance with this arrangement, a large Arab minority would still remain in the Jewish State, a plan should be made for the transfer of land and the exchange of populations, so as to make the two States, Arab and Jewish, as homogeneous as possible.

Along with the publication of the *Royal Commission Report* on July 7th, the Government issued a White Paper in which it announced the adoption of its recommendations, including that of partition. The White Paper said that the Government had been "driven to the conclusion that there is an irreconcilable conflict between the aspirations of Arabs and Jews in Palestine, that these aspirations cannot be satisfied under the terms of the present Mandate, and that a scheme of partition on the general lines recommended by the Commission represents the best and most hopeful solution of the deadlock."<sup>86</sup> The White Paper stated that pending completion of the details of the partition scheme, in accordance with the recommendation of the Peel Report, steps should be taken to prevent Jewish land purchases in all projected Arab territories and that, furthermore, for the period of August 19, 1937, to March 13, 1938, a "political high level" of 8,000 Jewish immigrants of all categories would be the maximum. One day before the issuance of the White Paper, the Government sent a letter to the League of Nations requesting that the Permanent Mandates Commission be asked to study the Peel Report and submit its observations.

The Peel Report and the Government's White Paper met with a very mixed reception. The Recommendation of Partition intrigued by its novelty and shocked by its directness. The *Royal Commission Report* was hailed on the one hand as "a great State Paper"; and on the other, it was ridiculed as an ab-

86. *Palestine: Statement of Policy by His Majesty's Government in United Kingdom*, Cmd. 5513, July, 1937.

surd concoction of paradoxes. The British Press received it without any great enthusiasm, but with the feeling that it offered some method of finally resolving the conflicting obligations to Arabs and to Jews. But when the issue came up for debate in the House of Lords on July 20th and 21st, the Government found itself subjected to severe attack, particularly from the Labor spokesmen, Lord Snell and Lord Strabolgi (the former Joseph Kenworthy). A devastating analysis came from Viscount (formerly Sir Herbert) Samuel. He pointed out that the proposed Jewish State would contain 225,000 Arabs as against 258,000 Jews, and that the partition proposal implied a compulsory exchange of populations, which the Arabs would not accept. There would be a permanent "pull" by the surrounding Arab States on the Arabs in the Jewish State, which would not be conducive to peace and order. The proposed frontiers would prove almost impossible to defend and the difficulties of administering a partitioned Palestine would be almost insuperable. He said that the partition scheme would have the effect of creating "a Saar and a Polish Corridor and half a dozen Danzigs and Memels in a country the size of Wales," and that the Commission seemed to have gone to the Versailles Treaty and picked out all the most awkward provisions it contained."<sup>87</sup>

No decision could be reached and Winston Churchill, who opposed the Government's recommendation, suggested as a compromise that the Cabinet should seek the approval of the League of Nations before drafting a definitive plan and before submitting it to the House of Commons. This proposal, which left Parliament unpledged, was adopted. The Thirty-Second (Extraordinary) Session of the Permanent Mandates Commission which opened on July 30, 1937, was devoted entirely to Palestine. Before it were the annual reports of Palestine for 1935 and 1936, as well as the report of the Royal Commission and a number of petitions from Arab and Jewish bodies. Mr. Ormsby-Gore was the accredited representative of the British Government during most of the session, and Mr. Hall, Chief Secretary of the Palestine Administration, appeared at other times. Members of the Commission received Jewish and Arab delegations privately during the course of the sessions.

87. Great Britain, *Parliamentary Debates, Lords*, Vol. 106, cols. 599-674, 797-824.

As in the British Parliament, the discussions of the Permanent Mandates Commission revealed a wide difference of opinion as to the validity of the conclusions of the Royal Commission, particularly with reference to the workability of the Mandate and the desirability of the radical solution of partition. Lord Hailey, the British member of the Permanent Mandates Commission, was in favor of the plan, expressing the belief that if a technically sound scheme of partition were presented, its advantages would greatly outweigh the disadvantages which would necessarily remain if the Mandate were continued in its old form. M. Van Asbeck was of the opposite opinion, "that partition would create more difficulties than it would settle."<sup>88</sup> The Chairman, Mr. Orts, believed that partition was in harmony with the spirit of the Covenant of the League of Nations and of the Balfour Declaration and that it took into account the principle of the dual obligation. But he thought that a too early establishment of independent states might be dangerous and might do more harm than good. He suggested the possible establishment of two mandates, for the Jewish State and the Arab State, with varying degrees of independence, and with certain arrangements for relations between them and for international obligations in conformity with the conditions and needs of each State. He added the following special conditions that would need to be fulfilled in the case of the Jewish State:<sup>89</sup>

In order to be in conformity also with the spirit of the Balfour Declaration, it must result in the creation of a Jewish State capable of setting up the Jewish National Home within its frontiers. A territory of the limited size defined in general terms in the Royal Commission's report would not fulfil that condition, particularly if the proposed transfer of the Arab rural population proved to be impracticable. The Chairman was afraid that once again it would be quite illusory to imagine that that population would willingly migrate to Trans-Jordan . . . The worst error of all, the Chairman added, would be to create a Jewish State that could not live, and the worst mistake would be to constitute it in such a form that its creation would mark the end of the effects of the Balfour Declaration, which was confirmed by the mandate.

88. Permanent Mandates Commission, *Minutes of the Thirty-Second (Extraordinary) Session*, Geneva, 1937, p. 195.

89. *Ibid.*, p. 202.

Mr. Rappard warned against a too hasty abandonment of the present form of the Mandate which would make it impossible to revert to the Mandate in case negotiations on partition failed. He was of the opinion that the Royal Commission's chapter on cantonization—concluding with a summary rejection—was based on an inadequate analysis. The practical arguments against cantonization did not impress him; he thought that the question whether partition or cantonization contained more difficulties was debatable. Though he agreed that cantonization would not furnish a permanent solution, he believed that it would prepare for partition, if that plan were finally decided to be the correct one, and yet at the same time it would permit other solutions. The plan of provisional cantonization would satisfy what was common in the view of the various members of the Permanent Mandates Commission. "The essential was that the proposed autonomy should give each element of the population the sense of complete independence in its own house."<sup>90</sup>

Rappard pointed out that the reason given for the unworkability of the Mandate was the opposition to it on the part of the Arabs. Since this opposition was based not on the method of administering the Mandate but on the principle involved in the Balfour Declaration itself, the objection was so fundamental that it could be raised against any scheme which did not repudiate the Balfour Declaration in toto. If the Mandate was being given up because the Arabs objected to it, the conclusion would have to be drawn that the partition scheme would also have to be given up since the Arabs were showing even more violent objection. He pointed out that whatever policy the British Government would choose, it ought to adopt "an attitude of firmness which it had not always adopted in the past administration of the territory."<sup>91</sup>

Count de Penha Garcia, a member of the Permanent Mandates Commission for Portugal, also emphasized the fact that the Mandatory regarded the Arab opposition as the determining factor in the situation and that the Arabs evidently were opposed to any plan that would promote further the development of the Jewish national home. They would be satisfied only by a plan that would keep the existing proportions between the

90. *Ibid.*, p. 203.

91. *Ibid.*, p. 150.

two peoples in Palestine at their present ratio. Theoretically, there were plenty of possible solutions. Although he himself thought that partition would prove extremely difficult and that cantonization was not much better, something could be said for these plans as for every scheme of conciliation which had been put forward. However, he added, "But any and every system would always be exposed to Arab opposition; and until some means was found of eliminating or mitigating that opposition, he saw no way out of the deadlock." <sup>92</sup>

The main points of the preliminary opinion delivered by the Permanent Commission were as follows:<sup>93</sup>

While there were undoubtedly intrinsic difficulties in the application of the Mandate, the fluctuations in British policy in administering the Mandate helped to encourage the Arabs in the belief that by resorting to violence they could succeed in stopping Jewish immigration. In 1936 the Arab insurgents therefore were surprised to find the Mandatory Power authorizing immigration despite the disturbances. The Commission quoted one of its previous statements to the effect that "the capacity of a government to establish peace and concord among those whom it governs is proportionate to its confidence in itself and its policy; and the likelihood of its being obliged to resort to force in order to impose its will is proportionate to the uncertainty of its intentions." <sup>94</sup>

However this may be with reference to the past, one point is quite clear to the Commission. "The present Mandate became almost unworkable once it was publicly declared to be so by a British Royal Commission speaking with a two-fold authority conferred upon it by its impartiality and its unanimity, and by the Government of the Mandatory Power itself." <sup>95</sup> If the partition scheme or any other policy substituted for the Mandate proves impracticable, it is hoped that the Mandatory Power will remember these reflections made on past policy, particularly since it has "recognized, through its accredited representative that the policy of extreme conciliation pursued hitherto toward the two opposing parties has failed of results." <sup>96</sup>

The Commission thinks it worthwhile continuing the examination

92. *Ibid.*, p. 198.

93. This is not a quotation, but a summary.

94. Permanent Mandates Commission, *Minutes of the Seventeenth (Extraordinary) Session*, Geneva, 1930, p. 143.

95. *Minutes of the Thirty-Second Session*, pp. 228-229.

96. The reference is to statements made by Ormsby-Gore at the second and third meeting of the Thirty-Second Session. See *Minutes*, pp. 16, 20.



of the advantages and drawbacks of the new territorial solution. It agrees that it involves sacrifices for both Arabs and Jews and lays down the general principle as follows: "Any solution to prove acceptable should therefore deprive the Arabs of as small a number as possible of the places to which they attach particular value, either because they are their present homes or for reasons of religion. And further, the areas allotted to the Jews should be sufficiently extensive, fertile and well situated from the point of view of communications by sea and land to be capable of intensive economic development and consequently of dense and rapid settlement."<sup>97</sup>

Although committing itself to an examination of the solution involving the partition of Palestine, the Commission is opposed to an idea of immediate creation of two new independent states. It considers a prolongation of the period of apprenticeship essential. Such an apprenticeship might be carried out in one of two forms: a) provisional cantonization; or b) the creation of two new mandates, with the League of Nations deciding the proper moment for self-government of each state, and for admission as members of the League of Nations.

#### *The Reactions of the Jews and the Arabs*

The Zionist Congress and the Council of the Jewish Agency met in the following month. Among the Jews, too, the partition proposal received a varied reception. Extremes met in rejecting it, and those who accepted did so for divers reasons. Some opposed the idea of partition because they would not yield a jot or tittle from their hope of ultimately establishing a Jewish State in the whole area of Palestine. On the other hand, the non-Zionist group rejected the proposal because they were absolutely opposed to the creation of any sort of Jewish State, still believing that the reconstitution of the Jews as a political entity would in some way prejudice their rights as citizens in other countries. Others argued against the small Jewish State on practical grounds, pointing out that under modern conditions such a state would not be economically viable or from a military point of view defensible. On the other hand, there were those who welcomed the idea enthusiastically because for the first time since the Jewish dispersal, a recognition of the Jews to statehood had been explicitly made. Among these were some who thought that the establishment of a Jewish State would improve relations with the Arabs because the Jews

97. *Ibid.*, p. 233.

would have some *quid pro quo* to offer the Arabs in economic relations, defense, etc.

Dr. Weizmann became the leading spokesman for the plan of partition both in the Council of the Jewish Agency and in the Zionist Congress where his support came principally from the General Zionists and the Labor Party. He advocated the partition plan as the lesser evil, emphasizing the fact that the Royal Commission had recommended, in the event of the failure to adopt partition, drastic restrictions on Jewish immigration. He agreed that the partition proposal made by the Royal Commission was unsatisfactory as it stood, but he felt that a small Jewish state would be preferable to a crystallized minority status in a hostile Arab state or federation of states. Using figures supplied by Dr. Ruppin, he argued that by intensive development of the fertile areas assigned to the Jewish State, as many as 100,000 immigrants could be brought to Palestine each year, which would give Jewish Palestine a substantial population of two and a half to three million Jews in the course of twenty years. Mr. Isaac Gruenbaum, a member of the Executive, formulated the choice as follows: "The alternative is either a Jewish majority in a Jewish State, or a Jewish minority in an Arab Palestine."<sup>98</sup> A further advantage of partition, as Dr. Weizmann and other speakers pointed out would be an improvement in Arab-Jewish relations. The establishment of two independent states on opposite sides of the political frontier would give each a status which would enforce mutual consideration and reciprocity.<sup>99</sup>

The opposing view<sup>100</sup> at the Zionist Congress was represented by widely different personalities and groups—the Mizrahi, Hashomer Hatzair, and the State Party.<sup>101</sup> American

98. *Survey of International Affairs, 1936*, p. 545.

99. This was also the view of Lord Peel and his colleagues. The Permanent Mandates Commission, too, while dubious of the partition scheme saw its most positive contribution in its effect on the relations between Arabs and Jews. (See Toynbee, *op. cit.*, p. 545.)

100. Objections to the partition proposal from various Zionist points of view are summarized in the following: Veteran Zionists, *Palestine Undivided*, Tel-Aviv, 1938; Abraham Revusky, *Partition or Zionism*, Zionist Committee for an Undivided Palestine, New York, May, 1938; Herman L. Weisman, *The Future of Palestine*, New York, 1937, the last being a well-documented brochure.

101. The State Party had a program similar to the Revisionists but remained within the Zionist Organization after the Revisionists had seceded in 1935.

Zionists were also strongly represented in the opposition, including Hadassah and leading persons associated with the Mack-Brandeis group and the American Economic Committee for Palestine. The outstanding spokesman against partition at the Zionist Congress was M. M. Ussishkin, who thirty-four years before had led the opposition against Herzl in the matter of the Uganda proposal. He was strongly supported by the rightist groups: by the Mizrahi who believed as Ussishkin did that the basis of the Jewish claim to Palestine rested in the Bible, and by the secular Jewish State Party, which was uncompromising in its political demands. On the left, the Hashomer Hatzair, the extreme wing of the Labor Federation, rejected partition on the ground that it would overemphasize the national aspect of the conflict between Arab and Jew and would obscure the basic class conflict. Partition would thus interfere with the ultimate union of the Jewish and the Arab working classes. The anti-partition groups felt that Weizmann had not properly stated the alternatives; that if determined resistance were offered to all attempts to repudiate the original form of the Mandate, the British Government would be forced to maintain it unaltered.

The resolutions of the Zionist Congress were formulated in such a manner as to allow the less extreme opponents to vote for them and to permit a further investigation of the partition proposal. The resolutions rejected the assertion that the Mandate had proved unworkable and that the aspirations of the Jewish people and of the Arabs of Palestine were irreconcilable. They declared that the particular scheme of partition put forward by the Royal Commission was unacceptable; but they empowered the Executive to enter into negotiations with the British Government for a further exploration of the precise terms on which a Jewish State would be created. The following is the text of the resolutions:<sup>102</sup>

1. The Twentieth Zionist Congress solemnly reaffirms the historic connection of the Jewish people with Palestine and its inalienable right to its homeland.

2. The Congress takes note of the findings of the Palestine Royal Commission with regard to the following fundamental matters: first,

102. Great Britain, *Palestine Partition Commission Report*, Cmd. 5854, London, 1938, pp. 18-19.

that the primary purpose of the Mandate, as expressed in its preamble and in its articles, is to promote the establishment of the Jewish National Home; secondly, that the field in which the Jewish National Home was to be established was understood, at the time of the Balfour Declaration, to be the whole of historic Palestine, including Trans-Jordan; thirdly, that inherent in the Balfour Declaration was the possibility of the evolution of Palestine into a Jewish State; fourthly, that Jewish settlement in Palestine has conferred substantial benefits on the Arab population and has been to the economic advantage of the Arabs as a whole.

3. The Congress rejects the assertion of the Palestine Royal Commission that the Mandate has proved unworkable, and demands its fulfilment. The Congress directs the Executive to resist any infringement of the rights of the Jewish people internationally guaranteed by the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate.

The Congress rejects the conclusion of the Royal Commission that the national aspirations of the Jewish people and of the Arabs of Palestine are irreconcilable. The main obstacle to co-operation and mutual understanding between the two peoples has been the general uncertainty which, as stated in the Report of the Royal Commission, has prevailed in regard to the ultimate intentions of the Mandatory Government, and the vacillating attitude of the Palestine Administration; these have engendered a lack of confidence in the determination and the ability of the Government to implement the Mandate. The Congress reaffirms on this occasion the declarations of previous Congresses expressing the readiness of the Jewish people to reach a peaceful settlement with the Arabs of Palestine, based on the free development of both peoples and the mutual recognition of their respective rights.

4. The Congress condemns the "palliative proposals" put forward by the Royal Commission as a policy for implementing the Mandate, such as curtailment of immigration, fixing of a political high-level in substitution for the principle of economic absorptive capacity, closing of certain parts of the country to Jewish settlement, limitations on the acquisition of land, etc. These proposals are a travesty of the Mandate and a violation of international pledges, and would prove destructive of the future of the National Home.

5. The Congress enters its strongest protest against the decision of His Majesty's Government to fix a political maximum for Jewish immigration of all categories for the next eight months, thus sweeping away the principle of economic absorptive capacity, in violation of Jewish rights and of the undertakings repeatedly given in this regard by His Majesty's Government and confirmed by the League of Nations.

6. The Congress declares that the scheme of partition put forward by the Royal Commission is unacceptable.

7. The Congress empowers the Executive to enter into negotiations with a view to ascertaining the precise terms of His Majesty's Government for the proposed establishment of a Jewish State.

8. In such negotiations the Executive shall not commit either itself or the Zionist Organization, but in the event of the emergence of a definite scheme for the establishment of a Jewish State, such scheme shall be brought before a newly elected Congress for decision.

At the Council of the Jewish Agency, the opposition led by Mr. Felix Warburg was on a different basis.<sup>103</sup> In the Zionist Organization most of those who objected to the partition plan did so because they hoped for a large Jewish state; in the Council of the Jewish Agency the non-Zionists opposed the idea of a Jewish state altogether. They did not wish to emphasize the national aspect of Jewish life: "they were interested in the up-building of Palestine as a place of refuge, as a cultural center for the Jewish people."<sup>104</sup> Dr. J. L. Magnes, President of the Hebrew University, opposed the partition plan largely on the ground that it was against the wishes of the Arabs. He urged the appointment of a joint committee of Zionists and non-Zionists to "negotiate with Great Britain, the Arabs, the League of Nations and the United States of America."<sup>105</sup>

At the Political Committee meeting the resolutions of the Zionist Congress were adopted, the American delegates abstaining from the vote. Before submitting the resolutions to the full Council an attempt was made to achieve a larger degree of accord. The American objections were met by adding a resolution instructing the Executive to request the British Government to convene a conference of Jews and Arabs for the purpose of exploring the possibility of a peaceful settlement on the basis of an undivided Palestine and of the Mandate. The resolution read as follows:<sup>106</sup>

The Council reaffirms the declarations of its previous sessions expressing readiness to reach a peaceful settlement with the Arabs of

103. Maurice J. Karpf, *Partition of Palestine and Its Consequences*, American Jewish Committee, New York, 1938.

104. *Ibid.*, p. 13.

105. *New Judaea*, Vol. XIII, August–September, 1937, p. 234.

106. Toynbee, *op. cit.*, pp. 547–548.

Palestine based on the free development of both the Jewish and Arab peoples and the mutual recognition of their respective rights. It directs the Executive to persevere in its efforts to this end, and, with this object in view, to request His Majesty's Government to convene a conference of the Jews and of the Arabs of Palestine with a view to exploring the possibilities of making a peaceful settlement between Jews and Arabs in and for an undivided Palestine on the basis of the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate.

As far as the Arabs were concerned, it was rumored that Emir Abdullah and the Nashashibi group in Palestine (National Defense Party) were prepared to accept the partition scheme. For the Emir it would have meant a larger kingdom, with the Arab portion of Palestine united to Trans-Jordan. Ragheb Nashashibi hoped that in exchange for his support of the Emir he would obtain a leading position in the new state and thus finally triumph over his Husaini rivals. The leaders of the National Defense Party seceded from the Arab Higher Committee two days before the publication of the Royal Commission Report. The secession was ostensibly on the ground of the arbitrary conduct of business by the Mufti of Jerusalem, but it was regarded in Palestine as a step toward acceptance of the anticipated proposal of partition.<sup>107</sup> It is said that followers of the Nashashibi made the rounds of the cafes to deride the crestfallen Husainis.<sup>108</sup> Emissaries were sent to the villages to herald the impending Arab State headed by King Abdullah I. To win the support of the notoriously jealous inhabitants of Nablus, it was announced that Nablus would be the capital of the new state.

While the Nashashibi faction might have been ready to agree to the partition plan if the Government showed absolute determination to carry it through, it publicly followed the same policy as the coalition of the Arab Higher Committee. Whether for reasons of strategy or of fear, the National Defense Party announced its own rejection of partition on July 21st and Nashashibi explained in *Falastin* that the Emir, who was reported in Reuters to have favored the plan, did not express the views of his party. The Emir himself in a number of obscure statements tried to deny his acceptance of the partition plan

107. *Ibid.*, *op. cit.*, p. 550.

108. Haaretz, *Annual Survey of the Arab Movement*, September 8, 1937.

and found it expedient to postpone the anticipated visit to Nablus, the prospective capital of his proposed kingdom.

The Mufti of Jerusalem and Auni Abdul Hadi were adamant against any concessions to the Jews. To them, any surrender of Arab territory to the Jews would have been unacceptable, and the partition plan involved giving the Jews fertile portions of Palestine. A formal rejection of the Report of the Royal Commission was made by the Arab Higher Committee in a published memorandum to the Permanent Mandates Commission. Unanimously rejecting the Commissioners' scheme of partition, the Arab High Committee announced that the only solution which they could regard as acceptable "must be based on the following principles:"<sup>109</sup>

- (a) the recognition of the right of the Arabs to complete independence in their own land;
- (b) the cessation of the experiment of the Jewish National Home;
- (c) the cessation of the British Mandate and its replacement by a treaty similar to treaties existing between Britain and Iraq, Britain and Egypt, and between France and Syria, creating in Palestine a sovereign State;
- (d) the immediate cessation of all Jewish immigration and of land sales to Jews pending the negotiation and conclusion of the treaty.

Two days after the publication of the Royal Commission's recommendations, the Arab Higher Committee sent an appeal for support and advice to the Arab Moslem leaders throughout the world: to Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Iraq, Trans-Jordan, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, and the Moslem communities in India, Tunisia and Morocco, and to the three Arab rulers already implicated in the affairs of Palestine by virtue of their intervention at the time of the strike in the previous year. Abdullah of Trans-Jordan and Ibn Saud sent cautious and vague replies. But from Iraq the response was unhesitating. The Prime Minister, Sayyid Hikmat Suleiman<sup>110</sup> called upon all Arabs to come to the assistance of the Arabs in Palestine in their opposition to partition. Referring evidently to the Emir of Trans-Jordan, he said, "Any person venturing to agree to act as head of such a state (proposed Arab State) would be regarded as

109. *Palestine Partition Commission Report*, p. 17.

110. He had been brought into office by the coup d'état of Sidki Bakir in 1936; both men were ardent Turkophiles.

an outcast throughout the Arab world and would incur the wrath of Muslims all over the East."<sup>111</sup>

Iraq was indicating a steadily increasing interest in Palestine at this time, with the developing economic ties between the two countries resulting from the oil pipe lines from Kirkuk, the automobile road across the desert from Bagdad, and the free zone in Haifa harbor allotted to trade from Iraq by the commercial agreement concluded in December, 1936. The Iraqi Government was evidently ready and eager to assume leadership of the anti-Zionist movement of the Arabic speaking world. On July 30, 1937, the Iraqi Government dispatched a note to the Secretary General of the League of Nations protesting against the proposals of the Royal Commission, particularly against the partition plan. In this letter it suggested that the Iraqi Government had a right to participate in the determination of Palestinian policy as an *amicus curiae* since it had assumed a moral obligation toward the Palestine Arabs when King Ghazi, together with other Arab rulers, had appealed to them to call off the strike of 1936. Iraq supported the policy of the Arab Higher Committee and suggested that the proportion of the Jewish population in Palestine should be frozen at the existing ratio, maintaining that this would be an adequate fulfilment of the Balfour Declaration.<sup>112</sup>

Early in September, between the 8th and the 10th, a Pan-Arab Congress was held at Bludan in Syria. It was organized by Nabih bey Azmey as President of the Palestine Assistance Committee and attended by five hundred representatives from Syria and neighboring Arab countries. There were 119 members from Palestine, 35 from Trans-Jordan, 75 from Syria, 60 from the Lebanon, 13 from Iraq, 4 from Egypt, and 1 from the Hejaz. No government was officially represented, but the attendance, which included an orthodox Metropolitan, revealed a growing sense of Arab unity. The strong interest of Iraq was indicated by the fact that a former premier, Naji Suwaydi, was chosen president;<sup>113</sup> Mohammed Ali Alubah Pasha, well-known Egyptian Pan-Arab, a Wafdist, former Egyptian Cab-

111. Toynbee, *op. cit.*, p. 551.

112. For an exchange of notes between the governments of Iraq and Great Britain, see *ibid.*, p. 552.

113. *Great Britain and Palestine, 1915-1939*, p. 91, states in a note that the president was Nabih Bey Azmey. This seems to be an error. See Robert Montagne, "Pour la Paix en Palestine," *Politique Étrangère*, Vol. III,



inet Minister, and a collaborator of the Mufti in the Islamic Congress in 1931, was chosen first vice president; and the Druse, Emir Shekib Arslan, head of the Syrio-Palestine Delegation to Geneva, and another collaborator of the Mufti, was the second vice president. In his address, the presiding officer referred to Zionism as "a cancer which ought to be removed from the body politic,"<sup>114</sup> and hinted that unless a policy along the lines of that formulated by the Arab Higher Committee were adopted, the Arab states might sever their connections with the British and French in favor of a new alliance. The reference was to a possible agreement to support Italy in the rivalry in the eastern Mediterranean and Red Sea area. Resolutions were adopted along the following lines:<sup>115</sup>

1. Palestine is Arab and its preservation as such is the duty of every Arab.

2. All offers of peace from the British are to be rejected if they contain a vindication of Jewish political and racial demands. The Jews are to be permitted to live in Palestine only as a minority, with the same rights which minorities possess elsewhere.

3. The Palestine Report is rejected; in particular the proposal for partition.

4. The Palestine question can be solved only if the following steps are taken first: (a) the withdrawal of the Balfour Declaration; (b) the abolition of the Mandate; (c) the signing of a treaty creating an Arab state after the example of Iraq; (d) the immediate prohibition of the sale of land to Jews and of further Jewish immigration; (e) the suspension of arbitrary measures and all restraints on liberty; (f) "The delegates pledge before God, before history, before the Arab nation and before the Islamic peoples to carry on their struggle and their efforts on behalf of the Arab cause in Palestine until it is saved and its sovereignty rests in itself."

5. There were also resolutions calling for more intensive propaganda and for a boycott on Jews as a patriotic duty. The Executive Committee was empowered to impose a boycott on British goods and to ask other Moslem countries to do the same unless Britain altered her policy towards the Arabs.

At its closing session, the Bludan conference sent telegrams to various persons which included Fawzi-ed-Din Kauwakji (the August, 1938, p. 393, and *Survey of International Affairs 1937*, Vol. VI, p. 552.

114. Hanna, *op. cit.*, p. 135.

115. As summarized in Robert Gale Woolbert, "Pan Arabism and the Palestine Problem," in *Foreign Affairs*, January, 1938, pp. 316-317.

leader of the Arab rebellion in Palestine, whom the British had allowed to escape), to Pundit Jawaharal Nehru, and to the Pope. Appeals were made to the world's 400,000,000 Moslems to support their brethren in preserving the sanctity of the Islamic Holy Places. Before and after the conference, protests against the partition of Palestine were organized throughout the Arab and Moslem world. The Syrian Government had addressed a note to the French High Commissioner expressing the condemnation of partition by all parties in Syria; there were mass demonstrations in Bagdad; a one-day strike in the Holy Cities of Arabia; a protest from the Moslem youth of Tunis to the British Consul; and numerous demonstrations in India. After the Bludan conference had dispersed, the Mandatory Administration on a number of occasions found it necessary to prohibit the entry of newspapers into Palestine from Syria, the Lebanon, Egypt and Iraq. When the Woodhead Commission arrived in Palestine to work out the detailed plan of partition, there were additional explosions of anti-British feeling in the neighboring Arab countries. In Palestine the Arab leaders threatened to boycott any Commission sent out to prepare the detailed scheme.

#### *The Abandonment of the Partition Plan*

Soon after the Bluden Conference, the so-called "Arab Rebellion" broke out in Palestine, beginning with the murder in Nazareth on September 26, 1937, of L. Y. Andrews, Acting District Commissioner for Galilee, who was killed together with his police escort. The rebellion abated after the issuance of the White Paper in May 1939, but did not end entirely until the outbreak of the Second World War. The investigation of the partition proposal conducted by the Woodhead Commission was carried on during the height of the Palestine disorders. The Commission had been planned a year earlier when the Peel Report was issued, but there was a delay in sending it on account of the disturbances. The new investigating body reached Palestine at the end of April 1938.

The terms of reference provided that the Commission should recommend boundaries for the proposed Arab and Jewish areas which would: a) afford a reasonable prospect of the eventual establishment, with adequate security, of self-supporting Arab and Jewish states; b) necessitate the inclu-

sion of the fewest possible Arabs and Arab enterprises in the Jewish area and vice versa.<sup>116</sup> The report of the Permanent Mandates Commission to the Council of the League of Nations had also contained a similar instruction.<sup>117</sup> The Royal Commission had stated, "The natural principle for the partition of Palestine is to separate the areas in which the Jews have acquired land and settled from those which are wholly or mainly occupied by Arabs."<sup>118</sup>

The Report of the Commission, published in October, 1938,<sup>119</sup> announced that they had not been able to find any practical plan for partition which would fulfil these terms of reference. The Commission demonstrated that if the Peel proposals were accepted, the Jewish State would have a population of 304,900 Jews and 294,700 Arabs, or an Arab minority of 49 per cent of the population; and secondly, that the Jews would possess only 1,140,200 dunams of land while the Arabs would retain 3,854,700 dunams; that is, the Arabs would have more than three times as much land as the Jews in the Jewish State. In the Arab State there would be only a small number of Jews; it would, therefore, not be possible to arrange a transfer of populations so as to make the Jewish State predominantly Jewish.

Although the Commission regarded the idea of partition as impracticable, it submitted three plans to careful analysis: Plan A, which was the suggestion of the Royal Commission, with boundaries more precisely drawn and adjusted to the defense problem; Plan B, a reduced version of Plan A, eliminating from the Jewish State Galilee and the portion lying south of the Jerusalem Enclave; Plan C, a plan reduced even more, which was favored by two members of the Commission. If any plan was to be chosen, this was regarded as the least objectionable.

The Partition Commission's objections to Plan A were as follows:<sup>120</sup>

1. The Royal Commission Plan was largely based on the assumption that by a process of exchange of land and transfer of populations,

116. *Palestine Partition Commission Report*, p. 249.

117. See above, p. 852.

118. *Royal Commission Report*, p. 382.

119. *Palestine Partition Commission Report*.

120. *Ibid.*, pp. 81 ff.

both States could become fairly homogeneous. However, it was found that the Jews constituted a negligible percentage of the population of the proposed Arab State (7,200 out of a total population of 492,000), and that they held an even smaller proportion of the land (37,000 dunams out of a total of 7,064,900 dunams). On the other hand, Arabs now constituted about 49 per cent of the total population in the proposed Jewish State (294,700 out of 599,600), and they held about 75 per cent of the land (3,855,000 dunams out of a 4,995,000 dunams). A voluntary exchange in the true sense of the word was, therefore, impossible.

2. Even on an optimistic basis it was not likely that many Arabs could be transferred from the Jewish State to the Arab State as a result of improvements in irrigation development and methods of cultivation. Such improvements would be costly and probably could not provide for the settlement of very much more than 50,000 or 60,000 Arabs. The well borings in Beer Sheba thus far did not indicate that this district could support a far larger agricultural population and it was premature to assume that extensive new settlements could be created until further investigations were made. Improvements in the Jordan Valley would also involve large expenditures and take considerable time, and at most could provide for only about 50,000 additional settlers. The southern part of the Beisan Plain might have room for about 4,000 persons through a more economical utilization of water. In the Gaza sub-district, intensive cultivation could be introduced over a considerable area, but the change would have to be a slow one. In the hill country there was no room for any large increase of the Arab population.

3. Even if it were possible to make land available for resettlement on a larger scale than a cautious policy demanded, it was unlikely that the Arabs would be willing to leave their homeland and start life afresh in a new area. The lands which they would be called upon to leave constituted the most fertile and best watered parts of Palestine, while the lands on which they would be invited to settle were situated in arid tracts with scanty and uncertain rainfall. In the Jordan Valley, which had the greatest possibilities of quick colonization, the climate was tropical. The Valley was situated below sea level and in the summer the atmosphere was oppressive. The unfriendly attitude toward the Jews would also make it improbable for the Arab cultivator to migrate.

4. Galilee should not be included in the Jewish State for three reasons: first, the population was almost entirely Arab and the land was almost entirely owned by Arabs; secondly, the Arabs living there were vehemently opposed to the inclusion of Galilee in the Jewish State and would resist such inclusion by force; thirdly, if

Arab resistance were effectively crushed, the pacification would be only temporary and the area would continue to be "a running sore" in the body of the Jewish State.

Plan B, as noted, was an intermediate plan with two main changes: 1) Galilee was taken from the proposed Jewish State and included in a mandated territory; 2) another area, south of the Jerusalem Enclave, was taken from the Jewish State and added to the Arab State. This was strongly favored by one of the Commissioners who made a very detailed note of reservation explaining why he believed this to be the best plan.<sup>121</sup>


The Chairman and one other member of the Commission proposed Plan C, which reduced the projected Jewish State to about 1,250,000 dunams on the coastal area between Zikhron-Jacob and Rehovoth, including Tel-Aviv and its environs. In addition to the Jerusalem-Jaffa Enclave proposed in the Royal Commission's partition plan, Plan C suggested that two other areas should be included in the British mandated territory, on the grounds that it would not be just to assign these regions either to the Jews or to the Arabs. The additional areas included in the British mandated territory were: a) the northern part of Palestine including Haifa, the Haifa Bay Plain, the Plains of Esdraelon, Jezreel and Beisan, the Huleh Basin and the whole of Galilee; and b) the southern part of Palestine, that is, the large undeveloped area in the sub-district of Beer Sheba, usually termed the *Negev*.

The resulting distribution of land, totaling 15,623,000 dunams, and its populations were as follows:<sup>122</sup>

The term "Mandated territories"—applied to the northern and southern territories excluded from the Jewish State—might imply that in these areas the policy of the Jewish national home would be continued. However, as indicated in the following provisions, this was not the Partition Commission's view of the matter.


121. *Ibid.*, see "Note on Reservations" by Sir Alison Russell, pp. 249 ff.

122. The estimate excluded 10,577,000 dunams of desert in the Beer Sheba sub-district and also roads, railways, lakes and rivers.



PALESTINE PARTITION PLAN A, 1938






PALESTINE PARTITION PLAN B, 1938







PALESTINE PARTITION PLAN C, 1938



DISTRIBUTION OF LAND AND POPULATION ACCORDING  
TO PARTITION PLAN C

	<i>Arabs</i>	<i>Jews</i>	<i>Total</i>
<i>Arab State</i>			
Population	444,100	8,900	453,000
Land	7,329,700	63,800	7,393,500
<i>Jewish State</i>			
Population	54,400	226,000	280,400
Land	821,700	436,100	1,257,800
<i>Mandated Territory</i>			
1. Jerusalem-Jaffa Enclave			
Population	211,400	80,100	291,500
Land	1,485,200	78,700	1,563,900
2. Northern Territory			
Population	231,400	77,300	308,700
Land	2,730,500	677,300	3,407,800
3. Southern Territory			
Population	60,000	—	60,000
Land	1,944,500 (?)	55,500	2,000,000
<i>Total Mandated Territories</i>			
Population	502,800	157,400	660,200
Land	6,160,200	811,500	6,971,700

*The Northern Mandated Territory.*

In the Northern Mandated Territory there would be careful control of the transfer of land so that the Jews should not be able to increase their settlements in this district except with ultimate Arab consent. Within this territory—the area corresponding approximately to Galilee—any transfer of land by a non-Jew to a Jew would be prohibited and the transfer of land to any company or corporation would be made only with the prior approval of the administration. This approval would not be given if the purpose of the transfer was to extend the Jewish occupation of Galilee. The prohibition should be reviewed after a period of ten years, but should not be withdrawn or relaxed unless the Mandatory Power and the League of Nations would be satisfied that the Arab opinion of the area was in favor of such withdrawal or relaxation. Jews would not be prohibited from residing in the proscribed area providing they did not acquire land.

There would be no prohibition of the transfer of land to Jews in

the urban area around Haifa or in any other urban area which the Mandatory Government may from time to time declare to be a free area for this purpose. As regards the rest of the territory, the transfer of land should be prohibited except in certain cases. The government might approve the transfer of land to Jews when this was necessary for the consolidation of existing Jewish holdings, for facilitating irrigation of existing holdings, or for the partition of *mushaa* land held in common by Jews and Arabs. Other transfers might also be permitted by the government under favorable circumstances, e.g., when there were possibilities of closer settlement on the land. In such cases, benefits resulting from closer settlement and land improvements should be shared equitably by Jews and Arabs.

*The Southern Mandated Territory.*

The Southern Mandated Territory, including Beer Sheba and the *Negev*, would be divided into two areas, one designated "unoccupied" and the other "occupied." The unoccupied area, which at present is desert and devoid of inhabitants, would be declared a public domain subject to the obligation to compensate tribes or individuals able to satisfy a competent court that they have occupancy rights in this area. The government, if it thought fit, could grant a lease to a Jewish company, properly financed, which would undertake to promote Jewish settlement in the *Negev*. The lease would be free of rent though taxation or royalties would be payable as usual in respect of the land or resources and for any expenses incurred by the government in maintaining communications with the Gulf of Aqaba. Such a lease would enable the Jews to experiment in the development of the unoccupied area of the *Negev*; and also leave the way open for other concessionaires, e.g., mining companies, to develop a part of the public domain under appropriate conditions. If the Jews took advantage of the opportunity offered and were successful, independence might later be granted to this portion of the territory.

In the occupied area now inhabited by tribes, Jews should, for the time being, be prohibited from acquiring land. However, steps should be taken to survey the land and settle the tribes as soon as possible. The government should meanwhile attempt to induce the Arab tribes to permit experiments, e.g., water boring tests, conservation of surface water, the establishment of an experimental dry farming station; it being made clear to the Bedouin that the purpose of the experiment was to improve their condition of life. Once the good-will of the Bedouin tribe was obtained, then the experiments should be taken over by the Jews in accordance with a program approved by the government. If further experimentation indicated that closer settlement of the land was possible, the govern-

ment, in consultation with the Jews and the Arabs, would estimate the quantity of available land. In projected developments local Arab inhabitants should have first claim; when the reasonable needs of the existing inhabitants shall have been met, the prohibition of Jewish acquisition of land should be withdrawn gradually and the Jews permitted to acquire and settle land, subject to government approval.

The Commission discussed the possibility of Bedouin opposition to the facilitation of Jewish settlement in the *Negev*, even if such settlement would promise to be of eventual benefit to them. In that case, the Commission believed that the Government should inform the Bedouins that it would itself undertake the needed development and if they still refused to agree to the Jewish settlement, they should be told that no funds would be available for improving their own lands. However, no compulsory measures should be employed to facilitate Jewish settlement. The political future of the *Negev*, even if settled by Jews, was left uncertain. The Commission expressed the opinion that no independent state should be set up there in opposition to the wishes of the Jewish minority unless it were very small. On the other hand, the area settled by Jews should not be made an independent state if the majority of the Bedouins in Beer Sheba were opposed to that course—assuming that their number and territorial disposition remained the same as at present. In any case, the Commission believed that it was desirable that the Mandate for the whole southern territory should continue for at least a ten year period.

Even this plan—with its reservations and complexities—received the reluctant support of only two of the Commissioners. In essence, the Commission found that no Jewish State could be devised which would include only a small number of Arabs and, at the same time, be large enough to allow for new immigration. In the second place, while it would be possible to organize a Jewish State which would be economically self-supporting, no Palestine Arab State could possibly maintain itself without the help of the Jewish areas. If the Arab State were to be self-supporting, it would therefore have to have a subsidy from the Jewish State—a solution which the Commission rejected as inequitable—or a subvention from the British Government. It calculated that Parliament would have

to provide a large subsidy, as much as £1,250,000 a year, in order to maintain the Arab State and the mandated regions, and that this sum would be quite apart from the cost of defense. Finally it pointed out that economic segregation within Palestine would mean the ruin of agriculture in the Arab State and would also place a severe limitation on industrial and commercial development in the Jewish area.

However, rather than report that it had altogether failed in suggesting a plan, the Commission diffidently suggested a modification of the partition idea. Agreeing that the two states should be organized as separate political units, they advocated withholding fiscal autonomy from them. A Customs Union would have to be an indispensable part of any scheme involving partition and the Union would apply to the Arab and Jewish States and the mandated areas. However, the Customs Service of the whole of Palestine would be administered by the Mandatory Government which would be, in accordance with this plan, in charge of the northern and southern mandated territories.<sup>123</sup> The Commission recognized that their recommendation would deprive the new States of sovereign powers, but they thought that such a plan might possibly be workable if the British Government were prepared to accept a considerable liability. The Commission furthermore recognized that there were political objections to the partition plan which might, in any case, make it unacceptable, but keeping within their terms of reference, they put forward their plan, evidently feeling that it was politically as well as practically unworkable.

Immediately after the publication of the *Palestine Partition Commission Report*, Great Britain issued a White Paper which was presented to Parliament in November, 1938.<sup>124</sup> The partition scheme which the Government had so strongly advocated a year earlier was now rejected as impracticable. The British Government now came back to the well-worn cliché that "the surest foundation of peace and prosperity in Palestine would be an understanding between the Jews and the Arabs."<sup>125</sup> Accordingly, Government declared their intention

123. *Ibid.*, p. 244.

124. Great Britain, *Palestine, Statement by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom*, Cmd. 5893, 1938.

125. *Great Britain and Palestine, 1915-1939*, p. 96.

to invite representatives of the Palestinian Arabs and of the neighboring States to confer with them in London. This conference would consider future policy with special reference to the question of immigration. The Government stated that if the discussions did not produce an agreement within a reasonable time, then they would make a decision of policy themselves and proceed to put it into effect with or without the cooperation of either the Jews or the Arabs. In rejecting the proposal for partition, His Majesty's Government emphasized the practical difficulties involved, but the opposition of the Arabs was undoubtedly the all-important reason for the Government's abandonment of the plan.



## CHAPTER XIII

# THE 1939 WHITE PAPER

## BACKGROUND OF THE MACDONALD WHITE PAPER

### *Disorders During 1937-1938*

THE Woodhead Commission had carried on its investigation of the partition proposal at the height of the Palestine disorders. The Preface of the *Report* stated that "no Arab witnesses came forward to submit evidence to us," and added that, "since our departure from Palestine violence has continued and intensified."<sup>1</sup> The introduction of drastic measures by the Government immediately after the murder of Mr. Andrews at the end of September, 1937, was followed by a temporary lull of violence. However, in mid-October, disorders again broke out accompanied by increasing lawlessness. The new airport at Lydda was burned, the oil pipe line from Mosul to Haifa was seriously damaged, a train was derailed on the line from Haifa to Lydda, attacks were made on Jewish omnibuses, and on October 15th two British constables were killed when a police patrol was ambushed on the Hebron road. Acts of terror were committed not only against government officials and Jews, but also against Arabs who did not fall in with the policy of the Mufti party. There were also signs that the system of *havlakah*, or self-restraint, which the Jews had practised earlier during the disturbances, was beginning to break down under the provocation of intensified Arab violence. In November, Jewish and Arab members of the Jerusalem Municipal Council issued a joint appeal to stop terrorism but with no effect. In December, Arab notables at Tulkarm petitioned the District Commissioner for permission to bear arms against Arab extremists. At the end of the year, four death sentences had been imposed and twenty-one men had been sentenced to imprisonment.

1. *Palestine Partition Commission Report*, Cmd. 5854, London, 1938, pp. 8, 9.

Several of the Arab leaders managed to evade deportation. Jamal Husaini, President of the Arab Party and figurehead for the Mufti, had escaped early. The Mufti himself, fearing arrest, at first secluded himself in the area of the *Haram-esh-Sharif*, then contrived to escape to Syria on October 15th, a day after the resurgence of violence. It was generally believed in Palestine and in the English press that the rebellion in Palestine was controlled and partly financed by the Mufti group in Syria. There was a good deal of feeling on the part of the British that the French—remembering England's attitude on previous occasions when the French had their troubles in Syria—found a certain satisfaction in affording asylum to the Mufti and his friends, and the issue was discussed by the Permanent Mandates Commission at a session in June, 1938. It was generally believed also that the rebels received financial help and arms from the Axis Powers; the arms found on the rebels were partly from stocks left in Trans-Jordan after the First World War, and partly of more recent German manufacture. The Germans and Italians also continued radio propaganda against the British, accusing them of atrocities against the civil population.<sup>2</sup>

During the first six months of 1938, the disorders assumed the form of organized guerrilla warfare. The active rebels probably did not number very many over a thousand at any one time, but it was difficult to subdue them since they worked in small groups, operating from the hill country of Galilee and Samaria. In order to mix more easily with the population in the towns or villages when it became necessary to hide, the Arab command required every loyal Arab townsman to abandon the fez and to replace it by the native *keffieh*. The activities of the bands included attacking Jewish settlements, ambushing military patrols, assassinating Arab *mukhtars* and policemen, mining roads and railway tracks, and sabotaging the Iraq Petroleum Company's pipe line. While the bands undoubtedly included genuine sympathizers with the Arab national cause, they also contained many recruits from the lower elements in the towns who were attracted by the pay and the chance of robbery. The

2. Margret Boveri, *op. cit.*, p. 360; ed., Arnold J. Toynbee, *Survey of International Affairs, 1941*. Vol. I, pp. 415-416; Robert L. Baker, "Invasion on Kilocycles" Chap. VI, *Oil, Blood, and Sand*, Appleton Century, New York, 1942.

rebel forces were also augmented by forced enlistments from the villages which were terrorized and made to contribute money and men. The two principal leaders of the rebellion were Abdul Rahim Haj Ibrahim, who assumed the title of Commander-in-Chief, and Aref Abdul Razzik. Abdul Rahim was regarded as a genuine patriot; Aref Abdul appears to have been a gang leader who served in the national movement because of the opportunities offered for extortion and robbery. Both leaders were in constant touch with the Mufti and the Arab Higher Committee in Syria.

As the terror became more intense in May and June, Jewish guerrilla bands were also organized from among the extremists in the Revisionist party. Although the *Vaad Leumi* and the Jewish Agency issued manifestos condemning the Jewish extremists, the terrorists continued their activities nonetheless. While the official Jewish organizations made very great efforts to condemn the use of violence, the Jewish terrorists received moral support from some Britishers. Early in June, a pamphlet was circulated in Palestine containing a letter from Colonel Wedgwood to the President of the Jewish ex-officers association at Tel-Aviv. Colonel Wedgwood wrote: "I am afraid that merely asking for justice . . . is useless. In my experience, especially in times of difficulty, governments give way only to action . . ." <sup>3</sup>

In July, the British brought reinforcements from Egypt, but the rebels continued to have the better of the situation. The Arab "General Command" established courts for the trial of Arabs accused of disloyalty to the national cause, and large numbers of suspects were abducted, delivered up to the tribunals, and many were subsequently found dead with notes pinned to their clothing stating that they had been executed in accordance with the sentences of the rebel courts. "The object of the rebels in this latest phase was not merely to challenge the authority of the mandatory power but to supersede it." <sup>4</sup> The rebel bands attacked Barclay's Bank at Nablus and escaped with £5,000; and a week later there followed attacks on post-offices and railway stations where sums of money were taken. In August, the rebel bands attempted to take over the southern parts of the country through capture of Hebron and

3. *Survey of International Affairs 1938*, Vol. I, p. 417, n. 1.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 418.

Beer Sheva. By the beginning of October, the civil administration outside of the Jewish areas and the larger towns was almost paralyzed. The most daring exploit of the rebel bands was the occupation of the Old City of Jerusalem. The Government was faced with the problem of difficult street fighting in the narrow places of the Old City and feared also that the damage to mosques in the Old City might release the dangerous forces of religious fanaticism.

After the Munich Pact, at the end of September, the British Government breathed more freely for a moment and sent adequate reinforcements to Palestine from neighboring countries. The total strength of the military forces in Palestine now reached 16,000 men in addition to the Trans-Jordan Frontier Force and the police, whose numbers were also increased by recruits from England and the employment of Jewish supernumeraries. The military and police forces were unified and reorganized, and during October the British gradually obtained the upper hand. The Old City of Jerusalem was systematically occupied, the operation proving relatively simple. This was the turning point. The British were also succeeding in the process of "combing out" the rebels from the hills and villages. Moreover, the rebellion was disintegrating from within as a result of dissension between the leaders of the terrorist activity in Palestine and the Arab Higher Committee in Damascus. Abdul Rahim Haj Ibrahim is reported to have disagreed with the policy of assassinating the moderates of the Nashashibi party. Aref Abdul Razzik, the other leader, was threatening to turn to extortion if he could no longer obtain funds from the Committee. Probably the report that the Woodhead Commission would decide against partition was also a factor in diminishing the violence of the Arab disorders.

Abdul Rahim abandoned his command in January, 1939, and was succeeded by his rival Aref Abdul. The months of December and January were marked by new attempts on the lives of the Arab leaders opposed to the Mufti, and by some acts of retaliation on the part of the Nashashibis against members of the Husaini family. Even after the military authorities gained the upper hand, disorders continued and there were 348 deaths in the first quarter of 1939. Abdul Rahim was shot dead in March, 1939, and Aref Abdul surrendered to the French in April and subsequently managed to escape from in-

ternment. The disturbances ended only with the declaration of war in September. The extent of the terror may be gauged by the fact that the casualties during the year 1938 reached a total of 3,717 as against 246 in the previous year. The figure for 1938 included 69 British, 92 Jewish and 486 Arab civilians, besides 1,138 rebels killed.<sup>5</sup>

The disorders also had serious economic effects. Unemployment rose and the surplus which had been built up in previous years was seriously depleted by the end of 1938. The British Government had to assume full responsibility for the expense of the military forces in Palestine; formerly the excess cost of maintenance outside of the British Isles had been met from Palestinian sources. Despite the deterioration of the economic situation in Palestine, the pressure of Jewish immigration increased because of the severity of anti-Semitism in Germany and the expansion of the Third Reich's control over the neighboring countries. However, the government continued its restrictive measures; in the year from April 1938 to March 1939, only 4,120 persons in the "capitalist" class and 2,300 on the "labor" schedule were permitted to enter Palestine. Notwithstanding the restrictions, the total number of Jews who entered Palestine legally in 1938 rose to 12,868, that is, about two thousand more than in the preceding year. In addition, there was a large illegal immigration, the exact proportions of which remained unknown.

#### *Political Discussions before the London Conference*

During the discussions of partition in Parliament in July 1937, Viscount Samuel, after strongly criticizing the partition scheme, made an alternative proposal designed to reconcile Jewish and Arab claims. This proposal contained features which reappeared in a number of forms during the discussions in the ensuing period. One of the new points in the conception provided for the limitation of immigration over a period of

5. Royal Institute of International Affairs, *Great Britain and Palestine 1915-1939*, p. 103. These figures are based on a report in *The Times* of January 2, 1939. The *Survey of International Affairs 1938*, gives slightly different figures: 77 British, 98 Palestinian members of the security forces, 206 Jewish civilians and 458 Arab civilians. It does not state the number of armed rebels killed. The figures are based on a report of the Administration of Palestine (*Survey of International Affairs 1938*, Vol. I, p. 414).

years during which the Jews would remain a provisional minority. The proposal contained the following six points:<sup>6</sup>

(i) Limitation of immigration to maintain the present balance of population between Jews and Arabs for a period of years, during which the Jewish population should not exceed say 40 per cent of the total population.

(ii) Recognition of Arab national aspirations and the attitude of Islam towards the Holy Places. The ultimate aim of Great Britain should be to build up, with the assent of France and full co-operation of the Zionist movement, a Great Arab Confederation (to include Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Trans-Jordan, Syria, etc.).

(iii) Opening of Trans-Jordan to development and settlement both by Arabs and Jews, with the financial assistance of the British Government (possibly in the form of a guarantee loan).

(iv) A solemn guarantee in perpetuity by the League of Nations of the Holy Places of Islam in Palestine.

(v) Formation of two communal organizations (i.e. an Arab Agency in addition to the existing Jewish Agency). The Arab Agency should have *inter alia* power to prohibit land sales within the Territory.

(vi) A Central Council for Palestine should be set up, not elected and not based on numbers, but representative of the two communities, i.e. a kind of Federal Council with British members acting in an advisory capacity.

In the fall of 1937, Mr. Albert H. Hyamson, formerly head of the Immigration Department in Palestine, and Col. Newcombe, an old friend of T. E. Lawrence's, formulated a "Suggested Basis for Discussion between Jewish and Arab Representatives." Col. Newcombe was one of the founders of the Palestine Information Bureau which was the accredited representative of the Arab Higher Committee until the latter was suppressed in 1936. The plan was reported to have had the support of some influential Arabs and was stated to be the outcome of many discussions that had taken place during the summer of 1937 between Jews, Arabs and Englishmen who were opposed to the partition proposal. Although the document was carefully worded, it was not in legal form and it was emphasized that it was not a proposal as a basis for an agreement

6. Royal Institute of International Affairs, *Great Britain and Palestine, 1915-1939*, p. 88.

but only a draft to initiate discussion. The draft was dated October 9, 1937, and was as follows:

(i) A sovereign independent Palestinian State to be created on 1st January . . . provided that the League of Nations certifies that the population of Palestine is then fit for self-Government.

(ii) Every Palestinian independent of race, religion and nationality shall have equal and complete political and civil rights.

(iii) In the meanwhile Great Britain shall continue to be responsible for the Government of the Country, the Palestine Government giving members of the population, Arabs and Jews, an ever-increasing share in the administration.

(iv) Complete autonomy shall be granted to all communities in communal matters in the widest sense as soon as possible, provided that no community has jurisdiction over members of another community in those matters. A Jewish National Home but not a Jewish State would thereby be provided.

(v) Complete municipal autonomy should be granted as soon as possible to all-Jewish and all-Arab towns, villages and districts.

(vi) The maximum Jewish population of Palestine and later of Trans-Jordan shall not exceed an agreed figure which shall be less than 50% of the total population.

(vii) The interests of the different communities of Palestine after the creation of the independent State shall be watched over by the British Government.

(viii) Great Britain shall retain special rights at Haifa.

(ix) This agreement shall hold for a term of . . . years from . . . and shall be renewable.

The draft was communicated to the Jewish Agency in London and it was also sent to Dr. Magnes in Jerusalem. The latter, in private conversations, brought it to the attention of a Zionist and non-Zionist member of the Executive of the Jewish Agency as a document which had promising possibilities for a Jewish-Arab rapprochement. As a result of these discussions Dr. Magnes was informed, during the month of December, that members of the Jewish Agency would be ready to meet with responsible Arabs of appropriate status to discuss the Hyamson-Newcombe draft. There was a question as to some of the clauses and some doubt as to the degree of support it had from the Arab side. It was emphasized by the Jewish Agency that the purpose of the meeting was purely for clarification, without further commitment. Only after the meeting would it be

possible to determine if there were room for further negotiations. It was also indicated that the meeting was to be considered unofficial and that no publicity should be given to it except by agreement of both sides.

Soon afterwards some notices of the forthcoming negotiations appeared in the Arab press. This led the members of the Jewish Agency to wonder whether the proposals were anything more than a maneuver on the part of the Arabs to draw out the position of the Jewish Agency which they might use for propaganda purposes. Nevertheless, the Jewish Agency continued to express its willingness to attend a meeting with the Arabs for the purposes of clarifying the situation but on the condition that no publicity be given to the meeting by the Arab side. At the same time, information received from London indicated that the Arabs who spoke with authority had never agreed to discuss matters on the basis of the Hyamson-Newcombe draft, which implied the possibility of the Jews constituting close to 50 percent of the total population. It was made clear that the Arabs would not agree to very much more than 35 percent for the ensuing ten or fifteen year period. If Arab-Jewish relations improved, a higher percentage might be considered later, but it was distinctly stated that "the Jews must never form a majority in the country, nor even approximate to parity."

The suspicions of the Jewish Agency that the Arabs had not changed their position essentially were soon confirmed after several meetings (held in the presence of an Englishman) between Dr. Magnes and an authoritative Arab who represented the Mufti, now in Beirut. The Arab representative produced what purported to be an amended draft of the Hyamson-Newcombe proposal. It followed the general form of the original Hyamson-Newcombe document but contained changes in the crucial clauses with reference to immigration and land sales, in addition to other modifications which transformed the whole character of the proposal. The Beirut amendment, as it was named, stated a position identical with that which the Arab Higher Committee had always taken. It was dated January 12, 1938, and read as follows:

(i) A sovereign independent Palestinian State to be created on 1st January. . . .



(ii) Every Palestinian independent of race and religion shall have equal and complete political and civil rights.

(iii) In the meanwhile Great Britain shall continue to be responsible for the Government of the Country, the Palestine Government giving members of the population, Arab and Jews, an ever-increasing share in the administration.

(iv) Complete autonomy shall be granted to all communities in communal matters in the widest sense as soon as possible, provided that no community has jurisdiction over members of another community in those matters.

(v) Complete municipal autonomy should be granted as soon as possible to all-Jewish and all-Arab towns and villages.

(vi) The maximum Jewish population of Palestine should be the present population. All Jews in Palestine on 1st . . . shall be entitled to apply for and receive Palestinian citizenship. During the interim period envisaged, the Arab leaders have not been authorized by Congress or by the Arab Kings to agree either to further Jewish immigration or to further land sales.

(vii) The interests of the different communities of Palestine after the creation of the independent State shall be guaranteed by the British Government.

(viii) The legitimate interests of Great Britain shall be safeguarded.

Dr. Magnes still hoped that something might result once the Arabs and Jews met face to face and he continued to encourage the arrangement of a meeting. The Jewish Agency representatives replied that they saw no hope of any advance. They rejected the Beirut amendment completely and would not for a moment consider it as the basis of discussion, let alone negotiation. Nevertheless, if the Arabs, understanding that the Jewish Agency completely rejected the Beirut proposal still wished to meet with them, they were prepared to do so. In a letter to Dr. Magnes about this time Moshe Shertok, the political secretary of the Jewish Agency, carefully analyzed the divergences between the Hyamson-Newcombe draft and the Beirut amendment. The crucial point was the elimination of clause (vi) and the substitution of an entirely new paragraph which prohibited immigration and land sales. In the original draft there were three points which had offered some hope of an advance on the part of the Arabs toward agreement with the Jews: (1) in the Hyamson-Newcombe draft there was the recognition, even though nominal, of the

Jewish national home; (2) the framework of the agreement was extended to include Trans-Jordan, offering the possibility of Jewish settlement there; (3) it implied the bringing of the Jewish population close to 50 percent in the course of a definite period. Moreover, the elimination of clause (ix) from the Beirut amendment indicated that there was no intention of making an agreement for a specified period which might then by mutual agreement be cancelled, amended or renewed, but that the Arab arrangement of crystallizing the Jews as a permanent minority was for all time.

Despite this abortive attempt to arrange a meeting with representatives of the Arab Higher Committee, Dr. Magnes persisted in his endeavor to reach some understanding and met with a prominent non-Palestinian Arab on February 6, 1938.<sup>7</sup> Dr. Magnes, it appears, indicated to him that in his personal view a practical solution could be obtained on the basis of a ten-year agreement during which the Jewish population would be allowed to become 40 per cent of the population. Dr. Magnes made clear that he was opposed to permanent minority status but that he would be ready to accept provisional or temporary minority status during the ten-year period.<sup>8</sup> As a result of these discussions a proposal was made along the lines indicated in the Beirut amendment with the difference that the crucial clause (vi) was left undetermined. It read: "The maximum Jewish population of Palestine shall be x% until there will be a further agreement between the two peoples."

Whatever may have been the private views of some of the moderate non-Palestinian Arab leaders, in their public expressions they followed the line laid down by the Arab Higher Committee under the Mufti's direction in Beirut. In October, 1938, the Foreign Minister of Iraq, Taufik es-Suwaidi was invited to London to discuss matters connected with Anglo-Iraqi cooperation. England was by this time fully conscious of the danger of a European war and was evidently anxious to remove sources of friction with the Arabs in the Middle East.<sup>9</sup>

7. Probably Nuri Said Pasha of Iraq. An Englishman and a local Arab representative were present at the meeting.

8. His ultimate aim evidently was the Hyamson-Newcombe proposal in accordance with which the Jews would be permitted to become almost one-half of the population. See his article in *Foreign Affairs*, January, 1943, "Toward Peace in Palestine."

9. *Survey of International Affairs 1938*, Vol. I, p. 439.

With reference to Palestine, the Foreign Minister transmitted a plan put forward by Nuri Said to which considerable publicity was given. The plan followed the usual lines of the fixed Arab program and was summarized in *The Times* and *The Daily Telegraph* as follows:<sup>10</sup>

To create an independent State founded upon lines laid down by a constituent assembly.

The British Government gradually to hand over the administration to the national Government within a definite time-limit, as was done in the case of Iraq.

All inhabitants of Palestine, regardless of race or religion, to be guaranteed full political and civic rights.

Every community to have civic rights, and none to be ranked above another.

Full rights of local administration to be granted to all Arabic and Jewish villages and towns in respect of authority, supervision, and administration, but without curtailment of civic rights.

The number of Jewish inhabitants not to be increased above the present level.

All rights to be guaranteed by the British Government.

All legitimate British interests to be secured. The ultimate aim is to develop a treaty-relationship after the model of Iraq.

About the same time, from October 7th to the 11th, there met in Cairo "a World Interparliamentary Congress of Arab and Moslem countries for the Defense of Palestine." The invitations were issued by a committee of Egyptian senators and deputies. Delegates came from Palestine, Egypt, Iraq, Syria and Lebanon, and from Morocco and Yemen, from India and from Moslem settlements in China and in America. It was a more impressive conference than the one that had taken place at Bludan in September of the previous year in a number of respects: the delegates came from a larger number of countries; the appeal was religious as well as on the grounds of Arab nationalism, which had been the single theme of the Bludan conference, and the delegates from countries where there were representative institutions had been chosen by parliamentary groups, while the delegates at the Bludan con-

10. Margret Boveri, *op. cit.*, p. 359; see also *Survey of International Affairs 1938*, Vol. I, p. 439; and *Great Britain and Palestine, 1915-1939*, p. 108.

ference represented either themselves or unofficial organizations.

On the other hand, the Cairo meeting revealed greater differences of opinion than the Bludan conference. All the delegates were united in their opposition to the Mandate and demanded independence for Palestine, but they differed on the place of Palestine in the future Arab world. The representatives from Syria regarded Palestine and Trans-Jordan as provinces of their own country, which had been arbitrarily detached, and looked forward to the reconstitution of "historic Syria." This solution was opposed, on the one hand, by Egypt which regarded Palestine as important for its defense, as the northern bastion of the Suez Canal; and, on the other hand, by Iraq which was anxious to control Palestine for economic reasons, as the commercial outlet on the Mediterranean. The aspirations of Egypt and Iraq were associated with the dynastic ambitions of their ruling houses, but increase of prestige for either the Iraqi or Egyptian dynasty was not looked upon with favor by Ibn Saud. Although delegates had not come from Saudi Arabia, the views of Ibn Saud had to be considered, since he was the outstanding symbol of Arab independence, having achieved rule through the force of his own arms. These conflicts among the Arab states found their reflection in a resolution of Faris Khouri, the leader of the Syrian delegation: that Trans-Jordan and the projected Palestine State should be free to decide on the question of their fusion with Syria. His resolution also provided that the state which would emerge should enter into a treaty alliance with France as well as Great Britain. This suggestion, however, was opposed by the Iraqi delegation on the ground that introduction of France would complicate the problem further and that it would be better to negotiate with Great Britain alone.

The resolutions finally adopted declared "that the Balfour Declaration was null and void *ab initio*; that no further Jewish immigration into Palestine should be permitted; that no form of partition should be accepted; and that Palestine should be maintained in its entirety as an Arab country."<sup>11</sup> The resolutions included the demand for a national government with a representative assembly, a treaty with Great Britain terminating the Mandate, and a general amnesty of political prisoners.

11. *Survey of International Affairs 1938*, Vol. I, p. 442.

The threat which had been made at Bludan was repeated: in the event that these demands were not accepted, the Arab and Moslem peoples throughout the world would be compelled to regard the attitude of the British and the Jews as inimical and they, on their part, would be forced to adopt a similar attitude with its consequences on political, economic and social relations.<sup>12</sup> Three members of the Committee, the President, Mohammed Ali Alubah Pasha from Egypt, Faris bey al-Khouri from Syria, and a member of the Bengal Legislative Assembly were appointed to proceed to London for the purpose of presenting the resolutions to the British Government.

There were other indications of Arab and Moslem solidarity on the issue of Palestine during the closing months of 1938. Soon after the Inter-Parliamentary Congress in Cairo, an Arab Women's Congress met in the same city and passed resolutions similar to those of the men. It was presided over by Madame Sharrawi, the leader of the Egyptian feminist movement; delegates were present from Palestine, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq and Iran. Earlier in the month the Premier of the Punjab, Sir Sikadar Hyat Khan, was reported to have said in a public address that he would rather be shot down than agree to Indian troops being sent to Palestine. The All-India Moslem League at its annual dinner in December passed a resolution which claimed representation for the Moslems of India at the forthcoming conference in London. The resolution warned the British Government that the League was ready, "if justice were not done to the Arabs," to adopt any policy that might be recommended by the Cairo Committee.<sup>13</sup>

On the other hand, within Palestine the British White Paper of November, 1938, announcing the conference, stirred up a revival of party strife between the Nashashibis and the Husainis. It will be remembered that the National Defense Party, headed by Ragheb Bey Nashashibi, had seceded from the Arab Higher Committee in the summer of 1937 on the eve of the partition proposal. During the terror in 1938, the Mufti engaged in a systematic and ruthless plan of extermination of his opponents, and Ragheb Bey fled to Egypt. Fakhri Nashashibi, his cousin and political aid, stayed on to fight: he was a

12. *Ibid.*, p. 442.

13. *Statement of India, Moslem Views on Palestine*, The Arab Center, London, 1939.

former Turkish officer and he surrounded himself with a group of young men who acted as his bodyguard. In the fall of 1938, he issued a scathing denunciation of the Mufti and the terrorist leaders, describing the rebellion as a means of personal aggrandizement. When the White Paper of November 9, 1938, appeared, he addressed a letter to Sir Harold MacMichael, the High Commissioner, in which he welcomed the Mandatory's new proposal and appealed to the Government to show firmness in their decision on the representation of the Palestine Arabs in London. He maintained that many of the party leaders had been compelled to leave Palestine as a result of the terrorist campaign organized by the Husaini faction. He claimed that the moderate elements in the country whom he represented comprised more than half of the Arab population, and constituted 75 percent of the Arab interests.

Fakhri's claim, however, lost a good deal of its strength when Ragheb Bey, the head of the Arab Defense Party, disowned his kinsman's position. Ragheb Bey declared that it was a "chimera to divide the Palestine Arabs into extremists and moderates"—that they were all extremists in opposing the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate. But he, like Fakhri, claimed that his party represented great strength in Palestine and demanded half of the number of the delegates. On the other hand, in Beirut, the exiled Haj Amin al-Husaini endeavored to revive the Arab Higher Committee, claiming that it represented all but a fraction of the Palestine Arabs, and that its decisions should be binding upon all.

### *The London Conferences*

Invitations for the London Conference were sent to Palestine Arabs and to the leading Arab States, including Egypt, Trans-Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Yemen.<sup>14</sup> In the case of the Palestine Arabs, the Government declared that it would re-

14. The personnel of the representatives of the Arab governments included a distinguished array: from Egypt, Prince Mohammed Abdul Moneim, supported by Ali Maher Pasha and Abdul Rachman Bey Azzam, Egyptian Minister in Bagdad; from Saudi Arabia, the Emir Faisal, son of Ibn Saud, supported by the Under-Secretary, Fuad Bey Hamza; from Iraq, Nuri Said, who was later relieved by Taufik Suwaidi, now ex-Foreign Minister; from Trans-Jordan, Tewfiq Pasha Abdul Huda, the Chief Minister, and Emir Abdullah; from the Yemen, Prince Saif al-Islam al-Husain.

fuse to receive the leaders regarded as responsible for the campaign of assassination and violence in Palestine, and it excluded the Mufti on these grounds. However, the practical effects of this reservation were neutralized by liberating the members of the Arab Higher Committee who had been exiled to the Seychelles and permitting them to act as the delegates of the Palestine Arabs in consultation with the Mufti. Thus they put the effective direction of the negotiations on the Arab side into the hands of the Mufti in Syria.

There was much wrangling on the question of the representation of the Nashashibi group. Despite the efforts of the Iraqi Premier, Nuri Said, and of Fuad Bey Hamzah, the Saudi under-secretary for foreign affairs, no agreement between the Nashashibi and the Mufti group could be reached as to the composition of the delegation. Ragheb Bey finally arrived in London at the head of an independent delegation and the onus of reconciling the two groups was shifted from the Arab Government to the Colonial Office. Malcolm MacDonald succeeded on the 9th of February, two days after the beginning of the Conference, in securing a compromise whereby the National Defense Party were to add to the major delegation two members chosen by itself. The nominees for the president were Ragheb Bey, the president of the party, and Yacoub Effendi Faraj, an old and sick man; thus the Nashashibi groups were reduced to a helpless minority.

The Jewish delegation to the Conference could not boast the support of any sovereign state or the decorations of royalty, but it included distinguished Jews from all over the world. The body of negotiators consisted of a permanent nucleus of five chosen by the Jewish Agency from its Executive, and others who were drawn from a wider Conference Committee of leading Jewish personalities, both Zionist and non-Zionist, representing the Jews of the British Empire and of foreign countries. The Conference Committee consisted of Dr. Weizmann and the other members of the Executive: eleven representatives of Palestine organizations; thirteen representatives of Zionist and non-Zionist bodies in Great Britain; two from the United States; and one each from France, Germany, Belgium, Poland, Eastern Europe and South Africa. The delegation was representative of every aspect of Jewish life and thought: non-Zionist leaders who had hitherto shown no interest in Palestine, along with life-long Zionists, industrialists

and labor leaders, orthodox and reform rabbis, a Sephardic leader of Oriental Jewry, a leader of the Jews of Germany, representatives of the democratic countries of the west, and spokesmen of the Jewish masses in Eastern Europe.<sup>15</sup>

The Conference met on February 7, 1939, at St. James' Palace. The opening was inauspicious: the Arabs maintained their refusal to recognize the Jewish Agency or to sit with Jews. Each delegation entered the Palace by a different entrance in order to avoid embarrassing contacts. Mr. Chamberlain's speech of welcome had to be given in duplicate, at 10:30 in the morning to the Arab delegation, and at noon to the Jews. Toward the end of the month when it was evident that no rapprochement could be achieved by this method of separate conferences, the British Government arranged an informal meeting at which representatives of the three major Arab states neighboring on Palestine—Egypt, Iraq and Saudi Arabia—conferred with the Jewish leaders and British ministers. There were two such informal meetings, but no agreement was reached and the two separate conferences continued until their termination on March 17th. The common factor in the negotiations, therefore, was the British delegation.

The first weeks of the Conference were occupied with statements of the Jewish and the Arab case and a discussion of the problem of immigration, land settlements and Legislative Assembly—the major points involved. On the Jewish side, at the formal opening of the Conferences speeches were made—in addition to that by Dr. Weizmann—by Mr. Isaac Ben-Zvi, the Chairman of the Jewish National Council in Palestine, by Rabbi Stephen S. Wise on behalf of the Jews in America, and by the Marquess of Reading as a leading non-Zionist. The Jewish case, presented by Dr. Weizmann, was in the moderate and conciliatory style characteristic of him and in harmony with the long established policy of the Jewish Agency. He based himself on the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate, as interpreted in the Churchill White Paper of 1922 and the Ramsay MacDonald letter of February, 1931. He asked for large-scale Jewish immigration to meet the tragic need of Jewish refugees, but he agreed that this would have to be limited by the principle of economic absorptive capacity. He laid emphasis on the need for an active development of the country's material re-

15. *New Judaea*, February, 1939, p. 95.



sources, its agriculture and its industry, and he indicated the need for effective safeguarding against crystallizing the Jews as a minority in Palestine. He reiterated the Jewish Agency view that the development of the Jewish National Home was compatible with Arab rights in Palestine and with the welfare of the existing population. He recognized the difficulty of Great Britain's position and the military reasons for its desire to conciliate the Arabs. But he expressed doubt whether the policy of "placating one's enemies and letting down one's friends will really do much to advance Britain's interests in the Near East or to restore peace to Palestine."<sup>16</sup> He agreed that it was essential that the British Empire be at peace with the Arab world, but he submitted that a strong Jewish Palestine might be of great value in the defense of the Empire and, in certain circumstances, perhaps of crucial importance. Above all he stressed the Jewish need and he pleaded with the British not to desert the Jews in "this the blackest hour of Jewish history."<sup>17</sup>

As a practical and concise summary of the Jewish claim, he submitted the following demands:

(1) Restoration of the economic absorptive capacity principle, and every legitimate assistance designed to facilitate large-scale Jewish immigration and its absorption. This should include the exploration of the possibility of an international loan for the settlement of Jewish refugees in Palestine.

(2) Assistance to Jewish settlement on the land. Among other measures, we would ask for the placing at our disposal of all substantial areas of land in Palestine now classed by the Government as "uncultivable."

(3) Creation of a permanent and adequate Jewish defense force in Palestine, which would not only ensure the safety of the Jewish settlements, but would also lighten the burden now weighing upon the British Forces, and be of real service to Great Britain in any possible emergency.

The main statement for the Arabs was made by Jamal Efendi al-Husaini. He outlined the Arab case in the usual terms and in its extreme form:<sup>18</sup> that the present form of the Man-

16. From unpublished notes on Dr. Weizmann's statements.

17. *Great Britain and Palestine, 1915-1939*, p. 109.

18. *Survey of International Affairs 1938*, Vol. I, pp. 448-449; Hanna, *op. cit.*, pp. 144-145.

date which recited the Balfour Declaration was incompatible with the promises made to the Arab people in the McMahon pledges two years before publication of the Balfour Declaration, and inconsistent with Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations; the Arabs would never recognize the validity either of the Mandate or the Balfour Declaration, and demanded the explicit cancellation of these undertakings and the establishment of Arab independence in Palestine which the Arabs considered their own land; the Mandate should be replaced by a treaty similar to that concluded between Great Britain and Iraq in 1930, which recognized the right of the Arabs to complete independence and to the establishment of a sovereign state; the attempt to establish a Jewish national home in Palestine must be abandoned, and as an immediate measure, Jewish immigration and the purchase of land by Jews must be prohibited by law. If their policy were adopted the Arabs would on their part, be prepared to make provision in their treaty with Great Britain for safeguarding reasonable British interests, for guaranteeing free access to all Holy Places, and for protecting the legitimate rights of the Jewish minority.

In view of the fact that the McMahon pledge to the Arabs during the First World War played such a large part in the Arab case the British Government decided to refer the question of the correspondence—which had never been published in full—to a sub-committee of English and Arab representatives. The complete correspondence in its original Arabic text with careful translation was made available to the Committee. The report of the Committee was adopted by the Arab and United Kingdom delegations to the Conference on the 17th of March and the complete correspondence was published in an official annotated translation.<sup>19</sup> Despite this painstaking study the British and the Arab representatives continued to disagree on its interpretation.

Although the British Government at this time was obviously anxious to support the Arab position as well as they could, the United Kingdom representatives maintained "that on a proper

19. *Correspondence between Sir Henry McMahon and the Sherif Hussein of Mecca, July 1915–March 1916, Cmd. 5957, 1939, and Report of a Committee Set up to Consider Certain Correspondence between Sir Henry McMahon and The Sherif of Mecca in 1915 and 1916, Cmd. 5974, 1939.*

construction of the Correspondence Palestine was in fact excluded" <sup>20</sup> from the area in which the British had promised to help the Arabs obtain independence. The very best that the British could do in the way of meeting the Arab view was to agree "that the language in which this exclusion was expressed was not so specific and unmistakable as it was thought to be at the time." <sup>21</sup> The British case did not rest exclusively on an analysis of the text of Sir Henry McMahon's letters but also on the reasonableness of the assumptions made. In this connection, besides detailing such matters as the French interest in Syria and Palestine which had relevance to the situation during the First World War, the British representatives also referred to elements in the situation which were permanent factors: that Palestine had a very special position as the Holy Land of three great religions, that it contained a great many buildings and institutions belonging to non-Arabs, that the country was not purely Arab as far as its ethnic constituents were concerned, and that Britain had practical interests in Palestine because of its proximity to Egypt and the Suez Canal, which made a consideration of its future different from the position of other Arab countries.

The Committee also touched on the question of the Hogarth Correspondence and the Balfour Declaration although the terms of reference did not enable it to express an opinion of the proper interpretation of these documents. With reference to the first, it offered the opinion that the Hogarth message implied "that His Majesty's Government were not free to dispose of Palestine without regard for the wishes and interests of the inhabitants of Palestine." <sup>22</sup> As to the Balfour Declaration, their view was that the compatibility of the Declaration with the pledges depended on the meaning given to the Declaration. British representatives on the Committee emphasized the fact that the Balfour Declaration expressly safeguarded the civil and religious rights of the Arabs and added that "this qualification is one of great importance and should have a far-reaching effect on policy." <sup>23</sup>

Although the British Government did not endorse the Arab

20. *Royal Commission Report*, p. 10.

21. *Ibid.*, p. 10.

22. *Survey of International Affairs 1938*, Vol. I, p. 453.

23. *Ibid.*, p. 453.

interpretation of the McMahon pledge, certain trends of thought implicit in the comments of the Lord Chancellor who formulated the view of the United Kingdom representatives appeared to the Jewish Agency as unfavorable to their position. In a letter written on March 28, 1939 to the Secretary of State for the Colonies,<sup>24</sup> it took exception to certain aspects of the report of the Committee, complaining that no opportunity had been given to the Jewish Agency to express its views on a controversy which so vitally affected the Jewish position. The failure to consult the Jewish Agency was all the more surprising in view of the fact that the Committee had gone beyond its terms of reference and made comments on the Balfour Declaration. The Jewish Agency's letter challenged the relevance of the Anglo-Arab investigation to the issue involved and the assumption underlying the Committee's inquiry that the British Government after their military conquest of Palestine were free to dispose of it solely in accordance with their own views. The Jewish Agency contended that the responsibility for Palestine's future had passed to the League of Nations which had subsequently conferred the Mandate on Great Britain to be administered in accordance with definite principles. If this contention were accepted, the Jewish Agency maintained, the Mandate must be considered as having cancelled the validity of earlier declarations which were not consonant with the provisions of the Mandate.

The separate conferences had not brought matters any nearer a solution. The Arab position left no room for compromise since it denied the Jewish historical connection with Palestine, took an absolutely negative stand on the question of immigration and land settlement, and allowed Jews participation in the political life of the country only as a permanent minority. In the effort to obtain some modification of this extreme position, the British Government arranged an informal meeting between the Jews and representatives of the Arab states on February 23rd. The gathering took place in a friendly atmosphere but from the very beginning it was evident that the British Government as well as Arab representatives had in principle accepted the claims of the Palestinian Arabs. Malcolm MacDonald opened the meeting by indicating that His

24. *New Judaea*, April, 1939.

Majesty's Government thought it would be desirable to take two steps: 1) to issue a Declaration terminating the Mandate and establishing an independent Palestinian State allied to Great Britain; 2) as soon as peace was re-established in Palestine, to take definite, practical measures to implement such a Declaration. He said that, in accordance with general opinion, the establishment of the Arab State must be a matter of gradual growth and that in the transition period the British Government would have the last word. During this transition period, it would be necessary to discuss what form of institutions should be set up in the way of Executive and Legislative Councils, etc. Furthermore, it would be necessary to consider constitutional safeguards in order to ensure (a) British authority in matters of vital importance to Britain and British interests, (b) the interest of Palestine as a Holy Land for Moslems, Jews and Christians, and (c) the special rights of the Jews as a minority community in Palestine.

Dr. Weizmann tried to be conciliatory in his reply and expressed his pleasure that the meeting with the Arabs had been arranged. He said that the Jews would be happy to see an independent Palestine provided that there were a preliminary agreement between Jews and Arabs as to their respective rights. He thought that, if the Arabs were willing to cooperate, a constitution which embodied the principle of non-domination by either side could be worked out and that this would be heartily supported by the Jews. He made it clear, however, that the Jews wanted further Jewish immigration and active development of agriculture with due consideration of the interests of the *fellahin*; and the gradual establishment of self-governing institutions through organic growth. He stated that the Jews would be ready to consider detailed proposals on the principle of the independence of Palestine, under a Jewish-Arab agreement and under the principle of non-domination.

The representatives of the Arab States supported the position of the British Government. Although they spoke with greater courtesy than was generally characteristic of the Palestinian Arabs, they took the same stand on the main points. Palestine, to them, was an Arab country and they did not recognize any special Jewish connection with it. Great Britain never had the right to dispose of Palestine; it had no right of conquest as the Arabs had been on the side of Great Britain

during the First World War. Not having any rights of ownership herself, Britain could not transfer such rights to the Jews. The growth of the Jewish community to nearly 400,000 made government difficult since there were differences of language, culture, political and social ideas, but in their desire to find a solution and a way of peace, the Arabs were ready to say that the present Jewish inhabitants of the country were welcome. If there were need for further Jewish immigration, it should be permitted not on the basis of any principle or treaty, but "on its merits," as for example, in Iraq or Egypt. The number of additional immigrants should not be fixed in advance, but given cooperation between Jews and Arabs "the admission of a number of immigrants might be envisaged." Another view was that "the right of Palestine to independence was incompatible with the conception of further immigration."

The Jewish representatives stated that there were a number of common problems with reference to the achievement of peace, economic prosperity, friendly relations between the two peoples, and preservation of British interests, which provided a basis for united action between Arabs and Jews. Ben-Gurion was particularly explicit in his statement that the independence of Palestine would ultimately be achieved by Jewish-Arab agreement and he could continue to live in Palestine only in the faith of such a future Jewish-Arab understanding. At the same time, the Jews took exception to the thesis that the problem of Palestine was simply that of one more Arab country and that its constitution could be discussed on a basis analogous to that which had been worked out in Iraq. Any agreement with the Arabs must be based on a clear understanding that the Jews regarded themselves in Palestine as of right, as a people returning to their national home, and that the only limitation on immigration that they would accept was that there should be no displacement of the existing inhabitants. Moreover, the Jews could never accept the status of a minority in Palestine no matter what their numerical strength. He added that independence in Palestine could not be achieved against the will of either the Jews or the Arabs.

The meeting ended without narrowing the gap between the Jewish and Arab standpoints. On the next day a similar meeting was held in which the British presented a modified proposal along the general lines of the plan previously contem-

plated. The British aimed to establish a single sovereign state in Palestine after a period of transition. The exact constitutional organization of the new state was not outlined, but it was assumed that a numerical preponderance of Arabs would be maintained, and that whatever safeguards might be devised to protect the Jewish minority would not nullify the political predominance of the Arabs. The proposals were evidently made to satisfy the Arab demand for retaining their position as a majority. The Arab representatives nevertheless took exception to the plan on two grounds: the proposed period of transition to self-government was too long; the participation of British representatives in the drafting of the new constitution was not warranted.

The Jewish delegation regarded the British suggestions as closing further discussion, for reasons which they explained in a statement dated the 27th of February.<sup>25</sup>

These suggestions ignore the principles on which the Jewish people have for twenty years co-operated with the Mandatory Power in Palestine. They pass over in expressive silence the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate. They ignore the historical connexion of the Jewish people with Palestine and its internationally established right to reconstitute its National Home in that country. They fail to envisage any further development of the National Home, and, indeed, they do not mention the National Home at all. They ignore the internationally recognized principle that "Jewish immigration should be authorized to the extent allowed by the country's capacity of economic absorption". No safeguards or provisions for the continuance of Jewish immigration are indicated. The Jewish Agency, the body specifically recognized in the Mandate as representing the Jewish people in all matters relating to the National Home, finds no mention. An independent state is to be created, but no guarantee is offered against the Jews being reduced to a permanent minority in Palestine. Even the principle of non-domination of either people by the other is omitted . . .

The suggestion thus constitutes a repudiation by His Majesty's Government of the solemn pledges given to the Jewish people in the Balfour Declaration, reaffirmed by successive British Governments, and endorsed in the Mandate by the League of Nations and the United States of America. This course is suggested at a time when the Jews are suffering unprecedented persecution and hundreds of thousands look to Palestine as their only hope and refuge.

25. *Survey of International Affairs 1938*, Vol. I, p. 456.

Throughout the Conference the Jewish delegates have shown themselves desirous of reaching an agreed settlement, but no settlement can be considered which would place the Jewish National Home under Arab rule, or condemn the Jews to a minority life in Palestine.

Another—the final—version of the British plan was presented on March 15th. During the interval there had been a third informal meeting of representatives of the Jews, the British and the non-Palestinian Arab States in connection with new modifications put forward by the British Government in the hope of making their proposal more acceptable to the Jews. According to press reports, the suggestions made by Great Britain included “the establishment of a Federal State, divided into cantons in such a way as to give the Jews a measure of autonomy in those areas in which they form a majority of the population. Mention was also made of an additional or alternative safeguard in the central legislature, where it might be possible to grant parity of legislative power to the minority on certain reserved topics.”<sup>26</sup> These amendments did not awaken any hopeful response on the part of either side, and the British Government which had announced that failing agreement, it would propose its own solution, proceeded to work out the details of their plan.

On March 13th, a Cabinet Committee approved the Government plan, and on March 15th, the British proposals were formally laid before the two delegations, although it was known in advance that they were unacceptable to them. The new British proposals were more detailed than the suggestions made at the beginning of the conferences but were in essence the same. The plan provided for a Palestine State to be set up after a transitional period. The period suggested for the country's apprenticeship in self-government was ten years, but its length would depend on the success of Arabs and Jews working together in the national institutions which were to be established. There was an implication that the termination of the period of apprenticeship would be made dependent on Jewish consent.<sup>27</sup> The development of self-governing institutions would be gradual and would culminate in a legislature elected by the various communities in proportion to their popu-

26. *Ibid.*, p. 457.

27. *Ibid.*, p. 458.



lation; and the British heads of departments would be replaced by Palestinians. Before the final stage a national assembly would be summoned to draft a constitution for an independent state which would enter into an alliance with Great Britain similar to that existing between the United Kingdom and Iraq. The constitution would provide guarantees for minorities and might establish a federal system of Arab and Jewish cantons. Jewish immigration was to be limited to 75,000 persons for five years, a number calculated to make the Jewish population one-third of the total. This was to be the top figure. The number of immigrants might be lowered if economic absorptive capacity proved less than anticipated. In certain areas purchase of land by Jews would be prohibited; in others it would be limited; in some it would be unrestricted.

The Jewish delegation declined to continue the conversations on this basis, for the provisions were identical with those which they had already rejected. The Arab delegation also objected to the plan in the form proposed. Their main demands were three: 1) immigration and land sale should be stopped immediately and completely; 2) the date of the transitional period should be fixed; 3) it should be made clear that the Jewish minority would not be able to hinder or prolong indefinitely the establishment of a fully independent state. Hostility to the plan was naturally less extreme among the Arabs than the Jews, and the British Government continued to confer with the Governments of Iraq, Egypt and Saudi Arabia. After conversations in Cairo, the three Arab States, with the consent of the Palestinian Arabs, formulated proposals which they sent to London in April, 1939. The Cairo proposals accepted the principle of limited immigration, terminable after five years, as outlined by the British, but advocated more drastic restrictions of purchases of land by Jews. They provided that a ten-year period should elapse before establishment of full independence, and expressed readiness to incorporate safeguards for the Jews as a permanent privileged minority with representation in the Executive and Legislative branches of Government in proportion to their number, and with local municipal administration in districts where the Jews constituted a majority. The Cairo proposals contained the following stipulations: transfer of departments of Government to Palestinian ministers, assisted by British advisers immediately after the

restoration of order; drafting the constitution of the new state at the end of three years; no representation of the Mandatory Power at the Constituent Assembly. The British reply to the Cairo memorandum simply announced the early publication of a definitive policy which had been adopted after the failure of the London conferences.<sup>28</sup>

The London Conference thus came to an end without having achieved an understanding between the Jews and the Arabs, which was supposed to have been its main purpose. The Government had already indicated that if no understanding could be reached they would impose their plan anyhow, and an announcement of its policy was expected immediately after the abandonment of the London Conference. But the German seizure of Bohemia and Moravia, followed by the Italian occupation of Albania turned the attention of the British to the European situation. In the meantime, another plan was being pushed by advocates of communal autonomy and parity and by those who believed in some form of cantonization. It was suggested that Britain and France might unite to promote the creation of a Syro-Palestinian federation, in which a bi-national Palestine or a separate Jewish canton might find a place similar to that of the Maronite community in Lebanon. The proponents of this plan thought that if a united Syria stretching from Turkey to Egypt were set up, the Arabs, freed from their alleged fear of Jewish domination in Palestine, might agree to a growing Jewish national home as a partner in a predominantly Arab federation.<sup>29</sup> The plan, however, did not find favor with the Government, nor for that matter with the French. Moreover, it was not calculated to meet the intransigent demands of the Arabs.

#### *The White Paper of 1939 and Its Provisions*

The new British policy was formulated in a White Paper issued on May 17, 1939.<sup>30</sup> The opening paragraphs of the White

28. *Ibid.*, p. 459.

29. Hanna, *op. cit.*, p. 147. This type of plan was advocated by Viscount Samuel in the House of Lords on July 20, 1937. Another version presented by Sir Arnold Wilson was approved by *The Times*, October 12, 1938, and received editorial support from other papers. (See Hanna, *op. cit.*, p. 194, n. 25.)

30. Great Britain, *Palestine, Statement of Policy*, Cmd. 6019, 1939. Two earlier versions of the White Paper will be found in *Report of the Executive to the XXIst Zionist Congress*, Jerusalem, 1939.

Paper rehearsed the obligations of the Mandatory Power—besides that touching the Holy Places, concerning which there was no dispute—as comprised in three points: 1) securing the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, 2) safeguarding the religious and civil rights of all the inhabitants of Palestine, 3) placing the country under such political, administrative and economic conditions as would secure the development of self-governing institutions. The Government agreed with previous commissions of inquiry that there were ambiguities in former statements of their obligations, particularly with reference to the phrase “a National Home for the Jewish people.” The proposal of partition, the Government alleged, would have clarified the meaning of the various obligations, but this proposed solution was found impracticable. In the present White Paper, His Majesty’s Government proposed to set forth an alternative policy in clear terms. The policy was outlined under the headings: 1) Constitution, 2) Immigration, 3) Land.

### *Constitution*

The White Paper did not contest the view that the expression “a National Home for the Jewish people” may have been understood at the time of its issuance to offer the prospect that in due course Palestine might become a Jewish State or Commonwealth. It was, furthermore, implied that the Zionist leaders were justified in believing that an ultimate Jewish State was not precluded by the terms of the Declaration or the Mandate. But it went on to state that the framers of the Mandate “could not have intended that Palestine should be converted into a Jewish State against the will of the Arab population of the country.”<sup>31</sup> To support this view the White Paper went on to quote from the 1922 (Churchill) Statement of Policy. However, it admitted that the 1922 Statement had not removed doubts and “His Majesty’s Government, therefore, now declare unequivocally that it is not part of their policy that Palestine should become a Jewish State.”<sup>32</sup>

On the other hand, it was pointed out in the White Paper, the British Government did not accept the view continuously put forward by the Arabs that Palestine had been included

31. Great Britain, *Palestine, Statement of Policy*, Cmd. 6019, 1939, p. 3.

32. *Ibid.*, p. 4.

in the area in which an Arab State was to be established. Regretting the misunderstandings that may have arisen through lack of sufficiently clear phrases, the British Government adhered to the view "that the whole of Palestine, west of the Jordan, was excluded from Sir Henry McMahon's pledge and they, therefore, cannot agree that the McMahon correspondence forms a just basis for the claim that Palestine should be converted into an Arab state."<sup>33</sup> Nevertheless, in their view, the whole spirit as well as the specific provisions of the Mandate were opposed to keeping the population of Palestine forever under Mandatory tutelage. His Majesty's Government wished to establish in Palestine as early as possible rights of self-government similar to those exercised by the people of the neighboring countries. While the exact constitutional forms which self-government will eventually take are not to be predicted, the object is ultimate establishment of an independent Palestinian State "in which the two peoples in Palestine, Arabs and Jews, share authority in government in such a way that the essential interests of each are secured."<sup>34</sup>

In the light of these considerations, His Majesty's Government made the following declaration of their intentions regarding the future government of Palestine:<sup>35</sup>

(1) The objective of His Majesty's Government is the establishment within ten years of an independent Palestine State in such treaty relations with the United Kingdom as will provide satisfactorily for the commercial and strategic requirements of both countries in the future. This proposal for the establishment of the Independent State would involve consultation with the Council of the League of Nations with a view to the termination of the Mandate.

(2) The independent State should be one in which Arabs and Jews share in government in such a way as to ensure that the essential interests of each community are safeguarded.

(3) The establishment of the independent State will be preceded by a transitional period throughout which His Majesty's Government will retain responsibility for the government of the country. During the transitional period the people of Palestine will be given an increasing part in the government of their country. Both sections of the population will have an opportunity to participate in the ma-

33. *Ibid.*, p. 5.

34. *Ibid.*, pp. 5-6.

35. *Ibid.*, pp. 6, 7.

chinery of government, and the process will be carried on whether or not they both avail themselves of it.

(4) As soon as peace and order have been sufficiently restored in Palestine steps will be taken to carry out this policy of giving the people of Palestine an increasing part in the government of their country, the objective being to place Palestinians in charge of all the Departments of Government, with the assistance of British advisers and subject to the control of the High Commissioner. With this object in view His Majesty's Government will be prepared immediately to arrange that Palestinians shall be placed in charge of certain Departments, with British advisers. The Palestinian heads of Departments will sit on the Executive Council, which advises the High Commissioner. Arab and Jewish representatives will be invited to serve as heads of Departments approximately in proportion to their respective populations. The number of Palestinians in charge of Departments will be increased as circumstances permit until all heads of Departments are Palestinians, exercising the administrative and advisory functions which are at present performed by British officials. When that stage is reached consideration will be given to the question of converting the Executive Council into a Council of Ministers with a consequential change in the status and functions of the Palestinian heads of Departments.

(5) His Majesty's Government make no proposals at this stage regarding the establishment of an elective legislature. Nevertheless they would regard this as an appropriate constitutional development, and, should public opinion in Palestine hereafter show itself in favour of such a development, they will be prepared, provided that local conditions permit, to establish the necessary machinery.

(6) At the end of five years from the restoration of peace and order, an appropriate body representative of the people of Palestine and of His Majesty's Government will be set up to review the working of the constitutional arrangements during the transitional period and to consider and make recommendations regarding the constitution of the independent Palestine State.

(7) His Majesty's Government will require to be satisfied that in the treaty contemplated by sub-paragraph (1) or in the constitution contemplated by sub-paragraph (6) adequate provision has been made for:—

(a) the security of, and freedom of access to, the Holy Places, and the protection of the interests and property of the various religious bodies.

(b) the protection of the different communities in Palestine in accordance with the obligations of His Majesty's Government to both Arabs and Jews and for the special position in Palestine of the Jewish National Home.

(c) such requirements to meet the strategic situation as may be regarded as necessary by His Majesty's Government in the light of the circumstances then existing.

His Majesty's Government will also require to be satisfied that the interests of certain foreign countries in Palestine, for the preservation of which they are at present responsible, are adequately safeguarded.

(8) His Majesty's Government will do everything in their power to create conditions which will enable the independent Palestine State to come into being within ten years. If, at the end of ten years, it appears to His Majesty's Government that, contrary to their hope, circumstances require the postponement of the establishment of the independent State, they will consult with representatives of the people of Palestine, the Council of the League of Nations and the neighbouring Arab States before deciding on such a postponement. If His Majesty's Government come to the conclusion that postponement is unavoidable, they will invite the co-operation of these parties in framing plans for the future with a view to achieving the desired objective at the earliest possible date.

### *Immigration*

The White Paper admitted that in accordance with the Mandate and the 1922 Statement of Policy, Jewish immigration was to be facilitated insofar as it did not prejudice the economic position of the existing inhabitants. It agreed, furthermore, that the British Government had reaffirmed in the letter of Mr. Ramsay MacDonald to Dr. Weizmann in February, 1931, that "economic absorptive capacity" was to be the *sole* criterion and that this interpretation was supported by resolutions of the Permanent Mandates Commission. Nevertheless, His Majesty's Government did not read these various documents "as implying that the Mandate requires them, for all time and in all circumstances, to facilitate the immigration of Jews into Palestine subject only to consideration of the country's economic absorptive capacity."<sup>36</sup> The White Paper asserted that the British Government could not find anything in the Mandate or in subsequent statements of policy to support the view that immigration continued indefinitely was indispensable for the establishment of the Jewish national home.

It declared further that the bitterness that had developed between the Arabs and the Jews and the lamentable dis-

36. *Ibid.*, pp. 8-9.

turbances through the previous three years had convinced His Majesty's Government that the principle of economic absorptive capacity as the sole criterion was not one which it was possible for them to continue. "The alternatives before His Majesty's Government are either (i) to seek to expand the Jewish National Home indefinitely by immigration, against the strongly expressed will of the Arab people of the country; or (ii) to permit further expansion of the Jewish National Home by immigration only if the Arabs are prepared to acquiesce in it."<sup>37</sup> The former policy, the Government believed, meant rule by force, which, apart from being contrary to the spirit of Article 22 of the Covenant, was not desirable from the point of view of the long range welfare of Palestine. Therefore, His Majesty's Government had decided to adopt the second principle, namely, that after an intermediate period, Jewish immigration was to be permitted only if the Arabs acquiesced. An abrupt and complete stoppage of Jewish immigration, however, would damage the economic system of Palestine, would be unjust to the Jewish national home and would disregard the unhappy plight of a large number of Jews seeking refuge from the European countries. In the light of these considerations, therefore, the Government proposed the following policy:<sup>38</sup>

(1) Jewish immigration during the next five years will be at a rate which, if economic absorptive capacity permits, will bring the Jewish population up to approximately one-third of the total population of the country. Taking into account the expected natural increase of the Arab and Jewish populations, and the number of illegal Jewish immigrants now in the country, this would allow of the admission, as from the beginning of April this year, of some 75,000 immigrants over the next five years. These immigrants would, subject to the criterion of economic absorptive capacity, be admitted as follows:—

(a) For each of the next five years a quota of 10,000 Jewish immigrants will be allowed, on the understanding that a shortage in any one year may be added to the quotas for subsequent years, within the five-year period, if economic absorptive capacity permits.

(b) In addition, as a contribution towards the solution of the Jewish refugee problem, 25,000 refugees will be admitted as soon

37. *Ibid.*, p. 10.

38. *Ibid.*, pp. 10-11.

as the High Commissioner is satisfied that adequate provision for their maintenance is ensured, special consideration being given to refugee children and dependents.

(2) The existing machinery for ascertaining economic absorptive capacity will be retained, and the High Commissioner will have the ultimate responsibility for deciding the limits of economic capacity. Before each periodic decision is taken, Jewish and Arab representatives will be consulted.

(3) After the period of five years no further Jewish immigration will be permitted unless the Arabs of Palestine are prepared to acquiesce in it.

(4) His Majesty's Government are determined to check illegal immigration, and further preventive measures are being adopted. The numbers of any Jewish illegal immigrants who, despite these measures, may succeed in coming into the country and cannot be deported will be deducted from the yearly quotas.

### Land

The Government notes that encouragement of close settlement of Jews on the land was a definite provision in the Mandate subject to the rights and position of the other sections of the population. However, it believes that in certain areas there is no further place for transfer of land to Jews. In view of this the High Commissioner will be given powers to prohibit land transfers as of the date of the 1939 White Paper. These powers will be retained by him throughout the transition period until the establishment of the Palestine Government as planned. The paragraphs on land are brief and may be quoted *in toto*.<sup>39</sup>

The Administration of Palestine is required, under Article 6 of the Mandate, "while ensuring that the rights and position of other sections of the population are not prejudiced," to encourage "close settlement by Jews on the land," and no restriction has been imposed hitherto on the transfer of land from Arabs to Jews. The Reports of several expert Commissions have indicated that, owing to the natural growth of the Arab population and the steady sale in recent years of Arab land to Jews, there is now in certain areas no room for further transfers of Arab land, whilst in some other areas such transfers of land must be restricted if Arab cultivators are to maintain their existing standard of life and a considerable landless Arab population is not soon to be created. In these circumstances, the High

39. *Ibid.*, pp. 11-12.



Commissioner will be given general powers to prohibit and regulate transfers of land. These powers will date from the publication of this statement of policy and the High Commissioner will retain them throughout the transitional period.

The policy of the Government will be directed towards the development of the land and the improvement, where possible, of methods of cultivation. In the light of such development it will be open to the High Commissioner, should he be satisfied that the "rights and position" of the Arab population will be duly preserved, to review and modify any orders passed relating to the prohibition or reservation of the transfer of land.

## REACTIONS TO THE WHITE PAPER

### *Arab and Jewish Rejection*

Despite the fact that the White Paper was practically a complete victory for the Arab delegation, the Palestine Higher Committee directed from Beirut took the position that it was unacceptable. On May 30th, the Arab Higher Committee issued a statement, hostile in attitude, in which objections were taken to the length and indefiniteness of the transitional period proposed in the White Paper. They argued that the Mandatory regime, represented as a period of preparation for self-government, had already been unduly prolonged. Pointing to the Franco-Syrian Treaty of 1936, the Arab leaders demanded that a national government should be instituted at the beginning and not at the end of the transitional period. Moreover, they objected to the presence of the representatives of the Mandatory Power on the constituent body. Nor would they yield in the matters of immigration and land settlement, demanding immediate cessation of Jewish immigration into Palestine and threatening to insist on reviewing the status of every Jew who had been admitted to Palestine since 1918, if any more Jews were permitted to enter. In fine, they demanded acceptance of their position without any qualifications whatsoever. Their statement declared: "The ultimate decision as to the fate of a virile people depends on its own will, not on White or Black Papers. Palestine will be independent within the Arab union and will remain Arab forever."<sup>40</sup>

40. *Survey of International Affairs 1938*, Vol. I, p. 466. On the basis of *Oriente Moderno*, July, 1939, pp. 379-380.

Muhammad Ali Alubah Pasha, as President of the Executive Committee of the Arab Inter-Parliamentary Congress, issued a protest against the White Paper a few days later. He concluded with an appeal to all Arab and Moslem countries to redouble their efforts in support of the Palestine Arabs. The governments of the independent Arab States made no official statements, but on the other hand they let it be known that they did not feel obligated to advise the Arabs of Palestine to collaborate with Great Britain on the basis of the White Paper, in view of the fact that Britain had rejected the counterproposals which had been made at the recent Cairo conference. Only a minority of the Arab political leaders regarded the White Paper as an acceptable compromise. These included the Chief Minister of Trans-Jordan, Tewfiq Pasha Abdul Huda and eight former commanders of rebel bands who circulated a manifesto affirming that the British policy "furnished an acceptable basis for the furtherance of Arab aspirations" and alleging that the Higher Committee were opposing it because they were "serving some foreign interest in consideration of fixed remuneration."<sup>41</sup>

To the Jewish community of Palestine the White Paper came as a great shock. On May 18th, one day after it was issued, demonstrations were held throughout the country and an oath was read in synagogues and public meetings denouncing the White Paper as a treacherous document which would never be accepted by the Jews. The oath appealed to the British people against the decision of the British Government. It declared:<sup>42</sup>

... the Jewish population proclaims before the world that this treacherous policy will not be tolerated. The Jewish population will fight it to the uttermost, and will spare no sacrifice to frustrate and defeat it. No member of the *Yishuv* will have a hand in the creating of any administrative organs based on this Policy, nor will anyone co-operate with it.

The *Yishuv* will neither recognize nor admit any callous restriction of Jewish immigration into its land. No power in the world can

41. *Ibid.*, p. 465.

42. *Jewish Frontier*, Vol. X, October, 1943, p. 14. This issue of the *Jewish Frontier* contains a collection of material on the British and Jewish reaction to the White Paper of 1939.

destroy the natural right of our brethren to enter the ancestral land for the purpose of rebuilding and living within it. The homeless will find their way here, and every Jew in this land will readily welcome them.

The *Yishuv* will not acquiesce in the degree that this country's soil be left barren and desolate. Our land-starved nation will make the soil fruitful again with the sweat of its brow and with its blood, and no power can keep us from it. . . . We are persuaded that the great British people will understand the spirit of our struggle—the struggle of a nation condemned to extinction in its Dispersion and fighting for its existence in its Homeland.

The demonstrations were accompanied by expressions of resentment. In Tel-Aviv, some groups, not exclusively made up of Revisionists, shouted “Down with Weizmann”—“Up Jabotinsky!” In the Jerusalem demonstration British police were stoned and one policeman was killed. At a meeting between Jewish representatives and Lieutenant-General Haining, the latter warned that there would be “no mincing matters” if rioting occurred again, and that if blood were shed, it would be on the heads of the Jews. Ben-Gurion, as Chairman of the Jewish Agency Executives, addressed a written reply to this, in the course of which he said:

We deeply deplore and condemn unreservedly the fatal shooting of a British constable. With all due deference I must, however, take exception to your statement this morning that the blood which may be shed will be on the heads of the Jews. . . . The Jewish demonstration of yesterday marked the beginning of Jewish resistance to the disastrous policy now proposed by His Majesty's Government. The Jews will not be intimidated into surrender even if their blood be shed. In our submission the responsibility for what may occur in this country in the course of enforcing the new policy will rest entirely on the Government.

In this letter and in a statement issued by him on the same day, analyzing the White Paper,<sup>43</sup> Ben-Gurion gave expression to a feeling developing in the *Yishuv* that the new British policy should be resisted by the Jews with all means at their command. The statement by the Jewish Agency for Palestine,

43. *Ibid.*, pp. 54 ff.

though couched in more formal terms, also indicated a trend toward resistance. The statement declared in part:<sup>44</sup>

The Jewish people regard this policy as a breach of faith and a surrender to Arab terrorism. . . . It is a policy in which the Jewish people will not acquiesce. The new regime now announced will be devoid of any moral basis and contrary to international law. Such a regime can only be established and maintained by force. . . . It seems only too probable that the Jews would fight rather than submit to Arab rule. And repressing a Jewish rebellion against British policy would be as unpleasant a task as the repression of the Arab rebellion has been.

The Jewish people have no quarrel with the Arab people. Jewish work in Palestine has not had an adverse effect upon the life and progress of the Arab people. The Arabs are not landless or homeless as are the Jews. They are not in need of emigration. Jewish colonization has benefited Palestine and all its inhabitants . . . The Jewish people has shown its will to peace even during the years of disturbances. It has not given way to temptation and has not retaliated to Arab violence. But neither have the Jews submitted to terror nor will they submit to it even after the Mandatory has decided to reward the terrorists by surrendering the Jewish National Home.

It is in the darkest hour of Jewish history that the British Government proposes to deprive the Jews of their last hope and to close the road back to their Homeland. This blow will not subdue the Jewish people. The historic bond between the people and the land of Israel cannot be broken. The Jews will never accept the closing to them of the gates of Palestine nor let their national home be converted into a ghetto.

The authoritative exposition of the Jewish case was presented in a letter addressed on May 31, 1939, by Dr. Weizmann to the High Commissioner for Palestine, with the request that its representations be forwarded to the Permanent Mandates Commission. He pointed out that the Palestine Mandate was unique, and was so intended to be; while the mandates for Syria and Iraq had as their primary purpose the independence of these countries, in the mandate for Palestine, as the Royal Commission had said, "the primary purpose of the Mandate, as expressed in its Preamble and its Articles, is the establishment of the Jewish National Home." Dr. Weizmann

44. *Ibid.*, p. 13.

submitted that it was reasonable to argue that the Palestine Mandate could not be properly terminated until the Jewish national home was firmly established. He proceeded to explain what might be regarded as a fulfillment of the Mandatory's obligation with respect to the establishment of the Jewish National Home:<sup>45</sup>

. . . If the Jewish Agency be asked what, in its view, is the test as to whether the Jewish National Home has been established, its answer would be that the Jewish National Home can only be regarded as established when its growth and development can securely continue without the assistance of the Mandatory. This was, indeed, the approach of the Royal Commission to the problem of the termination of the Mandate, when it sought a solution of two independent States. His Majesty's Government, in accepting the Royal Commission's recommendations, showed its understanding of the necessity for securing the fulfillment of the original purpose of the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate, and for providing for the further growth of the National Home, by indicating the following three advantages of the scheme from that point of view: (i) The Jewish National Home would be freed from the possibility of ever being subjected to Arab rule; (ii) The Jews would cease to lead a minority life; (iii) The Jewish National Home would become a Jewish State with full control over immigration. The present scheme nullifies all these objectives. It subjects the Jewish National Home to Arab rule; it perpetuates the Jewish minority position; it places Jewish immigration at the mercy of the Arabs. In short, it envisages the termination of the Mandate by jettisoning its primary purpose.

Continuing his analysis, he defined the essence of the Jewish national home to be the possibility of Jews entering into Palestine as of right and not on sufferance.

The Jewish Agency submits that it is of the essence of the conception of the National Home that it should be a place to which the Jews can come back, provided that objective considerations permit their return. A "National Home for the Jewish people" loses its meaning the moment that the entry of Jews is forbidden save with the permission of the Arabs. The test of the Jewish National Home must therefore be the effective possibility for any Jew who is able to settle in it without causing injury to others, to do so as a matter of right. The emphasis placed by the White Paper of 1922 on the fact that the Jews are in Palestine "as of right" obviously extends to

45. Jewish Agency for Palestine, *The Jewish Case against the Palestine White Paper*, London, 1939, pp. 9 ff.

their right of entry. This is fully recognised by the insistence in that White Paper that "for the fulfillment of this policy it is necessary that the Jewish community in Palestine should be able to increase its numbers by immigration." But the present Statement of Policy, while apparently admitting that the present Jews of Palestine are there as of right, proceeds immediately to deny the right of entry to Jews who are not yet there. It thereby undermines the basis of the right of the existing Jewish population, and shatters the whole conception of the Jewish National Home.

Contesting the view expressed by MacDonald, that the White Paper of 1939 might be considered a minimum fulfillment of the Mandatory's obligation to the Jews, he pointed out that the present document left out altogether the principle of the historic connection of the Jewish people with Palestine, which was an integral part of the Palestine Mandate. Likewise, the White Paper omitted other positive obligations imposed on the Mandatory, notably the recognition of the Hebrew language as an official language of the country and the recognition of the Jewish Agency as the body representing the Jewish people in matters affecting the interests of the Jewish national home. The trend of the new policy was "to whittle down the status of the Jewish people by limiting Jewish rights in regard to Palestine to those of the existing Jewish people of the country." Indeed the White Paper went further: while containing no provision for consultation with representatives of the Jewish people as a whole, it recognized the representatives of the neighboring Arab States as parties who were to be consulted in the future disposition of Palestine.

The intent of the White Paper was in every way contradictory to the principles underlying the Mandate. The Mandate, designed as an instrument for facilitating the development of the Jewish national home, was converted by the White Paper into a means of arresting that development and establishing the Arab majority in supreme rule. The application of the White Paper would subject the Jews against their will to the authority of an Arab State: the Arabs would permanently outnumber the Jews two to one, and as experience on minority guarantees had made clear, constitutional safeguards of minority rights were inadequate when the majority in power chose to disregard them. The Jews were being relegated to that minority status from which it

had been the object of the Zionist Movement, the Balfour Declaration, the Mandate, and the British Government's policy in the partition proposal to redeem them. Dr. Weizmann further pointed out that the proposals relating to the transfer of land and immigration necessitated the introduction of measures of discrimination between Jews and non-Jews, in flagrant violation of Article 15 of the Mandate, which provided that: "No discrimination of any kind shall be made between the inhabitants of Palestine on the ground of race, religion or language. No person shall be excluded from Palestine on the sole ground of his religious belief."

In his concluding paragraphs, Dr. Weizmann made a reference to the Government's argument that the continued application of the mandatory obligations would necessitate the use of force. He drew attention to the possible need of even greater and less warranted use of force if the Government would persist in carrying out its new policy.<sup>46</sup>

The practical reason given in paragraph 13 of the White Paper for this liquidation of mandatory obligations is that their continued operation would necessitate the use of force, to which His Majesty's Government object; they will relinquish rather than enforce mandatory obligations. But His Majesty's Government can hardly have overlooked the fact that this conclusion represents the triumph of force. In the light of the experience of the last three years, it must appear to the Arab terrorists as a premium on their campaign of violence, and to the Jews as a penalty on their self-restraint. Further, if the exercise of such force as may be indispensable for the discharge of mandatory obligations appears to His Majesty's Government to be so objectionable that those obligations have to be abandoned, they will no doubt be aware of the far-reaching implications of this attitude as regards their whole position in Palestine. As British authority is founded on the Mandate conferred upon and accepted by Great Britain on the basis of certain obligations, the repudiation of those obligations deprives British rule in Palestine of its moral justification. Even so, as continued British rule in Palestine is challenged by Arab leaders, it will involve the use of force. Force has, moreover, been used to prevent Jews entering Palestine; it may have to be used on an even greater scale in the future if the policy outlined in the White Paper is to be carried out in full. If it is the case that the use of force is inescapable, whatever course His Majesty's Government propose to steer, the Jewish Agency would submit

46. *Ibid.*, pp. 12-13.

that it is the justice of the obligation undertaken and the injustice resulting from their abrogation, that should decide the issue, and the Agency cannot agree that what was just when the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate were issued, has become unjust today.

### *Opposition in Parliament*

In Great Britain, the White Paper was met with a lack of confidence on many sides. The report of the Royal Commission which had so convincingly stated the case of the incompatibility of Arab and Jewish aspirations, had an effect which could not easily be thrown off. The press criticized the reversal of the Government's attitude and questioned the new effort to create a unitary state out of the antagonistic elements. The Government's proposals were subjected to sharp attack in both Houses of Parliament by leading statesmen who had been in contact with the Palestine problem since its inception. In the House of Commons, Leopold Amery<sup>47</sup> declared that the White Paper was "a direct negation of the principles on which our administration in Palestine has been based, and, in my view at any rate, a repudiation of the pledges on the strength of which the Government of Palestine was entrusted to our hands."<sup>48</sup> The White Paper was nothing else than a confession of failure and an act of appeasement. Its watchword was "'Appease the Arabs,' appease the Mufti. Appease them at all costs."<sup>49</sup> The White Paper was a "panic scheme" which would not work out in the end. The Jews of Palestine would not brook it: they were not, like the Jews of Germany, a helpless, hopeless minority, but a formidable body of people. They had drawn the breath of freedom and they meant to remain free. They were not going to let themselves be relegated to a position of a statutory minority. They were not going to be denied the hope of giving refuge and relief to their tortured kinsfolk in other lands, and they would not wait passively until in due course they and the land they created were to be handed over to the terrorist control of the Mufti.

Herbert Morrison, member of the Cabinet and one of the

47. He had been a member of the War Cabinet which adopted the Balfour Declaration, Under-Secretary for the Colonies (1919-1921), and Secretary of State for the Colonies (1924-1929).

48. *Parliamentary Debates, Commons*, Vol. 347, col. 201, May 22, 1939.

49. *Ibid.*, col. 2021.



leading figures in the British Labor Party, accused the Government of running away from the problem of Palestine and trying to solve a complex situation by wishful thinking. He said he was weary of listening to the Secretary of State, Malcolm MacDonald, and to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Richard Butler, who were always saying to the Arabs and the Jews, "Be friends, live together in harmony," just as they had said it to the Franco adherents and to Republicans in Spain. It was not enough to wish that things would get better. The Government lacked the statesmanship to create the social, economic and political conditions necessary to make cooperation successful. They had not even succeeded in effectively repressing disorder.

The Government knew full well, Morrison went on to say, that the trouble in Palestine was created by a minority of certain classes of the Arabs assisted by agents of Hitler and Mussolini, and that it had begun in the days when the Prime Minister (Neville Chamberlain) entertained a particular friendship for these gentlemen. The Government had finally plucked up enough courage to send out an army and to restore order. Now the Government proposed to run away from the problem again. If the situation were properly handled, the Government would not need a great British force in Palestine: it could have the cooperation of the Jews and a large number of the Arabs in maintaining order in Palestine. There were people willing to train themselves to fight for the defense, order and security of their country. A widespread impression had been created "that the way to make the British lion run is to make disorder, to murder, to ambush and to assassinate." Moreover, it was not fair to blame the whole matter on the Arabs: the Government should have given due credit to Herr Hitler and Signor Mussolini for the part they had played.

The White Paper meant that the sole arbiters as to the degree and extent of Jewish immigration into Palestine were to be the Arabs, strongly under the influence of Axis agents. The White Paper policy was a cynical breach of pledges given to the Jews and to the world. His own party as a minority could not prevent the approval of the White Paper, and he appealed to the members of the opposite side of the House "to stop this evil thing being done."<sup>50</sup>

. . . I ask them to remember the sufferings of these Jewish people all over the world. I ask them to remember that Palestine, of all places in the world, was certainly the place where they had some right to expect not to suffer or to have restrictions imposed upon them. Look at the extent of the country—this little patch of territory. Transjordan has been taken away. The rest of the Arabian countries released from Turkish rule as a result of the War have an enormous area. This tiny patch, Palestine, about the size of Wales, is left, and we are to stop these people from going there. I appeal to honourable Members opposite to take their courage in both hands, to put the honour of their country before the narrow claims of party, and to bring to bear all the pressure they can, all the influence they can, to prevent His Majesty's Government from doing this thing that they ought not to do.

Winston Churchill attacked the White Paper in one of the most brilliant speeches of his career:<sup>51</sup>

I say quite frankly that I find this a melancholy occasion. Like my right honourable Friend the Member for Sparkbrook (Mr. Amery), I feel bound to vote against the proposals of His Majesty's Government. As one intimately and responsibly concerned in the earlier stages of our Palestine policy, I could not stand by and see solemn engagements into which Britain has entered before the world set aside for reasons of administrative convenience or—and it will be a vain hope—for the sake of a quiet life. Like my right honourable Friend, I should feel personally embarrassed in the most acute manner if I lent myself, by silence or inaction, to what I must regard as an act of repudiation. I can understand others take a different view. There are many views which may be taken. Some may consider themselves less involved in the declarations of former Governments. Some may feel that the burden of keeping faith weighs upon them rather oppressively. Some may be pro-Arab and some may be anti-Semite. None of these motives offers me any means of escape because I was from the beginning a sincere advocate of the Balfour Declaration, and I have made repeated public statements to that effect.

It is often supposed that the Balfour Declaration was an ill-considered, sentimental act largely concerned with the right honourable Member for Carnarvon Boroughs (Mr. Lloyd George), for which the Conservative party had no real responsibility, and that, as the Secretary of State said yesterday, it was a thing done in the tumult of the War. But hardly any step was taken with greater deliberation and responsibility. I was glad to hear the account which my right

51. *Ibid.*, cols. 2168–2169.

honourable Friend the Member for Sparkbrook gave, derived from the days when he was working in the Secretariat of the War Cabinet, of the care and pains with which the whole field was explored at that time. Not only did the War Cabinet of those days take the decision, but all Cabinets of every party after the War, after examining it in the varying circumstances which have arisen, have endorsed the decision and taken the fullest responsibility for it. It was also endorsed in the most cordial and enthusiastic terms by many of the ablest Conservative Private Members who came into the House when a great Conservative majority arrived after the General Election at the end of 1918. It was endorsed from the very beginning by my right honourable Friend the Prime Minister (Mr. Neville Chamberlain).

Churchill also called on other members of the present Government who were beginning their political careers during the period of the First World War and had at the time cordially welcomed the historic declaration made on the 2nd of November. He declared that the Zionists had a right to look to the Prime Minister and to these men to stand by them in the days of their power. He pointed out that while he had not been a member of the War Cabinet in the days when the pledge was given, for he was then serving as one of the Secretaries of State, he had found himself wholly in agreement with the sentiments of Chamberlain and his friends when they sent in their memorial of support for the Declaration. Then he went on to explain the true meaning of the 1922 White Paper which he had issued as Secretary of the Colonies, and on which the White Paper of 1939 sought to found its argument.<sup>52</sup>

. . . I stand by every word in those lengthy quotations which have been made from what I wrote. I would not alter a sentence after the sixteen years that have passed, but I must say I think it rather misleading to quote so extensively from one part of the dispatch without indicating what was its main purpose. The particular paragraph quoted would do little to cool down the ardour of the Zionists and little to reassure the apprehensions of the Arabs. The main purpose of the dispatch was clear. This is what I said in paragraph (1): "His Majesty's Government have no intention of repudiating the obligations into which they have entered towards the Jewish people." I then proceeded to say that the Government would refuse to discuss

52. *Ibid.*, col. 2170.

the future of Palestine on any basis other than the basis of the Balfour Declaration. Moreover, the whole tenor of the dispatch was to make it clear that the establishment of self-governing institutions in Palestine was subordinated to the paramount pledge and obligation of establishing a Jewish National Home in Palestine. In taking up this position on behalf of the Government of the day I really was not going any further than the views which were ardently expressed by some of the ablest and most promising of our backbenches at that time. The fact that they are leading Ministers today should, I think, have gained for the problem of Palestine a more considered and more sympathetic treatment than it has received.

Finally he came "to the gravamen of the case": the decision to stop immigration after five years' time and make its continuation subject to the will of the Arab majority. This constituted a plain "breach and repudiation of the Balfour Declaration." It was a unilateral denunciation of a pledge made not only to the Jews of Palestine but to the whole Jewish people. He agreed that a distinction should be drawn between the establishment of a Jewish national home in Palestine and making Palestine a Jewish national home, and he indicated that he was the first to draw this distinction. But the idea of a Jewish national home in Palestine was reduced to a meaningless absurdity unless the Jews were allowed to resort to their home in case of need. "What sort of National Home is offered to the Jews of the world when we are asked to declare that in five years' time the door of that home is to be shut and barred in their faces?" Like Amery, he urged that the views of the Permanent Mandates Commission be taken into consideration before Parliament voted on the Government's proposals. In one of his concluding paragraphs he said:<sup>53</sup>

I cannot understand why this course has been taken. I search around for the answer. The first question one would ask oneself is foreshadowed in a reference made in the speech of my honourable Friend, and is this: Is our condition so parlous and our state so poor that we must, in our weakness, make this sacrifice of our declared purpose? Although I have been very anxious that we should strengthen our armaments and spread our alliances and so increase the force of our position, I must say that I have not taken such a low view of the strength of the British Empire or of the very many powerful coun-

53. *Ibid.*, col. 2175.

honourable Friend the Member for Sparkbrook gave, derived from the days when he was working in the Secretariat of the War Cabinet, of the care and pains with which the whole field was explored at that time. Not only did the War Cabinet of those days take the decision, but all Cabinets of every party after the War, after examining it in the varying circumstances which have arisen, have endorsed the decision and taken the fullest responsibility for it. It was also endorsed in the most cordial and enthusiastic terms by many of the ablest Conservative Private Members who came into the House when a great Conservative majority arrived after the General Election at the end of 1918. It was endorsed from the very beginning by my right honourable Friend the Prime Minister (Mr. Neville Chamberlain).

Churchill also called on other members of the present Government who were beginning their political careers during the period of the First World War and had at the time cordially welcomed the historic declaration made on the 2nd of November. He declared that the Zionists had a right to look to the Prime Minister and to these men to stand by them in the days of their power. He pointed out that while he had not been a member of the War Cabinet in the days when the pledge was given, for he was then serving as one of the Secretaries of State, he had found himself wholly in agreement with the sentiments of Chamberlain and his friends when they sent in their memorial of support for the Declaration. Then he went on to explain the true meaning of the 1922 White Paper which he had issued as Secretary of the Colonies, and on which the White Paper of 1939 sought to found its argument.<sup>52</sup>

. . . I stand by every word in those lengthy quotations which have been made from what I wrote. I would not alter a sentence after the sixteen years that have passed, but I must say I think it rather misleading to quote so extensively from one part of the dispatch without indicating what was its main purpose. The particular paragraph quoted would do little to cool down the ardour of the Zionists and little to reassure the apprehensions of the Arabs. The main purpose of the dispatch was clear. This is what I said in paragraph (1): "His Majesty's Government have no intention of repudiating the obligations into which they have entered towards the Jewish people." I then proceeded to say that the Government would refuse to discuss

52. *Ibid.*, col. 2170.

the future of Palestine on any basis other than the basis of the Balfour Declaration. Moreover, the whole tenor of the dispatch was to make it clear that the establishment of self-governing institutions in Palestine was subordinated to the paramount pledge and obligation of establishing a Jewish National Home in Palestine. In taking up this position on behalf of the Government of the day I really was not going any further than the views which were ardently expressed by some of the ablest and most promising of our backbenches at that time. The fact that they are leading Ministers today should, I think, have gained for the problem of Palestine a more considered and more sympathetic treatment than it has received.

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53. *Ibid.*, col. 2175.

tries who desire to walk in association with us; but if the Government, with their superior knowledge of the deficiencies in our armaments which have arisen during their stewardship, really feel that we are too weak to carry out our obligations and wish to file a petition in moral and physical bankruptcy, that is an argument which, however ignominious, should certainly weigh with the House in these dangerous times. But is it true? I do not believe it is true. I cannot believe that the task to which we set our hand twenty years ago in Palestine is beyond our strength, or that faithful perseverance will not, in the end, bring that task to a glorious success . . .

The Labor Party attempted to move an amendment declaring the Statement of Policy contrary to the Mandate. It sought to leave Parliament uncommitted pending action by the League of Nations. This resolution secured 181 votes, including those of Winston Churchill, Leopold Amery and some twenty other regular supporters of the Government.<sup>54</sup> At its annual conference held in Southport in May, 1939, the British Labor Party endorsed the stand taken by its representatives in Parliament against the White Paper. The resolution declared that:<sup>55</sup>

. . . the White Paper, by imposing minority status on the Jews, by departing from the principles of economic absorptive capacity governing Jewish immigration, by making Jewish entry dependent on Arab consent, and by restricting Jewish land settlement, violates the solemn pledges contained in the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate. The policy of the White Paper represents a further surrender to aggression, places a premium on violence and terror, and is a setback to the progressive forces among both Arabs and Jews. It also imposes new and intolerable restrictions on Jewish immigration at a moment when racial persecution increasingly divides the other countries of the world into those Jews are forbidden to enter and those in which they find it impossible to live.

This Conference reaffirms the traditional support given by the British Labor Movement to the re-establishment of a National Home for the Jewish people in Palestine. It recognizes that considerable benefits have accrued to the Arab masses as a result of Jewish immigration and settlement. This conference is convinced that under the policy of the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate, the possibility exists for continued and increasing peaceful cooperation between the Jewish and Arab peoples in Palestine.

54. *Ibid.*, cols. 2190-2192.

55. *Parliamentary Debates, Commons*, Vol. 350, col. 762, July 20, 1939.

The Government managed to win a slim majority, with only 268 votes out of a total usual strength of 413 cast in approval, 179 against, and 110 abstaining. It was evident from the large number of abstentions that disinclination to embarrass the Government at a critical period motivated the House of Commons in approving the White Paper, rather than any satisfaction with the new Government policy. A favorable resolution was also secured in the House of Lords despite strong protests from Lord Snell, Viscount Samuel and the Archbishop of Canterbury. The last named stressed two aspects of the problem: 1) the reduction of the Jews to the status of a permanent minority in a preponderatingly Arab State, 2) the position of Palestine as a country of international interest and not an Arab possession.<sup>56</sup>

I venture to think that it was precisely from this permanent minority status that they hoped to escape. They had hoped that in one place upon this earth this people of something like sixteen and a half millions might have a sphere of their own, where they could show what was in them, where they could be masters of their own destiny and affairs, and where these could be a centre of Jewish life, culture, and influence throughout the world. If they have, for obvious reasons, thrown very special emphasis, upon numbers, I believe that in their hearts what Zionists have desired more than anything is that they should get their freedom from this minority status. Now, I have to repeat, they are given the prospect that the minority status will be permanent, and whatever a National Home may have meant—we all know how many interpretations are put upon it—it surely cannot have meant that. It surely must have meant that somewhere in Palestine there would be a place where the Jews would be able to fulfill their aspirations, in some territory in which they had some autonomous control.

I have always had the greatest possible sympathy with the Arabs. I am bound to say that those who have been in Palestine cannot but have that sympathy. It is very widely felt in this country. I recognize the force of their claims and of their fears, but I feel bound to quote to your Lordships some words spoken in this House in 1923 by Lord Milner, at the very time when he professed himself in favour of a pro-Arab policy. I quote them as showing that it is not possible to regard the Arabs as those to whom a predominating influence in the future of Palestine should be entrusted. Lord Milner said: "Palestine can never be regarded as a country on the same footing as the other

<sup>56</sup> *Parliamentary Debates, Commons*, Vol. 113, cols. 115–116, May 23, 1939.



Arab countries. You cannot ignore the fact that this is the cradle of two of the greatest religions of the world. It is a sacred land to the Arabs, but it is also a sacred land to the Jew and the Christian, and the future of Palestine cannot possibly be left to be determined by the temporary impressions and feelings of the Arab majority in the country of the present day." Then, I submit, it is still less reasonable that it should be determined by a permanent Arab majority in a single future Palestinian State.

### *The Permanent Mandates Commission*

The Permanent Mandates Commission met in June and devoted several sessions to the consideration of Palestine affairs. The Colonial Secretary, Malcolm MacDonald, appeared in person. In defending the White Paper policy, he spent much time in trying to prove that it was in harmony with the Mandate and consistent with the policies pursued by previous British Governments. Moreover, he presented it as offering the greatest hope for a final settlement of the conflict between the Jews and the Arabs. He claimed that a reasonable actualization of the Jewish National Home had been achieved along the lines suggested in the 1922 (Churchill) White Paper, and that the Jewish community in Palestine already had sufficient strength to maintain itself. In taking the line that the new British policy was not contradictory to the Government's obligations under the Mandate, thus basing his argument on juridical rather than on political grounds, the Secretary for the Colonies was reckoning with the fact that the major function of the Permanent Mandates Commission was to report to the Council of the League whether the Mandatory Power was acting within the terms of the Mandate. The Government had already indicated that if the Permanent Mandates Commission should advise the Council that the White Paper conflicted with the Mandate, application would be made for modification of the Mandate on the grounds of unworkability. Such action, which would have necessitated taking up the matter with the Council itself, the Government intended to use only as a final resort.

A number of the members of the Permanent Mandates Commission, however, indicated clearly that it would have been better in their opinion if the British Government had in straightforward manner presented the issue in its obvious

political terms. At the close of the discussion the Chairman, Monsieur Orts, said in the course of his summary :<sup>57</sup>

The members of the Commission had all listened with equal attention to the accredited representative's preliminary statement, and to his replies to the questions they had showered on him. As the Commission's work had proceeded, the soundness of the thesis defended by the accredited representative to the effect that the new policy did not depart from the terms of the mandate, had seemed to the Chairman less certain. If, despite the remarkable talent displayed in its defence, that thesis had failed to convince certain members of the Commission, was not the explanation simply that, on this occasion, the mandatory Government had asked the League of Nations to follow it on to ground which was by its very nature unfavourable? If, as in 1937, the mandatory Government had implicitly admitted that the mandate had proved in practice to be incapable of application, perhaps the Commission would have followed it just as it did in 1937. If it had taken its stand purely on political grounds, it might perhaps have over-persuaded the Commission. By taking up the position it had done, it had cut itself off from any possibility of convincing the Mandates Commission.

MacDonald unearthed the old conversations between Commander Hogarth and King Husain in 1918, in an attempt to show that the words "civil and religious rights" in the Balfour Declaration and the phrase "rights and position" in the Mandate were intended to include "the normal political rights of a free people." The Hogarth message which he claimed was a balanced interpretation of what was intended by the British Government regarding both Arabs and Jews, did not imply any change in or addition to the Balfour Declaration; its purpose was merely to assure the Arabs that Palestine would not one day become a Jewish State against the will of the Arabs in the country. It expressed the British Government's determination that so far as Palestine was concerned "no people shall be subject to another." This was a rather tortuous defense of the White Paper, which unavoidably implied the subordination of the Jews to the Arab majority. The Chairman, without troubling to analyze the inconsistency of the argument, ruled it out of order as irrelevant: in view of the fact that the Hogarth

57. Permanent Mandates Commission, *Minutes of the Thirty-Sixth Session*, Geneva, 1939, p. 206.

message had not been communicated to the League of Nations before the Mandate was confirmed, it could have no bearing on the Mandate which was an international convention between the British Government and the League of Nations.<sup>58</sup>

Equally unsuccessful was MacDonald's attempt to justify the British decision to grant independence to the Arab majority in Palestine on the basis of Article 22 of the League Covenant. On this, Monsieur van Asbeck pointed out that although the Mandate for Palestine was in the "A" category, it was nevertheless a mandate *sui generis*, and did not provide that the Mandatory Power should establish a National Palestinian Government. Furthermore, he pointed out that "Article 28 of the Mandate did not expressly stipulate—as in the case of the Mandate for Syria and Lebanon and the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1922—that the Mandate should terminate, but merely contained certain provisions . . . which should apply in the event of the termination of the Mandate."<sup>59</sup> MacDonald went to great lengths in attempting to show that there had been no self-contradiction in British policy, "only a constant adaptation to changing circumstances," without departing from the letter or the spirit of the Mandate. Thus, he alleged, while in the early years it was right to have laid the emphasis on the obligation to the Jews, it was now right to lay the emphasis on the obligation to the non-Jews. The obligation to the non-Jews, he interpreted as meaning that there could be no further expansion of the Jewish national home contrary to the will of the non-Jewish population. His explanations were obviously forced and Monsieur Rappard was on one occasion provoked to make the observation that it seemed to be "a part of the great administrative experience and wisdom of the Government of the British Commonwealth of Nations to use words intended to give satisfaction to those who misunderstood them."<sup>60</sup>

58. *Survey of International Affairs 1938*, Vol. I, p. 473. This position was also taken in a "Memorandum on the Legal Aspects of the White Paper" published by the Jewish Agency in *The Jewish Case against the Palestine White Paper*.

59. *Survey of International Affairs 1938*, Vol. I, p. 474, and Permanent Mandates Commission, *Minutes of the Thirty-Sixth Session*, p. 200.

60. Permanent Mandates Commission, *Minutes of the Thirty-Sixth Session*, p. 177.

On the proposals made by the White Paper to limit immigration and land sales, the discussion revealed certain differences of opinion. Monsieur Giraud agreed with Lord Hankey that the limitations on immigration and land sale were not necessarily contrary to Article 6 of the Mandate which provided for the facilitation of Jewish immigration under suitable conditions and for the encouragement in cooperation with the Jewish Agency, of close settlement by Jews on the land. The majority of the members, however, took the position that Article 6 involved positive obligations which could not be abrogated as long as the Mandate was in force. Monsieur Rap-pard reminded his colleagues that when in 1937, the Mandatory Power had informed them that it was ceasing for the time being to apply the criterion of economic absorptive capacity, they had regarded that decision as equivalent to a partial suspension of the Mandate justifiable only as a provisional measure. The Chairman pointed out, moreover, that the publication of the Order-in-Council empowering the High Commissioner to make regulations prohibiting and regulating transfers of land, had presented the Permanent Mandates Commission and the Council of the League with a *fait accompli*.

In the discussion of the constitutional paragraphs of the White Paper, MacDonald outlined certain possibilities which he said had been suggested to both the Jewish and Arab delegations at the London Conference and which were designed to prevent the development of a situation in which the Arab majority would rule over the Jewish minority through their control of their central government. One example of such an arrangement would be a Federal State consisting of one Jewish province and an Arab province under a constitution, according to which the representatives of the Arab province should be the equal in numbers and powers to the representatives of the Jewish province. Continuing along this line, he gave another example:<sup>61</sup>

61. *Ibid.*, p. 172. The comments of two members of the Commission on this statement were significant. Count de Penha Garcia observed that "it seemed clear that the Arabs had not fully appreciated the position. They took the view that the independence which had been promised them was the independence of the Arabs as such; that was clearly not the case" (p. 173).

Again, supposing there was no federal State, but a unitary State: nothing in the White Paper compelled a two-to-one proportion of Arabs either on the Executive or in the Legislature of that State. Those concerned with framing the Constitution might also discuss the proposal, which had often been advanced, for parity in representation, and regard the Arabs and Jews as communities possessing equal status, and consequently entitled to equal representation on the Executive and in the Legislature. But supposing that was not practicable, supposing further that it was thought desirable that representation should be on a strict population basis, and that the Legislature should contain approximately two Arabs for every Jew, the provision might be made in the Constitution under which, on any matter of importance, no decision could be taken unless a majority of the Arab representatives and a majority of the Jewish representatives were in agreement.

Furthermore, he pointed out that the character of the proposed constitutional assembly had not yet been determined: it might possibly be elected or nominated, or partly elected and partly nominated. He said that it was also recognized that a special procedure would have to be devised for constitutional revision and that such revision would require the consent of both communities. He interpreted the conditions which would be necessary to secure the approval of the Mandatory Power for any proposed constitution:<sup>62</sup>

The acquiescence of both parties would be necessary if an independent State were to be established. Any other principle would seem to be impracticable. If the Arabs were dissatisfied with the proposed constitution, their protest would probably, if the mandatory authority were withdrawn, culminate in something like civil war. Similarly, if the proposed Constitution and independent State proved unacceptable to the Jews, they would also refuse to acquiesce and could cause very serious complications even by mere economic action, apart from any resort to violence. . . . His Majesty's Government . . . could not abandon its responsibility for the good government of Palestine if there was a likelihood of such abandonment leading to grave trouble and possibly civil war. That was why it had stated quite deliberately in paragraph 9 of the White Paper that 'the establishment of an independent State . . . would require such relations between the Arabs and the Jews as would make good government possible.'

62. *Ibid.*, p. 138. On the other hand, the Colonial Secretary stated that the new land and immigration policies would be carried through unaltered, no matter what opposition they encountered.

These explanations were intended to reassure the Jews that they would not be subjected to the Arab majority, although they gave no satisfaction to the objections raised on the score of immigration and land sales. As M. Rappard pointed out, the reassurances to the Jews on the constitutional question nullified the concept of independence as the Arabs understood it. The explanations given by MacDonald served only to emphasize the difficulty of Anglo-Arab agreement on the constitutional issue and also gave ground to the Arabs' lack of confidence in the British intention to carry out the White Paper along the lines sought by the Arabs. It became evident that the objections of the Palestinian Arab High Committee were not merely strategic but were based on distrust of the British position.

In its report to the Council of the League of Nations, the Permanent Mandates Commission declared that "the policy set out in the White Paper was not in accordance with the interpretation which, in agreement with the Mandatory Power and the Council, the Commission had placed upon the Palestine Mandate."<sup>63</sup> So worded, the conclusion was unanimous. However, three of the seven members—representatives of Great Britain, France and Portugal—thought that existing circumstances might justify the policy of the White Paper, provided the Council of the League of Nations did not oppose it. The other four, representing the neutral countries—Belgium, Holland, Norway and Switzerland—felt that the policy of the White Paper was absolutely contrary to the very terms of the Mandate and to the fundamental intentions of its authors, and therefore could not by any stretching of interpretation be made to appear in harmony with the Mandate.

In view of this difference of opinion, there was a leaning on the part of the members of the Permanent Mandates Commission to revert to the recommendations of the Royal Commission of 1937, and to suggest for renewed consideration "the setting up of two independent states, withdrawn at the outset from Mandatory control."<sup>64</sup> The analysis of the *Survey of International Affairs* concludes: "This echo of partition encouraged the British Government to express the hope that, if the Palestinian State could be given a federal constitution, a

63. *Ibid.*, p. 275.

64. *Ibid.*

bridge might yet be built between their proposals and the views of the majority on the Mandates Commission.”<sup>65</sup>

*The Zionist Congress on the Eve of the War*

The White Paper met with the condemnation of all Zionist groups throughout the world, but there were differences of opinion as to the method of opposing it. This question of policy formed the central theme of the political debates at the Twenty-First Zionist Congress which opened at Geneva on August 16, 1939. The different viewpoints cut across party lines; only the Jewish State Party, a minority group under the leadership of Meir Grossman, was solidly for a program of absolute non-cooperation with the British Government and civil disobedience. The main body of delegates fell into three groups: one group felt that the time had come to abandon or greatly modify Weizmann's policy of close cooperation with the Mandatory Power; another held the opposite view, that cooperation with Great Britain was unavoidable as well as desirable; the third, and largest, group attempted to find a middle course between these extremes, and succeeded in embodying its attitude in the resolutions adopted.

Ben-Gurion led the group which advocated a departure from the traditional Weizmann policy of cooperation. He argued that the White Paper was the logical consequence of a policy which required the Jews to carry their cooperation with Great Britain to the length of declining to take any action which might embarrass her despite the fact that the Arabs were prepared to use force in the pursuit of their aims. The Jews could not hope to divert the Mandatory Power from its policy of appeasing the Arabs unless they were prepared to cause serious inconvenience to the authorities in Palestine should they attempt to implement the White Paper. For this change to an activist policy of non-cooperation he found moral justification in the fact that the Permanent Mandates Commission had condemned the British policy as a violation of the letter and the spirit of the Mandate. By departing from the path of legal administration, the British had in a moral sense abdicated its governmental functions. Ben-Gurion made an extreme formulation of his views.<sup>66</sup>

65. *Survey of International Affairs 1938*, Vol. I, p. 479.

66. *Ibid.*, pp. 469-470.

The White Paper had created a vacuum which must be filled by the Jews themselves. The Jews should act as though they were the State in Palestine and should so act until there would be a Jewish State there. In those matters in which there were infringements by the Government, the Jews should act as though they were the State.

The underlying assumption of the opposing group was that some kind of relationship with a Great Power was essential for the promotion of Zionism, and that however weak Great Britain's support of Zionism had been, it still was more tangible than had been given by any other Power. Moreover, since the Jews sided with Great Britain in the imminent European war, it would not be possible to support the British Commonwealth against Germany and embarrass it in local affairs in Palestine. Rabbi Abba Hillel Silver of the American delegation, who warmly defended Weizmann's position, appears to have been motivated by this general line of thought. He believed that the Zionist movement and the Mandatory Power had not yet reached a parting of the ways and he saw hope in the fact that the Permanent Mandates Commission had condemned the White Paper. He thought that after this unfavorable judgment the British Government would not dare to go before the Council of the League for an endorsement of their policy, and that nothing should be done to provoke a conflict which might never become necessary. He urged the Congress not to yield to emotion and said:<sup>67</sup>

. . . The White Paper was a temporary document only; while they should oppose it with all energy, there were good prospects of its being nullified, and therefore no extremist measures should be adopted. . . . It was dangerous to act as though they were the State, when they were not. . . . In their desperation they should not put weapons into the hands of their enemies.

Berl Katznelson,<sup>68</sup> highly respected intellectual leader of the Labor Party, gave expression to the view of those who were seeking a middle course between the former policy of conciliation and self-restraint, and the aggressive policy of non-cooperation and active resistance. He supported the policy of aid-

67. *Ibid.*, p. 470.

68. Died August 12, 1944.



ing illegal immigration and he agreed that the Jews should carry arms, but insisted that they should use them only as a last resort; that they should be prepared to retaliate when they were attacked, but that they should scrupulously avoid staining their arms with innocent blood. He did not believe in a rebellion stimulated by emotional incitement and conducted in a dramatic setting; a successful political war could result only from actual needs and impelling forces. Moreover, the Jews must always remember, in fighting British policy, that they were opposing the decision of a particular government and that they had no grievance against the British people.

In the resolutions of the Congress, appreciation was expressed of the attitude taken by leading members of all parties in the British Parliament and of the decision of the Permanent Mandates Commission. The Congress declared its uncompromising hostility to the policy of the White Paper, at the same time proclaiming its unwavering support of Britain in her defense of democracy in the Western world. The resolutions denied the moral and legal validity of the British statement of policy incorporated in the 1939 White Paper, and declared that the Jewish people would not acquiesce in the reduction of its status in Palestine to that of a minority, nor in the subjection of the Jewish national home to Arab rule. There followed a declaration to the effect that resistance to the policy of the White Paper was not directed against the Arab people; that the Congress reaffirmed "the resolve of the Jewish people to establish relations of mutual goodwill and cooperation with the Arabs of Palestine and of the neighboring Arab countries." The Congress expressed its belief that despite the four years of bloodshed and destruction, a way could be found to harmonize Jewish and Arab aspirations, and it instructed the Executive to appoint a special committee to study Jewish-Arab relations in the social and cultural fields and to explore the possibilities of cooperation in these various spheres.

The resolutions were adopted by an overwhelming majority on the 24th of August. The last days of the Congress were overshadowed by the ominous development in the week before the declaration of war on September 3, 1939. Its agenda was curtailed and the members of the Executive were re-elected with no opposition except from the small parties from the

extreme Left and the extreme Right. The meeting of the Jewish Agency Council which normally would have followed immediately on the conclusion of the Zionist Congress was not held.

*Implementation of the White Paper*

The declaration of war by Great Britain on September 3, 1939—some three and a half months after the White Paper was issued—found Palestine in a state of political uncertainty. The fact that the White Paper had been strongly criticized in British parliamentary circles and condemned by the Permanent Mandates Commission fed the hope that it was not the last word in British policy. A statement made in the House of Commons on June 7th by Mr. Chamberlain lent color to the belief that he was ready to submit the Palestine problem to the judgment of the Permanent Court of International Justice at The Hague.<sup>69</sup> When the war broke out there was a feeling that the temper of appeasement had gone and that the 1939 White Paper would go with it.

The Jews were destined to be bitterly disappointed. The British failure to change the White Paper policy was still understandable in the early part of the war, when there was real danger that the Middle East might fall to the Axis. The harshness with which the British Administration in Palestine executed the restrictive measures of the White Paper in the matter of immigration boded no good, but hope lingered on that with the improvement of the military situation there would be an amelioration of policy. The atrocities committed against the Jews in Nazi-dominated territories did not move the British to open the doors of Palestine to the refugees or to relax the severe quota regulations. At certain of the most

69. As a matter of fact, there was little in the Prime Minister's statement to support this idea. In answer to a question whether the Permanent Mandates Commission had the competence of deciding whether proposals were legal or not, Chamberlain replied: "The only provision on such a matter is in Article 26 of the Palestine Mandate where it is laid down that if any dispute should arise between the Mandatory Power and another member of the League of Nations as to the interpretation of the application of the provisions of the Mandate, such dispute, if it cannot be settled by negotiation, shall be submitted to the Permanent Court of International Justice." (*Parliamentary Debates, Commons*, Vol. 348, cols. 412-414.)

critical periods no certificates were allowed at all because, according to Government estimates, the immigration quota for the period in question had been exhausted by "illegal" immigrants. Even when the Axis forces were expelled from North Africa the excuse of military exigency continued to be used as a justification for restrictive measures.

Only toward the end of the five-year term of the White Paper was there any deviation from the strict letter of the law in the matter of immigration. In the early part of the war, when the Mediterranean was open to traffic, a great number of Jews could have found refuge in Palestine; but the Administration limited the semi-annual quotas. Later, when Italy entered the war, and the Axis conquered Central and Eastern Europe, it became more difficult for Jews to escape, and most of those who succeeded in doing so found it impossible to reach Palestine. During the latter part of 1943, it was already clear that the total number of immigrants in the five-year period would fall short of the permitted quota. In November 1943, about a half year before the date of the termination of Jewish immigration according to the White Paper, the British Government announced that the full number of 75,000 would be permitted to enter Palestine even if this required an extension of time beyond April 1, 1944. However, there was no change in principle: the White Paper remained in force and immigration was to cease after the admission of the quota of 75,000.

On the constitutional provisions of the White Paper no major action was taken. The White Paper provided for the strengthening of local self-government and the establishment of a Palestine State after ten years if in the meantime satisfactory relations had developed between Jews and Arabs. In the interim there was to be an increasing degree of self-government, including the appointment of Palestinian heads of departments who would sit in the Executive Council which advised the High Commissioner. But the British authorities were not anxious to grant the Arabs a larger share in the conduct of the country during wartime and nothing was done to further the main constitutional provisions of the White Paper. In the matter of local self-government, the change was limited to transferring to Arab centers several district administrations previously in Jewish towns. The curb on land sales to Jews, however, was strictly enforced.

*The Land Transfer Regulations of 1940*

The MacDonald White Paper of 1939 had declared that "there is now in certain areas no room for further transfers of Arab land, whilst in some other areas such transfers of land must be restricted if Arab cultivators are to retain their existing standard of life and a considerable landless Arab population is not to be created." It provided that the High Commissioner should be given general powers to prohibit and regulate the transfers of land, taking effect retroactively from the date of the publication of the White Paper (May 17, 1939). On June 29, 1939, an Order in Council was passed giving the High Commissioner the necessary powers. As noted in the previous section, this haste in putting the restrictions into effect drew a critical comment from the Chairman of the Permanent Mandates Commission. Undeterred by this and other criticisms, the Government proceeded to issue, on February 28, 1940, a set of "Land Transfer Regulations" in the form of a White Paper.<sup>70</sup>

The Land Transfer Regulations of February, 1940, divided the country into three zones, as follows:

1) In Zone "A" the transfer of land was prohibited except to a Palestinian Arab. This prohibited district included the hill country as a whole together with certain areas in Gaza and parts of Beer Sheba where, in the opinion of the High Commissioner, the land available was already insufficient for the support of the existing population.

2) In Zone "B" transfers were prohibited ordinarily, but under certain conditions the High Commissioner could permit the passage of land to a non-Arab when the person to whom the transfer was intended received his approval in writing. This zone included the Plains of Esdraelon, Jezreel, Eastern Galilee, the Maritime Plain between Haifa and Tantura and between the southern boundary of the Ramleh sub-district and Beer-Tuviya and the southern portion of Beer Sheba.

3) In the remainder of Palestine land transfers remained unrestricted. This zone included all municipal areas, the Haifa industrial district, the Maritime Plain between Tantura and the southern boundary of the Ramleh sub-district.

70. Great Britain, *Palestine Land Transfer Regulations*, Cmd. 6180, 1940.

The Palestine Administration made no statement as to the areas involved in each zone. The Jewish Agency issued a statement showing that Zone "A," the prohibited zone, included some 6,615 square miles, or approximately 63 percent of the area of Palestine; the restricted area included 3,295 square miles, or some 32 percent of the area; while the so-called free zone consisted of some 519 square miles, or a little over 5 percent of the area. This, however, did not mean that Jews could acquire the whole area in the free zone. Out of a total estimated 332,160 acres in the free zone, 170,000 acres were already owned by Jews, while 162,160 acres were held by Arabs. It was, then, this small area, forming 2.6 percent of non-Jewish land in Palestine, that was still, theoretically speaking, open to Jewish land purchase without legal restrictions. However, 48,500 Arabs were living in this area, and the lands in proximity to Jewish settlements had been improved and had risen in value. In other words, the opportunity to buy land in the so-called free zone approached the vanishing point. The situation is indicated in the following table:<sup>71</sup>

	Area (Sq. Miles)	Area (Acres)	Per- cent of Total	Jewish Land (Acres)	Jewish Rural Pop.	Arab Land (Acres)	Arab Rural Pop.
Zone A (Prohibited)	6,615	4,104,000	63	80,500	5,000	4,203,500	564,000
Zone B (Restricted)	3,295	2,066,840	32	130,617	13,000	1,937,223	54,000
Free Zone	519	332,160	5	170,000	48,000	162,160	48,500

The publication of the land transfer regulations disturbed the period of peace which had reigned in Palestine since the previous September. Jewish public demonstrations against the land regulations were organized daily during the first week of March in Jerusalem, Haifa, Tel-Aviv, and Petach Tikvah. During the course of the demonstrations, the troops and police were stoned. Attempts were made to destroy government property and streets were barricaded. The Government had to resort to the use of force and a curfew was imposed at

71. Jewish Agency for Palestine, *Documents and Correspondence Relating to Palestine, August, 1939, to March, 1940*, London, March, 1940, p. 12.

TOTAL AREA 10,429 SQ MILES  
INCLUDING 266½ SQ MILES OF  
WATER SURFACE. LAKE TIBERIAS  
AND PALESTINIAN HALF OF DEAD SEA

ZONE A: 6,615 SQ. MI.  
LAND PURCHASES BY  
JEWS PROHIBITED



ZONE B: 3,295 SQ. MI.  
LAND PURCHASES BY  
JEWS RESTRICTED




FREE ZONE: 519 SQ. MI.  
LAND PURCHASES  
UNRESTRICTED



JEWISH LAND  
OWNED BY THE  
JEWISH NATIONAL FUND



JEWISH LAND  
IN PRIVATE  
OWNERSHIP



PALESTINE LAND TRANSFER REGULATIONS,  
FEBRUARY 28, 1940



one time or another in the towns where outbreaks occurred. Two soldiers and two policemen were injured, one of the latter seriously. Over 400 Jews were hurt, 74 seriously; 2 subsequently died. One hundred forty persons, all of whom were Jews, were arrested.<sup>72</sup> There were signs of unrest also in some Arab villages.

An old Jewish settler in close touch with the Arab villages has described the effect of land regulations. After telling of the return of neighborly relations between Jewish and Arab villagers following the cessation of the riots, he wrote:<sup>73</sup>

. . . In this state of quiet between the inhabitants the publication of the land sales prohibition found us. The Arab masses became frightened and suspicious. They haven't yet recovered from the riots and now there is again trouble. You know, Manya, that the simple folk in its primitive psychology cannot get it through its head that riots can take place in the country without the consent of the government. The best proof that the government does not want riots is the fact—there are no riots. And if a law has been made in which no one is interested and for which neither side has any use—finds, on the contrary, great harm—it is a sign that the government is not satisfied with the state of good relations between Jew and Arab. This is how the simple man understands it. Besides, they don't give time for the two sides to come to an understanding, perhaps the government fears that the two sides may manage to come to an understanding and therefore must interfere. There is no doubt that the Arabs are not satisfied with this law. But they won't dare to demonstrate openly against it. The blows they have suffered have not been healed. And as before the riots so also now they are unorganized and disunited; they fall under every influence and yield to it . . .

The Government's action was widely criticized in Parliament on all sides—by the Labor, Liberal and Conservative Parties. Mr. Clement Attlee, voicing the attitude of the Labor Party, asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies whether he realized “that the action of the Government in making themselves the judge in their own case, in taking action contrary to the Permanent Mandates Commission's decision, and in disregarding the Council of the League of Nations, will

72. Great Britain, *Parliamentary Debates, Commons*, Vol. 358, cols. 1194–1195, March 13, 1940.

73. In a private letter dated Tiberias, April 17, 1940, from Joseph Nachmani to Manya Schochet. See below, Chap. XIV.



cause very wide mistrust of the Government and a very wide feeling that instead of acting up to their obligations under the Mandate, they are flouting the authority of the League and international law?"<sup>74</sup> Mr. Amery (Conservative) and Mr. Archibald Sinclair (Liberal) urged the same question. Major Cazalet (Conservative) pointed out that peace had reigned in Palestine since the outbreak of the war and asked why Government sought to disturb this peace by introducing the Land Regulations. In answering these questions, MacDonald took the position that the Government was faced with a delicate situation in Palestine and that the Land Regulations had been introduced to assure a continuance of peace. But he offered no evidence to support his position.

These interpellations were preliminary to the full debate which took place in the House of Commons on March 6, 1940. A motion of censure was introduced by Mr. Noel Baker on behalf of the Labor Party. The motion was "that this House regrets that disregarding the express opinion of the Permanent Mandates Commission the policy contained in the White Paper on Palestine was inconsistent with the terms of the Mandate, and without the authority of the Council of the League of Nations, His Majesty's Government have authorized the issue of the regulations controlling the transfer of land which discriminate unjustly against one section of the inhabitants of Palestine."<sup>75</sup> In justifying the motion for the vote of censure, Noel Baker took the position that the Land Regulations were not only inconsistent with the Mandate but also, in final analysis, opposed to the interests of the Arabs. Jewish development had increased the amount of cultivable land available to the Arabs and Jewish progress in agriculture meant Arab progress. He put no stock in the excuse offered by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, that the Land Regulations were necessary to insure a peaceful Palestine. On the contrary, it was his opinion that the new regulations would cause ill feeling on both sides.

Summarizing the process by which the Secretary of State had proposed to stop the progress which had been made in Palestine, Baker stressed the point that in the future the Secre-

74. *Parliamentary Debates, Commons*, Vol. 357, cols. 2057-2060, February 28, 1940.

75. *Ibid.*, Vol. 358, col. 411, March 6, 1940.

tary would allow the Jews the right to free purchase in 2.6 percent of the total area of Palestine. Baker drew attention to the fact that when the Jews were "first promised the national home, it was to include Trans-Jordan, and was to be 45,000 square miles. In 1922, Trans-Jordan was cut away and it became 10,000 square miles. The Peel Commission proposed to cut it to 2,000 square miles. Now the Secretary of State cuts it to 260 square miles." <sup>76</sup> The Land Regulations "brought to the Jews of Palestine the three evils of the dispersion—barred doors, legal discrimination on racial and religious grounds, and permanent minority status." <sup>77</sup>

Sir Archibald Sinclair, speaking for the Liberal Party, reinforced Noel Baker's position. He questioned the Government on their failure to obtain a ruling from the International Court at The Hague on the legality of the White Paper. If the Government, as they indicated, were now soliciting the opinion of the Council of the League, why was this not done before the Land Regulations were enacted? "It is my profound conviction," he said, "one which I believe will be shared by many of my countrymen and by many men in other lands, perhaps by those who chronicle these ominous events hereafter, that His Majesty's Government are abusing and making a convenience of the League of Nations." <sup>78</sup>

MacDonald replied to these and other attacks in the now too familiar terms. The Government was prompted to enact these Land Regulations for two reasons: 1) the maintenance of impartial government in Palestine fair to the Arabs as well as to the Jews; 2) "to enable us to mobilize our forces to prosecute to a victorious conclusion the war against Nazi Germany." With reference to the first reason he leaned on the "authoritative commissions" which had told the Government that unless land legislation was introduced the "rights and position of the Arab population would be prejudiced." Despite his protestations that the Land Regulations were just, MacDonald betrayed the fact that his real concern was over a political aspect.<sup>79</sup>

If there was trouble in Palestine again there would be repercussions in Trans-Jordan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Egypt, and even echoes of

76. *Ibid.*, col. 415.

78. *Ibid.*, cols. 429-430.

77. *Ibid.*

79. *Ibid.*, Vol. 358, cols. 445-446.

that trouble in India. One had better be frank about these things; the House knows that it is perfectly true. I say I would justify these Land Regulations on two grounds. In the first place, by all the evidence of the series of inquiries they are essential if we are to carry out the Mandate and, therefore, they are morally right. In the second place, I do not think it weakens the argument for taking this action if it is held to be expedient politically now to do it when in a moment of supreme crisis we are engaged in a struggle for the defence of the liberties not only of ourselves, but of small peoples including the freedom of the Jews from cruel and vile oppression.

In the debate which followed, those who defended the Government took their cue from the political argument—the necessity of bearing in mind the reaction of the Islamic world and of reducing the danger of trouble in the Near East. Sir Henry Croft, in defense of the Government, said: “The information I get at the present moment is that whether it be in the Hedjaz, Saudi Arabia, Trans-Jordan, Egypt, Syria, Turkey or Moslem India, all eyes are at present looking in this direction. If anybody has now doubt as to the wisdom of trying to keep the peace by implementing the decision of Parliament last May he would only say that if Hon. Members realized what is the nature of the conflict that lies before us, let them look at the map before they vote against His Majesty’s Government tonight.”<sup>80</sup> The motion for a vote of censure was defeated and the Land Regulations remained in force.

During the five-year period, 1938–1943, the Jews acquired something less than 100,000 metric dunams, less than half the amount they had acquired during the previous five-year period. It appears, however, that a small amount of land was acquired in the prohibited areas.<sup>81</sup> The Regulations permitted the transfer of land in the prohibited zones at the discretion of the High Commissioner in cases where the registration of the sale was lodged in the Land Registry before the date of publication of the Land Regulations, and it may be that the land transfers were made in this way. Some land may also have been purchased from non-Palestinians and the Government may not have wished to raise the question of the property rights of na-

80. *Ibid.*, Vol. 358, col. 480.

81. In the report of the purchases of the Jewish National Fund for the year ending December 31, 1941, it is stated that 6,373 dunams were bought around Gaza, which lies in the prohibited area.

tionals of other countries. However, there were Arabs also who arranged legal fictions in order to sell land at high prices. Nevertheless, the Land Regulations were effective in greatly reducing the possibility of Jews' acquiring land.

The table below, showing Jewish land purchases and sales from 1934-1943, indicates that while the gross number of dunams bought by Jews after the introduction of the Land Transfer Regulations did not change much, the net balance of purchases over sales decreased steadily and greatly. In the years prior to 1939 the net balance of Jewish purchases over sales was about 50-55 percent. In this period there were also two instances of a high percentage of sales. In 1936 and 1937

JEWISH LAND PURCHASES AND SALES 1934-1943<sup>82</sup>

(in metric dunams)

	<i>Bought</i>	<i>Sold</i>	<i>Net Balance Acquired</i>	
			<i>Amount</i>	<i>Percent</i>
1934	110,970	48,856	62,114	55.1
1935	137,618	64,713	72,905	52.1
1936	50,808	32,663	18,145	35.7
1937	72,430	43,063	29,367	40.5
1938	47,443	20,163	27,280	57.5
1939	56,357	28,383	27,974	49.6
1940	49,735	27,251	22,484	45.2
1941	42,681	28,148	14,533	34.1
1942	62,582	43,771	18,811	30.1
1943*	48,052*	35,361*	12,691*	26.4

\* For six months only from January to June.

*Land Purchased by Jews from Arabs 1940-1943<sup>83</sup>*

	<i>Total</i>	<i>From Arabs</i>	
		<i>Dunams</i>	<i>Percent</i>
1940	49,735	23,410	47.0
1941	42,681	15,813	37.0
1942	62,582	19,655	31.4
1943*	48,052*	13,493*	28.1

\* January-June

82. *Statistical Abstract of Palestine 1937-1938*, p. 159; *Statistical Abstract of Palestine 1942*, p. 144; *General Monthly Bulletin of Current Statistics in 1942 and June-September 1943*.

83. *Statistical Abstract of Palestine 1942*, p. 144; *General Monthly Bulletin of Current Statistics in 1942 and June-September 1943*.

*Land sold by Jews to Arabs 1940-1943<sup>84</sup>*

	<i>Total</i>	<i>To Arabs</i>	
		<i>Dunams</i>	<i>Percent</i>
1940	27,251	161	0.6
1941	28,148	797	2.8
1942	43,771	1,176	2.5
1943*	35,361*	702*	2.0

\* January-June

the ratio of sales to purchases was 64.3 percent and 59.7 percent respectively. This was probably due to a combination of causes including the effect of speculative purchases in previous years, followed by the economic recession associated with the Ethiopian War and the Arab riots. After 1940 the ratio of sales to purchases increased rapidly and in the first half of 1943 reached almost 75 percent. In addition to the effect of the Land Transfer Regulations, economic factors due to the war situation were also probably at work in leading to excess sales. Some persons may have been forced to liquidate assets because of the wartime business situation, and others may have been led to sell because of a sense of insecurity.

A clearer idea of the effect of the Land Transfer Regulations may be gathered by breaking down these figures to show from whom the Jews bought the land. Figures available since 1940 show that the proportion of Jewish purchases from Jews was increasing, while the proportion of Arab sales to Jews was decreasing. In 1940 about half of the Jewish land purchases was from Jews. In 1941 the ratio was close to two-thirds; in 1942 over two-thirds; and in the first half of 1943 almost three-quarters. Moreover, during the same period the areas of land sold by Jews to Arabs increased, but evidently the Land Regulations were being strictly implemented by the Palestine Administration, and while land sales to Jews did not cease entirely, such sales were greatly reduced.

*Immigration During the War Period*

The White Paper provided for the admission of 50,000 immigrants under the old immigration categories at the rate of 10,000 a year, it being understood that a shortage in any one year might be added to the quotas for subsequent years within

the five-year period. In addition, 25,000 refugees were to be admitted, providing maintenance was assured by the Jewish bodies; special consideration was to be given to refugee children and dependents. On July 20, 1939, MacDonald announced in the House of Commons<sup>85</sup> that because 4,000 illegal immigrants had entered and an additional 4,000 were expected during the current six months period, the quota of legal immigration would be cancelled during the six months period from October, 1939, to March, 1940. A similar practice was followed in ensuing years. The number of certificates granted in the half-year schedules from April, 1940, to June, 1943, was as follows:

Apr. 1940 – Sept. 1940	9,350	
Oct. 1940 – June 1941	—	
July 1941 – Sept. 1941	750	
Oct. 1941 – Mar. 1942	3,000	(1,750 specified for dependents)
Apr. 1942 – Dec. 1942	5,500	
Jan. 1943 – Mar. 1943	5,400	
Apr. 1943 – June 1943	13,500	(10,625 specified for children)

A special provision was inserted in the White Paper to deal with illegal immigration, reading as follows: "His Majesty's Government are determined to check illegal immigration and further preventive measures are being adopted. The number of any Jewish illegal immigrants who, despite these measures, may succeed in coming into the country and cannot be deported, will be deducted from the yearly quotas."<sup>86</sup> This provision confirmed measures to check illegal immigration, which had already been introduced by the Palestine Administration. The Government had been deducting its estimate of illegal immigration from the legal quotas since 1934, and provisions for deportation were already in effect. On March 22, 1939, prior to the issuance of the White Paper, a measure had been passed providing for the punishment of "illegals" with prison terms before their deportation from Palestine. On April 7, 1939, a Greek ship with 681 "illegals" was apprehended by the

85. *Parliamentary Debates, Commons*, Vol. 350, cols. 808-812.

86. Great Britain, *Palestine, Statement of Policy*, Cmd. 6019, 1939, p. 11.

Palestine Coast Police near the Jewish colony of Nathania, where it had tried to land its passengers in the dark of night. The ship was brought to Haifa and a few days later it was ordered away without having been allowed to discharge its passengers. After that, as long as the Mediterranean was open to shipping, hardly a week passed without a vessel of one sort or another being apprehended.

After the publication of the White Paper, the Government became even more vigilant in its effort to prevent illegal immigrants from landing in Palestine, and more drastic in the treatment of them when apprehended. The Jewish community on its part took it upon itself to support illegal immigration with greater determination and to help the immigrants in every way possible. As the Nazis conquered one country after another, flight became increasingly imperative: Jews tried to get to Palestine by every means possible. Some came across land routes, often traveling on foot and taking many months for their journey. The great majority came by sea; they were charged exorbitant prices for transportation, frequently on unseaworthy vessels, and they suffered from unbearable unsanitary conditions during the uncertain journey. They sailed up and down the coast of Palestine for weeks waiting for an opportunity to land where they could not be reached by the arm of the Government. In fear of deportation, the immigrants often destroyed their identification papers. The Government thereupon instituted the practice of deporting the illegals to some island under British control, with the idea of returning them to their home countries after the war. Under such conditions it was inevitable that there should be incidents of stark tragedy.

In the beginning of September, 1939, a ship (the *Tigerhill*) reaching the coast of Palestine was fired on by the Coast Guard, and three refugees were killed and the others were refused permission to land. Despite a widespread protest in Parliament, MacDonald defended his action on the ground that the situation in Palestine was delicate and required careful handling, and that "to authorize the indiscriminate landing of refugees in Palestine would worsen rather than improve the security position there, which is at present satisfactory."<sup>87</sup>

87. *Parliamentary Debates, Commons*, Vol. 351, cols. 566-567, September 7, 1939.

Great numbers of Jews found themselves stranded in central and southeastern Europe, caught between the oncoming wave of Nazis and the drastic action of the British Government. Many committed suicide rather than return to their home countries where they faced death or the concentration camp.

In November, 1940, more than 1,770 Jews who had arrived at Haifa on two vessels—the *Pacific* and the *Milos*—were found to be without permits. Together with an additional 100 passengers taken from another vessel, they were transported to the *Patria*—a French ship under British control—for the purpose of being deported to a British colony on the island of Mauritius in the Indian Ocean. An official radio communiqué from Jerusalem on November 20th announced that the ultimate disposal of the immigrants would be deferred for consideration until the end of the war, but that they would not be permitted to return to Palestine or to remain in any British territory. On November 25th the *Patria* exploded in the harbor of Haifa, with the loss of 257 refugees. The cause of the explosion was never determined. The High Commissioner first announced that the survivors would, in any case, be deported, but public protest in Great Britain and the United States led to a withdrawal of the order. Of the 1,698 survivors, 1,043 were released from detention; the others were detained pending an investigation of their records. Those released were given the opportunity to enlist, and thirty-one joined the British, and seventy-seven the Czech forces.

At about the same time, another vessel, the *Atlantic*, had also brought a large contingent of refugees—about 1,800—to Palestine. About 130 of them had been transferred to the *Patria* before it went down; the remainder were landed and placed in the detention camp at Athlit. After the disaster to the *Patria*, the Jewish Agency appealed to the Government to permit the refugees from the *Atlantic* to remain in Palestine, but the Government summarily refused. One night the police surrounded the camp and proceeded to remove the refugees. The refugees offered resistance and the British police beat the men mercilessly with their truncheons to force them to leave. An authoritative confidential report states: "This witness saw people being carried out on stretchers, apparently unconscious, and others being pushed along naked, barefooted, many of them bleeding from their heads and bodies." The men were



carried, pushed, beaten and driven into large army lorries stationed just outside the entrance to the camp, and then rushed onto the ships before the Jews in Haifa realized what was happening.

In replying to a question by Colonel Wedgwood, Mr. George Hall, the Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, gave the following account of what had happened, expressing regret but emphasizing that the position of the Government with reference to illegal immigrants remained unchanged.<sup>88</sup>

The persons in question who all came from enemy or enemy occupied territory, were intercepted in an attempt to enter Palestine against what is well known to be the law of the country. His Majesty's Government, while not lacking in sympathy for refugees from territories under German control, can only regard the revival of attempts at illegal immigration at the present juncture as likely to affect the local situation most adversely and to prove a serious menace to British interests in the Middle East. They accordingly decided that these persons, and any further parties who may succeed in reaching Palestine with a view to illegal entry, should be sent to a British Colony for detention for the duration of the war.

As the right hon. Member will be aware, the steamship "Patria" on which the first contingent of illegal immigrants had already been embarked, sank in Haifa Harbor on 25th November as the result of an explosion. The causes of this disaster are still under investigation but it has been decided by His Majesty's Government as an exceptional Act of Mercy, after taking all circumstances into consideration and in particular, the harassing experience undergone by survivors, not to proceed with the proposal to send these particular persons overseas. They will accordingly be allowed to stay in Palestine subject to existing regulations and their number will be deducted from the next immigration quota.

The position remains unchanged as regards all other illegal immigrants who have arrived recently off the coast of Palestine or may arrive hereafter. They will be sent overseas as soon as the necessary shipping arrangements can be made. The case of these illegal immigrants is entirely different from that of other refugees admitted into Palestine on a purely temporary basis after careful investigation of the *bona fides*.

The deportees were sent to the island of Mauritius in the Indian Ocean. The number deported was about 1,600, mostly

88. *Ibid.*, Vol. 367, cols. 519-520, December 4, 1940.

from Austria, Czechoslovakia and Poland. The women lived in huts made of corrugated iron, while the men were placed in the old stone prison cells. The island was infected with tropical disease and soon after the arrival of the deportees there was an epidemic of typhus, followed by malaria. On June 14, 1944, in reply to a question in the House of Commons, Colonel Oliver Stanley, the Colonial Secretary, revealed that ninety-three of the internees had died. In October 1944 malaria was still taking a huge toll of the refugees, but all that the Colonial Secretary had to offer was that "he was satisfied that the government of Mauritius was doing everything possible in steadily reducing the incidence of the disease." Out of the total of 850 men of all ages, 224 volunteered for service with the Allied forces, and after lengthy negotiations, 149 were accepted. Sixty-four of the women offered their services to Government unconditionally, but only one was released. To the very end of 1944 the Government adhered strictly to its position of not permitting the deportees to go to Palestine, despite continuous representations on the part of the Jewish Agency and others, both Jews and Christians. Finally, however, at the beginning of 1945 an announcement was made that the refugees would be permitted to return to Palestine as immigrants, the number to be deducted from the quota.

The tragedy of the refugees did not end with the *Atlantic*. In March, 1941, the *Darien* reached Palestine with about 800 refugees, most of whom had escaped massacre in Rumania; the refugees included survivors of another vessel, the *Salvador*, which had sunk in the Sea of Marmora with a loss of 200 lives. The boat was apprehended and the refugees were placed in detention camps. A great many of them were trained agriculturists and skilled artisans and were eager to help in the war effort, but they were kept in enforced idleness under constant threat of removal.<sup>89</sup> Several lost their reason and were removed to a mental hospital, but these were the only ones allowed to leave the camp. MacDonald now found a new excuse; he insinuated that there might be enemy agents among the refugees, although he admitted that he had no conclusive proof of this. Lord Wedgwood called this "a bare-faced excuse which supplied fresh evidence of anti-Semitism." But Mac-

89. L. B. Namier, "Refugee Boats," *Time and Tide*, London, March 14, 1942.

Donald obstinately persisted in his course, moved neither by sense of shame nor by sharp attack.

The worst of the tragedies occurred in February, 1942. The *Struma*, a converted yacht of about 200 tons, flying the flag of the Republic of Panama, had left the Rumanian port of Constanza in October of the previous year. She had on board some 769 Jews—including a group of children between the ages of ten and sixteen—who were on their way to Palestine without visas. The small ship, badly overcrowded, reached Istanbul about mid-December and was laid up for repairs. The Turkish Government made it clear that the passengers would not be allowed to remain in Turkey; the British insisted that they would not be permitted to enter Palestine. After negotiations lasting about ten weeks, the British authorities relented so far, it appears, as to agree to the admission of the children. But there were further difficulties with the Turkish officials. The Turkish authorities finally decided to send the ship back to the Black Sea. On February 24th news was received that the vessel had sunk as a result of an explosion four or five miles from the entrance to the Bosphorus. Whether she fell to pieces, stuck a mine, or was torpedoed, was never determined, although all of these explanations were given. All but one or two of the passengers perished. A storm of protest came in from all parts of the world; there followed the usual excuses of the British authorities, who tried to put the blame on the Turks; and there were the usual expressions of regret on the part of the Government and the usual speeches by the friends of the Jews about the bad treatment of the "unfortunate refugees from Nazi terrors." But the British Government doggedly adhered to the letter of the law. All that Mr. Harold McMillan, the Colonial Secretary, could say was: "His Majesty's Government earnestly hope that such a tragedy will not occur again. It does not lie in their power, however, amid the dangers and uncertainties of war, to give any guarantee, nor can they be party to any measures which would undermine the existing policy regarding illegal immigration into Palestine in view of the wider issues involved."<sup>90</sup>

The Jewish authorities made a special effort to save the youth of Nazi-dominated Europe and endeavored to obtain the

90. *Parliamentary Debates, Commons*, Vol. 378, col. 1049, March 11, 1942.

aid of the Government in this. Something was done to facilitate the movement of children through administrative arrangements within the established immigration regulations and schedules, but here again no change in principle from the provisions of the White Paper was made. On April 24, 1940, in reply to a question as to how many children had been permitted to enter Palestine on special certificates with the assistance of refugee funds, MacDonald stated: "There are no special certificates for Jewish children wishing to enter Palestine outside of the periodic quotas. Several thousands of children have been admitted to Palestine in recent times in various categories under the quotas, with revisions given for students or dependents of permanent residents or of immigrants, and I understand that a number of those who have entered Palestine in this way have been assisted to do so by charitable organizations. Figures are not available, however, to show what proportion of the total number have received such assistance."<sup>91</sup>

On February 3, 1943, the Colonial Secretary, Colonel Oliver Stanley, announced that the Government of Palestine had agreed to admit 4,000 Jewish children from Bulgaria, together with 500 parents to accompany them. Besides these, some 270 children from Rumania and Hungary, already in transit to Palestine, were to be allowed to enter, and an additional number up to a total of 500 would be permitted. If the necessary transportation facilities could be made available, His Majesty's Government would be prepared to continue to admit children with a proportion of adults, within the limits of the 75,000 immigration quota. He indicated that about 29,000 certificates for this purpose were still available under the White Paper. He emphasized, however, that the usual conditions covering immigration would have to be fulfilled.

Much feeling had been stirred up at this time by the case of what came to be known as the "Teheran children." A migration of children fleeing from Poland, some with, some without, their parents, managed to reach Iran after wandering through Russia. An effort was made by the Jewish authorities to have them brought to Palestine, but Nuri Said Pasha, now Premier of Iraq, refused to give them visas for passage through that country. Despite all the efforts, including those

91. *Ibid.*, Vol. 360, cols. 192-193.

of Jewish bodies in the United States, the Government of Iraq persisted in its refusal. The children were finally transported to Egypt by boat, and from there overland to Palestine, where they arrived on February 18, 1943. When the group reached Palestine it consisted of 858 children accompanied by 100 men and 269 women.

The Evian Conference, which had been called in the summer of 1938 at the initiative of President Roosevelt, had proven a failure. Thirty-two governments had accepted the invitation to be represented at this refugee conference which attempted to substitute a planned migration of central European refugees for the chaotic flight that was proving disturbing to the other countries. Of all the governments, only one, Santo Domingo, offered to receive refugees for permanent settlement. The representative of the Dominican Republic offered to take a hundred thousand refugees for settlement in agriculture. An organization was formed in New York which entered into a contract with the Dominican Government for the settlement of the refugees. Some 500 Jewish settlers were sent over as a first contingent. An investigation made by the Brookings Institute in 1942 indicated that there was no possibility of any large scale absorption of refugees in the Dominican Republic. "By proceeding gradually it might ultimately be possible to settle from 3,000 to 5,000 immigrants in the Republic."<sup>92</sup> Sosua, where the settlement had been initiated with 474 refugees, could not accommodate any additional colonists. The colonization was very costly, being \$3,000 per male settler, a sum which was double the original estimate. Moreover, there was no opportunity for the Jews to maintain their special way of life, and there was danger that white settlers would be submerged by the surrounding colored population. Another competent survey of confidential character, made in 1944, came to the conclusion that: "One cannot speak of the colonization of thousands of families in the country at the present time."

Earlier, commissions of experts had been sent to explore the possibility of settlement in the various parts of the world—Rhodesia, British Guiana, and Mindanao in the Philippines—but the outbreak of the war in September, 1939 resulted in the

92. *Refugee Settlements in the Dominican Republic*. A Survey Conducted under the Auspices of the Brookings Institution, Washington, 1942, p. 341.

cancellation of these plans. In February, 1943, on the initiative of the United States, a new conference to consider the refugee problem met at Bermuda. Representatives of the United Kingdom joined with those of the United States. On the eve of the opening of the conference, representatives of both governments vied with each other in making "untenable claims about their past performances on behalf of refugees."<sup>93</sup> The deliberations were secret, but it is generally agreed that the results were virtually nil. Neither Great Britain nor the United States wished to admit any large number of refugees. Toward all proposals made the attitude of the representatives of the two governments was negative. "Large scale movements of people from Nazi-controlled Europe were, it was decided, impossible under the war conditions then existing. Earlier proposals to attempt to rescue Jewish children from Axis-controlled territories were said to be impracticable. As to finding places of permanent refuge for those of Hitler's victims who had escaped to neutral countries, the experts at the conference pleaded that the lack of shipping precluded effective action." The British representatives insisted that Palestine was out of the question and that the maintenance of the White Paper of 1939 was "essential from the point of view of stability in the Middle East." They also objected to the further entry of Jewish refugees into Cyprus and British East Africa. Speaking for the United States, Secretary Hull told the conference that he could do nothing since Congressional action determined the country's immigration policy.

Following the conference there were extended debates in the British Parliament, both in the House of Commons (May 19, 1943) and in the House of Lords (July 28, 1943). Although the question related to refugees in general, non-Jewish as well as Jewish, and was concerned with the possibilities of immigration to various parts of the world, the discussion centered around the problem of the Jewish refugees, with particular reference to the possibilities of Palestine. It was now clear beyond any doubt that there were no places outside of

93. From an address by James G. MacDonald (Chairman of President Roosevelt's Advisory Committee for Political Refugees) at a national conference for Palestine in Chicago, November 19, 1944. Part of his address is quoted in "Palestine and the Problem of Refugee Rehabilitation," *Jewish Frontier*, January, 1945.

Palestine where appreciable numbers of Jews could be admitted. But there was still no change in British policy, although greater moderation was observable as in the case of admission of children for whom, as was indicated, a quota of over 10,600 was permitted between April and June, 1943.

As noted above, a modification with reference to the time limit of the 1939 White Paper was granted in the fall of 1943. By that time the Axis armies had been cleared out of the Middle East and North Africa, and the Allies had made considerable progress in Italy. On November 10th, Colonel Oliver Stanley, Secretary of State for the Colonies, explained that of the total quota of 75,000 under the White Paper, only 43,922 had entered Palestine, legally or illegally, up to September 30, 1943, and that there were thus an additional 31,078 who, it might fairly be assumed, would have reached Palestine before March 31, 1944, but for the exigencies of the war. Colonel Stanley announced that His Majesty's Government had been considering this situation and had "reached the conclusion that it would be inequitable to close the doors of Palestine to those persons on account of the time factor."<sup>94</sup>

By April 1, 1944, the original terminal date of the White Paper, only about 50,000 Jews, including legal and illegal immigrants had entered Palestine, leaving a balance of some 25,000 certificates. There was still no change of attitude and the Palestine Administration doled out the certificates, insisting on many restrictions to limit Jewish immigration and confine it to refugees from countries recently liberated from Nazi control. Refugees from other countries and immigrants from Oriental countries were not regarded as eligible, the interpretation being that the outstanding certificates were to be used for relief of urgent cases. However, after considerable negotiation, the Jewish Agency succeeded, in the fall of 1944, in obtaining 10,500 certificates for distribution at their discretion.

Immigrants were admitted at the rate of 1,500-2,000 per month. By the end of 1944 an additional 10,000 succeeded in reaching Palestine, making a total of 60,000 who had entered since May, 1939, on the White Paper schedule. Of the 15,000 outstanding on January 1, 1945, the Government retained some 7,000 as a reserve for unknown illegals; of the 10,500 allotted

94. *The New York Times*, November 11, 1943.

to the Jewish Agency, 6,700 had not as yet reached Palestine. The following table gives a rough accounting of the distribution of the 75,000 immigration certificates:

	<i>Legal Immigration</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>Deducted by Government for Illegal Immigrants</i>	<i>Total</i>
1939 (since April)	8,617		10,289	
1940	4,547		6,276	
1941	3,647		1,894	
1942	2,194	19,005	1,000 (est.)	19,459
	<hr/>		<hr/>	
1943	8,507		No	
1944	12,500 (est.)	21,007	Figures	
	<hr/>	<hr/>		
		40,012		
Jan.-Apr. 1945				
Jewish Agency certificates still outstanding	6,700	6,700		
	<hr/>			
Government reserve for illegals and others			7,000	
		<hr/>	<hr/>	
		46,712	26,459	
Legal immigration		—	46,712	
Estimated illegal and Government reserve		—	26,459	
			<hr/>	
			73,171	
Balance unaccounted for		—	1,829	
			<hr/>	
			75,000	

The Nazi retreat from the countries they had conquered left in its wake a heritage of despoliation, disorder and hate. Despite the establishment of Allied administrations and various changes in local government, the plight of the Jews was only partially improved. Anti-Jewish legislation was gradually abrogated, but the effects of the Axis regime could not easily be undone. Anti-Semitism, which had grown strong roots in many of the European countries before the war and had been intensified by Nazi propaganda, was aggravated by the political



and economic problems facing the liberated countries. In some places fascists and crypto-fascists remained in office. Moreover, the unsettled economic conditions precluded rapid readjustment: many Jews liberated from concentration camps found that they had no jobs to return to or property with which to start life anew. The restoration of confiscated Jewish property presented many difficulties and aroused much ill-feeling, especially when, as frequently happened, the property had been sold to third parties who were loath to return it to the original Jewish owner and resisted compulsory restoration measures.

Among large sections of the Jewish populations in the liberated countries there developed a disbelief in the possibility of rehabilitation in their former homes. Many were moved by a strong desire to flee anywhere from the memories of the horror they had seen and suffered, but the desire to emigrate to Palestine was particularly strong. In the early part of 1944 David Schweitzer of the American Hias-Ica Immigration Association (Hicem), the largest non-Zionist Jewish emigration agency, declared that "the Jews of Europe do not debate for or against Palestine, they are only interested in the possibilities of getting there."<sup>95</sup> The desire felt by many Jews in liberated lands for emigration to Palestine was motivated by the wish to achieve psychological security and to bring up their children in a friendly Jewish atmosphere. The importance of Palestine for solving the problem of Jewish refugees was emphasized by James G. MacDonald, Chairman of President Roosevelt's Advisory Committee on Political Refugees and former League of Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, in his statement that "on the record Palestine offers incontestably the primary hope for the solution of the problem of Jewish refugees," because only in Palestine "will most of them feel that they have returned home."<sup>96</sup>

In the beginning of 1945 alarming reports issued from the liberated countries, indicating the urgent necessity of a large Jewish immigration into Palestine. There were tens of thousands of refugee Jews in Rumania, Hungary and the Balkans, and thousands in Algeria, Italy, France, and other countries liberated by the Allied powers. In Switzerland, where there were over 25,000 refugees, the authorities were urging emi-

95. *Palcor*, February 2, 1944.

96. *The New York Times*, November 20, 1944.

gration, and several thousands registered for immigration into Palestine. Despite this situation the British Government refused to allot any additional certificates. In reply to an appeal by Lord Strabolgi (Laborite) for immigration certificates beyond the exhausted White Paper quota, the Duke of Devonshire, Colonial Under-Secretary, replied: "I am sorry to have to answer with a negative, but the answer is in the negative." He gave as an excuse the lack of housing facilities in Palestine and its limited absorptive capacity; he implied the real reason when he added: "There are other complications of which your Lordships are aware." Thus, on the eve of the San Francisco Conference, there was no indication of any change in the immigration policy. It appeared that a continuation of immigration at the rate of 1,500-2,000 a month might be permitted even after the 75,000 certificates were exhausted; but there was as yet no change in principle from the conception of a "political high level" designed to crystallize the Jewish community as a permanent minority in Palestine.

## CHAPTER XIV

# THE MIDDLE EAST AND PALESTINE DURING THE SECOND WORLD WAR

THE growing importance of Palestine as gateway to the Middle East and as tricontinental bridge joining Europe, Asia and Africa, has been noted in previous chapters. Developments during the Second World War made even clearer the significance of the whole area for world affairs. The following paragraph well describes its importance during the war and its possibilities for the future:<sup>1</sup>

The geographical triangle stretching between the Mediterranean, the Black Sea and the Indian Ocean, and vaguely known as the Middle East, is the most important link between the key members of the United Nations: the United States, Britain and her central Asian empire, China and the U.S.S.R. The Suez Canal and the shipping lanes westward through the Mediterranean, eastward to India and southward around the Cape are the heart of an area including the richest petroleum deposits in the Old World, the greatest road and air network between East and West, and regions valuable not only from a purely strategical point of view but for cotton, grain, fruit, gold and chromium. Finally, the Middle East is not only the barrier between the two expanding ends of the Axis—in Europe and Asia, but contains the gateway to Europe through the Balkans, the backdoor to the Soviet Union through the Dardanelles and over the Caucasus, the road to India through Iran and Baluchistan, and the main route to Central Africa along the Nile Valley. In itself it is a vitally important section of the world and from the strategical point of view in a military sense it is the most important single geographical area of the war.

The Middle East region becomes, thus, an area where united international action is essential, but the same factors which make a harmonious United Nations' policy desirable make of the Middle East an area of possible future conflict. France will

1. C. L. Sulzberger, "German Preparations in the Middle East," *Foreign Affairs*, July, 1942, p. 663.

not permit herself to be ousted from her economic position in the Levant without a struggle. Russia is reviving old ties in Palestine and other parts of the Middle East and forming new ones. The United States, in addition to maintaining long-standing educational interests centering around the University of Beirut has, since the First World War, increased its material interests throughout the whole region; the acquisition of oil concessions in Saudi Arabia during the last decade has greatly extended American stakes. To Great Britain, the Middle East is at the very heart of its system of communication with India and the Far East. One of the major questions which faces the postwar world is whether the Middle East is to become the basis of unity or a major battleground in a third world war.

Among the Arab peoples there is increasing restiveness. Western influence has stimulated the desire for independence and substantial progress in this direction has been made from the time of the First World War. But the Arab peoples are still dissatisfied, feeling hampered in their economic development and dominated in their political life. At the same time the political leaders know that they are as yet dependent on the West for intellectual and material advance and for political stability. The Western system of ideas and institutions has no adequate foundation in the daily experience, in the thought life, or in the economic structure of the Middle East. As H. A. R. Gibb has recently pointed out, the real difficulty does not lie in the fact that Western institutions do not apply to the Arab peoples, but that "having no depth of foundation in the minds of either politicians or people (and) taken over simply as an external code of political behavior, they furnish no guidance out of an impasse or for moments of crisis."<sup>2</sup> He adds: "Generally speaking, the curse of the Middle East is superficiality, the rapid learning of techniques without understanding the mental processes that have gone to their creation, whether they are in mechanics, the sciences or the arts, or in government, administration or law."<sup>3</sup>

Even more serious than the lack of a deep enough understanding of Western culture is the existence of an economic-social structure wholly inappropriate to Western democratic

2. H. A. R. Gibb, "Middle Eastern Perplexities," *International Affairs*, October, 1944, p. 463.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 464.

institutions. It is a truism that Western democracy has been associated with the development of industry and commerce and with the rise of the middle class. In the Middle East the middle class is still weak and the landed aristocracy still exercises the dominant political influence. The great masses are bowed down by toil and poverty. Concerning Egypt, where Western political institutions have made the greatest advance and which is the richest of the Arab countries, a qualified observer has recently written: "Egypt's chief problem is that of simple bread and butter."<sup>4</sup> The youth who have attended modern schools feel a sense of frustration in the face of a lack of social and economic opportunities. They realize that the political leaders who, in the last analysis, represent the forces of property, have brought them no real advance. But their discontent is more likely to express itself in hostility to "foreign capitalism" and "alien rule" than in constructive action. In the atmosphere of disappointment and tension two alternative lines of action have their appeal. One is dictatorship based on the army, a solution which is favored by the upper classes, by discredited politicians, and by frustrated professional men. The other alternative is an anti-Western Moslem revolution resting on a sense of religious solidarity of the Moslem masses. The unsettled social situation in the Middle East is fertile ground for the growth of a native "fascism" or a recrudescence of Islamic absolutism, both forces being directed toward the expulsion of Western Powers and Western influences.

The British are conscious of the fact that the anti-alien feeling is directed against them as well as against France toward whom the hostility is more open. They realize that the United States, with a shorter history of penetration in the Middle East, a less tarnished imperialistic record, and a more idealistic reputation, has certain advantages for increased influence in the future. British advisers on Middle East affairs counsel that the heavier hand of previous British political and economic control be replaced by the lighter touch of "cooperative leadership." By taking the initiative in work for cultural and economic improvement of the Arab peoples,

4. John S. Badeau, *East and West of Suez*, Foreign Policy Association, 1943, p. 38.

it is hoped that Great Britain will retain its hegemony in the Middle East. Professor Gibb reflects such a view: <sup>5</sup>

For action on these lines, the hopes and expectations of the Arab world are centred first on Great Britain. In spite of all the grudges, the suspicions and the propaganda directed against us by enemies within and without, it is still British co-operation which the great majority desire to see extended in political and cultural life. But it must be made perfectly clear that their desire does not in any sense imply acquiescence in British political or economic control, nor even British leadership, except in so far as the taking of an initiative confers a natural leadership within the group whose co-operation is determined by that initiative. And it is equally important that recognition of our leadership should not be demanded in advance, which would necessarily induce a feeling of dependence and inferiority on the other side, but should follow naturally from the part which we shall play in a common enterprise.

Professor Gibb hopes that British cooperative leadership in the Middle East may be achieved in collaboration with the other Powers that have interests in this region. Recognizing that the relations between the British and the French in Syria "never have been good and are not good now," he still hopes to achieve cooperation since, as he thinks, the main interest of the French in the Levant is the maintenance of their cultural influence. The United States, he recognizes, has in addition to its educational interests also important oil interests. With reference to the educational interests there is no conflict; with reference to the oil interests, he believes that differences can be solved if the problems are approached "fairly and squarely and on the basis of reciprocity." With the Russians he counsels cooperation from the beginning, expressing the view that the U.S.S.R. has a contribution to make toward the solution of some of the difficult social and political questions in the Middle East. But there is another reason also: while Professor Gibb believes that the progressive elements in the Middle East would prefer British leadership in the problem of economic and social reconstruction, if the West fails he feels that the only alternative is Russian leadership.

The problem of the Jewish national home is inevitably inter-

5. Gibb, *op. cit.*, pp. 463-464.

twined with the complex situation which has been briefly outlined above. The persistent opposition of the British Colonial Office to any change in the 1939 White Paper is connected as much with its plan for hegemony in the Middle East as it is with its desire to avoid difficulty in Palestine itself. The wariness of the American State Department in supporting the Zionist program is undoubtedly related to American educational interests and economic policies in the Middle East. For the Arab political leaders themselves, opposition to Zionism is not only a response to a growing sense of Arab nationalism but has become an important element in each nation's plans. In some cases it is useful in gaining support in local political affairs; in others, it is a means of furthering ambitions for leadership in the Arab world as a whole; or it is associated with the extension of territories and with economic and political projects for the future. In more indirect ways the opposition to Zionism is part of the social struggle against Western and modern influences.

### THE ARAB MIDDLE EAST AND THE UNITED NATIONS

The Arab attitude toward the Allies during the war—at least until it became clear that the United Nations would win—was on the whole less than friendly, ranging from open rebellion to neutrality at best. There were small circles—led by Taha Husain in Egypt and by Dr. Abdurrahman Shahbandar<sup>6</sup> in Syria—which reflected a genuine response to the struggle against Nazism. Later, when Russia joined with the United Nations, Arab sympathizers of communism, of whom there were some, revealed pronounced anti-Axis tendencies. To the illiterate masses, however, the democratic appeal could mean nothing; and the “educated” youth and the middle class generally were inclined towards the Axis. This seems to have been due in part to sympathy with fascist ideas of direct action, and in part to traditional anti-British and anti-French attitudes. The major factor in the coolness of the political leaders to the United Nations’ effort was calculated self-interest: the Arabs wished to utilize the war to advance the cause of independence and to free themselves from the control of Great Britain and France; above all, they wanted to be on

6. Assassinated in 1940.

the winning side after the war. Since there was no certainty—in the early stages of the war—as to who would be victorious in the Middle East, the Arabs, as a whole, were noncommittal in their political policy.

Ibn Saud was the only ruler who was already completely independent. His attitude has been described as outwardly friendly towards the British, “but not in a degree to antagonize the Germans.”<sup>7</sup> Yet Saudi Arabia was the best case: at the other end was Yemen with its small and diminishing territory, which had been conniving with Italy for a number of years before the outbreak of the war. Egypt had won a large measure of independence by the Treaty of 1936 and had reached a satisfactory *modus vivendi* with the British, but there was still underlying resentment. Great Britain was regarded as being in league with the Palace and as having been instrumental in keeping the *Wafdist* Party out of the government. The relations with Trans-Jordan were also satisfactory, although its poverty and backwardness made it politically of no account. In Iraq the situation was bad despite the fact that it had enjoyed a treaty relationship of independence since 1932. Its government was unstable and anti-British factions were dominant. In Syria and Lebanon, the French Administration had made practical efforts to conciliate the population, but the failure of the unhappy Blum government to ratify the 1936 treaties made these countries susceptible to German influences. In Palestine, the almost complete capitulation to the Arab demands in the White Paper failed to appease the Mufti and he became openly pro-Axis.

The Germans exploited the situation to the utmost. The whole Middle East became a network of Axis agents; an elaborate propaganda apparatus was set up, with *gauleiters* in each district; and quislings were prepared in each country to take over in case of an Axis victory. The press and literature were subsidized; many doctors, dentists and government officials were in the pay of Hitler and Mussolini. Huge sums were spent on radio propaganda. Broadcasts in the native languages of each country, delivered by carefully chosen natives, emanated from the secret “Arab Nations Station,” the Athens “Free Arabic Station,” the Italian station at Bari,

7. Robert L. Baker, *Oil, Blood and Sand*, Appleton-Century, New York, 1942, p. 221.



and the German station at Berlin. The religious-minded were attracted by beautiful readings from the Koran, and the gullible by stories of Hitler's direct descent from the Prophet Mohammed. The contents of the broadcasts were for the most part directed to illiterates and low intelligences, with constant repetition of a few simple falsehoods, according to the Goebbels technique. Throughout the Middle East the slogan was spread: *Bissama Allah wa alalard Hitler* (In Heaven Allah and on earth Hitler).

No statement, however absurd, was neglected; and no promise, however impossible to fulfill, was omitted. Hitler was not only the enemy of the Jews and the British, he was also the protector of Islam, devoted with all his energies to the restoration of the caliphate and to the establishment of Arab unity. Day in and day out, the radio repeated the promise that "the day of liberation" from Britain was coming, and the Moslems were called on to rise and help the German liberators who were driving through the Caucasus and Egypt. The Arabs of one country were told that their people in another were being starved by the British, that there was lack of food in Syria and Egypt because it had been requisitioned for the armies. The Jewish peril was another theme; Britain and America were promising to give the best Arab land to the Jews. The United Nations were preparing Jewish domination of the Middle East; the Jews had already put the Lebanese out of business. Another insidious story was that a band of Jewish gangsters from Chicago and New York had settled in Palestine and were preparing a regime of terror. The Berlin radio kept reiterating the message: "Continue to fight against England and know that you will soon be free of the Anglo-Jewish yoke."<sup>8</sup>

Until November, 1942, the fate of the British in the Middle East hung in the balance. The Axis Powers had been attempting to execute their vast pincers movement—one arm of which was to come through Russia across the Caucasus, and the other across the Mediterranean through the north of Africa. It was planned that the pincers would close in the Middle

8. For a description of the Axis propaganda and intrigue in the Middle East, see C. L. Sulzberger, "German Preparations in the Middle East," *Foreign Affairs*, July, 1942, pp. 663 ff.; also Robert L. Baker, *op. cit.*, pp. 97 ff.

East, in Syria or Iraq. None of the Arab countries gave any help. King Ibn Saud "had not a word to say and could not spare a single trooper, camel or donkey when Rommel stood at Alamein."<sup>9</sup> One might argue that Saudi Arabia was neutral and could not participate, but a competent observer believes that the situation was not so innocent: "He (Ibn Saud) is waiting and is likely to jump to the side of the Axis the moment he is convinced it will win."<sup>10</sup> The British treaty with Egypt provided that she should come to the aid of Great Britain in case of war, but the best that Egypt would do was to declare itself a non-belligerent ally. The British had to take firm measures to ensure a genuinely neutral cabinet. In Iraq, which had a similar treaty, Rashid Ali al-Gailani, the Premier who had seized power by a coup d'état, attempted, in the spring of 1941 to secure the oil fields of Mosul for Hitler, whose drive to the East was now in full force. After the failure of the Iraqi *putsch*, the British, aided by the Free French, took over Syria which was swarming with Axis agents.

It was only when North Africa was cleared of Axis forces by the British and American armies that Egypt and Iraq made positive gestures of friendliness to the United Nations. In January, 1943—a year and a half after the British reconquest of Iraq and when all chance of an Axis victory in the Middle East had long passed—Iraq declared war against Germany. In November, 1943, Egypt declared its adherence to the Atlantic Charter. In both cases the respective governments frankly declared that their statements were made with an eye to obtaining seats at the peace conference. Despite the disappointment of British public opinion with the action of the Arabs during the war, official comment tended to offer apologies. It was argued that in view of Egypt's vulnerability to Axis bombing, and in the light of the fact that it could not contribute very much to the actual fighting, its non-belligerent attitude was not unjustifiable.<sup>11</sup> In answer to a question in Parliament concerning Egypt's participation in the defense of the country, Sir James Grigg, Secretary of War, replied: "The Egyptian Government fulfilled its obligation under the Anglo-

9. Pierre Van Paassen, *The Forgotten Ally*, Dial Press, New York, 1943, p. 180.

10. Robert L. Baker, *op. cit.*, p. 221.

11. The Royal Institute of International Affairs, *The Middle East*, May, 1943.

Egyptian Treaty of 1936.”<sup>12</sup> Evidently the Government felt that all it could have expected was the technical fulfillment of the terms of the treaty; far from expecting help, they were gratified that the Arabs had offered so little opposition to the Allied cause. This apologetic attitude was in line with the tendency not to antagonize the Arab countries, in order to win their cooperation with Great Britain after the war.

The scope of Great Britain's influence over the Middle East increased as a result of the war. France, its rival in this area, was now defeated and the weakening of her control over Syria and Lebanon was Britain's gain. However, new forces have begun to be operative: Russia cannot be expected to be wholly indifferent to what happens in the Middle East, where she had a great interest before the war. Mr. Maisky, former Russian Ambassador to Great Britain, traveled through Palestine and the Middle East in the fall of 1943, toured the Jewish colonies and visited Jewish industrial enterprises.<sup>13</sup> There were other incidents indicating a change of attitude on the part of Soviet Russia toward Zionism, to which it had hitherto been unfriendly. The election last year of the Patriarch in the U.S.S.R. was followed by a renewal of contacts between the Russian Orthodox Church and Arab countries. Arab diplomatic representation has now been established with all the independent Arab states from Bagdad to Cairo. Arab publications are sent to Moscow, and Arab students are invited there; in Arab countries pro-Soviet circles are springing up and leftist groups are more openly active in political life. Nevertheless, the Soviet attitude toward Arab affairs and toward Zionism still remains noncommittal. Its avowed interest in the Middle East centers around Turkey and Iran, particularly the latter where it is concerned with oil concessions.

Much more tangible are the evidences of a direct economic interest of the United States in the Middle East. The United States has established military missions in Egypt, Iraq and

12. *Parliamentary Debates, Commons*, Vol. 393, col. 511, November 2, 1943.

13. Eliahu Ben-Horin, in "The Soviet Wooing of Palestine," *Harper's*, April, 1944, pp. 413 ff. It was also noted that in the fall of 1943 the *Histadrut* (Jewish Labor Federation of Palestine) made a £10,000 contribution to the Russian Red Cross; consignments of surgical instruments and motor ambulances and other medical and hospital supplies have been sent from Palestine to Russia. In January, 1944, an exhibition showing the progress of Jewish colonization in Palestine was admitted to Russia.

Iran; President Roosevelt sent personal envoys to report on the situation in the Middle East;<sup>14</sup> American experts have been sent to assist local governments in the reorganization of finances and the police system, and to advise on the development of agricultural possibilities and engineering projects. The most powerful influence is that exerted through the grant of lend-lease privileges. This recent expansion of the interests of the United States in the political and economic affairs of the Middle East was highlighted by the widespread discussion, in the spring of 1944, of the proposed construction of a pipeline by the United States Government in cooperation with American oil companies, from Saudi Arabia to the Mediterranean. President Roosevelt's meeting with Ibn Saud after the Yalta Conference, in an atmosphere of pomp and ceremony on board an American cruiser, dramatized the American interest in Arabian oil.

The following comment made with particular reference to Syria is relevant to the general situation in the Middle East:<sup>15</sup>

Britain, of course, has special positions in Iraq and Egypt; it governs Palestine outright. These special positions may need defending at some future moment. It is not yet clear, for instance, what attitude Russia, whose awakened interest in the Middle East has been widely commented upon, will take with regard to the "independence" of Iraq, Palestine, Transjordan, and Egypt. A semblance of solidarity between Britain and France may, after all, be worth preserving, even in a British sphere like the Middle East. On the other hand, if what is left of the French position in the Levant succumbs to American, and possibly even Russian, pressure, Britain, whose Ninth Army still occupies Syria and the Lebanon, cannot be held responsible. Long experience has made the Cartesian French wary of the British in the Middle East. Today, as in the past, the French are apt to conclude: *Plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose.*"

These interests and conflicts help to explain the leniency with which the United Nations regarded the questionable attitude of the Arab nations during the war and the alacrity with which they accepted the Arab states as "allies" when the Axis Powers were already defeated. At the last moment, toward the

14. W. C. Bullitt in 1941; Colonel Harold B. Hoskins in November, 1942, and March, 1943; and, more recently, General Patrick Hurley.

15. Michael Clark, "Syria: Near East Cockpit," *The Nation*, March 17, 1945, pp. 301-303.

end of February 1945, the Arab countries—Syria, Lebanon, Egypt and Saudi Arabia—hastily declared war against the Axis.<sup>16</sup> They were all invited to participate in the San Francisco Conference. Egypt and Saudi Arabia were invited immediately, despite the fact that the latter did not sign the United Nations declaration until a month later. There was some question at first as to whether Syria and Lebanon would be invited, as juridically they were still mandated territories. A way out was found by extending the invitation at the suggestion of France. Iraq, theoretically independent but occupied by the British, was invited on the ground that it had declared war against the Axis in 1943.

#### *Saudi Arabia and Oil*

The ambiguous attitude of Ibn Saud toward the cause of the United Nations has already been noted. A defender of Ibn Saud has attempted to justify his action. He believes that since 1939, there have been a number of instances when a change of policy on the part of Ibn Saud in favor of the Axis might have been warranted on realistic grounds—e.g., after the collapse of France, during Germany's successful Balkan campaign in 1940 and when the Iraq uprising took place in May, 1941. Under all these temptations, Ibn Saud continued to counsel moderation.<sup>17</sup> A view intermediate between those who accuse him of readiness to go over to the Axis and those who believe he was trying to remain loyal to the Allies, is represented by the following quotation:<sup>18</sup>

Ibn Saud's attitude toward the war is clear. He is primarily an Arab and a Moslem. He must detest the Axis. But he has never loved the British, and although what he knows of Americans has made him sympathetic, what he does know is not very much. He has made alliances with the British out of necessity and self-interest, not because he considers them free from machinations or deceitfulness . . . He will support the cause of the United Nations only in so far as it guarantees justice, freedom and opportunity for the Arabs.

16. Declaration of war against the Axis and signing of the Declaration of the United Nations were prerequisite for invitation to the San Francisco Conference. After Yalta it was announced that the declaration of war against the Axis was to be made before March, 1945.

17. Arthur J. Arberry and Rom Landau, eds., *Islam Today*, Faber and Faber, London, 1943, p. 45.

18. Joel Carmichael, "Prince of Arabs," *Foreign Affairs*, July, 1942, p. 730.

There was for a time—and perhaps still is—a tendency to build him up as “Prince of Arabs,” as the most likely head of a possible Arab Federation, and he has been described as entertaining “a decided preference for Americans.”<sup>19</sup> The attempt to picture this shrewd, fanatical, ruthless—if intrepid, capable and altogether formidable—tribal chieftain of the Arabian desert as a great leader of the Arab states on their way to modernization and democracy, has evidently a great deal to do with the oil concessions which Ibn Saud granted to the American companies in 1933. When extensions of the concessions were negotiated in 1939, Ibn Saud again awarded them to the Arabian-American Oil Company; this time the competitive offers were made by government-controlled Japanese and German enterprises. It has been suggested that Ibn Saud’s decision to give the concessions to the Americans was due to his belief that he had no reason to fear imperialistic exploitation from the United States. However, in the 1939 situation, it is probable that the British brought pressure to bear to grant the concessions to the Americans rather than the Japanese and Germans.<sup>20</sup> It is maintained by some that Great Britain might have obtained the concession if she had wished.<sup>21</sup>

At any rate, both the United States and Great Britain are helping to maintain Saudi Arabia. A considerable portion of Saudi Arabia’s revenue comes from the sums paid for these concessions.<sup>22</sup> Most of the balance comes from a subsidy granted by the British Government, amounting to about a million pounds a year. The revenue derived from the annual Mecca pilgrimage, a third lucrative source of Ibn Saud’s income, was greatly reduced as a result of wartime transportation difficulties. The United States and British Governments have agreed to help Ibn Saud in his financial difficulties and an amount of 25 million dollars—or, according to another report, 10 million—will go to the King directly.<sup>23</sup> In March,

19. John Van Ess, *Meet the Arab*, John Day, New York, 1943, p. 88.

20. Baker, *op. cit.*, pp. 279–280.

21. John M. Bee, “Country of Potential Resources,” *Great Britain and the East*, May 16, 1942.

22. *The New York Times*, December 16, 1943.

23. *The New York Times*, March 18, 1944. A somewhat different version of the story is that the amount of 25 million dollars was paid by the United States Government to Ibn Saud to counteract subsidies paid him by the British Government and to assist the American oil companies in keeping their monopoly.

1944, Major General Ralph Royce, who had been to Saudi Arabia before, again visited the country and delivered an initial "token shipment of lend-lease munitions" as well as a payment of \$1,250,000 in Saudi Arabian coins minted in the United States. Prior to this, a delegation from Saudi Arabia, headed by the two sons of King Ibn Saud, visited the United States and were entertained by the Government and by the Standard Oil Company of California. Visits to Ibn Saud have also been paid by an emissary of President Roosevelt—General Patrick Hurley, who is connected with the oil companies.

The British have not issued any official statement with regard to their interest in the Saudi Arabian oil developments. According to one source,<sup>24</sup> they do not wish to enter into competition with American firms for Arabian oil. However, the proposal made in the spring of 1944 to construct an American government-owned and operated pipeline in territories within the British sphere of influence, i.e., through Trans-Jordan and Palestine, seemed to give serious concern to the British. In a somewhat sharply worded article, the *Economist*,<sup>25</sup> which is representative of British liberal opinion, implied that the statement made by Mr. H. L. Ickes<sup>26</sup> of the agreement with the Arabian-American Oil Company for the construction of a pipeline from the Saudi Arabian fields to the Mediterranean, was issued without prior consultation with Britain. Moreover, the article linked Mr. Ickes' announcement with the introduction of the Palestine Resolution in Congress in February, 1944,<sup>27</sup> citing both as examples of American excursions into Middle Eastern politics which "show little sign of forethought and even less of any desire to coordinate American policy with that of Great Britain." It also contained a reference to the wide scope of General Royce's military mission to Saudi Arabia, which concerned itself with petroleum extraction, communications and public health. The article concluded that a solution of the problems of Middle Eastern development would be found

24. John McCormick, *The New York Times*, March 18, 1944.

25. March 11, 1944.

26. In his capacity as Petroleum Administrator for War and president of the Petroleum Reserves Corporation. The Petroleum Reserves Corporation was founded in July, 1943, as an agency of the Federal Government "to inspire and encourage the national interest of the United States in the petroleum fields of the world where private industry is willing to go, and to propose safeguards for those interests."

27. See below, p. 1114.

only in the abandonment of "dangerous unilateralism and if America and Britain work together and plan policies to meet the interests of the whole area."

There are two contrasted views as to the relation of Great Britain and the United States of America in regard to the Middle East. One holds that they are in fact rivals engaged in a struggle of some intensity for influence in this region. The other view is that Great Britain is willing to share the spoils of Middle East exploitation with the United States but wishes that American policy be kept in harmony with general British policy. It is also possible that the private companies of the two countries regard each other as rivals while the governments realize the necessity of acting together; the British view undoubtedly being that in this area the United States should follow the British lead. Ibn Saud, it appears, was playing both sides to the greatest advantage, maintaining his connections with the United States and meanwhile seeking to establish oil relations with Great Britain through the appointment of a British Petroleum Adviser.<sup>28</sup>

Building of the pipeline through Palestine to the port of Haifa could undoubtedly be of advantage to the whole country and might be made to contribute to the development of the Jewish national home if the interests of the latter were safeguarded, e.g., through adequate provision for fair prices on oil sold at Haifa and standard wages for labor. Rumors, however, were rife that concessions were being made to Ibn Saud at the expense of the Zionist policy in Palestine.<sup>29</sup> Since his intervention in the Palestine situation during 1936, together with King Ghazi of Iraq and the Emir Abdullah, his interest in supporting the political ambitions of the Arabs of Palestine has grown. On March 21, 1943, in an interview with the representative of *Life*, he definitely aligned himself against the Jewish claims.<sup>30</sup> In this report he was quoted as saying that he did not believe that the Jews would ever achieve any state or power "either in the land of the Arabs or elsewhere," because of "what God has revealed unto us through the mouth of his Prophet in his Holy Book." What has been revealed is evidently an echo of the usual Arab arguments: the Jews have no

28. Henry J. Taylor, *New York World-Telegram*, April 13-18, 1944.

29. I. F. Stone, "Palestine Run-Around," *The Nation*, March 18, 1944.

30. Noel F. Busch, "King of Arabia," *Life*, May 31, 1943.



right to Palestine since the Jews were driven from it long ago; the demands of the Jews of Palestine are an injustice to the Arabs and to the Moslems in general; Zionism has caused dissension between the Moslems and their friends, the Allies; if the Jews are impelled to seek a place to live, Europe and America can supply larger and more fertile land than Palestine. In his conversation with President Roosevelt, Ibn Saud appears to have left the impression that his opposition to Zionism was extreme and unalterable.

*Egypt—Non-Committal and Non-Belligerent*

As in the case of Iraq, Great Britain had a treaty of alliance with Egypt (Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936). This treaty provided that "each of the High Contracting Parties undertakes not to adopt in relation to foreign countries an attitude which is inconsistent with the alliance . . ." It further provided that: "Should . . . either of the High Contracting Parties become engaged in war the other High Contracting Party will . . . immediately come to its aid in the capacity of an Ally. The aid of His Majesty, the King of Egypt, in the event of war, imminent menace of war, or apprehended international emergency will consist in furnishing to His Majesty the King and Emperor on Egyptian territory . . . all the facilities and assistance in his power, including the use of his ports, aerodromes and means of communication . . . martial law and an effective censorship."

Great Britain did not count on the military help of the Egyptian army, which was small and poorly trained, but it expected a declaration of war against Germany—and later against Italy—and full moral support in the war effort. However, anti-British feeling ran high among the people. It was the general opinion that the British were supporting the Crown and the aristocratic court clique, preventing the *Wafd*, which represented the nationalist middle class, from playing its due part in the government of Egypt. There was also a large settlement of Italians in Alexandria, and Italian business interests were generally strong in the country. Above all, Egypt did not wish to be involved in the war; it wanted to avoid becoming the target of bombs and perhaps finding itself on the losing side after the war.

In August, 1939, when the outbreak of the war was inevi-

table and young King Farouk felt the need for a strong prime minister, Ali Maher Pasha was appointed to form a new government. Egypt broke off diplomatic relations with Germany on September 7, 1939, and the Egyptian Army took up positions on the Egyptian frontier. Ali Maher Pasha, who was pro-Italian in his sympathies, as was later established, was loath to cooperate fully with the British Government in living up to the spirit of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of alliance. In April, 1940, the *Wafd* submitted a memorandum to the British Ambassador in which it declared itself willing to support the Allied cause. However, it laid down conditions which were unacceptable, i.e., that British soldiers leave Egypt immediately after the war; that England negotiate an immediate settlement of the Anglo-Sudan question after the war; and that Egypt be allowed "to defend her rights" at the peace conference. On May 4, 1940, when Italy's entrance into the war was in the offing, Saleh Harb Pasha, the Egyptian War Minister, after a conference with General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson, declared: "We are prepared for any and every eventuality, but our preparedness is entirely for defensive purposes." After the declaration of war, Egypt severed financial and economic relations with Italy and the Italian diplomatic staff left Cairo. However, Ali Maher Pasha ordered the Egyptian troops to refrain from attacking the Italians and the frontier units were withdrawn so as to avoid a clash.

Under pressure from the British, Ali Maher was forced to resign and Hassan Sabry Pasha replaced him. He organized a coalition government on July 28, 1940. This government included the *Saadists*, who were inclined towards Britain and urged a declaration of war, but did not include the *Wafdist* group. Despite the fact that he was no longer prime minister, Ali Maher continued to play a role against the allied war effort as the personal adviser of King Farouk and leader of the palace clique. On August 21, 1940, at a secret session of the Egyptian Parliament, Hassan Sabry declared that Egypt would fight if Italian troops crossed her frontiers.<sup>31</sup> In September, when Marshal Graziani's forces moved against Egypt, martial law was declared and all Italians in Egypt were rounded up. However, Egypt did not declare war, the main result being that the four Cabinet ministers representing the

31. *The New York Times*, August 23, 1940.

*Saadists* resigned. In May, 1941, General Abdul Aziz Masri, the Inspector-General of the Egyptian Army, escaped in a plane from Cairo, but his plane crashed and he was apprehended before he was able to reach the Axis lines. He was placed in custody to stand trial for treason.<sup>32</sup> Alexandria was severely bombed on June 6, 1941 and the Egyptian Government protested strongly to the Axis powers. The British Government made an unconditional grant of a million pounds for the extension of air raid precautions. But this did not induce the Egyptians to make the desired declaration of war against the Axis powers.

Hassan Sabry had died on November 14, 1940, while delivering the King's speech from the throne in Parliament. He was succeeded by Hussein Sirry Pasha who remained in power until February, 1942, when a clash between the King and the Prime Minister took place. The crisis originated in a difference of opinion concerning the relations with Vichy. At the behest of the British, Egypt broke off relations with the Vichy Government early in January, 1942, while King Farouk was absent from Cairo. When he returned he protested to the Foreign Minister that the royal prerogative had been violated. As a result, the cabinet of Hussein Sirry resigned and a serious crisis resulted. Despite the objection of the palace clique, at the urging of Sir Miles E. Lampson, the British Ambassador, the King reluctantly invited Nahas Pasha to form a new government on his own terms.<sup>33</sup> He dissolved Parliament and general elections were called for March, in which the *Wafd* Party obtained an overwhelming majority. Nahas Pasha, in favor with the British, became the prime minister and he held power until October, 1944. Ali Maher Pasha, suspected of pro-Italian ac-

32. He was released when Nahas Pasha came into power the following year, on the ground of inadequate evidence, but he was kept under police surveillance. It was rumored that doctored army plans given by General Wavell to Ali Maher Pasha were found on his person. General Masri was an outstanding figure in the Egyptian and Arab nationalist movement; he had assisted the Young Turks in seizing power but later broke with them, and was one of the chief organizers of the nationalistic al-Ahd secret military society. In 1914 he was arrested by the Turks and was saved from the gallows only through British intervention.

33. The British evidently had to use drastic measures, with armored cars and tanks at the palace gates. They are reported to have given the King a choice between abdication and naming a premier favorable to the Allies. (*The New York Times*, June 3, 1945.)

tivity, was detained by the British Government in April "for reasons relating to the safety and security of the State."

Throughout the entire period Egyptian leaders found it necessary to assure their people that Egypt was not at war. On March 30, 1942, when Parliament convened, King Farouk declared in his opening speech: "Egypt will do all within her power to avoid war." There was evident fear of fifth columnists and in a speech in Parliament on June 24, 1942, when the military situation was desperate, Nahas Pasha declared, in warning the Egyptians against the devices of the fifth columnists: "The British never have asked Egypt to participate in the war or to send troops to the frontier."<sup>34</sup> The British had allowed Egyptian troops to man the vital defense points in Egypt, including bridges and dams, but so serious were the apprehensions of treason, that on July 7, 1942, the Egyptian troops were replaced by British soldiers.<sup>35</sup> On the eve of the day of decision at Alamein, the British had to give assurance that Egyptian soldiers would not be called upon but that the British would defend Egypt and had the necessary forces to do so.<sup>36</sup>

When the tide began to turn in favor of the United Nations, Egypt rushed to ask for a share in the fruits of victory. After the American-British landings in North Africa in November, 1942, King Farouk declared in Parliament that Egypt, a non-belligerent ally of the United Nations, had requested and received a promise of representation at any peace conference to be held after the war. It was, however, not until November 14, 1943, that Egypt declared its adherence to the Atlantic Charter and the King stated that negotiations had begun to include Egypt among the United Nations.<sup>37</sup> On December 14, 1943, speeches were made in the Egyptian Parliament expressing the hope "that Egypt's great contributions to the war effort and the valuable assistance given to her ally" would entitle her to a seat at the peace conference and would "allow her to occupy the place she deserves in the concert of nations."<sup>38</sup>

During the premiership of Nahas Pasha, Egypt became the center of talks on Arab unity. In March, 1943, Nahas Pasha

34. *Ibid.*, June 25, 1942.

35. *Herald Tribune*, July 8, 1942.

36. *The New York Times*, July 1, 1942.

37. *Ibid.*, November 15, 1943.

38. *The Times* (London), December 14, 1943.

announced that discussions would be initiated with the purpose of calling a conference of Arab States in Cairo. The announcement aroused great interest in the Arab world as well as apprehension. A long period of discussion and negotiation followed which ended successfully in the calling of a preliminary conference in Alexandria in the fall of 1944. A protocol signed by the members of the Arab delegations at that time was the basis for a pact concluded at Cairo on February 14, 1945, establishing a League of Arab Nations. In the meantime, however, Nahas Pasha had fallen from power. The day after the conference in Alexandria ended, King Farouk dismissed the Prime Minister in a dramatic coup and appointed Ahmed Maher Pasha<sup>39</sup> in his place. Disturbances in Cairo were quickly suppressed. The new government undertook to continue the policy of Arab unity and instituted a special department of Arab affairs in the Egyptian Foreign Office.

In his relations with Great Britain, Ahmed Maher, who was supported by the *Saadists*,<sup>40</sup> followed a more moderate policy than the *Wafdists*, who demanded the evacuation of all foreign troops after the war, Egyptian control over Suez and the Sudan, and transfer of Anglo-American military installations and air bases to Egypt. In January, 1945, new elections took place which were boycotted by the *Wafd* Party and which resulted in giving the *Saadists* a majority in the Chamber of Deputies. There were further clashes in February, when the official reports stated that "agents of an Egyptian political party had incited the rioting, although the students ostensibly demonstrated for food and clothing." On February 24th, the Premier was assassinated at the time when he introduced for ratification the King's decree declaring Egypt at war with the Axis. While only two votes were cast against the bill in the Chamber, from which the *Wafdists* were absent, it passed the Senate, where a considerable group of *Wafdists* were still present, by only a relatively small majority (66-41).

On the economic side, Egypt gained greatly during the war and even enjoyed a period of prosperity. She expanded her industries and benefited by the many millions poured into the

39. The brother of Ali Maher Pasha, suspected of pro-Italian leanings, mentioned above, p. 971.

40. This group, named after Saad Zaghlul Pasha, the founder of the *Wafd*, split off from the *Wafdists* and developed into an important Egyptian party more conciliatory toward the British.

country by the Allied armies for supplies, works and services. Britain helped greatly through the purchase of Egypt's cotton crop when the blockade against Germany was declared; e.g., in 1940, the whole crop, and in 1944, half the crop. This put a premium on cotton planting and led to a food shortage. Although the upper classes grew rich, malnutrition and disease increased among the masses. As the war receded, economic problems became ever more serious despite considerable financial help extended by the British. At the beginning of 1945, Britain agreed to provide Egypt with \$40,000,000 for trade with the United States and Canada on terms which enabled British importers to compare their prices with those of other importers in advance. The United States is making a definite effort to increase its trade with Egypt. In his conversations with King Farouk following the Yalta Conference, President Roosevelt referred to the purchase by the United States of large quantities of Egyptian cotton during the war and expressed the hope that a greatly increased exchange of other commodities would be developed in the future.<sup>41</sup>

#### *Pro-Axis Rising in Iraq*

Despite the treaty of 1930, which was ratified in 1932, the course of British administration did not run smoothly in Iraq. There were many clashes between the Government and the extremists, who were pressing for immediate and complete independence. As long as he lived, King Faisal served as an able go-between. As Nuri Said Pasha remarked in April, 1941: "Since the untimely death of King Faisal, Iraq has not had a chance to have a strong head of the state who could firmly control the country." Under King Ghazi, the son and successor of Faisal, there was a rapid increase of pro-German propaganda in Iraq, although it is said that the young king himself was rather inclined toward the British. Along with the pro-Axis feeling there went a growth of anti-Semitism, and in October, 1936, the month when General Sidqi Beqir executed his coup d'état, anti-Jewish riots broke out in Bagdad, resulting in the death of several Jews. Sidqi Beqir was married to an Austrian wife and had dealings with the Germans in connection with the purchase of military supplies. When he was assassinated in

41. Department of State *Bulletin*, February 25, 1945, p. 289.

1937 in Mosul, it was reported that lucrative German munitions contracts were found in his pockets.

Through the efforts of Dr. Fritz Grobba, German minister to Iraq—one of Germany's ablest experts on Arab affairs—German influence began to replace that of the British in education, the government, and the army. Trade with Germany boomed under barter agreements. For a short time a pro-British element, headed by Jemal al-Midfai and Nuri Said Pasha, controlled the government, but anti-British feeling continued to prevail in the country at large. King Ghazi died in 1939, when his motorcycle crashed into a telephone pole on a highway outside Bagdad. It was said that he had been drinking and was speeding at eighty miles an hour, but the anti-British feeling was so great that the people believed a rumor that the British had murdered the King. Aroused by this rumor, a mob in Mosul murdered the British consul there. King Ghazi was succeeded by his four-year-old son, Faisal II, with the Emir Abdul Ilah, maternal uncle of the child, becoming Regent.

A most important influence was exerted on the course of events by the Mufti of Jerusalem who had fled from Syria to Iraq in the autumn of 1939. In Iraq he was acclaimed as an Arab hero and fêted by everyone from the Prime Minister down. The old dream of the *Istiqlal*, that Iraq would become the nucleus for a United Arabia, received a new impetus. The Mufti gave Nuri Said Pasha, the Prime Minister, a formal promise that he would refrain from political activity during his stay in Iraq, but this was evidently merely a cover for doing the opposite. He proceeded systematically to organize an anti-British movement with the support of the Iraqi Parliament. Nuri Said did nothing about it and, in fact, permitted the press to carry on ardent Arab nationalist propaganda which was to no lesser degree anti-British. Many who were not in agreement with the Mufti's anti-British aims thought that England, in the throes of war, might be willing to buy Arab friendship by striking a bargain over the Palestinian question. They were willing to join with the Mufti in stimulating popular feeling against Britain and used the Palestine issue as an instrument.

The Mufti established headquarters with a carefully chosen staff of propagandists and *provocateurs*. As noted above,

Jemal al-Husaini, the Mufti's relative and former president of the Palestine Arab Party, was the chief of staff. The organization had ample support from government funds and nationalist societies. The Iraqi Parliament voted 18,000 dinars and the Iraqi secret service paid a thousand dinars regularly from its hidden funds. Under a check-off system, two percent of the salary of every Iraqi government official, including the military and the police, was paid to the Mufti. Sums were received from the Palestine Defense Society, the Red Crescent and from other public funds originally collected for philanthropic purposes. Gifts also were sent from Egypt and from Saudi Arabia. Large sums are known to have been paid by the Germans and the Italians. In 1941 the British secret service was in a position to state categorically "that the Mufti had accepted a subsidy of £10,000 sterling from the Italian Minister in Bagdad and had agreed to start another revolt in Palestine if and when supplied with £20,000 gold monthly."<sup>42</sup>

The Mufti was therefore backed by large funds and had the tacit support of the Iraqi Government despite the fact that Nuri Said, ostensibly pro-British, was the Prime Minister. Through his organization the Mufti furnished the Iraqi Government with Palestinian and Syrian Arab refugees to fill essential government and other positions. These formed the nucleus of a pro-Axis and anti-British movement of rebellion. The Mufti also had the support of a number of Arab nationalist organizations which were receiving German funds arriving in Iraq through the diplomatic pouches of the Italian Legation. The Mufti concentrated his efforts on establishing a controlling influence over a large number of the police force, the army, teachers, doctors and lawyers. He was able to exert considerable pressure on the government in the granting of passports and obtaining the entry of Arab political refugees from Palestine into Iraq without payment of taxes. Publication under his control was not interfered with by the censorship and his own paper, *Istiqlal*, was left unhindered despite the fact that it was edited by Osman Qassin, the former editor of *al-Liwa* of Palestine, a publication known to have been subsidized by German and Iraqi funds.

42. C. L. Sulzberger, "German Preparations in the Middle East," *Foreign Affairs*, July, 1942. The above account of the activities of the Mufti in Iraq is drawn from this article.



A key person in the Mufti's organization was Taha Pasha al Hashimi, who had become Iraqi Defense Minister in December, 1938. Before that, he had been president of the Iraqi Palestine Defense Society in charge of the Mufti's propaganda and responsible for the preparation of the Nazi broadcast programs in Arabic. Taha Pasha was in close contact with Germany's "number one" Arab agent, Dr. Amin Ruwaiha, and through him, with the German Legation. He was also working together with a group of Iraqi army officers known as "The Golden Square" who were permeated with ultra-nationalistic and anti-British views, their aim being to make Iraq the nucleus of a Pan-Arab Federation, which would annex Syria, Palestine and Trans-Jordan.

At the outbreak of the war, Nuri Said, the Prime Minister, severed relations with Germany. He was accused by military circles of being Britain's tool. In order to gain popular support, Nuri Said befriended the Mufti and the latter exploited this friendship. He began to hold meetings with army officers, including the commander of the cavalry, Mahmud Salmud, a member of the Golden Square and later chief of the Iraqi Royal Air Force. With this situation in the background, the Golden Square began to take matters in hand. Early in 1940, Rustum Haider—friend of Nuri Said and his colleague in the Arab Delegation in Paris in 1919, and later King Faisal's political secretary—was assassinated. A cabinet shake-up in March 1940 brought to the premiership General Rashid Ali al-Gailani, an extreme pro-German militarist, who had been given a position in the government by Taha Pasha and who was now reappointed as Defense Minister. The Mufti played a major role in making the new government arrangements.<sup>43</sup> Parliament did not approve Rashid Ali's policy and a new cabinet was organized in February, 1941, but in April Gailani came back to power, this time as a result of a coup d'état by army circles.

There was no doubt about the anti-British orientation of the new government and the pro-British elements fled the country.

43. These events took place on the eve of a scheduled visit by Nuri Said to King Ibn Saud at Riad, where questions of the friendship treaty between Iraq and Saudi Arabia were to be cleared up. Nuri did not make the visit, fearing that the Germans might have him assassinated on the way to Saudi Arabia.

Egged on by the Germans and with German assistance, Gailani seized the oil fields, and soon clashes occurred between Iraqi soldiers and British detachments. At the end of April the British administration requested the Iraqi government to permit British soldiers to enter from India, in accordance with the terms of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty. At first Rashid Ali granted the request, but a few days later he informed the British that no additional forces would be allowed. The British, however, continued to bring soldiers to Iraq and they were attacked by the Iraqis. The Regent, who had received hasty warning, fled, and Gailani's action became unconstitutional as a result; but an illegal session of Parliament ratified his acts and Gailani's government was recognized by Vichy and by the U.S.S.R. which was still allied with Germany at the time.

Thus, in the days when there was difficult fighting in the north of Africa, at Tobruk, a new front was opened at the other extreme end of the Middle East, in Iraq. The Germans sent a number of planes to help Gailani. Iraqi students in Beirut left the American University to go home and fight the British. However, the measure of aid expected from Germany was not forthcoming, and after about five or six weeks' fighting the British gained control and a new government under Midfai came into power. Rashid Ali fled to Iran in the company of the Mufti of Jerusalem and a few other supporters. A number of the rebels were tried for treason and executed, but Rashid Ali and the Mufti got away, the former to Turkey and the latter finally landing in Germany.<sup>44</sup> Iraq virtually remained under military occupation. Later, Nuri Said again became prime minister, and on January 16, 1943, Iraq declared war against the Axis. The Regent, in a speech from the throne at the opening of Parliament when war was declared, stated that the declaration of war had been prompted by the desire of the Iraqi Government to be represented at the future peace conference. An immediate reward to Iraq was the grant of lend-lease facilities. In June, 1944, Nuri Said resigned, giving ill health as the reason, and Hamdi Pachachi Pasha headed a new cabinet.

While the revolt was no doubt inspired by the Germans, it

44. Rashid Ali was caught by the British in Italy and returned to Bagdad for trial.

had the sympathy of a large part of the population. The *Round Table*<sup>45</sup> of September, 1941, gave the following analysis of the situation:

The young men of the present generation have grown up in the tense atmosphere of the post-war years. From their first recollections those whom they revered as patriots in their country have been engaged in a struggle against either Britain or France. . . . They have observed with scorn what they regard as the futilities of the elder statesmen, the shufflings in and out of office, the pursuit of private interests, the acceptance of soothing formulas. They are contemptuous of the devotional and pacific aspects of their religion; Islam for them is a fighting creed, that bids them think shame so long as the foreigners are not driven out of the Moslem lands by the sword. They are fascinated by the apparent ease with which in Italy and Germany small but active minorities have seized control . . . When an Arab state possesses an army of its own, it is fatally easy for young men . . . to believe that their country . . . is called upon to assume the leadership in a mission to free its still enslaved kinsmen . . . In reality, the Iraqi rising was the extreme symptom of a widespread *malaise* among the Arab peoples. It is certain that its leaders were counting not only on German support but also on sympathetic action in the other Arab countries . . . For months before the actual revolt, the highest military authorities were openly broadcasting to the people that their army and air force had the glorious mission of renewing the heroic days of Arab conquests and the Crusades, and of liberating Syria and Palestine from the serfdom imposed on them by Europe and the Jews.

John Van Ess,<sup>46</sup> an American missionary who had lived for forty years among the Arabs in Iraq, made a somewhat similar analysis, as his comment on the modern type of education in the Arab countries indicates:

Education in all the Arab states has been superficial, laying entire stress on learning facts, colored to be sure by passing ideologies, but not at all inculcating the dignity of manual labor. . . . The boy has, therefore, found his home atmosphere uncongenial and has sought expansion in the cafés and clubs where he learned and practiced the patter of chauvinism. Indeed, such training seemed to be the surest

45. This quarterly reviews the politics of the British Commonwealth. The articles are anonymous but are generally understood to be by high British administrators from the Dominions and Colonies.

46. John Van Ess, *Meet the Arab*, pp. 175, 208.

guarantee of a government job, while, after all, all other doors, chiefly economic, were closed to him anyway.

Although Van Ess is generally sympathetic to the Arab peoples and to their aspirations, he nevertheless seems to think that the granting of independence to Iraq was premature. Historically, the political entity now called Iraq has no basis, and the peoples comprising it were never organically united in the past excepting as they formed parts of larger empires. When pressure from the outside was relaxed their centrifugal tendencies always reappeared. It is only among the tribes, which comprise seven-eighths of the country, that any corporate loyalty is to be found, and yet the first effort of the new system of government was to break down the tribal system and to substitute for it a system of government dominated by the *effendis* and landowners. He goes on to say :

A third weakness was the introduction of the electoral system in a country where even now less than twenty percent of the men and four percent of the women are literate. In a municipal election in Basrah a few years ago, each candidate received more votes than the total number of votes registered . . . A fourth, and to my mind, most fatal defect, was the setting up of a vast machinery of government, court, parliament, army, and air-force and an educational system which trained only for government jobs, all that before the country had become at all economically independent.

### *Independence in Syria and Lebanon*

Syria and Lebanon made treaties with France in 1936, according to which they would become independent—though retaining a treaty of alliance with France—three years after the ratification of the agreement by the French Parliament. However, the Blum Government, which had carried through the treaty, was soon surrounded with difficulties and passed out of existence before it could ratify the Syrian and Lebanese agreements. In 1938, the Sanjak of Alexandretta, Syria's northern outlet to the Mediterranean—the disposition of which had been in dispute since the end of the first World War—was declared an independent republican state and received the Turkish name of Hatay. Maintaining a nominal independence for a time, it was soon incorporated into Turkey. The failure to

ratify the treaty, and the separation of Alexandretta from Syria increased the restive spirit in Syria.

On the eve of the war the High Commissioner dissolved the Syrian Parliament and began ruling by decree. Strikes and riots had been growing worse from year to year. Nevertheless, when France went to war, the Syrians pledged their loyalty. After the fall of France, the Vichy Government appointed General Dentz as High Commissioner. The Syrians got a taste of fascist discipline, but despite the fact that there was a large French military force in the country, there were attacks on French officials and anti-French speeches in the mosques. Under the Vichy regime Axis agents poured into the country, and in May, 1941, at the time of the Iraqi revolt, hundreds of them, most of whom carried Bulgarian and Roumanian passports, came in through Turkey. There followed an undeclared war by the British and Free French forces, operating through Palestine, which regained control of Syria by June, 1941.

In a broadly worded statement, Mr. Anthony Eden, on May 29, 1941, declared that "His Majesty's Government had great sympathy with Syrian aspirations for independence." He also added that the Arabs could look to Great Britain for support in their aspirations for unity throughout the Arab world and for the strengthening of cultural, economic and political ties between the Arab countries. On June 8, 1941, General Georges Catroux, Commander-in-Chief and delegate of the Free French in the Levant, issued a proclamation in the name of General de Gaulle in which the Syrians and the Lebanese were promised independence. A supporting statement was made by the British Ambassador in Egypt, Sir Miles Lampson.<sup>47</sup> A formal proclamation of independence of Syria was made by General Catroux on September 27, 1941, and a similar one two months later to the Lebanese Republic.

The belief was widespread that Britain hoped to supplant the French in Syria and Lebanon. During the intervening period, in the summer of 1941, there had been an exchange of correspondence between the British and the Free French, in which the former gave assurances that they had no ambitions in Syria. On September 9, 1941, Winston Churchill declared in the House of Commons that the British were in Syria only to

47. Philip W. Ireland, ed., *The Near East, Problems and Prospects*, p. 222.

win the war and that they had no intention of using their position to displace France. He added, however, that it was British policy—as well as the declared policy of the Free French allies—that Syria should be given independent sovereign rights at the earliest possible moment. In November 1942, Mr. George Wadsworth presented his credentials as the American representative to the independent governments. He suggested the prospect of establishing full-fledged embassies in Syria and Lebanon and expressed the sympathy of the United States and her President for the future of the Arab peoples.

The establishment of independence renewed agitation on the part of the Arab nationalists for Arab unity and the question of the separate existence of the Lebanese State was thrown into relief. The Moslems in Beirut claimed that they were no longer a minority and formed a "Mohammedan front," urging the revision of the distribution of seats in connection with the proposed elections in March, 1943. They threatened to boycott the elections and thus widen the gulf between the Christians and the Moslems. The Lebanese Christians were divided in their views. A Maronite Archbishop declared that "independence is (with the Maronites) a matter of religion." Referring evidently to British and American support of pan-Arab schemes, he declared that "the United Nations should set free enslaved, and not enslave those free." His ideal was a union of an independent Lebanon with the Arab countries in an economic cooperation. Finally, it was decided that the Parliament should consist of fifty-five elected members, of whom twenty-five would be Moslems. When the elections were held in March 1943, strongly nationalist governments were elected both in Syria and Lebanon. The Syrian Republic was headed by Shukri Kuwatly as president, with Sadallah al-Jabiri as premier, both strict Moslems. In the Lebanon, where it was the general practice to choose a Christian as president and a Moslem as prime minister, Bishara al-Khuri was elected president, and he appointed Riad Bey es-Sulh as prime minister. The latter was an ardent Pan-Arab nationalist who, throughout his life, had sought alliance with whatever power seemed at the time most likely to advance the Pan-Arab cause. However, he now preached independence for Lebanon, coupled with cooperation with the other Arab countries.

The national bloc in control in Syria consisted of the leaders who negotiated the treaty in 1936 with the Blum Government. Their program is summarized as follows:<sup>48</sup>

The political aims of this National bloc are far-reaching. Greater Syria—that is, Syria, the Lebanon, Palestine and Transjordan—is, they say, a natural geographical and historical unit which should never have been split up. It must be reunited as soon as circumstances allow. Syria cannot recognize the sovereign independence of the Lebanon, though it is willing to recognize its autonomy. They have the same policy towards the Jewish colonies in Palestine to whom also they would be prepared to allow a certain autonomy. For the immediate future of Palestine, they say, the White Paper could be taken as a basis of understanding with the Arab world, and with Syria in particular. But they find it impossible to conceive any permanent settlement which leaves Palestine or any part of it outside the Arab world to which it belongs. As for the wider aspect of pan-Arabism, the Syrians are prepared to take their place in any scheme eventually agreed upon by the rest of the Arab nations.

At the second session of the Lebanese Chamber, held in the fall of 1943, Riad es-Sulh, the Premier, read a declaration in the name of his cabinet to the effect that Lebanon, basing its claim on the Atlantic Charter, wanted to live in full independence and enjoy complete sovereignty. This would require the elimination of France as Mandatory. Moreover, in addition to the amendment of the constitution, Sulh demanded the abolition of French as an official language, leaving only Arabic. He furthermore declared that the Lebanon in agreement with Syria should take over the *intérêts communs*.<sup>49</sup> The declaration proposed also that the system of elections by communities should be abolished as weakening the unity of the country. He also emphasized that Lebanon was a country with an Arab physiognomy and should be in the forefront in the movement for cooperation with her sister Arab states.

The statement by the Premier of Lebanon indicated a radical change in the policies of the republic; abolishing the Mandate,

48. *The Times* (London), January 20, 1944, as formulated by their special correspondent in Syria.

49. According to the system, the revenues from *intérêts communs*, consisting mostly of the customs duties and telegraph imposts, were divided among the Lebanese and Syrian Governments, with a balance retained by the French Government for common administrative expenses.

discarding the century-old tutelage of the French, giving up the communal system of voting, and promoting the idea of including Lebanon in a pan-Arab scheme. It meant, moreover, a unilateral decision to end the Mandate prior to any negotiations with the Mandatory or with the League of Nations. On November 2, 1943, the Lebanese cabinet obtained the approval of the chamber for amending the constitution and thus dispensing with the Mandate. This amounted to a revolution against the French. As a consequence, Jean Helleu, the Free French delegate to the Levant, dissolved the Chamber and arrested the Lebanese President, the Prime Minister and several other cabinet members and members of Parliament. This action aroused strong British protest on the part of Sir Edward I. Spears, head of the British Delegation in Beirut, and Harold Macmillan, British representative at Algiers. The Arabs, led by the Egyptian press, heaped protests and abuse on the French Committee of National Liberation. A student demonstration in Cairo stoned the building of the French representatives while shouting "Down with France" and "Long live England." The British objections were on technical grounds, i.e., they had not been consulted about the steps taken by the French, in contravention of the agreement of June, 1941. They also argued that Lebanon was of great strategic importance in the Middle East and if order were not restored, the English would be forced to take over. At the same time they made it clear that their policy was "Lebanon for the Lebanese." The United States followed the British line and protested to the French both in Beirut and in Algiers, though they emphasized that they were merely going along with Great Britain and did not mean to formulate a position of their own.

The French Committee was greatly embarrassed and attempted to blame Helleu for the whole affair. General Catroux was dispatched to Beirut and he succeeded in reaching an agreement which saved face for the French. However, he openly accused Britain and the United States of backing the Arabs in order to squeeze France out of the Middle East. In effect, he was forced, under British pressure, to submit to the demands of the Lebanese. The arrested members of the Lebanon and Syrian Governments were released and on December 23rd, Catroux signed an agreement with the Syrian and Lebanon Governments, handing over to the two nations all legis-



lative and administrative functions which France had hitherto exercised in their name. Syria, which was only indirectly involved in the Lebanese dispute with the French, was a great beneficiary of the struggle. The revenue from the *intérêts communs*, the mainstay of Levant finances, was taken over by the republics jointly. The previous disagreement between the two governments over the division of the revenue had provided a reason for prolonged French control. It was reported that the two governments had arrived at an agreement giving each a 40 percent share of the revenue, the balance of 20 percent being turned over to a common fund to be divided later.

The beginning of 1944 found the Syrian-Arab nationalists, with Anglo-American backing and enforced French consent, at the helm of Syria and in power in the Lebanon. The two republics were drawn into the Pan-Arab talks at Cairo, where the Lebanon delegation was enthusiastically received, with evident expressions of joy at the defeat of European power—in this case France—in a clash with the East. Nevertheless, in Lebanon itself there was still the apprehension that the dominance of Christians would come to an end—particularly if Syria should become part of a larger Arab federation. There continues to be a divided policy: some of the Lebanese are ready to accept the status of an autonomous district within a Greater Syria, while others still hold out for sovereign statehood. The Maronites in particular still fear that Lebanon is being led into the trap of Moslem Pan-Arabism.

On November 22, 1944, the Lebanon celebrated its first independence day. In December, a new cabinet under Abdul Hamid Karama was formed, but there was no change in policy from the previous line followed by Riad es-Sulh which continued to support the new government. In February, 1945, the first Lebanese envoy presented his credentials in London. Lebanon declared war against the Axis on February 27th, a day after the Syrian declaration, and following a period of negotiations, as has already been noted, obtained a seat at the San Francisco Security Conference.

The Syrian Government worked along two lines: to unify the country and to participate in the development of Pan-Arab unity. Internal unification of Syria meant abrogating the autonomy of the Druze and the Alawi districts. In September, 1944, Jebal Druze joined Syria, giving up its autonomy. This

unexpected action of the stubborn mountaineers was an indication of the growing sense of unity. In October, after returning from the Alexandria Conference, Premier al-Jabiri resigned together with his cabinet. The new cabinet was formed by Faris al-Khourî, a Christian, in an effort evidently to emphasize that Christians and Moslems stood united against the French attempt to encroach on the absolute independence of Syria.

There was pressure on the Government to support the plan for a Greater Syria, i.e., a union of Palestine, Trans-Jordan, Lebanon and Syria. The Lebanese were opposed to this idea in the fear of being submerged by the Moslem majority if such a state were constituted. In attacking the plan they used the Zionist scare, characterizing the project as a trap designed to permit Jewish Palestine to become a third partner in the united state of Syria,<sup>50</sup> and to enable Jews to penetrate the neighboring Arab countries. Syrian opponents of the Greater Syria also took up the cry about its Zionist character. At the same time, others denounced the federation plans discussed at Cairo as unsatisfactory because they did not provide for a Greater Syria. However, the major tendency in Syria was still for a unification of Lebanon and Syria in a single state.

The main problem that exercised both Lebanon and Syria was finding a solution for the conflict with France. The gradual return of France to a position of a great power, insisting on the reinstatement of its imperial position, aroused Syrian apprehensions. There arose a demand for a Syrian national army which would be a symbol and guarantee of national independence. The feeling that Great Britain and the United States were inclined to consider French interests led to intensification of the Syrian demand for complete independence.

The liberation of France and the recognition of de Gaulle brought with it a shift of attitude in British policy. Churchill, who had always held that a friendly attitude toward France was an essential element in British policy, was anxious that good relations should not be disturbed by differences of opinion with reference to Syria. In December, 1944, General Spears, regarded as the key figure in the anti-French maneuvers in Syria, was recalled. After the Yalta Conference, during the conversations held in Cairo, Churchill discussed the situation

50. See below, p. 999.

with President Shukri al-Kuwatly of Syria. On February 26th, Syria declared war against the Axis, and in his statement to the House of Commons the following day, Churchill made a point of reaffirming the disinterested policy of Great Britain with reference to the Levant:<sup>51</sup>

I must make clear the position of His Majesty's Government in respect of Syria and the Lebanon and in relation to our French allies. The position is governed by a settlement made in 1941 in which the independence of these Levant states was definitely declared by Great Britain and France. At that time and ever since, His Majesty's Government have made it clear that they would never seek to supplant French influence by British influence in the Levant states.

It was in harmony with this idea, evidently, that the invitation to Syria and Lebanon to the San Francisco Conference was given formally at the suggestion of France. But the Syrians were not pleased with this gesture. Despite British efforts, differences were not ironed out and the Cabinet resigned on April 6, 1945. Faris al-Khouri, the former Premier, headed the Syrian delegation to the San Francisco Conference. To what degree the implied British change of attitude toward abrogation of the Syrian Mandate influenced the American position is not clear. George Wadsworth, the American diplomatic representative in Beirut and Damascus, regarded as a strong supporter of complete independence for Syria and Lebanon and for the abrogation of the Mandate, was not recalled.

#### *Arab Unity and Federation*

During the First World War, Syria was the center of a movement toward Arab independence and unity; later, in Faisal's time, Iraq assumed the leading role. More recently, Egypt—where formerly, as an Arab writer has put it, “the Arab movement was drowned in the waters of the Nile”—has taken a prominent part in the effort to promote Arab unity. This development was foreshadowed when the Arab Inter-Parliamentary Congress met in Cairo in October, 1938, to consider the Palestine question before the forthcoming London Conferences. Mohammed Ali Alubah Pasha, an outstanding *Wafdist* statesman, was elected head of the Executive Com-

51. *The New York Times*, February 28, 1945.

mittee. During the early years of the war, conventions and assemblies were held in Cairo on Arab education, agriculture and medicine, and there were informal discussions and exchanges of opinion with visitors from other Arab lands.

After the British put down the Iraqi revolt and marched into Syria in the summer of 1941, they began a systematic encouragement of the idea of Arab unity. This was designed in part to wean the Arabs away from the Axis and in part to strengthen British influence in the Middle East. In a statement made by Mr. Anthony Eden on May 29, 1941, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs declared:<sup>52</sup>

The Arab world has made great strides since the settlement reached at the end of the last war, and many Arab thinkers desire for the Arab peoples a greater degree of unity than they now enjoy. In reaching out towards this unity they hope for our support. No such appeal from our friends should go unanswered. It seems to me both natural and right that the cultural and economic ties between the Arab countries and the political ties, too, should be strengthened. His Majesty's Government for their part will give their full support to any scheme that commands general approval.

From then on, conversations were conducted between Britishers and Arab leaders and consultations took place between prominent personages in the Arab world. At this time, Cairo, which had become the British diplomatic center for Middle Eastern affairs, took the lead in promoting the plan for Arab unity. The announcement in March, 1943, by Nahas Pasha that a conference of Arab states would be held in Cairo raised Arab expectations to a high pitch. At the same time it brought out the differences of outlook, of ambitions, and of program. Soon after the Egyptian plan had been announced, the Prime Minister of Trans-Jordan declared that the first step toward Arab unification was the creation of a Greater Syria under Emir Abdullah. But the next month Aluba Pasha came out with a defense of Egyptian leadership in the plan for Arab Unity only to be rebuked by the prominent Beirut journal, *al-Jumhur*. In June, Nuri Said, the Premier of Iraq, advanced another scheme for the establishment of a Greater Syria which Iraq would later join. Emir Faisal, son of Ibn Saud, on his way

52. Philip W. Ireland, ed., *The Near East, Problems and Prospects*, p. 222.

back from the United States in the fall, stated it as his view that Arab unity could be established on a sound basis only on the foundation of the *Koran*. This caused great embarrassment to the Arab statesmen who saw in this a danger of alienating Lebanon, with its Christian majority, and moreover of arousing apprehensions in the minds of the Great Powers of a resurgence of Pan-Islamism.

The Teheran Conference, which took place toward the end of 1943, signalized that postwar planning had entered a new stage and gave added impetus to the discussion of Arab unity and Federation. In the plans put forward at this time there is evidence of a realistic trend: an emphasis on the idea that Arab unification could be achieved only gradually and that consideration had to be given to divergences of cultural level, dynastic ambitions and, above all, to the strong desire for sovereignty on the part of each individual state. The Lebanese, whose cooperation is important, were adamant in their desire for independence. Palestine also presented a serious difficulty not only on account of the Zionist question but because of the problem of finding a representative on whom the Arabs could agree. Nevertheless, during the course of the year difficulties were ironed out and on September 24th a Conference for Arab Unity was held at Alexandria under the chairmanship of Nahas Pasha. To solve the Palestine problem, Musa al-Alami—a Husaini adherent—was first admitted as an observer and then apparently in the fuller role of a participant in the deliberations. Saudi Arabia and the Yemen first stood aloof and then were drawn into the discussions. The conference was concluded on October 7th with the signing of a Protocol by the representatives of Syria, Lebanon, Trans-Jordan, Iraq and Egypt. Saudi Arabia and Yemen signed later.

The Protocol was introduced by a general declaration which recognized the "strong contacts and numerous ties that bind all the Arab countries," and expressed the desire to strengthen and direct the bonds of Arab unity toward the present welfare and future security of the Arab countries. The first section called for the creation of a "League of Arab States." The participating states would have equal representation on the governing Board whose function would be to strengthen the ties between the states, to coordinate political policies and generally to promote the interests of the Arab countries. The Board

would serve as a body to mediate disputes, but no recourse to the use of force would be taken. The second section dealt with cooperation in economic, educational and social matters. A third section somewhat vaguely expressed the hope that in the future Arab countries would take further steps to cement unity. The fourth section was a special resolution which declared that the Arab states represented in the Provisional Committee would respect the independence and sovereignty of Lebanon within its present boundaries.

The fifth section, which dealt with Palestine, may be given in full.<sup>53</sup>

The Committee maintains that Palestine is an important mainstay of the Arab countries and that the rights of Arabs cannot be encroached upon without damage to peace and stability in the Arab world.

The Committee also maintains that the obligations undertaken by the British Government providing for stoppage of Jewish immigration, preservation of Arab lands and achievement of the independence of Palestine, constitute firm Arab rights, and the speedy carrying out of these obligations will be a step towards the aspired goal and towards reestablishing peace and stability.

The Committee declares that it supports the cause of the Arabs of Palestine by working for the realization of their legitimate aspirations and for the defense of their just rights.

The Committee declares that it, no less than anybody, is pained by the calamities and sufferings inflicted on the Jews of Europe by certain dictatorial governments of Europe. But it is essential that the problem of these Jews be not confused with that of Zionism; and there is no greater injustice or aggression than to solve the question of European Jews by perpetrating another injustice against the Arabs of Palestine, irrespective of their religious affiliations.

The special proposal for the participation of Arab governments and peoples in the Arab National Fund to save the land of the Arabs of Palestine is transferred to the sub-committee on economic and financial affairs for comprehensive discussion, and it is expected that the result of this inquiry will be submitted to the next meeting of the Committee.

The Alexandria Protocol was ratified by all the Arab states whose representatives had signed it, but cabinet changes in

53. As translated from the version given in *Al Hoda* (Lebanese daily), New York, October 27, 1944.

Egypt, Syria and Trans-Jordan, following closely on the conclusion of the Protocol, created a certain uneasiness. The new Egyptian Government, as already noted, continued the negotiations on Arab unity, King Farouk being eager to direct them on behalf of Egypt. In January, 1945, the Egyptian King met Ibn Saud among scenes of oriental splendor. As a counter move, the Hashimis<sup>54</sup>—Emir Abdullah of Trans-Jordan and the Regent Abdul Ilah of Iraq and their retinues—met in Trans-Jordan. It was in an atmosphere of tension and rivalry for leadership that the Foreign Ministers of the Arab states met in Cairo on February 14th to draft the constitution of the League of Arab States which had been proposed in the Protocol. Musa al-Alami was again in attendance, representing Palestine. The negotiations were conducted in utter secrecy. The discussions continued over a period of five weeks, culminating on March 22nd in the adoption of a Covenant of the League of Arab States. It was signed by the heads of Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, Saudi Arabia and Trans-Jordan. Yemen's signature was expected. Musa al-Alami, though participating in all of the discussions, was not among the signatories, since Palestine was not an independent state. There was, however, a resolution on Palestine incorporated as an annex to the Covenant.

Before explaining the main terms of the pact, it will be serviceable to a better understanding of its limitations and possibilities to trace briefly the conceptions underlying Arab unity and to give a brief account of recent proposals made for Arab Federation. It is generally agreed that the concept of the unity of the Arab people has a genuine historical and social basis. The Arabs have a community of cultural heritage and are bound together by a religious tradition. An educated Arab would be at home in any of the several Arab countries. However, when it comes to defining Arab unity in terms of a basis of organization and program of action there are great differences of opinion. To some it still connotes Pan-Islamism, i.e., union under the Caliph of all Moslem peoples, from Morocco to Persia and beyond, including the Mohammedans of India

54. As the family of the late King Husain of the Hejaz is known; Abdullah, Emir of Trans-Jordan, is the son of Husain, and Faisal II, the boy king of Iraq, is his great grandson.

and China. A recent article on Arab unity in the post-war world, wirelessly from Bagdad, declared that "the heart of the Arab world and Islamic culture remains in bounds roughly encompassed by the capital cities of Bagdad, Damascus, Mecca and Cairo."<sup>55</sup> It goes on to say: "But any solid pacific framework for the future must encompass not only the Middle East but the entire Moslem area ranging from Morocco to India and must first resolve the problems of that region." This view, however, is not authoritative: the trend of opinion among American and British scholars and among Arab political leaders is to dismiss Pan-Islamism as a nostalgic idea that no longer has real motive power.

Another conception of Arab Unity is implied in the idea of Pan-Arabism. This is a more limited concept since it includes only the Arabic-speaking countries. It differs also from Pan-Islamism in that it bases itself on Arab national culture and not on the religious tradition, despite the fact that it is closely associated with Islam. Pan-Arabism, which aims to unite all the Arab countries into a single unified state, is also today regarded as a chimera. Mohammed Ali Alubah Pasha declared in a recent volume: "I have no hesitation in saying: the idea of Pan-Arabism or Pan-Islamism which is supposed to unite all Moslems under one realm or under one empire, is all wrong and neither practicable nor glorious. It is not worth discussing or even pondering. It is an idea of the past. I am sure it cannot be realized and it is more harmful than useful, indeed it is absolutely useless."<sup>56</sup>

H. A. R. Gibb condemns Pan-Arabism even more severely:<sup>57</sup>

... Pan-Arabism is an ignorant, intolerant, explosive force; it substitutes wishing for thinking, fiercely resents not only Christian dominance but anything that savors of Christian practice and ideas, dreams of driving European and Jew into the ocean and restoring the glorious empire of the caliphate; it has no grasp of the problems of government, administration, and finance, of the economic structure of the world and the economic poverty of the Arab countries, of the discipline, training and scientific tradition that underlie

55. *The New York Times*, October 10, 1943.

56. *Principles of Egyptian Politics*, Cairo, 1942.

57. H. A. R. Gibb, "The Future for Arab Unity," in Philip W. Ireland, ed., *The Near East, Problems and Prospects*, p. 93.



technical progress. Its leaders may perhaps be not quite so ignorant, but in their own supposed interests they are ready to exploit the passions and instincts of the mob.

The term which has recently come into favor is "Arab Federation." This concept postulates a union of separate Arab states or politically organized regional units, each maintaining its own identity. There are divergences of opinion concerning the extent of the union, whether it should be confined to the development of a common educational system and the promotion of common economic interests, or whether it should include political and military unification. As generally presented, and as outlined by H. A. R. Gibb, federation would ultimately involve common action along four lines: cultural, economic, military and political.<sup>58</sup> Cultural union implies that all the inhabitants of Arab lands would have a common type of education and that joint institutions for science, scholarship and other forms of cultural activity would be maintained. The economic aspect implies that the governments of Arab lands would deliberately foster mutual economic relations and would discourage customs barriers. Political union would require all the Arab states to act as one unit in matters of foreign policy; military federation would include not only an alliance of the separate states in time of war, but the maintenance of an Arab army organized under a joint general staff.

Despite general agreement that federation in some form is the most practical of the several concepts of Arab unity, writers on the subject point out the enormous difficulties in application. First may be mentioned the conflict between religion and nationalism. While some proponents of federation insist that Islam is an essential part of Arab cultural heritage and that the *Koran* must remain the basis of the law in Arab countries, others would follow Turkey and establish Arab nationalism on the bond of common language, common economic factors and common political interests. There are great social-economic cleavages in the Arab countries; between the Bedouin and the settled population, the villages and the towns, the middle class groups and the wealthy landowners. The Arab countries abound in ethnic and religious minorities, many of which have roots in the country as old and as deep as

58. *Ibid.*, p. 98.

those of the Moslem Arab majority. As some Arab writers have pointed out, foreign missionary educational systems have added to the confusion by inculcating divergent cultural outlooks and developing superficial types of personality which are neither Arab, French nor English. The economic and social backwardness and the widespread illiteracy present great obstacles to the development of stable government in each country, let alone to federation. The different stages of industrial development would require varying customs policies, the lack of industrialization and financial resources would make it impossible to maintain a unified system of defense.

The political difficulties of federation are even greater than the social and economic. The smaller states fear the domination of the larger, and none of the larger states which have already achieved independence—Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Iraq—would be ready to enter a political union unless it became the leading power in the federation. While Egypt is ready to promote something in the way of cultural or economic ties, its interests are rooted in the Valley of the Nile. The major problem which engages Egyptian nationalists is the achievement of union of the Sudan with Egypt, to liberate this united Egypt from the control of the British, and to establish a middle-class democratic governmental system. The Egyptians regard themselves as culturally superior to the Arab countries in the East and are aiming for a synthesis of Islamic and European culture. There is hardly any common basis in their outlook on life with that of the *Wahhabi* fundamentalists of Saudi Arabia, and while both have a common background in Arab culture, the Egyptian, if he had to make a choice, would certainly prefer Western culture to the hard and fanatical *Wahhabi* code. Iraq is undeveloped and sparsely populated, and depends for its governmental expenses and social services on the oil revenues. It is subject to internal divisions and probably would quickly disintegrate through inner dissensions and attacks from the tribes if it were not supported by British military power. Syria and Lebanon are primarily concerned with insuring their independence before considering the question of federating with the other already established Arab states.

A number of concrete proposals for federation have been made during the war period. One of the broadest is the plan for a "Council of Confederated Arab States" proposed by Dr.

Yusuf Haykal in a recent exposition of Arab unity.<sup>59</sup> For the present, the Council would have four units: 1) Egypt, with the Sudan; 2) Greater Syria (Syria, Lebanon, Palestine and Trans-Jordan); 3) Iraq; 4) the Arabian Peninsula. Ultimately, however, the Arab Confederation would include the countries in North Africa. Dr. Haykal realizes the many difficulties involved. To make possible the formation of a unified Syrian state, it would first be necessary to create "the Syrian Confederation" which would be composed of Syria, Lebanon, Palestine and Trans-Jordan. There would be other problems to solve, e.g., the union of Sudan with Egypt, and the unification of the Arabian Peninsula which, in addition to Saudi Arabia, now contains a number of principalities and sheikdoms. The sensibilities of the Arab states would have to be considered: the Council should have its permanent seat in a centrally located city of the Arab countries but not in any one of the present capitals; it would have a President from among its members, elected annually for a one-year term, but with assurances given that he would be "simply a figurehead." Dr. Haykal also recognizes the importance of a period of educational work, of unification of legislation and of promotion of economic ties. On the face of it, it is clear that the plan is a goal for the future; at any rate no Arab statesman has espoused so broad a conception of federation for the postwar period.

A more definite project is entertained by Col. S. F. Newcombe, a leading Britisher who, since the First World War, has been interested in promoting the Arab cause. The following are the main lines of his plan:

1) Syria, Lebanon, Palestine and Trans-Jordan to be re-united into one State; the people of that State to decide its form of government; if required, Maronites in Lebanon to have a privileged regime.

2) An Arab League to be formed; Iraq and Syria to join at once. Arab States can join later at will.

3) The Arab League to have a Permanent Council nominated by the Member States and presided over by one of the rulers of the States, to be chosen by the States concerned.

4) The Arab Council shall be responsible for: (a) Defense, (b)

59. Yusuf Haykal, *Towards Arab Unity (Nahwa-l-wahda-l-'Arabia)*, Cairo, 1943, p. 93. Dr. Haykal is a member of the Board of Higher Education in Palestine. He has studied political science in London and criminology in Paris.

Foreign Affairs, (c) Currency, (d) Communications, (e) Customs, (f) Protection of minority rights.

5) Jews in Palestine to have semi-autonomy; their own rural and urban district administration, including Schools, Health and Police subject to general supervision by the Syrian State (under International Guarantee). Jerusalem to have a special commission of three theocratic religions to ensure free access and worship.

This plan has not been put forward publicly but it undoubtedly represents a serious line of British thought on the subject. By the terms of this plan, Great Britain would stand in treaty relation to the Arab League and protect it from outside aggression. It would assure the safety of communications between the Mediterranean, the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf, and be responsible for the safety of the route from Haifa to the Bosphorus, including air transport for the whole area. The plan suggests that perhaps the United States, France or the United Nations would cooperate in the responsibility of protecting the Arab States from outside aggression.

The Arab League would have a wide measure of autonomous government. Within each state the members of several nationalities or communities would be organized on the lines of the "millet" system of the Ottoman Empire or of the Palestine Religious Communities Ordinance. The jurisdiction of these communal organizations would be co-extensive with the whole of the federal states and would give the communities complete autonomy in cultural matters and in questions of personal status and in labor matters, social legislation and civil litigation when only the members of one community are concerned. Thus the inhabitants of the states composing the Arab League would be citizens of their particular state and also members of the Jewish and Arab communal organizations within their state. This conception is regarded as harmonious with the 1939 White Paper on which the arrangements for Palestine are predicated.

Similar to this plan is the one recently advanced by Nuri Said Pasha,<sup>60</sup> at that time the Prime Minister of Iraq. He has suggested an outer and inner ring of Arab states: the first to consist of Iraq, Egypt and Saudi Arabia; the second of Syria, the Lebanon, Palestine and Trans-Jordan. The outer ring

60. *Sunday Times* (London), February 27, 1944.

would form a loosely linked League with common cultural endeavors and policies of mutual assistance. The inner ring would form a single entity as a federated state, with its own currency, defense system, customs and foreign representation. When this and similar plans are examined they reduce themselves—as far as the postwar period is concerned—to a proposal for federating Syria, the Lebanon, Palestine and Trans-Jordan, to create a Greater Syria. At first blush, it appears as the simplest plan; moreover, it has the support of Trans-Jordan and of Iraq. Nevertheless, this plan also abounds in extraordinary difficulties, political and practical.

From the dynastic point of view, the Greater Syria plan may be regarded as a Hashimi proposal. Trans-Jordan would join the federation only if Emir Abdullah would become the head of Greater Syria—an ambition which stands in conflict with the ideas of the Syrians. Besides, Ibn Saud and the Imam of Yemen are bitterly opposed to Abdullah as a scion of the Hashimite dynasty. Iraq's favorable attitude to the formation of a Syrian Federation, which it would later join, is connected with its desire to obtain an outlet to the sea through Haifa or Tripoli. But Saudi Arabia is opposed to this. She does not wish to see the present balance between the major Arab countries disturbed, and she looks askance at the strengthening of either Iraq or Egypt. Recently Ibn Saud has again raised the question of repairing the Hejaz railway which connects Saudi Arabia with Palestine, Syria and Trans-Jordan, and which could be used to strengthen his influence in these countries. For the present, Ibn Saud is obstructing plans for Syrian Federation on the ground that the problem of Palestine must first be solved.

There are difficulties within Syria itself; while there has recently been close cooperation between Lebanon and Syria, the Christians of Lebanon have made it clear that they stand on their demand for full independence of the Lebanon in its present boundaries. The problem of Palestine, both Arab and Jewish, is certainly not the least of the difficulties. An editorial in *Falastin* (February 28, 1943), referring to Eden's statement on Arab unity, emphasized the fact that Arab aspirations had changed since the last war and that at the present time each country was primarily concerned with independence. The editorial declared:

Mr. Eden who succeeded in solving the problem of Egypt in 1936 was requested to state his opinion on the Arab problem and responded with his well-known statement of British sympathy for Arab aspirations. The Arabs are fully aware of Britain's part in the independence of Iraq, Egypt, Transjordan, and now Syria and Lebanon. Arab aspirations have changed during the last quarter of a century, and are not concentrated on the idea of an empire but rather on cultural and economic ties between independent Arab countries; therefore, what the Arabs aspire to today is the independence of each and every Arab country, cultural and economic ties between these Arab state formations, but above all, they wish to achieve the independence of each country. No doubt this concept should make it easier for Great Britain to show her sympathy for Arab unity and to participate in the realization of that coveted unity.

Although a federation of Greater Syria is not necessarily opposed by Zionists, there are difficulties from the Jewish side as well. The British and Arab proposals for Syrian federation assume the 1939 White Paper as the basis of their Palestine policy. But even those Jews who urge Jewish cooperation in the promotion of Arab federation would not accept the White Paper as the basis. Indeed, Jewish sponsorship of the federation idea has proved a boomerang and has played into the hands of the Arab opponents of Greater Syria. When Nuri Said Pasha proposed his federation plan in the early part of 1944, Lebanese deputies dubbed it "a Zionist scheme" designed to allow a Jewishly dominated Palestine to become a third partner in an Arab state and to give the Jews an opportunity to promote a large-scale Jewish immigration into Palestine and to infiltrate into the neighboring Arab countries as well.<sup>61</sup> There was a general tendency to blame the difficulties in regard to Arab federation on the Zionist issue. The less the Arabs found themselves to be in agreement on political and economic policies, the more likely were they to emphasize their unity of opposition to the Jewish national home.<sup>62</sup>

61. Color was lent to this argument by Dr. Magnes' proposal. Dr. Magnes believes that the establishment of a Syrian federation would relieve the Palestine Arabs of the fear of being dominated by a Jewish majority and they would then be inclined to agree to large Jewish immigration and also to admitting Jews in the neighboring countries. See below, Chapter XV, p. 1176.

62. As a matter of fact, Arab unity on Palestine was negative and superficial. Although the Arabs were all agreed that Palestine should not be a Jewish state, they were in conflict concerning its disposition.

Competent observers, therefore, pointed out that there were no great prospects even for the implementation of a limited federation of the four neighboring countries—Syria, Lebanon, Palestine and Trans-Jordan—in the postwar period. Although Great Britain was much interested in such a union as a means of extending its influence over Syria and consolidating British control over the East, it could not go so far as to force the issue. Mr. Eden's statements indicated that Great Britain would be glad to support the development of a Greater Syria if the Arabs wished it, but that His Majesty's Government did not propose to initiate it. When the French grew stronger and the British decided to work with them rather than against them, the British seemed to have lost some of their enthusiasm for the federation idea.

Joining the 1939 White Paper to the federation idea, as in Colonel Newcomb's plan, was no doubt calculated to stimulate Arab support of the federation idea, but this was not a sufficient inducement for the Arabs who were more immediately concerned with the problems of securing independence in each country, and who were confronted by serious local economic and political problems. The Arabs were of course glad to accept the 1939 White Paper in any case; and the common opposition to Zionism was exploited as a unifying element. In the form proposed by the British, the main effect of the federation proposal was to strengthen support for the 1939 White Paper.

The Zionist Organization has made no official pronouncement on the subject of Arab federation. In January, 1942, Dr. Weizmann wrote: "We should . . . be ready, if necessary to consider joining, under proper safeguards, in federation with Arab states."<sup>63</sup> The Zionist leaders as a whole seemed to feel, however, that the question was largely academic, and that all discussion should be postponed until the issue was raised in a more concrete form. In general, the tendency of Zionist writers is to emphasize the importance of economic cooperation

Syrians have always claimed it as the southern part of their country; Iraq wants it as a seaboard; Egypt hopes to annex it to protect the eastern end of the Suez Canal when the British are ousted; Ibn Saud would wish it as an outlet to the north and west.

63. Chaim Weizmann, "Palestine's Role in the Solution of the Jewish Problem," *Foreign Affairs*, January, 1942.

throughout the Near East as the basis for any real unity. As indicated by Alfred Bonn  in *The Economic Development of the Middle East*,<sup>64</sup> political federation could be accomplished only when the several Middle East states had reached a more homogeneous economic structure which would permit interchange of goods and the integration of the various economies. He suggests a planned regional development of the Middle East with full utilization of natural resources for the raising of the standard of living.

A similar view of the problem of federation is indicated in the following comment on the basis of Arab unity in the *Foreign Policy Bulletin* of January 28, 1944.<sup>65</sup>

The economic and social backwardness of Arab society as a whole tends further to jeopardize hopes of unity. Striking cultural differences exist between the nomad populations and the settled farmers. The very marked divisions between the ruling elite and the Arab communities at large also emphasize the lack of cohesion among the Arab peoples. The Arab nations are historically countries of economic scarcity. The level of consumption is normally low, and the economic development of the area can only progress on the basis of united action. In a federation Syria and Iraq may become the food producing areas, while Palestine could become the industrial center, drawing on the rich oil reserves of the region. In the future, regional irrigation projects as well as transportation development will necessitate closer cooperation.

The experience gained during the war, it is pointed out,<sup>66</sup> through the Middle East Supply Center, could be used to integrate the economic life of the whole region. The MESC was originally a British agency organized for the purpose of handling major supplies for Eastern Mediterranean countries. Since March, 1942, it has been a joint Anglo-American body. Today the operations of the MESC, with its headquarters in Cairo, cover Iran, Iraq, Syria, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and a number of other countries in Africa. During the war the main purposes of the MESC were to stimulate agricultural

64. Issued by Economic Research Bureau of the Jewish Agency, 1943.

65. Grant S. McClellan, "War Revives Plans for Arab Federation," *Foreign Policy Bulletin*, January 28, 1944.

66. Howard P. Whidden, Jr., "MESC Holds Promise for Future of Middle East," *Foreign Policy Bulletin*, September 24, 1943.



and industrial production, to save shipping by reducing imports, and to prevent economic collapse in the areas vital to the Middle East campaign. After the war, the organization could be developed not only to unify control of transportation facilities but to continue to encourage and direct agricultural and industrial development on a regional pattern. This approach accords with the principles of contemporary postwar planning. It implies that political tension can be relieved by the promotion of a "freedom from want" policy for backward areas of the world as well as for our own country; and that the economic development of backward regions must be the united concern of the more advanced nations.

While there has been a growing recognition among the younger Arab leaders of the significance of economic questions and of the relation of economic problems to social and political affairs, the controlling political forces do not view the economic coordination of the Middle East by the MESC with favor. Arab politicians are likely to decry this as a new method of economic domination by foreign interests. Local economic and political factors have offered a serious obstruction to the work of economic coordination and integration. The jealousy of the landowners and narrow chauvinism, playing on the fears of food shortages, have made it necessary for the MESC at times to use "the most energetic means" to obtain a necessary interchange of surpluses between the Middle Eastern countries in wartime.<sup>67</sup>

At the time of the conferences in Alexandria on Arab unity, Professor Gibb summarized the situation as follows:<sup>68</sup>

All (Arab) Governments pay lip-service to the ideals of Arab federation; all are dominated by local interests and personal ambitions. Since February 1942 the Wafd has been in power in Egypt. It was thrust into power by extremely strong British action; and so we have a particularly strong moral responsibility for its actions; and no Egyptian is likely to allow us to forget it. One might have hoped that it, at least, would rise above the general level, in view of its claims to be a truly national Government, inspired by broad political principles and progressive social ideals. In fact it differs little from its predecessors and other Middle East Governments, except for its

67. H. A. R. Gibb, "Middle Eastern Perplexities," *International Affairs*, October, 1944, p. 460.

68. *Ibid.*, pp. 460-461.

unfortunate authoritarian obsessions. When it comes to actual measures, even the Wafd cannot afford to challenge vested interests and the privileges of the landowners.

Nevertheless, in the present state of public feeling one of the policies which figure prominently in the Wafdist programme is that of close cooperation with the "sister Arab countries." But even suppose al-Nahhas Pasha was eager to create an effective economic co-operation with other Arab countries, what can he dare to do? There are scarcely any possible tariff modifications which would not affect the interests of Egyptian growers or industries (any measure which might be thought to benefit Egyptian industry at the expense of Syria or Iraq is, of course, blocked by the Syrians or Iraqis). So Arab co-operation, in spite of the intense desire of many of the most far-sighted as well as many popular elements in every Arab country to see something accomplished, is confined in practice to the innocuous field of "cultural co-operation" by means of missions and interchange of teachers, students, books, etc., and the organization of cultural congresses. Meanwhile the public is cosseted by the comings and goings of premiers and foreign ministers, by plans for conferences, by speeches and handshakings.

Despite the undoubted validity of this severely critical analysis, the conference held in Cairo in February, 1945, which was consummated by the formulation of the Covenant of the League of Arab states, must be adjudged a step forward in the movement toward Arab unity. It is still in the stage of a paper plan, but it goes beyond a mere declaration of the desirability of Arab unity and constitutes a basis for organization. It begins by repeating the general declaration of the Alexandria Protocol on the desirability of strengthening Arab countries and promoting their welfare through the establishment of a "League of Arab States." There are twenty Articles and three Annexes: Articles 1-4 deal with the purposes of the League of Arab States, set up a Council for realizing the objectives of the League, and outline the procedure for adding new member States. Articles 6-9 prohibit the resort to force and provide for the mediation of disputes between Arab States. Articles 10-17 are concerned with the work of the Council: a permanent secretariat is provided for; Cairo is designated as the permanent seat of the League, the Council however being free to meet at any other place; ordinary sessions are to be called twice a year and extraordinary sessions may be called on the demand of any two members. Articles 18-20 are concerned

with the method of withdrawing from the League, ratification of the Covenant and its modification. The Annexes deal, respectively, with Palestine, cooperation of Arab countries not members of the League, and the choice of a secretary general.

The signatories of the Covenant were the representatives of Egypt, Iraq, Trans-Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen. The League constitutes a voluntary association. Each State has only one vote regardless of the number of representatives. Decisions on matters of arbitration and conciliation among the member States are to be taken by majority vote, but such decisions are binding only on those States which voted with the majority; thus, only unanimous decisions are binding on all States. Any member of the union may withdraw after giving a year's notice. A member may be expelled but only by unanimous vote. The Covenant may be amended at any time by a two-thirds vote of the Council, but any member State that does not choose to accept the amendment may withdraw from the union as soon as it becomes effective. The parties to any dispute brought before the Council are not to be represented in the deliberations of the Council.<sup>69</sup>

In the Covenant, Lebanon appears as a fully independent State, equal in competence to the other States, thus eliminating the necessity of any special resolution such as appeared in the Alexandria Protocol. Important modifications were introduced into the Covenant as concessions to the Lebanese. The Protocol had stated that "in no case should a foreign policy be pursued that is detrimental to the League or any member of the League." This was omitted in the Covenant so that if Lebanon should wish to contract a treaty with France on lines differing from those made by Syria, it would not be subject to criticism by other members of the League. Moreover, the Protocol provided that all differences between two members of the League might be brought for arbitration before the governing body and the decisions would then be binding. The Covenant provides only for disputes "not involving the independence, the sovereignty and the territorial integrity" of the States. This concession enables Lebanon to avoid being forced to accept a change in its status or boundaries by a majority vote.

The Palestine resolution is contained in Annex 1, and differs

69. Summary based on the report in the *New York Sun*, April 18, 1945.

appreciably from that in the Protocol. In the Protocol, although Palestine is designated "an important mainstay of the Arab countries," a continuance of British administration is implied. The British Government is commended for the stoppage of Jewish immigration and the defense of Arab rights. Moreover, the Protocol expresses sympathy for the situation of Jews in other countries even though it rejects the Zionist solution. In the Covenant there is no mention of the British nor of the Jews. The position is taken that Palestine is juridically independent as a result of her detachment from the Ottoman Empire despite the fact that this independence has as yet not been realized in actuality. Until full independence is achieved, the Council of the League will designate an Arab representative to take part in its activities. The resolution concerning Palestine reads as follows :

At the end of the last war, Palestine, like the other Arab States detached from the Ottoman Empire, was liberated from Ottoman domination. Having become autonomous, she was no longer dependent on any other state.

The Treaty of Lausanne proclaimed that her fate would be settled by the interested parties. But if Palestine has not been able to order her own destiny, it is nevertheless true that it is on the basis of the recognition of her independence that the Covenant of the League of Nations in 1919 settled her status.

Her international existence and independence therefore cannot *de jure* be questioned any more than can the independence of any other Arab country.

If, for reasons beyond her will, her independence has failed to materialize, this circumstance cannot constitute an obstacle to the participation of Palestine in the work of the Council of the League.

The State signatories of the present Covenant consider that, under these conditions and by reason of the special circumstances involving Palestine, until that country can exercise all the effective attributes of her independence, it behooves the Council of the League to designate an Arab representative from Palestine who will participate in its work.

An American correspondent, writing from Cairo, takes the view that despite the fact that the delegate from Palestine, Musa el-Alami, was not enabled to sign the Covenant, as a re-

sult of the special resolution "Palestine stood acclaimed as juridically independent in the eyes of thirty million Arabs."<sup>70</sup> However, it is far from clear that the Arabs of Palestine accept this disposition of the matter as satisfactory. The Arab National Bloc met at Nablus the early part of April, 1945, and adopted a resolution demanding amendment of the Covenant on the ground that "it did not achieve the aspirations of Palestine."<sup>71</sup> Whether this is the reaction of the opposition only or the general feeling in Palestine remains to be seen.

*The Nation* correspondent makes an interesting comment on the relation of the Pan-Arab League to the United Nations policy, particularly that of the British:<sup>72</sup>

The first theory is that the powers are not encouraging the Pan-Arab League at all but are working frantically under cover to stymie it. That does not jibe with all the evidence at hand to the contrary. Others say the whole deal is a plot to sabotage Zionism by making it impossible to reach any solution in Palestine except one favorable to the Arabs. That may be, but it would seem to be risking an enormous amount of pain for a minor pleasure. The third school—and here we begin to approach something resembling sound politics—suggests that Britain is making the most of a trend which it would be more dangerous to obstruct than to encourage. According to this reasoning, the Foreign Office has long since decided that the good old days of divide and rule are past. Opposition to Arab union would stimulate it more than mild support. So we will unite and rule, or at least try to, making the best of a poor bargain. The corollary to this is that a strong pan-Arab bloc would discipline itself, pushing recalcitrant member states into line without the need for thankless British intervention.

But there is still another hypothesis, one favored by the cynical set. It goes much farther than the last, which it dismisses as wishy-washy and very un-Whitehall. It argues that Britain is heart and soul behind Arab unity, desperately behind it—in a table-stakes game to save its position in the Middle East between Russia and the United States. The Arab world disunited might be easily picked off piece by piece by the Soviets or bought out in a similar fashion by the Americans. The latter fate, it is true, holds no special terrors for the local Arab magnates now in power, but the other possibility

70. Hal Lehrman, "Pan-Arabia Deserta," *The Nation*, April 14, 1945, p. 413.

71. *The New York Times*, April 5, 1945.

72. Lehrman, *op. cit.*, p. 414.

would be a catastrophe for them. And neither prospect looks attractive to Britain.

In a comment under the title "Kings, Oil and Water," the British Liberal paper, *The New Statement and Nation*,<sup>73</sup> agreed that rightly or wrongly the world would regard the Arab League as an outwork of the British Empire, that the French could not be expected to view its formation with enthusiasm, and that the attitude of the Russians and the Americans would be greatly influenced by their anxiety over Middle East oil. It expressed the view that association of the Palestine Arabs with the new League justified some foreboding with reference to the future of the Jewish national home. The editorial declared that the worst approach to the problem was through "the jungle of Middle Eastern politics" and that the Arab states were at present "a group of backward political units ruled by a reactionary and rather rapacious feudal caste. Their populations are dismally poor and they are in numbers, wealth and civilization far behind the levels they reached in antiquity. . . . To stereotype this decay in a rigid political pattern is the worst thing we could do. Nor can we find a solution of the Middle Eastern problem by concentrating on our own Imperialist interest in oil wells, ports and airfields vital for our communications." An economic approach to the solution of the problem was suggested through "water", i.e., through extensive use of irrigation and hydroelectric power, improved agriculture, and stimulation of industrial development throughout the Middle East.

## AFFAIRS IN PALESTINE

Palestine's contribution to the cause of the United Nations during the war stood out in marked contrast to that of the Arab-dominated countries in the Middle East. Some contribution was made by the Arab sectors of the population; the most useful was that of the *fellahin* who were stimulated to increase their production by the high prices of agricultural products. Some service was rendered to the armed forces by the Arabs: there were 9,000 enlistments in the various branches, and no doubt in individual cases the Arabs made as good a record as the Jews. However, the ratio of Arab enlist-

73. March 10, 1945.

ments to the total population was small, half the volunteers were discharged and a large percentage deserted, some with arms. The attitude of the political leaders was divided and uncertain at the beginning of the war, and the pro-Axis elements predominated until the victory of the United Nations became apparent.

The Jews were driven by a hatred of all that Hitler represented. Defeat of the Axis was essential to the future of the Jews all over the world and to the work of reconstruction in Palestine. They bent their energies to a successful prosecution of the war. The Jewish enlistments were so large as to prove embarrassing to the British authorities who wished at first to keep them down to the level of the Arab enlistments. The Palestinian Jewish units made a noteworthy contribution to the victory in the Middle East. Of even greater import was the Jewish Palestinians' contribution in industrial production. The possibility of obtaining needed materials on the spot saved invaluable time and conserved shipping space. The services rendered were recognized by the British authorities, but the *Yishuv's* contribution to the war did not affect at all the political attitude toward the Jewish national home.

#### *Political Attitude Among Jews and Arabs*

In October, 1939, shortly after the outbreak of the war, the Mufti of Jerusalem, Haj Amin al-Husaini, fled from French-controlled Lebanon to the so-called "non-belligerent" Iraq which was then under the pro-Axis ministry of Rashid Ali al-Gailani. For a time political policy in Palestine was still under the influence of the traitorous Mufti who had left behind an extensive organization which continued to function "despite British policing efforts."<sup>74</sup> However, after the failure of the Iraqi *putsch* and the defeat of the Axis forces in Egypt, the Mufti's power waned and there was a shift from a pro-Axis line to alleged support of the British. When the pro-British Arab leaders, Nuri Said (in Iraq) and Nahas Pasha (in Egypt) came into power and accepted the 1939 White Paper as the basis of their Palestine policy, Arab political opinion in Palestine tended guardedly to follow suit.

The acts of sabotage and murder which, though much re-

74. C. L. Sulzberger, "German Preparations in the Middle East," *Foreign Affairs*, July, 1942, p. 666.

duced, continued to some extent even after the White Paper, ceased altogether after the declaration of war. The enforcement of wartime measures for public security and the concentration of large military forces made terrorism extremely dangerous. The disintegration of the Mufti's activities and the cessation of the terrorist movement brought great relief to the Arab rural districts. The following is a picture of the situation given by a Jewish settler:<sup>75</sup>

And one fine day the whole land began to breathe freely. I cannot describe the joy of the Arabs. They manifested exceptional friendship toward the Jews. In 32 years I have seen nothing like it. Complete quiet reigned in every corner of the country. Where squads of soldiers had feared to pass, solitary Jews walked in complete security. Scores of sheiks came to visit me, excitedly happy, fell on my neck, kissed me and blessed me. It is obvious that the sufferings of the Arab masses were so strong and the destruction wrought so great that they cannot restrain their feelings when they realize that they are free of their dictators who ruled over them by means of terror, murdered and pillaged in the name of nationalism.

The riots are now in the past. And stories (of these times) fill their hours of idleness and supply the talk at the *madefia* (municipal lodging and boarding houses maintained by villages for the use of travelers). One (speaker) tells of a court decree against him, another of the murder of a brother, a third that of a friend, a fourth of the theft of an ox or horse, or the extortion of money—stories that reflect a boundless cruelty. And among the guests sits also some Jew, in complete security, listening with curiosity to the new thousand-and-one nights.

There was, however, no essential change in the opposition to the Jewish national home on the part of the political leaders. The press made it clear that the Arabs had not given up their demand for full independence; they had merely postponed the demand, they said, out of a sense of loyalty and a reluctance to embarrass the British during the war period. Despite the virtual acceptance of the 1939 White Paper, there was no official commitment to it: the press urged its full implementation in order to prevent misunderstanding between the Arabs and the British. *Sirat* (March 29, 1943) pointed out that the Arabs did not need to commit themselves to the White Paper since

75. From the letter of a Jewish settler quoted above, Chap. XIII, p. 937.



the British Government had obligated itself to carry it out with or without the consent of the Arabs or the Jews. Reiterating that the Arab demand for immediate independence still stood, it declared: "We have already said that the Arabs have postponed their demands because they do not want to annoy their friends who are busy with the war, a war of life or death. But if the Arabs find that the other side comes forward with demands menacing the existence of the Arabs, then the Arabs cannot but insist on the preservation of their life in their home-land." In an editorial on February 25, 1943, *Falastin* commented with satisfaction on the Government's strict observance of the stipulations of the White Paper on immigration and land sales. It mentioned with commendation Colonel Stanley's statement that the special grant of certificates allowed for children would be deducted from the total number of immigrants permitted under the White Paper quota. The editorial also called on Government to prevent efforts made by Arab sellers to evade the restrictions on land sales.

The influence of the old leadership seemed to have weakened. Ragheb Bey Nashashibi was old and discouraged; he lacked mass support and no longer hoped for government backing. Fakhri Bey, his energetic nephew, had been assassinated at the instigation of the Mufti in November, 1939, during a visit in Bagdad. Jamal Effendi, the next ranking member of the Husaini family after the Mufti, was in custody. However, that the Husainis still exercised influence among the Arabs was indicated by the fact that as late as March, 1944, Nahas Pasha insisted that the release of Jamal was essential to ensure the formation of the Palestine Arab delegation to the proposed Cairo Conference on Arab Unity. For a period of time in the early years of the war, the British seemed to be playing with the idea of supporting Auni Abdul Hadi—the leader of the *Istiqlal* national movement—for the position of Arab spokesman. But this notion was apparently dropped later.

There was some indication that the Arabs themselves were trying to break away from subordination to the leading families and were seeking to form a new political representative body to replace the defunct Arab Higher Committee. Steps were taken to resuscitate the political parties formed in 1935; on one occasion the leaders of the major groups were invited to Trans-Jordan for consultation with Emir Abdullah, appar-

ently with the view of achieving cooperation and choosing a united representation. There were also meetings of Chambers of Commerce, private gatherings and public appeals in the press for an Arab Congress which would elect a supreme representative body to take part in the Arab negotiations with other states and to speak out against Jewish political activity whenever a pro-Jewish statement appeared. Protests were organized in connection with the declaration made by United States Senators in 1942 against the White Paper and in connection with statements made by Wendell Willkie during his visit to the Middle East.

There was also some attempt on the part of the younger Arab intellectuals to formulate a socially progressive line of policy. Symptomatic of this was the formation of the League of Arab Students in Jerusalem, consisting of teachers, officials and secondary school students. The aims of the League were stated to be: 1) spread of progressive ideas and cultural and social progress among the Arab youth; 2) work against fascist influence; 3) campaign against illiteracy amongst the peasants; 4) instruction of the peasants in hygiene and sanitation. The statements of the leaders indicated a combination of influences from the University of Beirut and of poorly assimilated communist ideas. In general issues, the League of Arab Students expressed opinions contrary to those held by the old party leaders. The Jewish-Arab problem was not a main issue with them, but they indicated interest in it as one of the problems facing Palestine and were reputed to show a desire for Arab-Jewish rapprochement. However, conversations held between their leaders and Jewish representatives revealed that while their attitude was friendly, their position on the Jewish national home did not, in the final analysis, differ essentially from that of the other political groups.

The influence of the League of Arab Students is, in any case, of no political significance whatsoever. The old political forces representing in the main the landed aristocracy are still in power. In the spring of 1944 there were signs that the Husaini faction, formerly led by the discredited Mufti, was again assuming active leadership. At that time the American and British public opinion indicated strong support of the Zionist aspirations. In the United States there were a series of sympathetic expressions for the Jewish aspirations in Palestine by

outstanding persons and organizations: by President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Representatives and Senators, scholars and religious leaders, and labor and liberal organizations. The Congressional Hearings on the proposed Palestine Resolution revealed strong support for the Jewish Commonwealth conception, and the platforms of both political parties, Republican and Democratic, contained special clauses in favor of the Zionist purpose. The National Executive of the British Labor Party in April, 1944, went even further than any pro-Zionist opinion in the United States by suggesting not only the establishment of a Jewish Commonwealth but a transfer of Arabs from Palestine to more sparsely settled Arab countries. The various pronouncements in favor of the Jewish national home led the Arabs to suppress their internal differences and to reorganize in opposition. Moreover, the consultations on Arab unity, which had been going on during 1943-1944, raised the question of the Palestine Arab representatives at the projected conference.

The Mufti, at that time in Germany, could not of course be explicitly mentioned for leadership. The revived "Palestine Arab Party," as the Husaini faction was known, decided to retain Jamal al-Husaini, its former president, although he was known to have assisted the Mufti in organizing the pro-German Iraqi coup in the spring of 1940. The British, however, who had taken him in custody and sent him to Rhodesia, refused to release him. Taufiq Husaini, a senior member of the family, was elected vice-president, but it was assumed that his leadership was only nominal and that he would yield to a more active personality.

The resumption of leadership by the Husaini faction meant the end of the plan previously sponsored by the Government of building up Auni Bey Abdul Hadi, head of the *Istiqlal*, as the Arab leader. Negotiations between Egyptian dignitaries and Palestinian Arabs looking toward the formation of a coalition body to represent the Arabs of Palestine at the proposed Conference on Arab Unity, fell afoul of the Husaini party's insistence on having the major share in such a body. After further negotiations Musa al-Alami was recognized as the new leader; he had married into the Mufti's family, had participated in the London Conference of 1939, and had at that time repre-

sented the Palestine Arab Party's demands with a suave intransigence. He was a British-educated lawyer, served for a long period with the British administration in Palestine and was socially acceptable to British circles. Musa al-Alami represented the Palestine Arabs in the preliminary conference at Alexandria, held in September 1944, and in the Cairo Conference in February, 1945, when the Covenant of the Arab States was drawn up. In April, 1945, a new Higher Arab Committee was formed and declared its intention to create a Land Reclamation Investment Company—not dissimilar in functions to the Jewish National Fund—for the purchase of land in Palestine and the settlement of Arab colonists.

By acquiescing in the 1939 White Paper the Arabs had agreed to a policy, which, although failing to grant them full sovereignty over Palestine, gave them essentially what they wanted: recognition of Arab predominance, limitation of Jewish immigration and restriction of land settlement. The points that satisfied the Arabs were necessarily repugnant to the Jews, who were relegated to the position of a permanent minority. To the resentment caused by political implications of the White Paper, the war added the anguish of what appeared to the Jews as British callousness in the darkest hour of Jewish need. What the restrictions on immigration meant to the Jews of Palestine can scarcely be realized; for the great majority of the Jewish families in Palestine had kin in the lands of Eastern and Central Europe which the Nazis had overrun. There was hardly a home in Palestine free of personal tragedy. Anxiety created an emotional tension which was kept at a high pitch by the illegal landings, deportations and searches for arms. Moreover, the personality of Sir Harold MacMichael, the High Commissioner, was provocative. He was an able administrator, well bred and well educated, but he suffered from the defect of many Colonial officials; he was unsympathetic and aloof to the point of superciliousness. He was bent on a literal interpretation of the law and was generally regarded as petty.

As long as the British were confronted by military danger, self-restraint was exercised by all parts of the *Yishuv*. At the beginning of 1944—as will be more fully related further on—extremist groups inaugurated acts of sabotage and terror which eventuated in an attempt on the life of Sir Harold Mac-

Michael and were brought to a tragic climax with the assassination of Lord Moyne. Though a considerable part of the population may have passively sympathized with the terrorists, the *Yishuv* as a whole maintained its attitude of self-restraint, being encouraged in this by the authoritative Jewish bodies: the Jewish Agency, the *Vaad Leumi*, and the *Histadrut*. The line of policy of the *Yishuv* was indicated in the slogan: "We shall fight the White Paper as if there is no war; we shall fight the war as if there is no White Paper."

The Palestine Executive of the Jewish Agency<sup>77</sup> played a guiding role in the reformulation of the Jewish national home program. During a visit to the United States, Ben-Gurion, the political leader of the Executive, took an important part in defining the Zionist aim in terms of the creation of a Jewish Commonwealth. The movement for a restatement of position, which had developed independently in the United States, culminated in the conference held at the Biltmore Hotel in New York in May, 1942, where a new formulation of position was incorporated in what came to be known as the Biltmore Program. The new statement was a return to that conception of the Balfour Declaration which envisaged the ultimate establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine. The heart of the program was a demand for mass Jewish immigration into Palestine for the double purpose of giving immediate large-scale relief to Jewish refugees escaping from Nazi terror, and of laying the foundations for the early establishment of a Jewish majority in Palestine. For this purpose it was urged that immigration into Palestine be placed into the hands of the Jewish Agency. The closing paragraph of the Biltmore Program summarized its aim:

The Conference urges that the gates of Palestine be opened; that the Jewish Agency be vested with control of immigration into Palestine and with the necessary authority for upbuilding the country, including the development of its unoccupied and uncultivated lands; and that Palestine be established as a Jewish Commonwealth integrated in the structure of the new democratic world.

77. The active members were now all Zionists. The influence of the non-Zionists began to decline after 1933, though it continued to be significant for a number of years. The destruction of German Jewry eliminated the German non-Zionist group from effective influence, and the death of Mr. Felix Warburg in 1938 removed the mainstay of the American non-Zionist group.

The great majority in Palestine heartily welcomed the new formulation of purpose, but there were also voices of dissent. During the summer of 1942, a group of leading Jews led by Dr. Magnes formed the *Ihud* (Union), for the purpose of advancing the idea of a bi-national state. The group included a number of outstanding personalities associated with public life and philanthropic endeavor in Palestine. It consisted mainly—although not wholly—of men and women whose basic education and cultural background had been obtained in the United States, Great Britain and Germany and who represented a “Western” as against an “East European” orientation. While relatively few in number, they represented a prestige group, either because of social standing or intellectual achievement, and were in a broad sense expressive of an upper middle class liberalist approach. The presidium elected at the first meeting consisted of Dr. Magnes, Miss Henrietta Szold, Moshe Smilansky and Dr. H. M. Kalvarisky, chief sponsor of the League for Jewish-Arab Rapprochement.

In a declaration made early in September, 1942, after pledging its adherence to the Zionist movement, and avowing its support to a steadily growing Palestine Jewry, the *Ihud* organization enunciated a program containing a threefold conception of union: 1) a union between Jews and Arabs in Palestine in a bi-national state; 2) a union of an autonomous bi-national Palestine with an Arab Federation; 3) and a union of Semitic Arab countries in an international association of free peoples of the world. Because of Dr. Magnes' prestige, the *Ihud* program received considerable publicity in the United States. The emphasis on the bi-national state and the failure to make any explicit declaration on immigration aroused much controversy in the Zionist world both in Palestine and the United States. In reaction to the organization of *Ihud* there was an intensified advocacy of the Jewish Commonwealth program. The official Zionist organizations in America adopted the Biltmore Program. At a meeting of the members of the General Council of the Zionist Organization (Smaller Actions Committee) who were resident in Palestine, the Biltmore Program was adopted as the policy of the World Zionist Organization and thus became at the same time the stated policy of the Jewish Agency.

The resolution favoring the Biltmore Program was approved

by a large majority—twenty-one persons voting for it, representing all the major parties: the General Zionists, *Mizrahi* and Labor. The *Hashomer Hatzair*, with two votes, and the Socialist Zionists (*Left Poale Zion*), with one vote, opposed it. These representatives accepted the planks in the Biltmore Program which called for mass Jewish immigration and unrestricted land settlement, but indicated their adherence to a political organization along bi-national lines. There was also one dissident general Zionist representing the *Olei Germania* (Immigrants from Germany) group. Three members of the Labor Party abstained from voting; the reasons for their opposition were not given, but they were generally known to be opposed to Ben-Gurion's leadership and regarded the Biltmore Program with suspicion as encouraging the idea of a partition of Palestine.<sup>78</sup>

There was intensified activity for the improvement of Arab-Jewish relations in the social sphere on the part of advocates of the Jewish Commonwealth as well as the bi-nationalists. C. M. Kalvarisky, the persistent supporter of Arab-Jewish rapprochement, and other persons connected with the *Brith Shalom* movement, organized a new association in August, 1939, under the name of the League for Arab-Jewish Rapprochement. Among the activities outlined were the usual ones designed to promote cooperation between Arab and Jew in economic, educational and social relations. Members of the League were active in forming study groups and clubs, and establishing contacts between Arab workers and intellectuals. They also proposed activities related to the war situation: joint activity of Jews and Arabs for cooperation in air-raid protection, establishment of first-aid stations, and organization of voluntary fire-fighting companies. Although agreeing to the organization of separate national military formations, Arab as well as Jewish, they urged that the Jewish Agency should not hinder Jews from taking part in mixed formations. They decried attempts to make out all Arabs as fascist sympathizers and urged that quick and solid support be given to Arab groups ready to carry out anti-Nazi activities.

78. Since the program of the Jewish Commonwealth emphasized the aspect of political control, some thought that its promoters might be willing to accept a smaller Jewish state immediately rather than continue to hope for a Jewish state in the whole of Palestine ultimately.

The Socialist Zionists had joined the League at the beginning; the *Hashomer Hatzair* regarded the work of the League favorably but thought that its attitude on fundamental principles of Zionism had not been clearly expressed. After considerable negotiation and the formulation of a Protocol, the *Hashomer Hatzair* joined the organization.<sup>79</sup>

The Jewish Agency welcomed the efforts made by other Jewish groups in the direction of Arab-Jewish rapprochement and engaged in efforts of their own to develop good neighborly relations, particularly in the rural communities. Classes for the study of Arabic were organized for those who had immediate contact with the Arabs, such as watchmen in the fields and shepherds. Arab social customs were studied to avoid tactlessness. One of the problems that was found needing attention was the question of water rights, disputes about water being a frequent source of difficulty. Seminars in Jerusalem and Tel-Aviv were arranged by the Jewish Agency for teachers of Arabic with particular reference to practical needs.

The *Hashomer Hatzair* also conducted a seminar for the intensive study of Arabic; a Christian Arab from Haifa was engaged as teacher, and the students spent five months in Arab rural districts, putting in fifty hours a week in the study of Arabic and Arab life. The trainees were then distributed to different settlements to spread a knowledge of Arabic. In one of the *Hashomer* settlements adjoining an Arab village, arrangements were made to permit the Arab children to use the playground together with the Jewish children. In the harbor area of Haifa a mixed playground was opened for the benefit of Jewish and Arab children whose parents work at the port. Hadassah also has attempted to expand its work with Arabs. Hadassah's booklet on the fundamentals of child care was translated into Arabic. School luncheons, initiated by the Hadassah for the Hebrew schools, were introduced into a number of Arab schools, and the experience and advice of the directors of the Hadassah school luncheon were placed at the disposal of the Arab schools.

Despite improved social relations in Palestine, the general opinion was that there was no coming together on the political question. The articulate political opinion of the Arabs continued to be that Palestine was an Arab domain subject to the

79. See below, Chap. XV, p. 1162.



will of the majority of its present inhabitants and that decisions with reference to its future should be made only from the point of view of the interest of the present population without any relation to the Jewish problem in other parts of the world. That "progressive" groups shared this view was brought out in a meeting between leaders of the League of Arab Students, referred to above, and a number of Jewish representatives. The meeting was held in Jerusalem in December, 1941.<sup>80</sup> In opening the meeting the Jewish representatives submitted a number of questions concerning the possibility of an agreement between the Jews and the Arabs on the matter of immigration, particularly in the light of the need of a large Jewish immigration at the present time to help the Jewish situation in Europe. The Arab representatives felt that discussion of the question of immigration was premature because first, good relations had to be established between Jews and Arabs. They maintained that the Mufti had managed to impress the people at large with the idea that immigration was economically detrimental to them and time must elapse before this attitude could be changed. They thought that the discussion should include three points: 1) a joint struggle against Nazism; 2) the demand for the immediate establishment of democratic institutions in the country; 3) full cooperation between Jews and Arabs in all fields of activity—economic, social and cultural.

In discussing the struggle against fascism, they agreed that the Arab leaders were strongly pro-Nazi but thought that the common people were less so, "only sixty per cent pro-Nazi." A united front of Jews and Arabs against fascist forces, they argued, was important in itself and in addition would ultimately lead to bringing the Arabs and Jews closer together. A lasting rapprochement would require a breakdown of segregating tendencies in social and economic activities. In this connection they expressed themselves forcefully against the principle of one hundred percent Jewish labor in Jewish enterprise and the boycott against Arab products, which they said had had a very harmful effect on the Arab attitude, particularly on Arab workers.

80. The report of the meeting was confidential and the League of Arab Students requested that their names be withheld. The Jewish representatives were authoritative persons in touch with official circles.

Their main emphasis was on the immediate establishment of representative institutions on the basis of the rule of the majority. Since the Jews were best off in democratic countries, the Arab representatives argued that Jews would be well treated in Palestine under a democratic constitution. (A Jewish representative remarked that this complete trust in the will of the majority was somewhat contradictory to the previous statement that the masses were imbued with pro-Axis feelings.) They were confident that a popular government would deal with the question of Jewish immigration on its merits and would not hesitate to encourage it, along with Syrian or any other immigration, if judged advantageous to the country. The democratic conception, as they understood it, included the guarantee of minority rights, and such rights could be protected in the basic constitution of the country.

During the course of the discussion one Jewish representative suggested the concept of parity as the guiding principle, including numerical parity between the inhabitants for a definite period and parity of representation in all branches of the government. Along with this he proposed cooperation between Jews and Arabs in the formation of an Arab Federation. These proposals were unequivocally rejected. The Arab speakers maintained that the question of federation could not enter into the discussion; neither the Arabs nor the Jews outside of Palestine should be made partners in negotiations between the Jews and Arabs in Palestine. The decision whether to join or not to join an Arab Federation should be left to the representative body in Palestine after it had been formed. In any case, the question of federation was academic at the present time. Parity, either numerical or constitutional, was also completely repudiated. They asked: "If the Jews agreed to parity and got it while a minority, who will guarantee to the Arabs that the Jews will consent to remain at parity when they will constitute a majority?" But their main point was that a government by parity was in itself not desirable; it was no improvement on the usual type of democracy which meant rule by the majority; in their opinion, constitutional parity was a negation of democracy.

The Jewish representatives could not see any value in continuing the conferences in the light of the fact that the Arab representatives refused to deal with the question of immigra-

tion. It seemed to them that the Arab "progressives" were ready to unite with the Jews for their own purposes but were not concerned with the Jewish aspects of the problem. The Arab representatives, in a supplementary memorandum, stated that when they accepted the invitation to the meeting they had no idea of discussing the problem of immigration, "either of Jews or Syrians or of others." They indicated that they realized it would be necessary for them to define their point of view on the question of immigration but they hoped that their failure to do so would not retard progress in the discussion of the other questions which "were so important for our dark times." The impression, however, remained with the Jewish representatives that the Arabs would be ready to consider Jewish immigration only on the basis of immigration in general, that their awareness of "our dark times" did not extend to an active interest in relieving the Jewish situation in Europe—to say nothing of any sympathy for the Jewish national home conception.

#### *Jewish Military Aid for the Middle East*

On September 5th, 1939, two days after the declaration of war, Sir Harold MacMichael, the High Commissioner, broadcast an appeal to all Palestinians to lay aside their differences in a common effort against German aggression. There was no reaction on the part of the Arab political leaders; but the response of the Jews was immediate and clear. On August 29, when the declaration of war by Britain against Germany seemed imminent, Dr. Weizmann addressed a letter to the Prime Minister, assuring him that the Jews "stand by Great Britain and will fight on the side of the democracies." He stated that the Jewish Agency wished that the recent differences in the political field with the Mandatory Power should give way before the greater and more pressing exigencies of the time and would therefore place themselves "in matters big and small under the coordinating direction of His Majesty." He said further that "The Jewish Agency is ready to enter into immediate arrangements for utilizing the Jewish manpower, technical ability, resources, etc." <sup>81</sup> Chamberlain replied promptly (September 2, 1939) and cordially, expressing pleasure at the assurance of

81. Jewish Agency for Palestine, *Documents and Correspondence Relating to Palestine, August, 1939, to March, 1940*, London, 1940, p. 22.

wholehearted cooperation on the part of the Jewish Agency. However, on the offer of service his reply was noncommittal: "You will not expect me to say more at this stage than that your public-spirited assurances are welcome and will be kept in mind."

On September 3, 1939, when England officially declared war on Germany, the Executive of the Jewish Agency at Jerusalem issued a statement in the spirit of Weizmann's letter to the Prime Minister. This read in part as follows:

His Majesty's Government has today declared war against the Germany of Hitler.

At this fateful moment, the Jewish community has a threefold concern: the protection of the Jewish homeland, the welfare of the Jewish people, the victory of the British Empire.

The White Paper of May, 1939, was a grave blow to us. As heretofore we shall defend to the utmost of our ability the right of the Jewish people in its National Home. Our opposition to the White Paper was, however, never directed against Great Britain or the British Empire.

The war which has now been forced upon Great Britain by Nazi Germany is our war, and all the assistance that we shall be able and permitted to give to the British Army and to the British People we shall render wholeheartedly.

On the same day, the Executive of the Jewish Agency and the General Council of the Jews of Palestine (*Vaad Leumi*) held a joint meeting, at which it was decided to register volunteers—men and women—for service during the period of the emergency. The volunteers were to be recruited for two purposes: (1) to serve the needs of the Jewish community—in economic endeavor, security, and other public requirements of the *Yishuv*; (2) to be at the disposal of the British military authorities in Palestine for such services as they might require. A total of 136,043 persons registered, of whom 85,781 were men and 50,262 women, comprising over seventy percent of men of eligible age and over forty percent of the women. A medical examination was given to each registrant and detailed particulars recorded as to the competence of each person and the branch of service in which he or she wished to enlist. Most of the young men of military age declared their readiness to serve in the armed forces in defense of Palestine.

From the first, the Jewish Agency had suggested the organization of some kind of special Jewish military force primarily for Palestine defense. The Civil Administration viewed the suggestion with disfavor since it would strengthen the Jewish position in Palestine and antagonize the Arabs. The military authorities, in the early months of the war, saw no great need for a large army in Palestine. One highly placed military officer, not unfriendly to the Jewish desire to serve in the fighting units, nevertheless is reported to have argued that since there was no immediate likelihood of Italy coming into the war, increase of military forces in the Middle East was unwarranted. He explained that Syria, to the north, had a French army which would fight with the British; that Trans-Jordan, to the east, was under British control, and hence Iraq, behind it, would not join hands with the Germans; and that to the south, in Egypt, the British had a substantial army. Crowning what seemed to him to be a smart and conclusive argument, he said, referring to the west: "You couldn't give us a navy and so we couldn't enjoy any assistance from you there." The Jewish Agency could not, of course, argue the question of military strategy and they confined themselves to urging the importance of training young men for service so that they might be prepared if and when needed. In December, 1939, Dr. Weizmann made a formal proposal suggesting the training of Palestinian Jews as junior officers in order to facilitate the organization of a Jewish military unit later. There appears to have been some sympathetic response on the part of military authorities in England but nothing was done about the matter.

In May, 1940, with the invasion of Norway and the Low Countries, and with the fall of the Chamberlain Government, the question of Jewish military units was again taken up. On May 23, Colonel Wedgwood asked the Secretary of State for War whether the offer by the Jews had been considered by His Majesty's Government. Mr. Anthony Eden replied: "In the opinion of His Majesty's Government, the raising of separate Jewish formations would present great difficulties and it would be of much more advantage if the Jews who are anxious to serve enlist in His Majesty's Forces in the ordinary way."<sup>82</sup> Conversations were also in progress between the Jewish

82. *Parliamentary Debates, Commons*, Vol. 361, cols. 331-332.

Agency representatives and Lord Lloyd, Secretary of State for the Colonies. Lord Lloyd expressed the Government's concern over the possibility of repercussions among the Arabs. A number of points were clarified: that the proposed Jewish force would be available for service under the British anywhere His Majesty's Government saw fit, inside or outside of Palestine, and that the function of the Jewish Agency would cease with the recruitment and selection of the men. Although Lord Lloyd seemed to some extent reassured, no conclusions were reached at the time.

When Italy entered the war, in June, 1940, Weizmann made another urgent plea. He pointed out that Mussolini had actively aided the Arab rebellion in Palestine since 1935 and might make Jewish Palestine an object of special attack.<sup>83</sup> He begged that the Jews of Palestine be given an opportunity to organize for Home Defense, and urged the need of speedy action along the following lines:

- (1) To allow the Jews of Palestine, under the direction of the Jewish Agency and the Jewish National Council, and under the control of the British Military Authorities, to organise as many military units as they could, and to train and drill their men, as far as possible with the help of the British forces in the country.

- (2) To provide arms, under the control of the British authorities, for Jews thus trained, on the responsibility of the Jewish Agency and the *Vaad Leumi*.

- (3) To authorise the Jewish Agency in London, and its branches in the United States, the British Dominions, and other neighbouring countries, to provide all possible help, economic, financial and military, to the Jews of Palestine—again under the supervision of the British Military Authorities.

- (4) To instruct the Palestine Administration to treat the Jewish Community in Palestine as allies of Great Britain, and to encourage, to the fullest extent, their cooperation in the defence of the country.

This appeal apparently went unheeded. In August, 1940, Dr. Weizmann addressed a letter directly to Winston Churchill. He explained that there had been an indication of good-will on the part of the Government during the previous three months, but no concrete results had as yet been achieved. After again

83. Tel-Aviv and Haifa were in fact bombed.

urging the general reasons for a Jewish army on the grounds of British interest and the strong desire of Palestinian Jewry, Weizmann went on to say :

Should it come to a temporary withdrawal from Palestine—a contingency which we hope will never arise—the Jews of Palestine would be exposed to wholesale massacre at the hands of the Arabs encouraged and directed by the Nazis and Fascists. This possibility reinforces the demand for our elementary human right to bear arms, which should not morally be denied to the loyal citizens of a country at war. Palestinian Jewry can furnish a force of 50,000 fighting men, all of them in the prime of their strength—no negligible force if properly trained, armed, and led. If Palestine be invaded and the Jewish community be destroyed for lack of the means of self-defence, a grave responsibility will attach to the British Government which refused them.

This letter appears to have had some effect. During the following months negotiations entered a practical stage. In the middle of October, 1940, Government approved a definite though much limited scheme authorizing the recruitment of Jews for incorporation as separate units in the British Army. Only a part of the number—less than one-third—were to be drawn from Palestine, the rest would be taken from the United States and other countries. The Jewish units were to be trained in the United Kingdom, officers being selected by the Jewish Agency with the approval of the War Office. The forces would be employed at the discretion of the War Office in any theatre of the war regarded as necessary. Equipment would be provided by His Majesty's Government as and when resources allowed. The cost of equipment and maintenance would be borne largely by His Majesty's Government. No announcement of the arrangement, however, was to be made until later, and the United States was to be consulted. At the end of December, there was still no announcement. When Anthony Eden became the head of the Foreign Office, Dr. Weizmann wrote to him calling the matter to his attention. Negotiations were renewed, and in January Dr. Weizmann offered some suggestions partly in reference to the contents of the announcement but mainly to its form. In the midst of these discussions, Lord Lloyd fell prey to what proved to be a fatal illness.

With the death of Lord Lloyd, in February, 1941, the or-

ganization of the Jewish Army was again postponed. At first the delay appeared to be due to consideration of certain details designed to remove minor difficulties, but on March 4, 1941, Lord Moyne,<sup>84</sup> the new Colonial Secretary, wrote to Dr. Weizmann stating that "the matter has now been shifted onto quite other ground." He said: "I am very sorry that I have to tell you that the raising of the Jewish contingent has to be postponed. . . . The Prime Minister has decided that owing to lack of equipment the project must for the present be put off for six months, but may be considered again in four months." In the same letter, Lord Moyne added, "I can assure you that this postponement is in no sense a reversal of the previous decision in favor of your proposal." Despite this clear-cut promise, Lord Moyne notified Dr. Weizmann on October 15th that the proposal of the Jewish Agency had been rejected. In explaining his action in the House of Lords on November 25, 1941, Lord Moyne used the argument of practical difficulties and lack of equipment.<sup>85</sup> However, it was generally understood that political considerations were dominant in the mind of Lord Moyne.

Although the plan for the formation of a special Jewish division was not carried through until the fall of 1944, Palestine units consisting wholly of Jews under their own Jewish officers gradually evolved in the course of the war. The change from the original plan of Arab-Jewish units under the command of British officers came about not by definite change of policy but as a result of practical military considerations. To the British officers it was natural to think in terms of national groups since there were many such units in the British Army. They found the morale much better when they could appeal to the sense of Jewish national consciousness. In the beginning, mixed companies of Jews and Arabs were organized in Palestine, largely through individual recruiting for auxiliary technical services of the British Army. The military authorities found this method of recruiting inadequate and turned to the Jewish Agency for skilled workers and mechanics. The Jewish Agency, which consented to supplying the needed workers, at the same time urged two points right from the beginning: that the Jews be organized in separate units and that they be

84. Assassinated by Jewish terrorists in Cairo in November, 1944.

85. *Parliamentary Debates, Lords*, Vol. 121, cols. 193-194.



allowed "to do all the jobs of British soldiers, to carry rifles and to fight" and not only to be "hewers of wood for the British soldiers who would place our soldiers in a position of inferiority to them."

The requests of the Jewish Agency for separate Jewish units were not granted officially, but the military authorities included some of the Jewish forces in the fighting units where, however, for the most part they still continued to furnish technical service and manual labor. After Italy entered the war and the campaign in the Middle East assumed a crucial stage, political considerations played a smaller part and the Army agreed to recruit volunteers for the regular infantry as well as other services. The Jewish infantry companies were to serve for the defense of Palestine mainly, though in principle they could be required to serve in Egypt and elsewhere, when this was necessary for the defense of Palestine. In these companies, while commands were given in English, written instructions were communicated in Hebrew as well, and Hebrew was freely used among the service men. Enlisted men received promotions, some reaching the rank of captain and several Palestinian Jews attained the rank of major. No special Jewish insignia were allowed, but the use of the *Magen David* (the double triangle of the Shield of David) and other Hebraic emblems were permitted. In all official reports the Jewish companies were referred to simply as "Palestinian."

From the beginning, Jewish volunteers greatly outnumbered the Arabs, not only in the aforementioned mechanical and fighting services,<sup>86</sup> but even in services in which the Arabs were better equipped. In March, 1940, when the question of the Jewish Army first came up for discussion in the British Parliament, MacDonald, after some prodding, reported that since the beginning of the war, 1,709 Jews and 393 Arabs had enlisted in Palestine for service overseas.<sup>87</sup> Later the Government adopted a policy of balancing the enlistments, limiting the number of Jews accepted to the number of Arab volunteers. When pressed with the question whether the enlistments

86. This was illustrated in the case of a request for 400 volunteers for stevedore and lighterage duty. The Administration first suggested application to the Arabs for this service, but when the number of men desired was not available the Army turned to the Jewish Agency. The men were supplied and served in various ports in the Near East.

87. *Parliamentary Debates, Commons*, Vol. 358, cols. 1960-1961.

in Palestine were being limited on racial grounds, Mr. Henry George, the Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, denied this, and fell back on the conventional Government excuse that equipment was lacking to supply all who volunteered. Later, under the pressure of public opinion as expressed in the Parliamentary Debates, and in the light of the growing seriousness of the military situation, the limitations on recruitment of Jews were abandoned.

In the very early part of the war a Palestine Auxiliary Military Pioneer Corps, comprising 742 Jews and 306 Arabs, had taken part in the fighting in France.<sup>88</sup> Palestine units were with the British Army in Greece and Crete, and by all accounts rendered excellent service. Nearly all of the soldiers in these units were Jews. On September 10, 1941, Captain David Margesson, Secretary of State for War, reported that 1,541 Palestinians who had fought in Greece and Crete were presumed to be prisoners of war. On October 22nd, the Under-Secretary, Mr. Hall, indicated that the total number of Palestine Jews in all the services—Army, Navy and Royal Air Force—was over 9,000, including 1,505 missing or prisoners.<sup>89</sup> In a discussion on the question of the Jewish Army in the House of Lords on November 25, 1941, Lord Croft indicated that there were by that time 11,368 Palestinians serving with the British Army, and that of this total, 7,985 were Jews,<sup>90</sup> and 3,383 were Arabs. The number serving in various units in the Middle East was stated at that time to be as follows:<sup>91</sup>

	<i>Jews</i>	<i>Arabs</i>	<i>Total</i>
1. Palestine Infantry Company	1,359	1,032	2,391
2. Royal Engineers and Royal Army Service Corps	3,334	502	3,836
3. Auxiliary Military Pioneer Corps	2,835	1,321	4,156
4. Port Authority Companies	457	528	985
<i>Total</i>	<u>7,985</u>	<u>3,383</u>	<u>11,368</u>

88. *Ibid.*, Vol. 358, cols. 1960–1961, March 20, 1940.

89. *Ibid.*, Vol. 374, col. 1765.

90. This was outside of 1,585 Pioneer Jews serving in the Royal Air Force, as reported by Lord Moyne on December 16, 1941 (*Parliamentary Debates, Lords*, Vol. 121, col. 305).

91. *Ibid.*, col. 102.

The Palestine Jews in these various services were later incorporated into purely Jewish units serving in the Middle East, and by August 1942 they numbered over 20,000.<sup>92</sup> They had seen service in France, England, Greece, Crete, Abyssinia, North Africa and in various other fronts in the Middle East. They were largely attached to the artisan works company, electrical and mechanical companies, mechanical workshop companies, map survey depots, movement and transport units, and a camouflage company.<sup>93</sup> When the special Jewish Palestine units were formed as part of the infantry, it was believed that the Jews would be permitted to do combat duty, but the nearest they got to this were assignments to guard duty. In July, 1943, the first Jewish battalion was ordered to foreign service. Again it was hoped that the Palestinians would be permitted to fight, but this expectation was disappointed. It was only after the formation of the Jewish Brigade that the Palestine Jews as such were permitted to do combat duty.

In August, 1943, there were 22,000 Jews in the British forces organized as special units. In addition to this force in the regular armed divisions, there were 7,000 men in the Supplementary Police Force and 35,000 Civil Defense Workers. There were also about 1,500 Jews from Palestine and the Middle East in the R.A.F., stationed in numerous places throughout the Middle East. A volunteer Coast Guard, formed in the summer of 1942, was reported in September, 1943, as having their own uniforms and as being fully equipped. The total number of Jewish volunteers in active military service in August 1943 was about 30,000; this number had grown to 35,000 up to September, 1944, when the Jewish Brigade was organized. In addition to this number, 15,000 were serving as special policemen in Palestine.

By all reports the Palestine Jews rendered courageous and skillful service and received high praise from their commanders. Pierre Van Paassen, in a striking chapter entitled

92. Major Lewis Rabinowitz, *Soldiers from Judaea*, American Zionist Emergency Council, New York, by arrangement with Victor Gollancz, London, 1945, p. 5.

93. Camouflage was important in the battle for Egypt and was referred to particularly by the Prime Minister in his account of the victory. The work of the Jewish camouflage company was particularly resourceful and ingenious. Though it is not mentioned by name, this company evidently played an important part in the Egyptian campaign. (*Ibid.*, p. 43.)

"The Best Kept Secret of the War," recounts a number of situations in Ethiopia, Syria and North Africa, in which Jews distinguished themselves in tasks which required ingenuity, stamina and utter self-sacrifice. The determined contribution of the Jewish units to the Allied victory in the Battle of Egypt—through technical services, intelligence work and fighting—helped to tip the scales in favor of the United Nations when the British and Axis forces were closely balanced. In the day of El Alamein, "Jewish Palestine was one of the imponderables that turned the tide against Hitler at the moment when he and almost the whole world least expected it." <sup>94</sup>

### *The Jewish Army Proposal*

The question of Jewish military units aroused much discussion in Great Britain and the United States. The demand for Jewish forces to fight in the Middle East and for the defense of Palestine became linked with the broader issue of the creation of a Jewish Army made up of volunteers from various parts of the world which would fight against Axis forces under the command of the United Nations. There were a number of motivations behind the movement for a Jewish Army. Some felt that since Hitler had singled out the Jews for special attack, the Jews ought to fight him as Jews. Sponsors of the Jewish Army proposal emphasized the idea that the Jews would have a stronger case for recognition at the Peace Table if they had fought in a special division. Others thought that the influence on the despairing Jews throughout the Nazi-occupied European countries would be great; fighting Hitler would give Jews a new sense of hope and strength in carrying on the struggle against nazism. In the proposals, the problem of Palestinian Jewish units for service in the Middle East and defense of Palestine sometimes became confused with the idea of the creation of a Jewish Army drawn from various parts of the world to fight Hitler on a European front.

The Jewish Army issue was the subject of long debates in the British Parliament; in the House of Lords on June 9, 1942, and in the House of Commons on August 6th. The debates revealed the type of proposals that were being put forward at the time. It was brought out that besides the idea of a Jewish

94. Pierre Van Paassen, *The Forgotten Ally*, Dial Press, New York, 1943, p. 232.

Army consisting of 200,000 Palestinian and stateless Jews, which was being sponsored by groups in England and in the United States, there was another more responsible proposal put forward by the Jewish Agency.<sup>95</sup> The Jewish Agency proposed that the existing dispersed Jewish companies be organized into recognized Jewish Battalions. With these would be united a force of 6,000 men in the Jewish Supernumerary Police on active duty in Palestine. An additional force of about 10,000 men would be enlisted immediately. These elements forming an army of over 20,000 should be molded into a single force and equipped for combat service in the Middle East under the British. The second part of the Jewish Agency proposal was to recruit and equip an additional 40,000 to 50,000 men available for "Home Guard" duties in Palestine; this could be done without taking them away from agricultural and industrial work.

The debate in the House of Lords was opened by Lord Wedgwood.<sup>96</sup> A part of his speech on this occasion created a stir in the United States as well as in Great Britain. He urged that the Mandate for Palestine be transferred to the United States because England had gone back on its promises. He said, bitterly: "I hope yet to live to see those who sent the 'Struma' cargo back to the Nazis hung as high as Haman cheek by jowl with their prototype and Fuehrer, Adolf Hitler." He summarized three demands: permission to the Palestine Jews to raise and arm Home Guards; organization of a definitely Jewish force from any Jews who had escaped or could escape from Hitler; and "the arming and training to fight of all the Jews now ignominiously serving in the Pioneer Corps." Lord Croft, speaking for the Government, endeavored to show that as full use was being made of the Jewish desire to serve as available equipment permitted. Lord Moyne, however, revealed the political motivation in the Government's policy of limiting Jewish military formations. In a statement openly anti-Zionist and pro-Arab, he described Palestine as being already overcrowded; that to bring more Jews there would be like "putting exactly three pints into a pint pot." He thought that if the fear of Jewish domination could be overcome, Syria, Lebanon and

95. *Parliamentary Debates, Lords*, Vol. 123, cols. 191-193; *Commons*, Vol. 382, col. 1248.

96. Lord Wedgwood died on July 26, 1943.

Trans-Jordan might offer some possibilities for Jewish immigration, although he alleged that there was a problem of overcrowding in those countries as well.<sup>97</sup>

In the House of Commons there was, similarly, both support of and opposition to the idea of increasing and organizing the Jewish forces in Palestine. Colonel Cazalet (formerly Major),<sup>98</sup> who had made an attack against the Land Regulations, pleaded with the Government "to give that comparatively small Jewish community in Palestine a chance of fighting, a chance of defending their own homes, a chance of showing the Jews in Europe that somewhere in some part of the world, the Jews are not utterly defeated and overwhelmed."<sup>99</sup> Mr. James Griffiths, a newcomer in the Palestine debates, asked the House of Commons to concentrate on the immediate problem of arming the Jews in Palestine—a proposal which he strongly supported—rather than on the broader plan of the Jewish Army. He centered attention on the two proposals made by the Jewish Agency: a force of about 20,000 men built up on the basis of the existing Jewish units in Palestine; the drafting of 40,000 or 50,000 additional men and women for Home Guard and Civil Defense duties. Commander Locker-Lampson favored the Jewish Army in its broadest form. He said: "I am in favor of the Jewish Army because Hitler does not want one. Arm your friends, because your friends are the friends of freedom."<sup>100</sup>

Captain de Chair, who was opposed to the formation of a Jewish Army, gave Arab antagonism as the major reason. He said: "We always have to face up to the difficulty of their susceptibility to German propaganda, which has been extremely successful."<sup>101</sup> He thought the promotion of separate forces in Palestine, Arab and Jewish, would inevitably lead to a clash; he wished to utilize the local Jewish patriotism without creating a Jewish Army which, in his opinion, would arouse Arab susceptibilities. Mr. Lipson, a Jewish member of Parliament, put forward the old anti-Zionist argument that the Jews were a religious community only and that service in a special Jewish Army had the odor of nationalistic separatism not compatible with full loyalty to the States of which the Jews were subjects.

97. *Parliamentary Debates, Lords*, cols. 196–200.

98. Colonel Cazalet was killed in an airplane crash over Spain.

99. *Parliamentary Debates, Commons*, Vol. 382, cols. 1242–1247.

100. *Ibid.*, col. 1264.

101. *Ibid.*, cols. 1251–1253.

Stressing the nationalistic element, he averred, played into the hands of anti-Semites who used this as a means of justifying discrimination against Jews in various parts of the world. Another twist to the argument against the Jewish Army was given by Major Sir Derrick Gunston, who thought that it would endanger a favorable postwar settlement of the Jewish question: it might give the idea that Palestine would be made a Jewish state after the war and might encourage Jews of Eastern Europe to think that Palestine could solve all their difficulties. It was evident that the opposition to the Jewish Army was due—not to the merits of the case—but to its connection with the political problem: it would strengthen the Jewish claim and antagonize the Arabs.

The debates in Parliament, though failing at the time in their primary objective of obtaining a Jewish Army in Palestine and the Middle East, probably contributed to the relaxing of the restrictions. The “parity” formula, by which the number of Jewish recruits was limited by the number of Arabs who volunteered, was abandoned and this may have been in part due to the force of public opinion. Moreover, as noted above, companies consisting of Jews only, although referred to as Palestinian and receiving the pay of Palestinians, were by this time the general rule.

The Jewish Army question continued to be discussed and for a period became a major issue in American Jewish life. Anti-Zionists and non-Zionist proponents of the Jewish national home were generally opposed to the project; there were also some Zionists of long standing who showed no enthusiasm. The Zionist organizations supported the idea of a special Jewish Brigade in the more realistic form proposed by the Jewish Agency. The Jewish public, however, was generally in favor of the Jewish Army project and there developed an unexpectedly large following among persons—Jews and others—who had hitherto never evinced any particular interest in Jewish causes. A large Committee for a Jewish Army was formed, which included prominent leaders in American life representing all religious denominations and drawn from many branches of public life and business: the Army, Navy and Government; churches, educational institutions and social work; labor organizations, the press, and the legal profession. The main effort of the Committee consisted in publishing full page

advertisements in leading American daily papers.<sup>102</sup> As the culmination of several months' propaganda, a large meeting of about 1,000 persons was held at the Hotel Commodore on December 16, 1942.

The plan for the Jewish Army gained force from the fact that about this time a Greek unit was organized in the American Army. It was to consist of Greek nationals, including those who had taken out their first papers for American citizenship, and Americans of Greek extraction in the service who wished to join. The men were to wear the United States uniform with a distinctive shoulder patch authorized by the War Department.<sup>103</sup> This was the fourth such battalion which had been formed during the year in the United States; the others being Polish, Norwegian and Austrian units. The New Zionist Organization of America (Revisionists) supplemented the proclamation of the Committee for a Jewish Army by similar full-page advertisements of their own in which they presented three demands: the establishment of a Jewish State; the recognition of the Jewish people as an ally of the United Nations; and the formation of a Jewish Army to fight under a Jewish banner.

The program of the Committee for a Jewish Army promoted by these groups called for the formation of a military force of 200,000 Jews who would fight in the Middle East and in any other theatre of war decided on by the United Nations. American Jews were not to be included in this Jewish Army; it was to be composed about half of Palestinian Jews who were to fight in the Middle East, and about half of stateless Jews, made up of refugees from Nazi-occupied countries, who would fight in various parts of the world. In giving their reasons why a Jewish Army should be formed, the following points were emphasized: Palestine was the key to the Middle East; no one would defend Palestine like the Jews; the Arabs of the Middle East were hostile to the United Nations and were on the verge of open revolt. There were 100,000 Jews in Palestine and the Middle East among whom were trained and experienced fighters, and another 100,000 Jews scattered the world over, the victims of Hitler, who were anxious to join in the Jewish Army

102. See "A Proclamation on the Moral Rights of the Stateless and Palestinian Jews," *The New York Times*, Monday, December 7, 1942.

103. *The New York Times*, December 12, 1942.



"for victory and vengeance." The quick mobilization of this relatively large force would be of significant help in winning the war. Moreover, it would take the wind out of the sails of those anti-Semites who were always insinuating that the Jews were ready to let others do their fighting for them. In the last war, when there were Jews in the armies of the Central Powers as well as in the Allied Armies, the British had formed Jewish battalions. "Why not now, when all the Jewish people are united on the side of the United Nations?" <sup>104</sup>

This agitation brought no practical results. The Jewish Agency, however, continued to press its proposals and finally in September, 1944, the British War Office announced that "His Majesty's Government have decided to accede to the request of the Executive of the Jewish Agency for Palestine that a Jewish Brigade Group be formed to take part in active operations." The decision was no doubt influenced by the Prime Minister who, it will be remembered, had originally agreed to the formation of a Jewish Brigade. On September 29, 1944, in his review of the war situation before the House of Commons, referring to the announcement that the Government had decided to allow the formation of the Jewish Brigade, Churchill declared: "I know there is a vast number of Jews serving with our forces and the American forces throughout all the armies, but it seems to me indeed appropriate that a special Jewish unit of that race which has suffered indescribable torment from the Nazi should be represented as a distinct formation among the forces gathered for their final overthrow. I have no doubt that they will not only take part in the struggle but also in the occupation which will follow."

On October 19, 1944, it was officially announced that Brigadier Ernest Frank Benjamin was appointed Commanding Officer of the Brigade. Meanwhile, negotiations were carried on between the British Government and the Jewish Agency with regard to the flag and insignia of the Brigade. On October 31st, the Jewish Agency announced that the British Government had approved the flag of the Jewish Brigade—two horizontal blue stripes on a white background, with a blue Shield of David in the center. A blue and white shoulder flash with a Shield of David in gold had also been authorized. The armlet

104. *10 Reasons Why a Jewish Army*, Committee for a Jewish Army of Stateless and Palestinian Jews, New York.

designation was to be "Jewish Brigade Group" in white on khaki, with the Hebrew equivalent "Hativah Yehudit Lochemet" (Jewish Combat Unit). A very vigorous recruiting campaign was carried on in Palestine as well as in England and the new recruits were sent to the training station of the Brigade somewhere in the Middle East. At the completion of this training period the Brigade was sent on combat duty in Italy and it was on active combat duty from March 15th. It was attached to the British Eighth Army under the general command of General Mark Clark.

*Self-Arming among Arabs and Jews*

During the war period there was an increase in self-arming and in arms traffic among both Arabs and Jews. The carrying of arms is customary in desert and rural areas in Arab countries, and there would in any case have been, under war conditions, a tendency on the part of the Bedouins and the villagers to purchase rifles and munitions. The presence of military stocks offered opportunities and the fear of inflation further stimulated purchase of arms as a good investment. Some American reporters saw in the increase of self-arming a preparation for military action on the part of the Jews and the Arabs.<sup>105</sup> Tension between the two groups was undoubtedly one factor and the Jews had learned the necessity of self-defense through bitter experience. However this may be, as a matter of fact there were no incidents of violence between Jews and Arabs during the period of the war. The acts of terror perpetrated by Jewish groups during 1944 were directed wholly against the Government and were largely the result of despair at its failure to change the White Paper policy. Provocative activities by the Government in conducting arms searches in the Jewish settlements helped to increase the tension.

During the early part of the war, the Government had conducted arms searches in the Jewish settlements, but these were later stopped or at least not very vigorously pursued. However, in the summer of 1943, a campaign against concealed arms was again undertaken; the Government attempted to implicate Jews in a military trial of two privates in the British

105. C. L. Sulzberger, *The New York Times*, July 29, 31, August 1, 1943; F. Lawrence Babcock, "The Much Promised Land," *Fortune*, October, 1944.

Army who had been arrested the previous January on the charge of stealing arms from the military stores. Both soldiers pleaded guilty and accused a number of Jews, who, they alleged, were acting as intermediaries for a Jewish organization. The case against the two soldiers (Harris and Stoner) and the trial of the two Jews (Reichlin and Sirkin) directly charged with complicity, which followed that of the two soldiers, assumed the character of an attack against the Jewish defense organization in Palestine and against the Jewish Agency as standing behind it.<sup>106</sup>

The trial of the soldiers took a peculiar turn. Much emphasis was laid on the extenuating circumstances which led the defendants to steal the arms: their underprivileged home environment as children, their lack of money and innocence of the ways of the world, which made them easy prey for "an organization so powerful and so ruthless that once its tentacles had closed on them, there was virtually no escape."<sup>107</sup> The attorney for the defense insinuated that now that the war had receded from the frontiers of Palestine, the Palestinian Jewish soldiers "under influence of this organization," were no longer working in the interests of the United Nations. The presiding military judge declared that "the safety and defense of Palestine" was being threatened by a "vast and dangerous organization with vast resources behind it."<sup>108</sup>

A sense of outrage spread through the Jewish community in Palestine. Ben-Gurion, speaking for the Jewish Agency, branded the utterances of the military judge and the prosecutor as anti-Semitism of the worst type; he accused the counsel for the defense as having acted without regard for truth or

106. A. C. Sedgwick, reporting the case in *The New York Times*, August 13, 1943, wrote: "A certain high official of the Jewish Agency was alleged by the prosecutor to have had knowledge of the practice of acquiring arms for distribution, presumably among such sections of the Jewish population as would be interested for nationalistic reasons in arming themselves."

107. In a public address delivered by Ben-Gurion in October, 1943, he described the two soldiers involved as "deserters from the British Army, who had broken their oath to King and Country, participated in hashish smuggling together with Arabs, sold tires and bullets stolen from the Army to Arabs, stolen money in a Haifa hotel and attempted robbery in Haifa. One of the soldiers had committed theft and robbery before in England." ("British Officialdom Slanders the Jews," *Jewish Frontier*, February, 1944.)

108. *The New York Times*, August 13, 1943.

decency and challenged him to substantiate his allegations against the Jewish organizations before any independent board of inquiry.<sup>109</sup> The *Histadrut* (Labor Federation) protested vigorously to the High Commissioner against a remark made by the prosecutor to the effect that the Labor Federation "exercised Nazi discipline over its members." At an extraordinary meeting of the General Assembly of the *Vaad Leumi* (*Asefat Haniivharim*), Isaac Ben-Zvi, the chairman of the *Vaad Leumi*, declared that the Jewish community deeply resented using the trial as "a platform for insinuations against the *Yishuv*." He declared that there had been many trials of non-Jews on similar charges, but in no case had wide publicity been given, as in this instance, when reporters were especially invited from Cairo to be present. The Assembly adopted a resolution condemning this exploitation of the trial of individuals for the purpose of making an attack against the Jewish community.

The two British soldiers were sentenced to fifteen years' imprisonment, and the two Jewish civilians, Abraham Reichlin and Leib Sirkin, to seven and ten years, respectively. On October 7th, the Military Court also sentenced another Jewish civilian to seven years in prison for "illegal possession of ammunition." He had been authorized to carry a revolver with twelve bullets, but a search of his house revealed thirteen and he was charged in connection with this extra bullet.<sup>110</sup> The tense feeling in the Jewish community was aggravated when, on October 11th, an Arab who had been found in possession of a considerable supply of arms got off with a relatively light sentence. He had on him a British Army service rifle loaded with twelve rounds of ammunition, a bandoleer with seven rounds of rifle ammunition, and a bayonet. The Arab was tried in a civil court and sentenced to six weeks' imprisonment for illegal possession of arms.<sup>111</sup> On November 11th, two Arabs were sentenced to from two to three years in prison by a military court for the illegal possession of 1,800 rounds of ammunition.<sup>112</sup> On No-

109. *Ibid.*, August 15, 1943.

110. *Ibid.*, October 8, 1943. This extra bullet was similar to the type of ammunition which had figured in the case against Reichlin and Sirkin and the effort was made to tie him up with the accusation against the defense organization.

111. *Palcor*, October 11, 1943.

112. *Ibid.*, November 3 and 11, 1943.

vember 19th, eight Arabs were found guilty by a military court for illegal possession of arms including sub-machine guns, and were sentenced to from one to four years' imprisonment. The trial was conducted with a minimum of publicity.<sup>113</sup>

A tragic case occurred on November 16th at Ramat Hakovesh, a Jewish settlement in the coastal plain of the Sharon. A force of British police, Indian troops and Polish Military Police descended on the settlement with the alleged purpose of finding Jewish deserters from the Polish Army, uncovering arms caches, and breaking up a training camp for a unit of the illegal armed organization. There was a forcible round-up of all of the men inside a barbed wire enclosure, and evidently some resistance on the part of the settlers. The search was carried on all day and thirty-five men were arrested. The inhabitants of the settlement were herded into an enclosure and the men who offered resistance were beaten. As the police force withdrew, the officer in command fired two shots and one of the settlers, Shmuel Wolinietz, was hit. He was taken to the Government Hospital at Nablus in a serious condition. On Saturday afternoon, November 20th, reports of the gravity of his condition resulted in demonstrations in Tel-Aviv and a fire was started in the Government District Office. There were civilian casualties from blows struck by the police when the crowd refused to disperse and some of the police were injured by stones hurled by demonstrators in retaliation. Wolinietz died on Sunday morning, and in the afternoon, as the news spread through Jerusalem, all traffic was stopped. The Government issued a Hebrew bulletin designed to keep the public quiet, and bundles of them were publicly burned by demonstrators in Tel-Aviv. The Government then suspended the Jewish newspapers for what was officially described as "highly tendentious accounts of the search last Tuesday at Ramat Hakovesh and giving wide publicity calculated to mislead and inflame public opinion."

Demonstrations were held throughout the country demanding that the arms searches cease. At a meeting at Ramat Hakovesh on Sunday morning, a member of the settlement pointed out that the colony had suffered from continuous attacks by Arabs during the disturbances of 1936-1939. Wolinietz's wife had been seriously wounded at that time when a bus carrying

113. *Ibid.*, November 19, 1943.

workers was blown up by an Arab-planted land mine. Speakers at the funeral justified the right of Jews to self-defense. Ben-Gurion, who spoke on behalf of the Jewish Agency, declared, "The few arms in our possession are for our defense and we shall guard them like the apple of our eyes." At the funeral, which took place at Ramat Hakovesh on November 23rd, Moshe Shertok, who delivered the eulogy, made the necessity and the right of self-defense the theme of his address.

The protests and demonstrations were renewed, and the Jewish bodies demanded that an inquiry be instituted into the circumstances which resulted in the death of Wolinietz and the numerous injuries and arrests of settlers. The Government released the thirty-four settlers arrested at Ramat Hakovesh and dropped proceedings against them. The Jewish newspapers, which had been suspended for eleven days, were allowed to reappear. However, despite what seemed to be a more conciliatory attitude on the part of the Government, the *Yishuv* was again disturbed on December 8th, when seven settlers of Hulda, arrested on October 3rd, were placed on trial before the Military Court in Jerusalem on the charge of illegal possession of bullets and hand grenades.<sup>114</sup> On December 10th, all the seven settlers were found guilty by the military court, and on December 20th they were sentenced for periods ranging from two to six years. On January 1st, the General Officer in Command of British Forces in Palestine and Trans-Jordan confirmed the sentences by the military tribunal. Following this, the Jewish *Mukhtars* (heads of villages) informed the High Commissioner that "under the circumstances they were unable to continue their duties."<sup>115</sup>

### *The Outbreak of Terror*

Thus, at the end of 1943 the atmosphere was highly charged; however, the first month of the new year was still relatively quiet.<sup>116</sup> Reports of the Nazi atrocities against the Jews in

114. Hulda was a settlement completely destroyed in the Arab attacks of 1929 and rebuilt by Jewish settlers in 1932. During 1936-1939, they suffered heavily at the hands of the Arabs and seventeen of their number were killed.

115. *Palcor*, January 3, 1944.

116. There seems to have been some belief, both in Palestine and in Zionist circles in Great Britain, that a more favorable attitude was being considered by the British Government and that a statement annulling or

Eastern and Central Europe continued. As the time limit of the White Paper (March 31, 1944) approached, and no change in British policy on immigration was announced, despite the continuance of Nazi atrocities against the Jews, the tension reached a breaking point. Signs of unrest appeared on February 5th, when an unauthorized Revisionist procession protesting against the White Paper was held at Jerusalem and a number of the demonstrators were arrested. On Saturday night, February 12th, the offices of the Department of Migration in Jerusalem and Tel-Aviv were damaged by incendiary bombs, the explosion taking place during the same hour in both cities; the following night similar explosions took place in Haifa. During the same weekend a member of the Labor organization *Hashomer Hatzair* was shot by a member of the *Brith Trumpeldor*, Zionist Revisionist youth organization. The shooting occurred when a group of members of the *Brith Trumpeldor* broke into the *Hashomer Hatzair* club rooms in Tel-Aviv and tried to distribute pamphlets of the *Irgun Zvai Leumi*, the Revisionist military organization.

The Hebrew press was unanimous in condemning the outbreaks as "insane acts of hooligans" opposed to the interests of the country as a whole and particularly harmful to the Jewish population. The Government issued a statement announcing that the Migration Offices at Tel-Aviv and Haifa would be closed as a result of the bomb explosions and that only limited services for urgent passport matters would be provided at the Migration Offices in Jerusalem and in Jaffa. The terror, however, continued and grew worse. On February 17th, two British police officers were reported to have died of bullet wounds inflicted by unidentified persons in an encounter in Hadar Hacarmel, a Jewish section of Haifa. The police reported that a parcel discarded by one of the assailants contained "subversive pamphlets." The following night in Jerusalem, a Jew who failed to identify himself when challenged, was shot by the police. Later it was determined that he was an innocent victim, a barber returning from work.

The *Vaad Leumi* issued a statement calling on the Jewish

substituting the White Paper would soon be forthcoming. It is possible that Churchill's presence in Cairo—where he was recuperating from an attack of pneumonia contracted after the Teheran Conference—gave rise to the rumor.

population to take a determined stand against the persons responsible for the recent acts of sabotage and terror, but this had as little effect as the previous protests of the Hebrew press. A new wave of terror broke out on February 24th, in which two police cars were wrecked and several British police inspectors narrowly escaped injury. During the four weeks that followed there were several cases of shooting both of police officers and Jews. The terror reached a new height on March 23rd, when there were explosions in police headquarters in Jerusalem, Haifa and Jaffa, and open shooting of British constables in Tel-Aviv. Six British policemen and one Jew were shot, and more than a dozen persons seriously injured. The Palestine Government imposed a rigid curfew and invoked the death penalty for violence and sabotage which had been enacted in 1936 but which had lapsed in the summer of 1940.

The acts of terror and sabotage were carried on by two groups: the *Irgun Zvai Leumi* (National Military Organization), and a more extreme offshoot which called itself "Fighters for the Freedom of Israel," usually referred to as the Stern Gang.<sup>117</sup> Although distinctly separate organizations, following different policies, probably some of the extremists in the *Irgun Zvai Leumi* collaborated at times with the Sternists. The membership of the *Irgun Zvai Leumi* has been estimated as numbering several thousand; the Sternist group included at most several hundred.<sup>118</sup> Both groups had their origin in an activist movement in pre-war Poland which stemmed from the extremist wing of Zionist revisionism. Although the leaders of the official Revisionist movement advocated a firm

117. This account follows closely the article by Gerold Frank, who was in Palestine during the period of the terror, appearing in *The Nation*, December 2, 1944.

118. *Time Magazine* of April 3, 1944, carried an article which charged the "dread Hagana" with the acts of terror in Palestine. They obviously confused the *Hagana*, the regular Jewish defense organization in Palestine with the *Irgun Zvai Leumi* and the "Stern Gang" which are in open defiance against the official Zionist authorities and other Jewish bodies. Despite the fact that the *Hagana* is technically illegal, the Zionist organization takes the responsibility for it as a legitimate home defense association. Although, as in the case of the arms searches, the *Hagana* has from time to time been molested by the British authorities, on the whole it has not been interfered with and on occasion, it has even been depended upon for aid in the maintenance of public security. There is no official estimate of the membership of the *Hagana* but it is a large group probably numbering around 50,000.



and maximalist Zionist political policy, they abjured the use of terror. Extremist elements, particularly among the youth, influenced by the fascist example, urged the use of violence as a political instrument. These "activists" held the view that Great Britain would never permit a mass immigration of Jews into Palestine, or the creation of a Jewish majority except under the pressure of force. Though anti-British, they disclaimed being anti-Arab; they held that the Jews and the Arabs could have reconciled their differences if Great Britain had not set the two peoples against each other.

Although similar in their general outlook, the two groups—the *Irgun* and the Sternists—differed considerably on the question of method, particularly with reference to the degree of violence that should be used. The *Irgun Zvai Leumi* directed its activities against the institutions and machinery of Government, and set out to destroy police stations, post offices and other Government buildings. Although carrying weapons, they claimed that they used them only in self-defense when they encountered resistance. The members of the *Irgun* protested against being called terrorists; they regarded themselves as a Jewish military underground operating against "the enemy," i.e., Great Britain. They issued "communiqués" couched in military terminology, wore armbands and other insignia, and when arrested claimed the right to be treated as prisoners of war. On several occasions they made public acknowledgment of their responsibility for setting the bombs in the Government offices and the police stations. In the midst of the terror they issued a proclamation which read: "There is no longer an armistice between Jewish youth and the British Administration, who are not taking into consideration our loyalty and sacrifices, wherefore we are forced to draw our own conclusions fearlessly."<sup>119</sup> However, they consistently denied any complicity in the shootings.

The Stern Gang was an out-and-out secret terrorist society. Its members hid in the large cities under aliases and their parents were generally unaware of their activities. It is thought that they were organized in groups of ten and that no member knew any of the terrorists outside of his own group; they usually operated two or three at a time. A small percentage of the group were native-born Palestinians, usually drawn

119. *The New York Times*, February 28, 1944.

from the poorer Sephardic stratum of the population; the majority were young Polish-born Jews. Their purpose was to drive the British out of Palestine and they believed that assassination of the higher Government officers was an indispensable step toward this end. Although usually referred to as "a gang" they were in fact, as C. L. Sulzberger of *The New York Times* has termed them, "misguided idealists" who considered themselves patriotic martyrs of the same tradition as the assassins in the Irish Republican Army.<sup>120</sup>

The group took its name from Abraham Stern, a Polish-born Jewish intellectual with a messianic complex. Stern received a scholarship as a classical student in Italy in the early 1930's before Mussolini adopted his anti-Jewish policy. He was greatly influenced by fascist ideas and became imbued with Anglophobia. In 1937, Stern organized a group of activists in Poland and when the war broke out some of them joined the Polish Army. It appears that their military training included instruction in terrorism and sabotage. Later they were captured by the Russians who released them, and they found their way to Palestine with other Polish troops. There they deserted and carried out sabotage activities against the Government. Stern and two of his followers were killed in 1942 in an encounter with the British police. The Sternists maintained that their leader was deliberately murdered and a blood feud sprang up between them and the police. Shortly before the shootings in February occurred, twenty members of the gang had escaped from a detention camp.

From the beginning of the outbreaks the Jewish authorities had branded the sabotage and terror as the acts of "a gang of lunatics endeavoring to establish a reign of terror,"<sup>121</sup> and appealed to the Jewish population to take a determined stand against persons responsible. Since a number of those arrested in the police raids were members of the former Revisionist Party (now the New Zionist Organization), doubt was raised as to the attitude of this organization on the terror. To clear up the situation, the New Zionist Organization, both in Palestine and in London, formally dissociated itself from the acts of terror in a memorandum addressed to the Chief Secretary of the Palestine Government. The official Revisionists expressed

120. C. L. Sulzberger, *Ibid.*, January 14, 1945.

121. *Palestine*, February 21, 1944.

deep sorrow at the loss of life and destruction of property, and reaffirmed faith in political action. At the same time they took occasion to state that the terrorism was "the product of events going back to 1920 and recurring during successive periods of civil commotion in Palestine when non-Jewish residents were repeatedly rewarded with political concessions at the expense of Jewish rights."<sup>122</sup> It urged the British Government to apply itself to the deeper causes underlying the situation.

The Arabs had not in the early weeks of the disturbances expressed any strong reaction. As no assaults had been made on them they looked at the situation largely as a feud between the police and the Jewish extremists. Toward the end of March, however, when the connection of the terror with the White Paper was made more explicit, Arab organizations began to take a more active interest, and the Arab press tended to impute blame to the entire Jewish community for the disturbances. Some Arab political groups wired protests to the High Commissioner, to the Colonial Office and to the British Parliament.<sup>123</sup> One Arab leader declared that it was necessary to continue the search for illegal arms and ammunition in all Jewish centers if Arab apprehensions with reference to the public security in Palestine were to be allayed.

The American press featured the outbreaks and there was considerable editorial comment. There was, of course, consistent condemnation of the acts of sabotage and terror. At the same time it was pointed out that past instances of Arab terrorism had been rewarded by new concessions at the expense of the Jews and that it was not strange "that some misguided Jewish youths have said to themselves, 'Maybe we'd have better luck if we tried those tactics, too?'"<sup>124</sup> Anne O'Hare McCormick devoted a column in *The New York Times*<sup>125</sup> to an analysis of the situation, pointing out that the attacks were not against the Arabs but against the British police force, and that they were "probably intended as a protest against the provision in the White Paper which set March 31, 1944 as the date on which immigration into Palestine should end." She de-

122. *The New York Times*, April 2, 1944.

123. *Ibid.*, March 28, 1944.

124. I. F. Stone, *PM*, April 5, 1944.

125. March 27, 1944.

clared that in the light of the ghastly tragedy of the Jews in Hitler's Europe, it was not "hard to understand why fanatics already half crazed from brooding over irremedial horrors, should go completely crazy." She summed up the situation as follows:

At any rate, the violence that flared up when the White Paper was issued flares up again as the time limit for immigration expires. Acts of terror will not open the doors. They will harden the British, encourage the Arabs and poison the atmosphere in which the problem of Palestine has to be solved. On the other hand, the crimes of these lawless bands, repudiated by every serious Zionist, should not prejudice the solution. Quite apart from the future political status of Palestine, no humane government or individual could advocate closing the gates to a temporary haven. If the neutral countries of Europe heed the President's plea to open their borders to the new victims of Nazi occupation, and there is any way to get these people out of Europe, no quota should be allowed to stand in the way of their finding refuge in a country where they will be welcomed.

There were several months of relative quiet, but in the middle of July the terror was renewed when ten men entered the Jerusalem District police barracks and planted bombs. They were interrupted and in the course of an exchange of shots an Arab watchman and two policemen—one Jewish and one Arab—were shot and killed; two British constables were wounded. On August 7th, an attempt was made on the life of Sir Harold MacMichael, the retiring High Commissioner. Accompanied by his wife, he was on his way to a reception tendered in his honor by the municipality of Jaffa. His car was attacked by assailants armed with tommyguns and his aide-de-camp and police chauffeur were seriously wounded. Sir Harold was slightly wounded; his wife was unhurt. The men escaped through a nearby Jewish village, Gevat Shaul.

The attack on Sir Harold MacMichael was denounced by Jewish and Zionist authorities and by the Jewish press in Palestine and throughout the Jewish world in the most extreme terms as an abominable act violating every canon of moral and political behavior. The Jewish Agency, the *Vaad Leumi*, the Rabbinical Council, all public bodies and the press in Palestine, appealed to the *Yishuv* to do everything in its power to give assistance to the Government in bringing the perpetrators

"of this dastardly act" to justice. The Palestine Administration introduced drastic measures: a collective fine was imposed on the village through which the assailants had escaped, searches for terrorists were made in the settlements and suspects were arrested and banished in large numbers. Neither the moral suasion of the Jewish authorities nor the extreme measures of the Government were effective. Toward the end of September there was a new outburst of terrorism: police stations in Jerusalem and Haifa were stormed by parties of men armed with automatic weapons. The Palestine Administration, failing to suppress the outbreaks, turned on the Jewish authorities charging them with inadequate assistance in tracking down the terrorists.

At the end of October, the appeals of the Jewish bodies having failed, the *Vaad Leumi* declared that it was prepared to use "active, systematic measures." It was implied that these measures would include the use of force which the Jewish authorities had hesitated to employ hitherto, in the fear of adding to the disorder by initiating an internecine conflict. Moreover, it appears that hitherto the Jewish bodies were far from certain that they would obtain Government cooperation in the use of forcible measures. The announcement on the part of the *Vaad Leumi* of their readiness to take drastic steps was accompanied by an indignant protest against "the attempt by the authorities (Government) in their statement of October 10th to saddle the collective responsibility for acts of terrorism by reckless dissidents upon the entire *Yishuv* and the Jewish people, to obscure its war effort and diminish its moral stature."<sup>126</sup>

A week later the world was shocked by the assassination in Cairo on November 6th of Lord Moyne,<sup>127</sup> then acting as British Minister resident in the Middle East. He was shot by two assailants as he was alighting from his car at his home. The chauffeur was killed instantly; Lord Moyne never regained consciousness and died the same night. An Egyptian constable shot one of the assailants and his companion was caught

126. *Palcor*, October 26, 1944.

127. Lord Moyne (Walter Edward Guinness) was born in Dublin of the famous family of brewers. He took his post at Cairo in August, 1942, following a career in which he served as Colonial Secretary in 1941-1942, Under-Secretary of State for War in 1922-1923, and leader of the House of Lords.

nearby. An enraged crowd almost lynched the two men. From the beginning it was suspected that the assassins were Jews from Palestine, but this was not confirmed until a day or two later. They proved to be members of the Sternist group. At the time they gave their names as Moshe Cohen and Itzhak Salzman. Their true names proved to be Eliahu Bet-Zuri, a twenty-three year old surveyor from Tel-Aviv, and Eliahu Hakim—who gave his age as twenty but was probably younger—a Sephardic Jew from Haifa who was born in Beirut. Both admitted that they had come to Egypt with the premeditated purpose of killing Lord Moyne whose policies, they alleged, were prejudicial to the Jewish aspirations in Palestine.

The assassination shocked Zionists throughout the world. Dr. Weizmann called at 10 Downing Street to express the feelings “of deep moral indignation and horror” which were shared by Jewry throughout the world. The Jewish authorities and the Hebrew press in Palestine characterized the crime as a foul murder which besmirched the Jewish name and distorted the character of the Jewish renaissance movement in Palestine. The Jewish Agency called upon the *Yishuv* to resist the threats of the terrorist bands and to deprive their members of all refuge and shelter. The American and British press, while condemning the murder in most extreme terms, warned against blaming the Jews or the Zionists for the outrage. There was recognition that the assassination was an act of despair in the face of the failure of Great Britain to find a solution for the Palestine problem. The Arab press in Palestine used the occasion to inaugurate a vehement anti-Zionist campaign.

Churchill at first showed great reticence. He paid tribute to Lord Moyne as a “personal friend and servant of the State.” He declared that the assassination was particularly reprehensible in view of the fact that Lord Moyne had devoted himself during the year to finding a solution for the Zionist problem, and that “the Jews in Palestine have rarely lost a better and more well informed friend.” Ten days later, in a statement made before the House of Commons, he uttered a sharp warning against terrorism in Palestine, declaring that he would have to reconsider his position on the question of a Jewish Palestine if the terror continued. He said: “This shameful crime has shocked the world and has affected none more strongly than those like myself who, in the past, have been con-

sistent friends of the Jews and constant architects of their future. If our dreams for Zionism are to end in the smoke of an assassin's pistol and the labors for its future produce a new set of gangsters worthy of Nazi Germany, many like myself will have to reconsider the position we have maintained so consistently and so long in the past."<sup>128</sup>

Churchill's statement evoked a reaction in the liberal British press. The *Manchester Guardian* wrote: "If anyone but Churchill had made this kind of statement against Jewish terrorism in Palestine it might have been resented both as harsh and threatening." The *New Statesman and Nation* characterized his statement as "a rather unnecessarily sharp warning to the mass of Jews," and it went on to say: "If there has been not all the cooperation in tracking down the terrorists that there should be, that is due in no small measure to the sense of frustration felt by many Jews to their belief that the authorities have often been lax in putting down Arab terrorists."<sup>129</sup> The Jews in Palestine, though deeply hurt, did not take the Prime Minister's declaration in bad part; the Hebrew press emphasized that part of the declaration which stressed the need of suppressing the terror. The *Palestine Post* voiced the general view when it wrote: "There is no one from whom the bitter words could have come with better grace and greater sincerity or been received with greater understanding. Faithful are wounds from a friend, and no leader can ask more than that his castigation of a people should be accepted as a wound inflicted by a friend."<sup>130</sup>

The two men were tried before an Egyptian court in January and condemned to death on the hangman's scaffold. The accounts of the trial were censored. Reporters present came away with the impression that the two men had stated their case with dignity. Eliahu Hakim, the younger of the two, often quoted eloquently from the Bible. Bet-Zuri carried the burden of the defense; he spoke with a directness and a sincerity which carried conviction, and brought to bear on his argument a broad knowledge of history and politics. He declared that they had come to Egypt to kill Lord Moyne, not as an

128. *The New York Times*, November 18, 1944.

129. As quoted in the *Daily Press Survey* of the Jewish Agency, London, November 24, 1944.

130. *Palestine Post*, November 19, 1944.

individual—they had nothing against him as a person and did not even know him—but as a symbol: “He was a symbol of British rule in Palestine and as a symbol we killed him.” He went on to accuse Great Britain because it had deliberately halted immigration into Palestine in contravention of the Mandate, at a time when thousands of Jews now dead in Europe could have been brought into Palestine. The presiding judge tried to stop him on the ground that he was engaging in political propaganda, but Bet-Zuri’s manner was so absolutely sincere that the judge let him continue.

In explaining the motives for the murder, Bet-Zuri revealed a sense of deep hostility toward the Palestine Administration which had arrested and held men in jail without benefit of trial and had employed torture to elicit information. But the main cause of their resentment was “a terrible sense of frustration when they saw their people massacred through Europe by the million and were given no opportunity to fight as Jews against the monstrous enemy, or even to rescue those who could be saved.”<sup>131</sup> The defense appears to have made a profound impression on the correspondents. The attack against Great Britain also made a great appeal to the Egyptians who, despite their difference with the defendants on the Zionist policy, recognized them as representatives of a nationalism which they understood.

The terror in Palestine ceased immediately with the assassination. The end of the terror seems to have resulted more from the psychological revulsion following the assassination than from the measures taken by Government and the Jewish authorities, although these no doubt played their part. As time passed, and the British still failed to declare any change of policy with reference to immigration, signs of strain again appeared in Palestine; the *Yishuv* was deeply divided as to what attitude to take in the face of British inaction.

## ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT DURING THE WAR AND POSTWAR ECONOMY

The population of Palestine continued to grow during the war. The last Government estimate showed that on March 31, 1944, the total population of Palestine on that date was 1,697,869. This figure included Bedouin nomads estimated at

131. Gerold Frank, “Two Were Hanged,” *The Nation*, March 31, 1945.



66,553, but did not include illegal or unrecorded immigration, Arab or Jewish. The ratio of the Jews in the population remained about the same, i.e., at 30 percent. The distribution was as follows:

	<i>Total</i>	<i>Percent</i>
Moslems	1,042,056	61.4
Jews	509,184	30.0
Christians	132,843	7.8
Others	13,786	0.8
	<hr/> 1,697,869	<hr/> 100 0

The estimate of the Jewish authorities is somewhat larger for the Jewish population, namely, 560,000 as of September, 1944. The Jews living in rural communities, distributed in 282 settlements, were estimated as numbering 132,700 or 23.7 percent of the total Jewish population. This represented an increase in the number of Jews living outside of the municipalities, but the urban development was relatively larger and the ratio of Jews in the rural communities to the total Jewish population dropped several percent during the period of the war. Moreover, despite the increase in the number of agricultural settlements, the number of Jews engaged in agriculture decreased as a result of enlistments and absorption into war industries.

The Arab inhabitants also showed some tendency toward an increase in the proportion of those living in the towns, but this was relatively slight. The non-Jewish rural population in 1942 was 763,924, or 64.3 percent of the total non-Jewish population. The rural character of the Arab population was accounted for by the predominance of Moslems in the rural communities; the Christian section of the population was even more urban than the Jewish, only about 21.6 percent living in rural communities. Of the total Moslem population of 995,292, the number of 724,559, or 72.8 percent, were in rural communities, mostly devoted to agriculture. In 1931 the ratio of the Moslem rural population (75.2 percent) to the total Moslem population was somewhat, but not much, larger.

#### *Developments in Industry and Agriculture During the War*

The Ethiopian War and the Arab disturbances between 1936 and 1939 had already weakened Palestine's economy, and with

the outbreak of the World War the major industries faced a crisis. The citrus industry was virtually bankrupt and could not obtain shipping for export of fruit. Building practically ceased as a result of the difficulties in obtaining materials. However, when the Middle East became the theatre of military operations, Palestine developed as an important center of supply and both agriculture and industry received a new impetus.

The Jewish bodies had proposed plans to the British Government for the development of Palestine as a supply base for the Middle East immediately upon the outbreak of the war. It was pointed out that Palestine enjoyed certain special advantages: a central geographic position in relation to Egypt to the south, Syria and Turkey to the north, Iraq and Iran to the east, and the Mediterranean to the west; a supply of skilled labor and of modern technicians; scientific institutions and experts in several fields, among whom were a number who had enjoyed great distinction in European countries; a considerable amount of fluid capital brought in by immigrants and available for expansion of production. The Palestine Administration, however, did nothing to aid these proposals nor did the Colonial Office provide any tangible assistance. It recognized that Palestine had resources for providing general stores and equipment for troops in the Middle East, but did not come forward with any loans or subsidies.<sup>132</sup>

The military authorities, however, unlike the civil administration, were constantly helpful. The stationing of numerous army units in Palestine required the building of camps and hospitals, the erection of fortifications, the construction of roads, etc., and Jewish companies—particularly the *Solel Boneh*, the contracting organization of the *Histadrut*—were able to complete exacting tasks on very short notice. The contracts received from the military authorities primed the pump of the depressed Palestine economy and started the industrial effort on a far more intensive scale than before the war. When the war came nearer to the Middle East, the British Government showed interest in Palestine's industrial ability. The Middle East Supply Council, organized in February, 1941, placed large orders in Palestine. *The Times* (London) reported on May 12, 1943, that service orders in the previous year had

132. *Parliamentary Debates, Commons*, Vol. 361, col. 383, June 5, 1940.

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increased to £P10,000,000 as against £P4,000,000 in 1941 and £P1,000,000 in 1940.

Under the stimulus of the war effort, agricultural production increased rapidly, assisted by Government aid. In the production of cereals, largely in Arab hands, improved methods were introduced in some parts of the country. The major increase in agricultural production was due to Jewish effort and was accomplished in three ways: the establishment of new colonies; the expansion of existing settlements; and particularly the extension of irrigated areas devoted to mixed farming, mostly dairy products and vegetables. New Jewish agricultural settlements were established each year and by May 1, 1945, had reached over three hundred, an increase of about fifty settlements since the outbreak of the war. Palestine made considerable progress in the direction of food self-sufficiency. The production of milk and eggs increased rapidly from year to year. The most conspicuous expansion in agriculture was in the production of fresh vegetables and potatoes, the latter increasing threefold since the beginning of the war. As the following table indicates, almost half of the food supply of the Jewish section of the community is now derived from Jewish farms:<sup>133</sup>

	1939	1944
Jewish Agriculture	26.0%	47.0%
Imports	67.0%	47.0%
Arab Agriculture	7.0%	6.0%
	<hr/> 100.0%	<hr/> 100.0%

The Jewish fisheries represented an interesting and important development. A beginning in lake and deep-sea fishing had already been made before the war, but the Jewish fishing industry was still small and amounted to no more than 4 per cent of the total catch of the country. Toward the end of the war period it constituted about one-third of the total. Besides the further development of deep-sea and lake fishing, artificial ponds covering an area of over 5,000 dunams were created in the Jewish settlements. The haul of Jewish fishing during recent years increased as follows:<sup>134</sup>

133. *Palestine Review*, January, 1945, p. 161.

134. *Palestine Review*, January, 1945.

<i>Year</i>	<i>Tons</i>
1939-40	131
1940-41	234
1941-42	369
1942-43	682
1943-44	1,203

The production of potash, bromine and other chemicals important for the war effort vastly increased during the war. For military reasons the exact figures have not been published, but judging from the size of the pans used in evaporation and from the residue (carnallite) which is collected in the processing, the mineral output has at least doubled since the outbreak of the war. The sale of electric power increased from 92,000,000 kwh. in 1939 to 162,600,000 kwh. in 1943, an increase of about 77 percent. The electric power used for industrial purposes about doubled, from 26,000,000 to 51,000,000 kwh. The following local raw materials were used for the first time to produce commodities not previously manufactured in Palestine: phosphate for superphosphate; lime-carbide; sulphur—sulphuric oxide; ethyl alcohol—acetic acid; wood—acetic-acid methyl alcohol; banana fibers—rope; maize—starch; bones—manure, buttons, glue, etc.; cats' intestines—surgery thread.<sup>135</sup>

Sir Douglas Harris, chairman of the Palestine War Supply Board and representative of the Middle East Supply Council, in a report dated April 23, 1943, stated that "the share of the Jewish population in both capital investment and value or production in industry is about 85 percent. The Jewish share in industrial production for the Army, however, exceeds 95 percent of the total." He illustrates the relative growth in the various major industries by the figures on page 1054.

The number of Jewish industrial enterprises established during the war is estimated at about 400, making a total of about 6,000 establishments. A better indication of the growth is obtained from the number of workers. In 1936, there were approximately 30,000 workers in manufacture and handicrafts; in 1943, the number was estimated at 61,000, of which some 46,000 were in larger industrial establishments and 15,000 in workshops.<sup>136</sup> Among the new products introduced

135. Sir Douglas Harris, *Report on Palestine War Supply* (typewritten), April 23, 1943, British Library of Information.

136. *Palestine Review*, January 1945, p. 63.

<i>Industry</i>	<i>Number of Workers Employed in Industries</i>		<i>Increase percent</i>
	<i>1939</i>	<i>1942</i>	<i>%</i>
Foodstuffs	5,610	9,497	69
Metal	2,544	4,210	65
Textiles, Clothing & Leather	4,210	6,487	57
Non-metallic minerals, cement, etc.	2,679	3,811	42
Chemicals, soaps, paints, drugs, etc.	1,082	1,425	32
<i>Total</i>	16,125	25,430	63.5

were the following: industrial machinery and tools, spare parts for motor cars, textiles, home and kitchen utensils, building materials, all kinds of agricultural tools and machinery, medical and electrical instruments and a wide range of chemical products. The diversification of the industrial war effort and the development of new lines of endeavors were greatly facilitated by the presence in the country of many highly qualified scientists and experts as well as by the facilities offered by the Jewish scientific institutes in the country.

Among the new industries established in Palestine during the war, the following may be selected for special mention:

*The Diamond Industry:* A diamond industry was established in 1941 mainly by refugees from Belgium and some from Poland. In a short time Palestine has become one of the leading world centers for the industry. The diamonds produced are mainly for industrial purposes. The Tel-Aviv and Nathania industries are operated entirely with machines manufactured in Palestine.<sup>137</sup>

*The Concrete Shipbuilding Industry:* The Concrete Shipbuilding Company was organized by a refugee, a shipwright from Serbia. By the end of 1942 the company had launched a fleet of 20 fishing trawlers of 110 tons each, equipped with Diesel engines, also manufactured in Palestine. The concrete manufactured for these ships is seven times more watertight than ordinary concrete; the vessels are built in a quarter of the time required for the steel vessels and the construction cost is 40 percent less.

*Iron, Steel and Machine Shops:* The Haifa Iron Foundry produced a wide range of products, some of which are now exported, e.g., iron pylons, used in the recent improvements in the port of Beirut. A new steel foundry near Haifa has begun to produce steel equal in quality

137. Sir Douglas Harris, *op. cit.*

to that made in Sweden. Over a thousand persons are now employed in steel forging and the casting of steel and iron and tool manufacturing. Some 250 small factories are making spare parts for motor cars, bodies for armored cars and precision instruments.

*Oil Refining and Chemicals:* The Haifa Oil Refinery completed at the end of 1939 has a crude oil capacity of about 2,000,000 tons per annum and a "cracking" capacity of about 1,000,000 tons with considerable room for expansion. A number of chemicals are made as by-products of the oil refining. In the chemical industry, in addition to the manufacture of products from the Dead Sea carried on before the war (chlorine, caustic soda, caustic potash, bleaching powders, fertilizers) new developments include sulphuric acid, superphosphates from Trans-Jordan, rock phosphates, and carbonic acid from coke as well as from alcohol. Various pharmaceutical products formerly imported are now made in Palestine.

*Textiles and Wearing Apparel:* Palestine's textile industry and the manufacture of wearing apparel made great advances during the war. In 1934 the first cotton spinning mill was established; there are now some 5,500 spinners in operation in the country, while cotton weaving is carried on by 24 firms on about 300 power looms and 150 domestic hand looms. Khaki drill is being made for the Army in three textile factories and rayon is being woven by five firms with 100 looms. The wool industry was primitive until 1940; there are now nine firms employing 65 looms. The country's first automatic wool spinning mill was opened in May 1940 at Ramat-Gan, Tel-Aviv. The manufacture of men's and women's wear, underwear, knit goods, hosiery, has developed sufficiently to satisfy the major part of the local needs. The manufacture of shoes has also developed rapidly.

Besides the contributions made in agriculture and industry, Jewish medical and scientific institutes rendered important services to the military and industrial effort. Through the help they gave, working in cooperation with industry, the British armies were supplied with bandages, ether, sulfanilamide, benzoic acid, Vitamin B complex, ascorbic acid, insulin, alkaloids and microscopic stains. Thousands of doctors, nurses and dentists came from Palestine to assist the British armies in Libya, Eritrea and Ethiopia. Hadassah placed its medical center in Jerusalem at the disposal of the Empire. The Daniel Sieff Institute at Rehovoth experimented with the production of important drugs difficult to obtain in war time. The Hebrew Technical Institute at Haifa was in constant cooperation with

His Majesty's Forces and placed their technical laboratories at the disposal of the Army and Navy. The Institute also assisted the Royal Engineers in testing materials and in finding out what local materials could replace imports.

Of particular significance was the work of the Hebrew University at Jerusalem. It conducted research over a wide range to assist in the development of industry, particularly in the chemical branch. It investigated problems in which some particular interest was shown by certain firms as well as questions of common concern to Palestine industry as a whole. The Meteorological Department of the Hebrew University prepared weather data for the British and Allied Forces operating in the Near and Middle East, in the Caucasus, the Sudan, Ethiopia and Eritrea. The Department of Parasitology conducted courses in war surgery and tropical medicine for the Australian Expeditionary Forces. It supplied anti-tetanus and typhus serum to the Army Medical Corps and shipped 70,000 phials to the Polish Army and the same amount to the Russian Army. The Department of Oriental Studies furnished the Intelligence Service with interpreters familiar with all the languages and dialects in the neighborhood, including Somali, Amharic, Galla for Ethiopia, Kurdish, Chaldean, Turkish and Armenian for northern Iraq, and Coptic and Berber for North Africa.

The war brought about serious economic problems as well as economic development. The citrus industry, which was the main export commodity before the war, suffered disastrously, as is indicated by the following figures:

#### EXPORT OF CITRUS FRUIT

<i>Year</i>	<i>Quantity (in cases)</i>	<i>Value £</i>
1938-39	15,264,776	4,355,853
1939-40*	7,590,465	1,918,298
1940-41	77,735	23,578
1941-42	34,051	15,564
1942-43	4,594	3,511

\* The figures for 1939-1940 and later do not include fruit bought by Government for His Majesty's Forces in the Middle East.

The banks made considerable advances to help maintain the groves. Some of these advances were guaranteed by the Gov-

ernment, but these guarantees applied only to groves planted before 1935. Moreover, the area covered by the advances was limited so that some of the groves received no loans despite the fact that they fulfilled all conditions. The Government also extended loans to citrus growers for irrigation, acquisition of stock and poultry, purchase of seeds, plows and fertilizers, etc., with the double purpose of relieving the plight of the citrus industry and making the country more self-sufficient in food-stuffs. The increased manufacture of citrus fruit juices, oils and quantities of butyl alcohol and acetone also served to alleviate the situation slightly. With the invasion of Italy and the consequent partial opening of the Mediterranean, the citrus industry showed signs of recovery, but it was still in a depressed state at the beginning of 1945. At that time the English Ministry of Food made arrangements for the purchase of one and a half million cases of Palestine citrus, that is, one-tenth of the amount exported in the last year before the war.

From the point of view of the great majority of the inhabitants of the country, the most serious problem was the very great rise in the cost of living. Taking January, 1938, as normal, the wholesale prices, according to Government figures, had risen to 281.0 by the end of 1942. The Jewish Agency made an estimate of the cost of living at the end of 1942 based on prices in the Arab and Jewish markets in three towns. The index, based on average prices of 1937 was 291.9 for the Arab markets and 253.6 for the Jewish markets. The cost of living index as determined by the Government's statisticians showed a rise of about 95 percent from the beginning of the war to August, 1942, while the rise in the cost of living in the United Kingdom for the same period amounted to 29.3 percent. Salaries and wages had also increased, but not in proportion to the increase in prices. After 1942, a labor shortage developed which acted as a handicap to Palestine's war effort. Unemployment in the Jewish community, which was over 6,500 at the outbreak of the war, disappeared altogether. This resulted from the combined effect of greater industrial activity and the relatively large number of Jews who had enlisted in His Majesty's Forces and in the supplementary police.

War conditions have had a revolutionary effect on the economic life of the rural Arabs of Palestine. As a result of high prices paid for food products, and thanks to his independence



of market products, the *fellah* has become—temporarily, at least—a well-to-do farmer. There were cases of Arab grain growers who received lump payments of hundreds of pounds for their harvests. In addition, the wages paid to the inhabitants of rural districts for labor on public works undertaken by the civil and military authorities were several times as great as those of peace time. Since the Arab rural workers could rely on their own villages for food, the excess earnings in wages enabled them to put aside savings. Good prices and high wages for the rural workers have operated to free the Arab *fellah* from the heavy burden of indebtedness which has held him down for centuries.

The following quotation indicates the progress made by the Arab section of the population, particularly in the rural community:<sup>138</sup>

The native sector of Palestine's economy is usually regarded as static, contrary to the novel, dynamic economy built up by Jewish immigrants. This assumption is, however, a fallacy, originating in the general appearance of the backwardness presented by Arab social life, and in the lack of reliable figures about the changes occurring therein. In fact, the Arab economy, too, is at present in a state of rapid growth and transition . . . At the same time, its standard of living, previously higher than in the adjacent countries, has further improved; agriculture has been both expanded and intensified; the number of Arab workshops and factories, though still very small, is on the increase; and recently there has been a marked progress even in Arab banking. The old feudal structure of the native society is rapidly giving way to new social forms, and it is this rise of new social forces, more than the reaction against foreign predominance, which finds its expression in the local national movement. It should be borne in mind that this development has been very much fostered by external factors, chiefly by Jewish immigration. . . .

The continuous influx of capital has enabled the Arabs to get rid of a great part of their indebtedness, and furthermore to invest large sums in earning assets, mainly in agricultural holdings and in urban properties. They were also anxious to adopt the new methods of farming introduced by the Jews. To quote one example—tractors were introduced into Palestine by Jewish settlers about 15 years ago, and up to the disturbances Arab farms and plantations also had been ploughed up by Jews. They were also instrumental in breaking large

138. *The Economist*, June 12, 1943.

tracts of virgin land in the south, but by now this job is done almost entirely by the Arabs themselves, who own about 10 percent of all the tractors in the country. So Jewish immigration has not only created a new external demand for land in Palestine and enhanced its price; at the same time it has enabled Arab farmers and capitalists to extract increased revenue from landed property, and supplied them also with means for expanding their holdings . . .

Labor organizations among the workers in the cities have also made considerable progress during the war, and the number of organized Arab workers now exceeds 5,000. Some 1,500 were connected with the *Histadrut* (Jewish Labor Organization), while others were connected with the mixed center at Haifa stimulated by the Jewish labor organization, and some were independent Arab unions. A beginning has been made also in urban cooperatives, e.g., the Carters' Cooperative and Butchers' Cooperatives. In the skilled trades, wages of Arab workers have been approaching those paid to Jewish workers, although in unskilled work wages are still considerably below those paid to Jews.

The first Arab Labor Convention was held on January 22, 1943, at Jaffa, with an attendance of some 25–30 delegates. Unions from Jaffa, Haifa, Jerusalem and Bethlehem were represented and reporters from the Arab and Jewish press were invited. The Government was represented by a recently appointed Labor Inspector, Mr. Chudleigh, and his Arab secretary. In his address, delivered in English and translated into Arabic, Mr. Chudleigh—who is a British trade union organizer—praised the recent development in trade unionism in Palestine among the Arabs and urged the need of bringing up the number of organized workers to 50,000. He stressed the importance of taking advantage of existing labor legislation and declared that the Government was ready to assist in improving the condition of the worker and planning more progressive labor laws. He spoke highly of the achievement of Jewish labor's sick funds and hoped that social security would soon be introduced into Palestine.

The speeches by the Arab labor leaders indicated a realization that the country was ceasing to be purely agricultural and that industrial change was sweeping over Palestine. In the light of this it was essential to secure decent labor conditions for urban workers. It was pointed out that while prices for

products had risen 300 percent, most Arab workers earned only 22 piastres a day (approximately one dollar), which was hardly sufficient for bare subsistence under prevailing prices. The resolutions of the Conference demanded further development of the Arab labor unions, opposed ceilings on wages, demanded the appointment of Arab officials in the Department of Labor, and insisted on the right of the Arab worker to receive the same wages as others.

There was considerable discussion of the different standard of wages for Jews and for Arabs. The speakers argued that if the Arab worker received as high wages as did the Jews, his mode of life would change and he could send his children to school. The difference in wages, moreover, caused friction between the Jewish workers and the Arab workers and prevented consolidation of the labor effort and the improvement of general conditions of labor in Palestine. They pointed out that the Jewish families were better off also because both men and women worked, while among the Arabs only the man was a wage earner. The meeting expressed appreciation of the help given them by the Labor Department of Government. Although some of the ideas advanced appear to have been suggested by the work of the *Histadrut*, nevertheless, as an editorial in *Davar*<sup>139</sup> complained: "The Arab meeting was conspicuous by its failure to see that the Histadrut will be able to do a great deal for the Arab worker as well. No mention was even made at the meeting of the demand submitted by the Histadrut to the Wages Committee for the equalization of minimum wages for the Arab and Jewish unskilled workers."

The Arab Labor Congress, which was the first representative Arab assembly since the outbreak of the war, was followed by a series of conventions of Arab Chambers of Commerce and business circles. These assemblies concerned themselves with both economic and political matters which they regarded as inter-related. They were opposed to the new types of taxes projected, particularly to the inheritance tax. Editorial comment in the press, reflecting the opposition to the estate duty, alleged that such taxation might have far-reaching results affecting "the very existence of the Arab." Inheritance taxes would force the Arabs to sell their land and it thus might go out of Arab ownership. The results of the meetings

139. The Hebrew Labor daily.

of Chambers of Commerce included, besides opposition to the new taxes, proposals favoring the establishment of an Arab National Investment Company and for the re-establishment of the Arab National Committee which had been dissolved after the disturbances.

*The Government's Conception of Postwar Reconstruction*

In sharp contrast to the possibilities suggested for postwar development by the growth of industry and technology during the war period, stood the present Administration's program for reconstruction. On the 22nd of March, 1943, the Palestine Government in an official communiqué announced that Sir Douglas Harris, the Chairman of the War Supply Board, was to be relieved of his duties and would act as the Reconstruction Commissioner, a post created by the High Commissioner. His function would be the preparation of a coordinated scheme for postwar agricultural and industrial development including a plan for social security in Palestine. The main paragraphs of the communiqué were:

Any such plan must cover a wide field. It must aim at extending the scope of various departments of Government, thus paving the way for desirable additions to the public services. It must embrace the development of municipal activities, with a view to the provision within urban areas of those amenities to which the citizens of the post-war world may reasonably consider themselves to be entitled.

It must promote the welfare of the rural population, on whose efforts the town dweller depends in so large a degree for his subsistence. It must cover industrial development and reorganization, selecting for perpetuation those industries which can be assured of survival in the face of foreign competition under peace-time conditions, and must determine how the products of such industries can best be marketed abroad and the extent of any protection which may be required to further their utilization within Palestine itself.

It must contemplate an expansion of the social services, including education, housing, insurance for ill-health, unemployment, and old age, the promulgation of legislation relating to conditions of labor and the like. Finally, it must give some indication of the cost of the measures necessary to attain these objects.

On the next day the High Commissioner added his statement, broadcast over the Jerusalem radio, in which he commented on the appointment of Sir Douglas Harris and on the

Government's plan for dealing with postwar reconstruction. He pointed out first that the Government contemplated "much more than extension of direct action on the part of the Government" and that as a result of the growth of local autonomy "a great opportunity presents itself to municipalities and other local bodies." Apparently referring to a plan prepared by Tel-Aviv, he complimented those who had shown foresight in preparation of comprehensive schemes but quickly added "but the towns are not all. Palestine is essentially an agricultural country and the need for constructive work by and on behalf of the rural population is at least as great." He then proceeded "with cautionary remarks" designed to make it clear that too rapid development should not be expected. He pointed out that Palestine would have to be financed either locally or out of accumulated resources or from foreign borrowings, "for instance, on the London market." In the latter case, Palestine would have to compete with the countries of the world and that "let it be remembered that the great majority have suffered infinitely more than Palestine," and that the urgency of their needs would make possible only a very limited issue for Palestine.

After preparing his hearers for a limited program of development, he turned to a discussion of the several objectives of the reconstruction plan. As having prior call on Government aid, he mentioned: social services, including the expansion of education and health facilities and insurance against ill-health, old age, unemployment and disability. He noted that the Jewish community had already done much along these lines, that the Arabs were less well provided for and in their case there was "much leeway to be made up." To meet the problem of postwar demobilization, he suggested an extensive building program which would at the same time make up for the housing shortage which had now become acute. Having thus disposed of the building problem, he took up the question of industry long enough to indicate that only "those industries which have a reasonable chance of survival in the circumstances of Palestine and in the face of foreign competition should be selected for encouragement." At the same time, he emphasized that the Government had no intentions of controlling industry "on the totalitarian model"; that it did not propose to maintain the controls established during the war for a

day longer than necessary, but planned to give as free a rein as possible to private and commercial enterprise. In the case of the citrus industry, he indicated that the Government would continue a close study of the problem, in the light of its importance for the whole country. "Planning is also urgently required in respect of such matters as irrigation, drainage and water supplies, reafforestation, terracing and every cognate method of preserving what little remains, after many years of insufficient attention, of the soil of the country." Toward the close of his discourse, he warned that a program covering all the projects he had mentioned could not be carried out in full within the space of a few years.

The Jewish community regarded the Government's Reconstruction Program as a confirmation of the White Paper policy, designed to slow up—rather than to facilitate—the progress of Palestine. It brought an end to the hope still entertained by some that Jewish cooperation in the war effort would lead to modification of Government's policy, at least on the economic side. The moderate *Palestine Post* attacked the plan as "incomplete and even meaningless," and as "vague on essential points." The plan did not indicate whether Palestine's present condition or its potentialities would be the basis for reconstruction; whether the selection of industries would be left to that type of official prognosis which had in the past so easily prophesied doom for enterprises now flourishing; whether the prosperity spoken of was the prosperity of a progressive Palestine or the prosperity of some would-be monopolistic interests outside of Palestine; whether possibilities of Jewish capital, which the High Commissioner had failed to mention, would be considered in the reconstruction plan. Comparing the Palestine reconstruction program with Churchill's statement on postwar planning, which had been broadcast on March 21, 1943, the *Palestine Post* of the 24th said:

The Prime Minister's speech, to take one example, envisages the growth of what are nowadays called "economics of plenty," involving all-round employment, industrial expansion and the substitution of international cooperation for the pre-war order of cut-throat competition. The announcement defining the tasks of the Reconstruction Commissioner in this country, by contrast, accepts the continuation of international competition, the maintenance of trade barriers

and the liquidation of those industries which the Reconstruction Commissioner may not regard as capable of survival in that struggle. In truth, the reconstruction of this country, which even before the war had in large measure the characteristics of a "development economy," cannot be planned on static or water-tight compartment conceptions. It must be appraised as part of the international scene, with special reference to the question of the revival of Asia, to use Mr. Churchill's regional subdivision, which vitally affects the Arab world and the needs of the homeless Jewish people. Reconstruction is no new phase in this country. It has gone on for more than twenty years. Any scheme that restricts or stultifies this progress can have no place in the post-war world.

Ben-Gurion made a comprehensive analysis of the reconstruction plan at a joint meeting of the Elected Assembly (*Asefat Hanivharim*) and the Zionist General Council the day after the High Commissioner's speech on the radio. He described the High Commissioner's statement as "no mere improvisation, but a carefully prepared speech of a ruler" on the fate of the country after the war. It was to be regarded as the economic side of the White Paper and was designed to freeze the Jewish development more or less at its pre-war stage. He recounted the main objectives of the reconstruction scheme: social services, industrial development, Government control of economic life, irrigation and land development, and analyzed what each aspect implied for the Jewish portion of the population.

The first and foremost of the provisions, the development of public services and educational facilities, Ben-Gurion said, was wholly laudable, but obviously the main expansion was to be for the Arabs. The Jews would serve the function of supplying the extra revenue needed by the Government for the welfare, education and health services. In industry, the development of which was of special significance to the Jews, the Administration's plan called for curtailment and not for expansion, as was indicated by the High Commissioner's emphasis on the idea that "Palestine is essentially an agricultural country." Moreover, the appointment of Sir Douglas Harris, who had never shown any friendliness to the Jewish industrial development during his term as Development Officer in the previous seven years, did not inspire confidence. Although the High Commissioner had indicated that the controls established dur-

ing the war were to be dropped, he had also suggested that certain controls would be retained, and in respect to this, Ben-Gurion said: "We cannot conceal our anxiety that this control is directed toward shackling our economic initiative and restricting the basis of our settlement work." The plans for irrigation, drainage, water supply and terracing might in theory be a great blessing for the Jews as well as for the Arabs, but in the light of the restrictions imposed by the Land Regulations, they could hardly be of any great significance for the Jews. Even with reference to the Arab areas, it was clear that no extensive work was envisaged. The improvements were meant to preserve the soil on the hillsides in order to further existing Arab cultivation, and not to supply land for new settlement.

The Government's plan of financing the Reconstruction Program was evidently based on the view that Jewish immigration, with its influx of new capital, would largely cease. The modest development promised for the rural Arab population, Ben-Gurion pointed out, was evidently to be financed out of accumulated capital brought into the country by Jews in the past, for there were no other substantial deposits of capital in Palestine. Essentially what the Government intended to do was to utilize the Jewish energies to carry out the provisions of the White Paper, making them parties to it. He contrasted the Jewish conception of postwar development with that of the Government. The Jewish conception was based on two major assumptions: that the country was at present largely undeveloped and could, with an energetic and broad-visioned program, maintain a far greater population; that only the Jews, because of their bond to their ancient homeland and because of their need to escape massacre and destruction, could be depended upon for making the great effort required for such a development. In concluding, he said:

Our programme is the maximum development of this country in agriculture, in industry and on the sea, in order to prepare for a maximum immigration within the shortest possible period of time. To that end, there must be an international loan and a new regime which will have the capacity, the will, the perseverance, the enthusiasm and the vision to rebuild the ruins of a nation and its homeland. An alien regime, however conscientious it may be, will never



accomplish that task. Officials who are today in Tanganyika, tomorrow in Palestine and the day after in the Sudan, officials who have no real connection either with the country or with its inhabitants, either with its past or with its future, will not succeed in reconstructing this country and achieving the advancement of its inhabitants. This great and difficult task can be accomplished only by a regime which identifies itself wholeheartedly, body and soul, with the country and the revival of its people.

### *The Jewish Conception of Postwar Development*

Underlying the British Administration's conception of postwar reconstruction is a *laissez faire* orientation modified somewhat by State intervention to ameliorate poverty, disease and illiteracy. Tariff and taxation policies are formulated on the theory that Palestine is to remain an agricultural country; at best only native industries or those which have already been established are to be assisted. Industrial growth during the war period is regarded as an artificially stimulated development which must subside in the reconstruction period after the war. Underlying the whole view is the preconception that Palestine is a small and poor country with little room for new immigration.

The Jewish plans are markedly different in spirit and pattern. "Development," not "reconstruction," is the keyword, and development is conceived as depending on man's skill and energy as much as on the factor of natural resources. The Jewish plans, moreover, are permeated by contemporary economic ideas: they propose a planned use of modern science and technology to maximalize production and imply a literate and trained farmer and worker. They envisage an "economics of welfare" which sets the goals of endeavor in terms of a good standard of living for the masses of the people. Although agriculture is conceived as the basis of economic life, industry and commerce are to be developed as fully as possible, and there is no preconceived notion that Palestine is by nature ordained to remain a country of poor peasants. Moreover, Palestine is regarded as one area in a large Middle East regional development, whose progress, furthermore, is dependent on some form of international regulation or agreement.

In summarizing his conclusions on the main lines of economic development of the Middle East, Alfred Bonne of the

Economic Research Institute of the Jewish Agency for Palestine, declares, first, that "any improvement in the standard of living must commence with the peasant, who is the basic element of the Oriental population."<sup>140</sup> The measures needed for a planned development after the war are:

(i) Redistribution of national income through reduction of rent on land, reform of land tenure, policy of taxation for the benefit of the lower income groups, and the introduction of improved marketing methods;

(ii) Raising productivity and extension of cultivated area through the inauguration of large-scale development projects, with special reference to irrigated farming;

(iii) Industrialization as a definite state policy;

(iv) Restricting tendencies toward world-market price fluctuations and their effects on local production by means of international agreements;

(v) Establishment of state services on a large scale in the sphere of communications, health, education, etc.

Taking the economy as a whole, the conceptions of the British Administration and the Jewish bodies differ most in that the latter envisage a gradual industrialization of the Middle East, stimulated by the example and leadership of Palestine. Instead of permitting a recession from the increased plane of industrial achievement of the war period, the Jewish economist would make it a springboard for further development of manufacturing and commerce. While the future industrial development of Palestine is conceived mainly in terms of private initiative and enterprise—either of individuals or of voluntary cooperatives—it would require Government assistance and investment of state and public capital. The Jewish economic authorities accept the idea suggested by British and American writers that the Middle East Supply Center established during the war be used as an instrument for postwar industrial expansion,<sup>141</sup> but they recognize that a full and all-round development of the backward areas of the Orient would call for a more comprehensive organization assisted by an international body

140. *The Economic Development of the Middle East*, Economic Research Institute, Jewish Agency for Palestine, Jerusalem, 1943, p. 102.

141. *Ibid.*, p. 88.

and large-scale co-ordination. With the development of industry would go a further expansion of commerce between the various countries of the Middle East region and between Europe, Asia and Africa. Palestine is particularly well situated from the point of view of shipping and air routes as the hub of three continents, linking transportation in all directions.

The development of trade and industry contemplates progress along varied lines. To begin with, there is much room for expansion in the industries based on local products: wine; juices, syrups and essences of citrus fruits; olive oil and soaps; canned fish and vegetables; tobacco and cigarettes; and leather goods of various sorts. Palestine's healthy climate and scenic beauty, its religious and historic associations, its recent development under Jewish stimulus as a university, research and musical center—all these present possibilities for a very great increase in the tourist trade, which has always been a substantial factor in the income of the Holy Land. The industries developed in the last decade, and particularly stimulated during the war—textile and clothing, shipbuilding, iron and steel and machine shops—are the beginnings of a modern large-scale industrial development. The housing needed for the present and growing population would provide the impetus for the growth of a large number of attendant industries, e.g., stone-cutting, manufacture of bricks and concrete, wood and iron work, furniture and other home equipment.

There are particularly great potentialities for the development of a chemical industry. Large quantities of bituminous limestone, gypsum, rock salt, sulphur, and alum are found in various parts of Palestine, and there is an abundance of various kinds of clay. The proximity of the Haifa pipeline makes possible the development of refining industries and by-products such as paraffin, resins, gums, acids, plastics, etc.—the whole gamut of synthetic materials involved in the newer types of industrial production. The potassium and magnesium deposits in the Dead Sea are capable of unlimited exploitation for various purposes: potash for fertilizer, bromine for pharmaceutical products and photographic materials, and magnesium which is of growing importance for the light metal industry generally. Biochemistry also has opened up unprecedented possibilities through new formulas by which sugar and

starch cellulose may be used as substitutes for petroleum in the production of plastics, aviation fuel and synthetic rubber, as well as the usual by-products of petroleum. The Daniel Sieff Research Institute of Rehovoth has made progress in working out formulas for sugar fermentation particularly well adapted to the type of vegetation in various parts of Palestine, e.g., for the industrial use of the date palm, which can grow in parts of Beer Sheba where the soil is too saline for the usual type of cultivation.

In regard to the agricultural aspect of development, the difference between the Jewish and British views is more in the way of tempo and emphasis. The plans proposed by the Jewish organization emphasize the need of intensified afforestation, terracing, drainage, economic use of water supply, development of new water resources, progressive elimination of malaria, better provision for elementary and practical education in rural communities. Two great social impediments to the progress of Arab agriculture, these plans insist, must be removed: the *mushaa* land system and the tremendous burden of debt resulting from the usurious rates of interest paid to *effendi* landlords. Both short and long term credit are needed, the latter primarily to enable the Arab farmers to change from intensive methods of cultivation to forms of irrigated crop culture adapted to the best use of soil and climate in each case. Raising the standard of cultivation among the Arab peasant and cultivator would have many beneficial effects on the country as a whole, e.g., reducing the amount of food imported, increasing the local consumer demand for manufactured products, and eliminating the cheap source of labor which undercuts wage standards.

Indirectly, the improvement of Arab peasant agriculture would increase absorptive capacity by reducing the average area of land necessary for family maintenance. However, in the Jewish plans, increase of absorptive capacity in the agricultural sector is regarded as being dependent for the most part on the development of irrigation. At the present time only a little over 350,000 metric dunams of land are under irrigation. According to the survey made by the Commission of Experts in 1927, under the late Dr. Elwood Mead, the irrigable area of Palestine (outside of Beer Sheba) was, in accordance with two different inquiries, estimated at 3,000,000 and


4,000,000 dunams, respectively.<sup>142</sup> This estimate was confirmed through an independent investigation by another American expert, F. Julius Fohs, who attacked the question from the side of the amount of rainfall. He concluded that the rainfall of Palestine, if properly conserved and distributed, will irrigate 3,500,000 dunams of land, and at the same time provide for the ordinary requirements of a population of 2,500,000.<sup>143</sup> Thus it is possible to irrigate an area ten times greater than the present and to convert land now used for cereals—in the production of which Palestine cannot compete with other countries—to mixed farming, poultry, dairy products, vegetables, fruits and honey.

In the development of intensive agriculture, the Jewish plans, like those of the Government, depend largely on the five plains or valleys: the Maritime Plain (the Valley of Sharon); the Haifa Bay area, or the Plain of Acre; the Valley of Esdraelon; Beisan and the Jordan; and the Huleh district north of Galilee. However, the Jewish agriculturists believe that the hill districts in Palestine, concerning which the British investigators have been pessimistic, are capable of considerable development, as indicated in the Jewish villages of Ataroth and Kiryath Anavim, near Jerusalem. The Jewish agricultural experts propose that the hill regions be planted with various fruit trees, nuts and carobs. The last named humble fruit tree can become an important element for improving the food balance and lessening the cost in feeding cattle and poultry. The hills are, from a climatic point of view, particularly well adapted for dairy and poultry farms and for beekeeping.

The above discussion of agricultural development does not include the *Negev* or sub-district of Beer Sheba, which is a problem in itself. All investigators agree that Beer Sheba, now sparsely settled, is capable of sustaining a very large population. Reference has already been made in a previous chapter to Sir John Hope Simpson's statement that "given the possibilities of irrigation there is practically an inexhaustible supply of cultivable land in the Beersheba district." Mr. Blake, the geological adviser to the Government of Palestine, wrote, in

142. *Reports of the Experts Submitted to the Joint Palestine Survey Commission*, Boston, 1928, p. 22.

143. F. Julius Fohs, *Memorandum to the Palestine Royal Commission on the Water Resources of Palestine*, New York, 1936, p. 8.



CANAL PROJECTS OF PALESTINE



1928: "The development of the water supplies in the Beersheba district would appear an important problem, the solution of which might allow of considerably greater agricultural activity."<sup>144</sup> Mr. F. A. Stockdale, who reported for the British Government on Palestine and Trans-Jordan in 1935, says: "Here the whole aspect of the country could be changed and the welfare of the people materially improved, if water supplies were available for irrigation and for the 'watering' of stock."<sup>145</sup> The ruins of several important ancient cities, and the remains of drainage systems and terracing from Roman and Byzantine times, are evidence that this section of Palestine was far more intensively cultivated. Dr. W. C. Lowdermilk of the United States Bureau of Agriculture, commenting on this fact, concludes that a large stationary population lived in Beer Sheba some 1500 years ago. Borings made by Government hitherto have found sweet as well as saline water, although the latter predominates.<sup>146</sup> Several proposals for irrigation have been made besides the boring of artesian wells, namely, the construction of reservoirs for impounding storm water flowing off from the Judean hills or bringing water by channeling from the upper Jordan, as suggested in Dr. Lowdermilk's proposal.

### *The Lowdermilk Proposal*

A comprehensive solution of the problem of irrigation in Palestine, including Beer Sheba and the Jordan Valley has recently been suggested by Dr. Lowdermilk.<sup>147</sup> He believes that the Jordan Valley, including Trans-Jordan and the Hauran

144. *Report on the Geology and Water Resources of Palestine*, p. 50.

145. *Colonial Office*, October, 1935, p. 9.

146. See *Palestine Partition Commission Report*, October, 1939, pp. 54 ff. The Commission finds that the well boring experiments have thus far been disappointing to the hope of obtaining large quantities of sweet water through artesian wells. However, the Commission adds: "A final conclusion cannot be reached until the remaining borings have been completed, but the most that can be said is that the Beersheba area is not one in which it is possible to sink a bore at random and obtain sweet water" (p. 55).

147. W. C. Lowdermilk, *Palestine: Land of Promise*, Harpers, 1944. The author makes clear that "this book was written from the point of view of a land conservationist whose life work has been to study the relation of peoples to their lands." In 1938-1939 he spent fifteen months making an intensive survey of soil and water conservation in Europe, North Africa and the Near East. He visited Palestine and came to the conclusion that the soil reclamation work done by the Jewish pioneers surpassed anything he had seen in any country.



and Maritime slopes of Palestine afford "a combination of natural features and a concentration of resources which set the stage for one of the greatest and most far-reaching reclamation projects on earth, comparable to our TVA in scope and importance."<sup>148</sup> The general idea that the topographical features of Palestine could be used for the development of power and irrigation has long been known. Over forty years ago, Theodor Herzl in *Altneuland* sketched the general outlines of a plan which used a combination of two resources: the sweet waters of the upper Jordan flowing from Mt. Lebanon and Hermon—to be used for irrigation; and the differential in level—close to 1,300 feet—between the Mediterranean and the Dead Sea, to be used for power.<sup>149</sup> French engineers have been working on similar plans for decades, and one such project was proposed shortly before the outbreak of the Second World War by Pierre Gandrillon, a French scientist and engineer of note.<sup>150</sup>

Dr. Lowdermilk's proposal, therefore, is not new, but he develops the idea in the light of modern technological knowledge and broad social principles indicated in the TVA experience. His plan assumes the following form:<sup>151</sup>

*Irrigation Program*—The sweet waters of the upper Jordan and its tributaries (the Yar and Zerga Rivers) would be developed into open canals or closed conduits running around the slopes of the Jordan. This would provide water for irrigation of the slopes and floor of the Jordan Valley and for leaching alkaline soils, making them suitable for farm forage crops. The amount of water available would make it possible to irrigate about 300,000 acres, almost double the area of the Jordan Valley. The surplus could be used for irrigation in the plains of Esdraelon-Beisan and possibly some portions of the valleys of Galilee.

*Power Program*—The waters of the Jordan at the intersection of the Yarmuk and the Jordan, now used to create water power, would be reserved for irrigation purposes. For the power program, sea water from the Mediterranean would be brought into the Jordan Valley, which is about twenty-five miles away. Several technical possibilities are available for effecting the link: the Jordan Valley

148. *Ibid.*, p. 169.

149. Alex Bein, *Theodore Herzl*, Jewish Publication Society of America, 1941, pp. 400–401. The idea was suggested to him by a French engineer.

150. *Popular Science*, March, 1943.

151. Lowdermilk, *op. cit.*, pp. 170 ff.

Authority plan calls for an open canal of some seven miles from Haifa to Mount Carmel, and for a twenty mile tunnel through the Plain of Esdraelon to the edge of the chasm of the Jordan Valley. One million kilowatt hours per day of electric energy could be created.

Power and irrigation would be the basis of a broad economic development of the land and its mineral resources. As in the case of TVA, water conservation, flood control and prevention of soil erosion would be an important part of the activities of the Jordan Valley Authority. The problem of scientific range management and grazing would also fall within the jurisdiction of the JVA, and progress along these lines would be of great significance for the whole Near East where the struggle between the nomad shepherd and the settled farmer has been a destructive force throughout the ages. Reforestation of land unsuited to farming and grazing would come within the scope of the undertaking. An important phase of the Jordan Valley Authority and one that would soon pay for itself would be the extraction of minerals from the Dead Sea on a scale far larger than at present. Full scale draining of the *Huleh* would be incorporated with the activities of the JVA, and the problem of irrigating the *Negev* would be solved. The cheap power available under the JVA would, moreover, make possible the development of industries in this whole region.

Preliminary studies of the geographical conditions in Palestine indicate that there are no great technical difficulties in the way of such a program and justify the expectation that the costs would not exceed similar projects of this kind. Vast quantities of military equipment, tanks and military trucks could be acquired for the development of the Jordan Valley Authority. The project would provide employment for a great number of immigrants from the devastated lands of Europe. It could be financed by a loan, from the reconstruction funds of the United Nations, and contributions of public Jewish and non-Jewish organizations. Some parts of the venture, for instance, the exploitation of the minerals of the Dead Sea, which is expected to bring good returns in a short time, could be taken care of by private capital or investments on a limited profit basis. Dr. Lowdermilk points out that the Arabs of Palestine and Trans-Jordan would greatly benefit

from the Jordan Valley Authority project, and that the absorptive capacity of Palestine could be greatly increased. He estimates that in addition to 1,800,000 Jews and Arabs now living in Palestine and Trans-Jordan, at least 4,000,000 additional Jewish immigrants could be absorbed. This figure is in accord with critical estimates of Palestine's population in previous times and would give a density of population similar to that of Italy, a suitable comparison in view of the general character and position of Italy and the fact that it is a semi-industrialized country. For Palestine alone this degree of population density would mean a population of about 3,500,000, more than double the present number.

The Lowdermilk plan, and similar projects, it has been suggested, can play a decisive role in the solution of the political problem. In the editorial from *The New Statesman and Nation* mentioned above,<sup>152</sup> the view was expressed that the Palestine problem, though offering insuperable difficulties when seen in isolation, could be solved if it were considered as part of a broad policy of economic development of the Near East designed through the full use of irrigation and hydroelectric power to restore the whole Middle East region to its ancient fertility and to its position as a great center of culture. The article declares: "Leagues between kings may be a good thing in their way, but what we urgently desire to see is a plan of development for the whole of this Arab world, based on the utilization of rivers and subsoil water . . . The 'Big Three,' it is said, are about to inaugurate a new form of 'trusteeship' under which they propose to act as the guardians of some backward and troubled regions. To summon these states as independent sovereigns to San Francisco is an empty gesture. To offer them help in developing their resources of water would be the first act of an enlightened trustee. . . . Our own inclination is to discourage haste in drafting a political solution. The Middle East is a thirsty land. What it wants is neither kings nor constitutions, but water."

152. March 10, 1945. See above, p. 1007.

## CHAPTER XV

# THE SHAPING OF POLICIES AND SUMMARY OF PROPOSALS

**A**T THE time of the opening of the San Francisco Conference (April 25, 1945), the principles of the 1939 White Paper—restriction of land sales to Jews within a small area of Palestine, and limitation of immigration to keep the Jews a permanent minority—still constituted official British policy. There were signs of a possible change. The 1939 White Paper had been modified to allow Jewish immigration to continue after March 31, 1944—which had been set as the closing date—up to the original quota of 75,000 and it was believed in some quarters that the British Administration would continue to admit some Jewish immigration beyond this figure.

American official policy remained undetermined despite repeated pronouncements by President Roosevelt, heartening to the Zionists, and much favorable opinion in Congress. The nearest to an expression of an official position was the statement authorized by President Roosevelt to the effect that “the American Government has never given its approval to the White Paper of 1939.”<sup>1</sup> Public opinion—as represented in statements made by leading Congressmen, by labor organizations, and religious bodies—generally supported the Zionist cause, although skeptical and opposing views were not altogether absent. The State Department followed a cautious line. Russia, although noncommittal, was regarded as veering away from its traditional anti-Zionist policy.

Among the Arabs, the extreme anti-Zionist position persisted: occasionally there appeared demands in the Iraq press that all but the native Jews be evacuated from Palestine. There was no change either on the part of Palestine Arabs or of the Arab states toward Zionism: they still called for the ab-

1. The declaration was made in March, 1944, to Dr. Wise and Dr. Silver, co-chairmen of the American Zionist Emergency Council.

rogation of the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate, the cessation of Jewish immigration, and the drastic restriction of land sales. As noted in the previous chapter, in the Annex to the Covenant of the League of Arab States, the position was taken that Palestine was already *de jure* independent, even though this condition had as yet to be realized in fact. At the time of the Cairo Conference there was a report that the Arab representatives were ready to consider a plan of admitting 200,000 to 300,000 Jewish immigrants in the course of a ten year period.<sup>2</sup> There was no confirmation of this report, but it may be that it reflected a willingness on the part of groups among the Arabs to accept *faute de mieux* a British-sponsored plan for a minimum immigration of Jews which would meet the Jewish need to some degree and yet not lead to an appreciable increase in the ratio of Jews to the total population.

## THE SHAPING OF POLICIES IN RECENT YEARS

### *Formulation of Zionist Positions*

At a meeting of the Executive of the Zionist Organization held at the time of the Zionist Congress in Geneva in August, 1939, shortly before the outbreak of the war, the members of the American delegation in association with the World Zionist leaders, set up a unified Emergency Committee representative of the different American Zionist groups. The purpose of the Committee was to coordinate Zionist work in the United States and to maintain contact with the various sections of the Zionist movement abroad which might find themselves cut off from communication with the offices of the Executive in London or

2. Julian J. Meltzer cabled a report to *The New York Times* (March 10, 1945) which suggested that Arab representatives of the Conference were ready to consider allowing the Jews to increase up to the number of Moslem Arabs which would give the Christian Arab minority the balance of power. Anne O'Hare McCormick, in her column the following day, supported the plan. However, there was no intimation from Arab sources that the plan was acceptable. Although the plan would have left the Arabs as a majority, it is hardly reasonable to believe that the Moslems would have accepted such a plan or that even the Christian Arab minority would have wished to place themselves in the position of acting as the balance wheel.

Jerusalem. The Committee was later reorganized under the name American Zionist Emergency Council. In addition to a number of outstanding Zionist leaders appointed by Dr. Weizmann on behalf of the Jewish Agency Executive, the Emergency Council was composed of the four major Zionist groups: the Zionist Organization of America, Hadassah (the Women's Zionist Organization), the *Poale Zion* and associated Labor-Zionist groups, and the *Mizrachi* (the orthodox Zionist group). These groups, as well as the Jewish Agency members, were represented on the Executive of the Emergency Council.<sup>3</sup> The full Council included also the *Hashomer Hatzair*, the *Left Poale Zion*, and (until recently) the State Party—each being represented by one observer without vote.<sup>4</sup>

During the course of the war, definitions of the Jewish national home, which for want of a better name may be called "maximalist," gained support both among the organized Zionists and the Jews at large. The fact that Hitler had selected the Jews for a special target led many who hitherto had shown no interest in Jewish group life, either of a religious or national character, to a keen awareness of the Jewish problem. Some Jews went all the way from indifference to the extreme position of advocating a Jewish Army and a Jewish State. This tendency was probably accentuated by the growth of anti-Semitism in the United States.

Within the Zionist Organization there emerged a new position which may be regarded as intermediate between the general policy that had been followed under Weizmann's leadership during the previous quarter of a century and the more extreme view that had received expression in the Revisionist Party and in the New Zionist Organization. The change was stimulated by a number of factors. First may be mentioned the disillusionment with the policy of conciliation which had guided the Zionist leadership in its dealings with Great Brit-

3. Dr. Stephen S. Wise was elected chairman of the Emergency Council. After the American Jewish Conference, Dr. Silver was elected as co-chairman and for a period directed the political work. A difference of opinion with Dr. Wise with reference to tactics in promoting the Jewish Commonwealth aim led to Dr. Silver's resignation in December 1944. He was later re-elected co-chairman with Dr. Wise.

4. These combined organizations had a membership of about 300,000 at the end of 1944.

ain. Zionists came to feel that Great Britain would accept all concessions but would give nothing in return, and, moreover, that no moderate Arab group existed with which the Jews might cooperate in working out a bi-national conception. The second factor was the tragedy of the Jews in Europe. Many who previously were satisfied with the cultural conception of Zionism now realized that Palestine could make a great and indispensable contribution to the refugee problem. A third factor was the absolute determination of the *Yishuv* in Palestine to resist any tendency to relegate it to a position of permanent minority status. Finally, there was a feeling that a new stage in international development would come about and that post-war reconstruction would be along lines of larger scope; and there was the hope that the solution of the Jewish problem would be fitted into the general world order of security and freedom for all peoples.

These tendencies found expression both in Palestine and in the United States, now the two main centers of Jewish life. The revised position, although first formulated at meetings of the Palestine Zionist Executive in Jerusalem, was crystallized at the Extraordinary Zionist Conference held at the Hotel Biltmore in New York in May, 1942. Six hundred delegates from all parts of the United States were in attendance. The presence of Dr. Weizmann, Ben-Gurion and Nahum Goldmann gave the gathering the character of an international convention which, though lacking the authority of a Zionist Congress, nevertheless served as a forum for the expression of the views of the various parties and of Zionist public opinion generally. The attitudes of the leaders of world Zionism indicated progress toward a unified and firm outlook. There was less tendency to appeal to the friendship of Great Britain and a more direct appeal to the conscience of mankind and to the decisions of the United Nations. Dr. Weizmann defined the Jewish problem as "a part of the statesmanship of tomorrow" and urged that action be directed toward bringing to the notice of "the American, British, and the Russian people, the decisive elements in our problem and their interplay with the problem of world stabilization."<sup>5</sup> Ben-Gurion demanded a clear, unequivocal re-affirmation of the Balfour Declaration and of the Mandate. Nahum Goldmann emphasized international implications and urged

5. *Jewish Frontier*, June, 1942, p. 5.

unsparing effort to bring Russian Jewry back into the fold of the Zionist effort.

Considerable attention was given to the problem of Jewish-Arab relations. Dr. Weizmann re-asserted his principle of Arab-Jewish cooperation, but emphasized that such cooperation had to have as its basis a recognition on the part of the Arabs of "the historical connection of the Jewish people with Palestine." "All other provisions of the Mandate may be watered down, have been watered down, may be interpreted down almost to the White Paper, but this recognition of the historical connection of the Jews with Palestine has come to stay, and means to stay, because it is part of the consciousness of the world. Jews—Palestine—the Bible—the Decalogue—the history, the foundations of Christianity, all that forms an indissoluble whole which goes toward the laying of modern civilization." <sup>6</sup>

David Ben-Gurion, political leader of the Palestine Executive of the Jewish Agency, emphasized two points in his discussion of Arab-Jewish relations. He denied in clear and forceful terms a rumor that Zionist policy contemplated a forcible transfer of Palestine Arabs to other lands. While it was true that Syria and Iraq with their vast stretches of territory suffered from under-population, and that after the war these Arab countries might wish to strengthen their economic and military position by encouraging Arab settlers from Palestine, such a voluntary migration was "a purely internal Arab problem, in which we may help if asked by the Arabs but in which we neither can nor ought to take the initiative." <sup>7</sup> In his opinion, such transfer was not prerequisite for a large mass immigration and colonization of Jews. The Jewish development was predicated on the idea that Palestine could provide for the present Arab population with its natural increase as well as for a many times larger Jewish population. He took the position that "a mass immigration and colonization on the largest possible scale, such as we must expect after the war, can be effected without the slightest need for displacing the present population." <sup>8</sup>

On the other hand, he emphasized, was the necessity of fac-

6. *Ibid.*, p. 8.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 13.

8. *Ibid.*



ing the fact that a mass immigration program could not be achieved with "Arab consent." He cited the Mufti's testimony before the Royal Commission in which the former Arab leader made it clear that no further Jewish immigration would be permitted into Palestine if the Arabs gained control. He pointed out that not a single Arab had ever come forward to differ with the Mufti on this question. There was an unbridgeable gulf between those who believed that Jewish immigration into Palestine was an inalienable right which did not need Arab consent, and those who thought that the Jews must take Arab opposition and prejudices into account. The latter thought that Arab-Jewish relations were fundamentally a matter of education; the former were convinced that the Arab nationalists would never agree to Jewish immigration *a priori* but would acquiesce in it when it became an established fact. Immigration was "the crucial problem" on which there could not be any compromise: "no political opposition or obstruction on the part of the Arabs, no terrorist intimidation, no restrictions of a morally and legally invalid White Paper will prevent Jews from getting back to the land of Israel." His main demand, therefore, was that the Jewish Agency be given control over Jewish immigration. As the trustee for the prospective immigrants and settlers, it should be vested with all the necessary authority for developing and upbuilding the country in order to prepare it for as large an immigration as possible.

Ben-Gurion did not believe that enlightenment or practical benefits for the Arab people would soften Arab political resistance to Zionism; nor did he believe that "bi-nationalism" or "parity" offered a solution. If the term "bi-national state" meant simply a society in which all the inhabitants—Jews and Arabs alike—were to enjoy complete equality of rights as individuals and as national entities with the right of free development of their language, culture and religion, "then certainly no Jew, much less a Zionist, can fail to advocate such a regime."<sup>9</sup> But bi-nationalism in the sense of constitutional parity, so that irrespective of numerical strength, Jews and Arabs would be equally represented in the main departments of government on a fifty-fifty basis, he no longer thought workable, although he had at one time strongly advocated such a plan. Without a Mandatory, such a self-governing state would, he

9. *Ibid.*, p. 14.

feared, mean a permanent deadlock. In any case, thus far, not a single Arab leader had been found to agree with the principle of parity with or without a mandate.

He also touched on the question of the relationship of a Jewish Palestine to a more comprehensive political entity. Whether Palestine would remain a separate unit or become part of a Middle Eastern Federation, a British Commonwealth of Nations, an Anglo-American Union, or some other larger international association, would depend upon postwar world patterns. He emphasized, however, that whatever would be the constitutional relation of a Jewish Palestine to neighboring countries, there must be a continued willingness and readiness for close cooperation with the Arabs both in Palestine and in the surrounding territories.

Among the leaders of American Zionism there was also recognition of the fact that a new era was opening and that a re-orientation was necessary. The speakers were practically unanimous in support of the growing sentiment for formulating the Zionist aim in direct and unequivocal terms. The trend of the Conference was to abandon all compromise plans, e.g., "the Mandatory status quo," partition, bi-nationalism, and to insist on "a full implementation of the Basle program." This was interpreted to mean "that Palestine be established as a Jewish commonwealth integrated in the structure of the new democratic world." Differences of opinion existed with reference to various points: whether the Jewish Commonwealth should be established in some provisional form immediately after the war, or was to develop in due course; what degree of authority should be given to the Jewish Agency; and what degree and form of international supervision should be provided. But there was consensus on fundamental objectives: that mass immigration to Palestine be insisted upon so that Jews could become a majority in Palestine at the earliest possible moment; that this required giving the Jewish Agency an appropriate degree of control over immigration along with necessary powers for the economic development of the country; that the principles of democracy would be basic, and that this implied the recognition by the Jewish Commonwealth of international authority on the one hand, and, on the other hand, complete equality for all individuals in Palestine regardless of race, descent or religion, including autonomy for the different

communities—Jewish and Arab—in the management of their internal affairs, education, religion, and so forth.

The views of the Extraordinary Zionist Conference were formulated in a number of resolutions, adopted on May 11, 1942, which became known as the Biltmore Program:<sup>10</sup>

1. American Zionists assembled in this Extraordinary Conference reaffirm their unequivocal devotion to the cause of democratic freedom and international justice to which the people of the United States, allied with the other United Nations, have dedicated themselves, and give expression to their faith in the ultimate victory of humanity and justice over lawlessness and brute force.

2. This Conference offers a message of hope and encouragement to their fellow Jews in the Ghettos and concentration camps of Hitler-dominated Europe and prays that their hour of liberation may not be far distant.

3. The Conference sends its warmest greetings to the Jewish Agency Executive in Jerusalem, to the Vaad Leumi, and to the whole Yishuv in Palestine, and expresses its profound admiration for their steadfastness and achievements in the face of peril and great difficulties. The Jewish men and women in field and factory, and the thousands of Jewish soldiers of Palestine in the Near East who have acquitted themselves with honor and distinction in Greece, Ethiopia, Syria, Libya and on other battlefields, have shown themselves worthy of their people and ready to assume the rights and responsibilities of nationhood.

4. In our generation, and in particular in the course of the past twenty years, the Jewish people have awakened and transformed their ancient homeland; from 50,000 at the end of the last war their numbers have increased to more than 500,000. They have made the waste places to bear fruit and the desert to blossom. Their pioneering achievements in agriculture and in industry, embodying new patterns of cooperative endeavor, have written a notable page in the history of colonization.

5. In the new values thus created, their Arab neighbors in Palestine have shared. The Jewish people in its own work of national redemption welcomes the economic, agricultural and national development of the Arab peoples and states. The Conference reaffirms the stand previously adopted at Congresses of the World Zionist Organization, expressing their readiness and the desire of the Jewish people for full cooperation with their Arab neighbors.

6. The Conference calls for the fulfillment of the original purpose of the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate which "*recognizing the*

*historical connection of the Jewish people with Palestine*" was to afford them the opportunity, as stated by President Wilson, to found there a Jewish Commonwealth.

The Conference affirms its unalterable rejection of the White Paper of May 1939 and denies its moral or legal validity. The White Paper seeks to limit, and in fact to nullify Jewish rights to immigration and settlement in Palestine, and, as stated by Mr. Winston Churchill in the House of Commons in May 1939, constitutes "a breach and repudiation of the Balfour Declaration." The policy of the White Paper is cruel and indefensible in its denial of sanctuary to Jews fleeing from Nazi persecution; and at a time when Palestine has become a focal point in the war front of the United Nations, and Palestine Jewry must provide all available manpower for farm and factory and camp, it is in direct conflict with the interests of the allied war effort.

7. In the struggle against the forces of aggression and tyranny, of which Jews were the earliest victims, and which now menace the Jewish National Home, recognition must be given to the right of the Jews of Palestine to play their full part in the war effort and in the defense of their country, through a Jewish military force fighting under its own flag and under the high command of the United Nations.

8. The Conference declares that the new world order that will follow victory cannot be established on foundations of peace, justice and equality, unless the problem of Jewish homelessness is finally solved.

The Conference urges that the gates of Palestine be opened; that the Jewish Agency be vested with control of immigration into Palestine and with the necessary authority for upbuilding the country, including the development of its unoccupied and uncultivated lands; and that Palestine be established as a Jewish Commonwealth integrated in the structure of the new democratic world.

The spirit of the Biltmore Resolutions permeated the proceedings of the forty-fifth Annual Convention of the Zionist Organization of America, held during October, 1942. There was a demand for a vigorous and bold policy in terms of "Herzlian Zionism," free from restrictions and the possibility of devious interpretation. The formation of the *Ihud* in Palestine during the summer, and statements made by Dr. Magnes, served to stiffen the attitude of the Convention against all compromise proposals and to sharpen the pronouncements in favor of the Jewish Commonwealth. The President of the Zionist Organization, Judge Louis E. Levinthal, sounded the keynote

in his address, declaring that "the Jews of America sense the temper of the times and will not endorse halfway measures or half-hearted efforts." He reaffirmed the desire of the Zionists to cooperate with the Arabs in the spirit of the Faisal-Weizmann agreement of 1919, but opposed the idea of Palestine as a bi-national state as a whittling down of the pledges made to the Jewish people. Louis Lipsky expressed the view that the Basle program, the Balfour Declaration, the Mandate—all appropriate for their day—had now become inadequate in the light of the great changes that were taking place in the world. The commonwealth formula was now inevitable to initiate the final stage of Zionism which would abolish once and for all the rootlessness of the Jewish people.

Mr. Robert Szold, one of the old Mack-Brandeis group, and an organizer of the Palestine Economic Corporation, who had for many years emphasized the economic aspect of the upbuilding of Palestine, now stressed the political aspect. He proposed that the objectives of the Zionist movement be stated in the unequivocal and Herzlian terms of a Jewish state; that Palestine as a whole be recognized by the nations of the world as the Jewish homeland, with the untrammelled right of immigration and colonization and where they would be free to become a majority. He analyzed and rejected all other plans, such as partition, bi-nationalism or regional federalism, alleging that each of these meant some unwarranted restriction on Jewish development. He urged that it was imperative to invest the Jewish Agency with quasi-governmental powers in economic and fiscal matters in order to enable it to facilitate mass immigration immediately after the war. Mr. Emanuel Neumann,<sup>11</sup> long known as an advocate of the Herzlian conception of Zionism, on this occasion stressed the economic conditions necessary for a large immigration. He urged that a great development scheme was needed for the Arab regions, and that the United States, which was destined to play an important part in the Near East in the future, could make an indispensable contribution to its social and economic problem. In a progressive Middle East, utilizing its resources for the benefit of the

11. Mr. Neumann has long been associated with the Zionist movement in the United States and from 1933 to 1937 was the American representative of the Zionist Organization on the Executive of the Jewish Agency in Jerusalem.

whole people, Palestine, intensively cultivated and industrially developed, could support a population of millions.

At a joint session of the Zionist Organization of America and of Hadassah, held October 17, 1942, the Biltmore Program was adopted as the policy of the American organizations. The resolutions stated: "Any program which denies these fundamental principles, such as advanced by the *Ihud* or any other group, is unacceptable to the Zionist Organization of America and Hadassah, the Women's Zionist Organization of America." The Biltmore Resolutions were succinctly stated as requiring: "that the gates of Palestine be opened; that the Jewish Agency be vested with control of immigration into Palestine and with the necessary authority for upbuilding the country; and that Palestine be established as a Jewish commonwealth integrated into the structure of the new democratic world."

The *Mizrahi* and Labor groups soon followed suit in adopting the Biltmore Program. The Labor organization made the Jewish commonwealth aim a part of a comprehensive set of resolutions on the Jewish problem adopted at its Convention in March, 1943. There was, however, in their statement no explicit opposition to the bi-national concept and more emphasis on the positive principles of the commonwealth idea, e.g., 1) full use of the natural resources of Palestine that would make possible an extensive plan of Jewish immigration and colonization; 2) vesting all necessary authority for the regulation of immigration and development in the hands of the Jewish Agency; 3) equality of rights for all without distinction of race or religion; 4) recognition of Hebrew and Arabic as official languages on the same plane; 5) right of each community to conduct its own system of education and communal institutions.<sup>12</sup>

The Biltmore Program was adopted as the policy of the World Zionist Organization, and hence of the Jewish Agency, at a meeting of the General Council (Smaller Actions Committee) held on November 6, 1942, in Palestine. The resolution was approved by a large majority—twenty-one persons voting for it, representing all the major parties, the General Zionists, the *Mizrahi*, and the Labor Party—(*Mapai*); the *Hashomer Hatzair*, with two votes, and the Socialist Zionists (*Left Poale*

12. *The Jewish Frontier*, April, 1943, pp. 31 ff.

*Zion*), with one vote, opposed it. There was also one dissident General Zionist, Dr. Sali Hirsh, of the *Olei Germania* (Immigrants from Germany) group. Three members of the Labor Party abstained from voting. Those opposing the Biltmore Program did so on the ground that its Arab policy was inadequate and that it did not make sufficient provision for international guarantees.

*Jewish Opinion in America for and against the Jewish Commonwealth*

The formulation of the aims of Zionism in terms of the establishment of a Jewish Commonwealth received widespread support both in the United States and Palestine, while evoking considerable opposition as well. It was overwhelmingly endorsed at an American Jewish Conference held in New York City, September 29–October 2, 1943. The Conference, originally projected by Mr. Henry Monsky, President of the *Bnai Brith*, was called for the purpose of considering and recommending action on problems relating to the status of Jews in the postwar world and to the implementation of the right of the Jews with respect to Palestine. When the Conference convened, sixty-five Jewish organizations, including the non-Zionist American Jewish Committee, were represented, comprising practically every organized Jewish body of national scope. A small number of groups representing extremist positions refused to participate, e.g., the revisionist New Zionist Organization, and the ultra-orthodox *Agudath Israel* and Union of Orthodox Rabbis.

Following are the major paragraphs of the Declaration on Palestine:

We call for the fulfillment of the Balfour Declaration, and of the Mandate for Palestine, whose intent and underlying purpose, based on the "historical connection of the Jewish people with Palestine," was to reconstitute Palestine as the Jewish Commonwealth.

We demand the immediate withdrawal in its entirety of the Palestine White Paper of May, 1939, with its unwarranted restrictions on Jewish immigration and land settlement. The White Paper is a violation of the rights accorded to the Jewish people under the Mandate for Palestine. It was characterized by Mr. Winston Churchill in the House of Commons as "a breach and a repudiation of the Balfour Declaration." The Permanent Mandates Commission of the

League of Nations refused to recognize its legality or its moral validity.

The Conference demands that the gates of Palestine be opened to Jewish immigration, and that the Jewish Agency, recognized under the Mandate as the authorized representative of the Jewish people, be vested with authority to direct and regulate immigration into Palestine, to develop to the maximum the agricultural and industrial possibilities and the natural resources of the country, and to utilize its uncultivated and unoccupied lands for Jewish colonization and for the benefit of the country as a whole.

The measures here urged constitute the essential prerequisites for the attainments of a Jewish majority and for the recreation of the Jewish Commonwealth.

In the pursuit of its objective of a Jewish Commonwealth, the Jewish people has steadfastly held before it the ideals which shall integrate Jewish Palestine within the new democratic world structure. The Jewish people pledges itself to scrupulous regard for and preservation of the religious, linguistic and cultural rights of the Arab population of Palestine, and to the civil and religious equality of all its inhabitants before the law. The inviolability of the Holy Places of the various religions shall be guaranteed.

The Jewish people reaffirm its readiness and desire for full cooperation with its Arab neighbors in Palestine, and in the work of its own national redemption, welcomes the economic and political development of the Arab peoples of the Near East.

On the basis both of the part it has played in the history of civilization, and of its present achievement in Palestine, the Jewish people believes that the Jewish Commonwealth to be established will represent another fundamental contribution to the social and political ideals of the world. It will finally answer the agonized cry of the most martyred of peoples, and enable it to take its rightful place in that progressive order of mankind which, we pray, may issue from the present struggle.

The organizations which abstained from voting gave as a reason the divergences of opinion among their members on the Palestine issue. Two organizations, the National Council of Jewish Women and the Jewish Labor Committee, explained their position on the floor of the Conference.<sup>13</sup> The Council of Jewish Women stated that their program did not include the

13. The *Hashomer Hatzair*, which also abstained from voting, submitted a statement explaining its dissent from the Jewish Commonwealth resolution in the light of its general position which, while agreeing in the program of maximum immigration, nevertheless advocated a bi-national state. See below, pp. 1164-1168.



subject of Zionism and that their membership differed widely on the issue. At a convention held shortly afterward, the Council urged the immediate abrogation of the White Paper of 1939 and placed themselves on record as being in favor of unrestricted immigration of Jews into Palestine and the continued upbuilding of the land in the spirit of the Balfour Declaration. The Jewish Labor Committee<sup>14</sup> stated that they took no stand on the ultimate constitutional status of Palestine because there was no unanimity among its membership on this issue. But it declared its solidarity with organized Jewish labor in Palestine in demanding immediate annulment of the White Paper, the guarantee of free Jewish immigration into, and of land purchase and colonization in, Palestine.<sup>15</sup>

After the Conference a number of other participating groups made reservations as to that part of the Palestine resolution which affirmed the Jewish Commonwealth. Mr. Monsky, who had supported the resolution at the Conference, announced after a meeting of the *Bnai Brith* in May 1944, that while his organization would continue full participation in the American Jewish Conference, the *Bnai Brith*, as such, could take no position either for or against the Jewish Commonwealth resolution; that in accordance with the traditional policy of the *Bnai Brith* each member had a right to determine his own attitude on ideological and political issues, and the organization did not wish by rule of the majority to encroach upon the freedom of the minority, however small. The Union of American Hebrew Congregations (Reform) adopted a similar position: continuing its membership in the American Jewish Conference, it declared that "The Union recognizes the right of each individual to determine his own attitude on this controversial question and therefore the Union refrains from taking any action on the Palestine resolutions adopted by the American Jewish Conference."<sup>16</sup> The National Federation of

14. The American Jewish Labor Committee is a body of representatives of the Jewish Socialist Fraternal Orders Arbeiter Ring. It claims a membership of between 250,000 and 500,000. The Committee consists mainly of leaders of the old Bundist Socialist, an organization, anti-Zionist in its orientation, in Eastern Europe. However, a number of pro-Zionists are also included in the leadership of the Committee.

15. Alexander S. Kohanski, Editor, *The American Jewish Conference, Its Organization and Proceedings of the First Session*, New York 1944, pp. 280-288.

16. *The Conference Record*, January 15, 1944, p. 4.

Temple Sisterhoods, also a Reform group, in a meeting held in New York City in May, 1944, likewise refrained from action on the Conference Palestine resolution on the ground of the right of individual conscience and belief.

The most important dissenting opinion came from the American Jewish Committee, whose representatives had voted against the Palestine resolution at the meeting of the American Jewish Conference. The American Jewish Committee, while representing a minority as far as numbers were concerned, included outstanding leaders in Jewish philanthropic and communal work. It was organized in 1906 primarily to prevent the infraction of civil and religious rights of Jews in any part of the world and to secure for Jews equality of economic, social and educational opportunity. As noted in an earlier chapter of this book,<sup>17</sup> under the leadership of Louis Marshall, the American Jewish Committee had supported the Balfour Declaration and cooperated with the American Jewish Congress at the Peace Conference in Paris in 1919. The "non-Zionist" participation in the Jewish Agency came largely from among the leaders of the American Jewish Committee. It consistently and repeatedly endorsed the principle that Palestine should "remain open to the immigration of Jews to the extent of its absorptive capacity" and that no steps should be taken "which would impede the continued development of the Jewish national home in Palestine."<sup>18</sup> Although the majority of the members were opposed to the Jewish state conception, the Committee as a whole was favorable toward the upbuilding of Jewish life in Palestine in the economic and cultural phases and also supported the basic principles underlying the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate.

The present position of the American Jewish Committee on Palestine was enunciated as part of a general statement on the Jewish situation at its annual meeting held on February 1, 1943. This statement recognized that Palestine had now built up a sound economic structure and a satisfying cultural and spiritual life, and that though Palestine could not alone furnish a solution of the problem of postwar Jewish rehabilitation, it

17. Chap. IV, p. 246.

18. The American Jewish Committee, *To the Counsellors of Peace, Recommendations of the American Jewish Committee*, March, 1945, p. 70.

was to be regarded as an important factor. The Committee affirmed a desire to cooperate with those Jews who wished to settle in Palestine. Pains were taken to reiterate that "there can be no political identification of Jews outside of Palestine with whatever government may there be instituted." In the light of the wide divergences of opinion with reference to the character of the future government of Palestine, the resolution declared "that under existing conditions there should be no preconceived formula at this time as to the permanent political structure which shall obtain there." The Committee proposed that a self-governing Commonwealth should be developed in Palestine in due course, but pointedly omitted the adjective "Jewish." The policy of cooperation between Jews and Arabs in Palestine was endorsed, and it was urged that "every possible avenue be followed to establish good-will and active collaboration between them."

The most definite part of the Committee's declaration was the recommendation of an international trusteeship for Palestine, responsible to the United Nations, with the following functions:

- (a) To safeguard the Jewish settlement in and Jewish immigration into Palestine and to guarantee adequate scope for future growth and development to the full extent of the economic absorptive capacity of the country.
- (b) To safeguard and protect the fundamental rights of all inhabitants.
- (c) To safeguard and protect the holy places of all faiths.
- (d) To prepare the country to become, within a reasonable period of years, a self-governing commonwealth under a constitution and a bill of rights that will safeguard and protect these purposes and basic rights for all.

In his address of acceptance, Mr. Joseph M. Proskauer, former Justice of the State Supreme Court, newly elected president, declared that the statement of principles drawn up by the American Jewish Committee was a "great compromise" and had set the stage for all Jews—orthodox and reform, radical and conservative, Zionist, non-Zionist and anti-Zionist alike—to join for effective collaboration in the upbuilding of Palestine.

Judge Proskauer, in presenting the dissenting statement on behalf of the American Jewish Committee at the American Jewish Conference in 1943, took the view that the Palestine resolution proposed by the Conference was unwise, that it might carry with it embarrassment to the government of the United States, and was likely to jeopardize the status of Jews and perhaps even to prejudice the fullest possible development of the Jewish settlement in Palestine.

The negative character of Judge Proskauer's declaration was offset by the temperate presentation of his case. The Conference was also pleased by the expressed willingness of the American Jewish Committee to cooperate with the Conference in those activities in regard to which there was no ideological disagreement.

However, this friendly relation was temporary. In October, at a closed session of the Executive of the American Jewish Committee consisting of seventy-five representatives of various institutions throughout the country, the American Jewish Committee resolved to withdraw from the Conference. It based its action on the Palestine resolution which demanded the eventual establishment of the Jewish Commonwealth, and on the alleged subordination of the other Jewish issues to "the problem of the political structure of Palestine." The position taken by the American Jewish Conference, it was stated, was in such essential disagreement with the fundamentals of the American Jewish Committee that a withdrawal was unavoidable. The Committee, however, declared its readiness to cooperate with the Conference in promoting the religious, cultural and philanthropic activities of Jewish life in America. It reaffirmed its desire to utilize the opportunities which Palestine offered for relieving the distress of the Jews of Europe and stated that it would continue its efforts to bring about the abrogation of the White Paper.

The American Jewish Committee was attacked as having acted against the common interests of American Jewish life, and as having violated democratic principles in refusing to accept the judgment of the very great majority of the delegates of the American Jewish Conference. Dr. Stephen S. Wise and Mr. Henry Monsky, speaking for the Interim Committee of the American Jewish Conference, issued a statement which accused the American Jewish Committee of introducing divi-

sion in the councils of American Jewry, and denounced the act of withdrawal as unjustifiable in view of the fact that prior to the sessions of the American Jewish Conference, the conditions of the American Jewish Committee for its entry were accepted. The members of the American Jewish Conference associated with the Zionist Organization and Hadassah resigned from the Committee, as did also the Rabbinical Assembly of America and the United Synagogue which represent, respectively, the rabbis and laymen of the conservative wing of American Jewry.

On January 17, 1944, the American Jewish Committee addressed a memorandum on the 1939 White Paper to Lord Halifax, the British Ambassador. The memorandum pointed out that the temporary conditions which motivated the issuance of the White Paper had now passed, since the Near East was no longer in danger of Axis conquest. It emphasized particularly the plight of millions of Jews of Central and Eastern Europe and pleaded that an opportunity be given them to go to Palestine and there re-establish their lives on a basis of freedom and security. Zionist opinion, while expressing satisfaction with this evidence of a united front against the White Paper, nevertheless viewed the memorandum as inadequate.<sup>19</sup> The abrogation of the White Paper, without substituting a constructive program for it, might simply relieve Great Britain of the stigma of having enacted religious and racial discrimination in Palestine; if the political status remained uncertain, it would not be possible to initiate the colonization and industrial development of Palestine indispensable for a large immigration.

A virulent attack against the Biltmore Program and the Jewish Commonwealth idea came from a minority of Reform rabbis who stimulated the development of the anti-Zionist American Council for Judaism. At a conference held in Atlantic City, June 1-2, 1942, eighty Reform rabbis issued a statement in which they formulated a "Program of Liberal Judaism." They proclaimed their faith in the "eternal principles of justice and righteousness" and their belief that the ultimate solution of the problems of the Jewish people were to be sought in the "solution to the universal problems of man." They defined Judaism in universalistic religious terms, with

19. *The Jewish Frontier*, February, 1944.

the implication that religious universalism was antithetical to nationalism. They rejected as "dangerous and suicidal" the alleged attempt on the part of Zionists to delude the Jewish people into believing that Palestine alone represented the panacea for all Jewish ills. On August 12th a statement was issued by Rabbi Louis Wolsey of Philadelphia, carrying the signatures of eighty-seven anti-Zionist Reform rabbis, approving the previous statement drawn up in Atlantic City. The paragraph on Palestine reads as follows:

Realizing how important Palestinian rehabilitation is towards relieving the pressing problems of our distressed people, we stand ready to render unstinted aid to our brethren in their economic, cultural and spiritual endeavors in that country. But in the light of our universalistic interpretation of Jewish history and destiny, and also because of our concern for the welfare and status of the Jewish people living in other parts of the world, we are unable to subscribe to or support the political emphasis now paramount in the Zionist program. We cannot but believe that Jewish nationalism tends to confuse our fellowmen about our place and function in society and also diverts our own attention from our historic role to live as a religious community. Such spiritual role is especially voiced by Reform Judaism in its emphasis upon the eternal prophetic principles of life and thought.

On November 16th, a reply to this anti-Zionist blast was given by a group of 757 Orthodox, Conservative and Reform rabbis. They called attention to the fact that the signatories of the anti-Zionist statement represented no more than a small fraction of the American rabbinate and a minority in the rabbinate of their own group, that is, of Reform Judaism. The overwhelming majority of American rabbis regarded Zionism as an affirmation of Judaism fully consistent with its traditional, moral and religious principles. It was absurd for the anti-Zionists to appeal to the Prophets of ancient Israel for the substantiation of their views, since the vision of the restoration of the Jewish people to Zion had its origin in the teachings of the Prophets. They summarized their views as follows:

Zionism is not a secularist movement. It has its origins and roots in the authoritative religious texts of Judaism. Scripture and rabbinical literature alike are replete with the promise of the restoration of

Israel to its ancestral home. Anti-Zionism, not Zionism, is a departure from the Jewish religion. Nothing in the entire pronouncement of our colleagues is more painful than their appeal to the prophets of Israel—to those very prophets whose inspired and recorded words of national rebirth and restoration nurtured and sustained the hope of Israel throughout the ages.

Nor is Zionism a denial of the universalistic teachings of Judaism. Universalism is not a contradiction of nationalism. Nationalism as such, whether it be English, French, American or Jewish, is not in itself evil. It is only militaristic and chauvinistic nationalism, that nationalism which shamelessly flouts all mandates of international morality, which is evil. The prophets of Israel looked forward to the time not when all national entities would be obliterated, but when all nations would walk in the light of the Lord, live by His law and learn war no more.

Replying to the anti-Zionists' objection to the political aspect of the Zionist movement, the statement pointed out that immigration and colonization were obviously practical matters which required political action. The settlement of half a million Jews in Palestine since the last war was made possible by the political action which culminated in the Balfour Declaration and the Palestine Mandate. They expressed particular resentment at the implication that Zionists held a double political allegiance, and charged that while the anti-Zionist rabbis were protesting sympathy for the homeless Jews of the world and for their brethren in Palestine, they were strengthening the hands of the enemies of the Jewish homeland through their distorted propaganda.

Despite this rebuke, the Reform rabbis proceeded to organize "The American Council for Judaism" for the active propagation of their views. The rabbis succeeded in obtaining the backing of an anti-Zionist group of wealthy Jews, some of whom were connected with the American Jewish Committee.<sup>20</sup> In establishing The American Council for Judaism, Rabbi Louis Wolsey of Philadelphia declared that its purpose would be to oppose the establishment of a Jewish State in Palestine, and to propagate the idea that Jews were members of a religious community. He said: "We are definitely opposed to a Jewish State, a Jewish flag, or a Jewish army. We are

20. Prominently associated with the Council are Arthur Hays Sulzberger, publisher of *The New York Times*, and Mr. Lessing J. Rosenwald, son of the late Julius Rosenwald.

interested in the development of Palestine as a refuge for persecuted Jews, but are opposed to the idea of a political state under Jewish domination in Palestine or anywhere else.”

Mr. Lessing J. Rosenwald became the president of The American Council for Judaism and offices were established in Philadelphia. The organization planned a wide range of activities, including publications, a lecture bureau, and large-scale advertisements.<sup>21</sup> It organized its own meeting to coincide with that of the American Jewish Conference and issued a counter-statement which was prominently featured in *The New York Times* along with a report of the Conference. The Council sent a large delegation to the Congressional hearings on the Palestine Resolution, held in February, 1944. While the statements made by its representative were strongly anti-Zionist, Mr. Rosenwald’s statement was free of animus and he declared that he agreed to that part of the proposed Congressional resolution which called for taking “proper measures to the end that the doors of Palestine shall be opened for the free entry of Jews.” He pleaded for this on humanitarian grounds and on the principle of non-discrimination against Jews.

These dissents from the Jewish Commonwealth position were from the side of those who believed that the new formulation over-emphasized the political aim of Zionism. There were, however, also disagreements on the part of groups who held that the official Zionist position did not go far enough in its demand for a Jewish state or was not propounded with sufficient aggressiveness. These more extreme groups included the New Zionist Organization, and the State Party—a dwindling group—which still was formally associated with, though no longer represented in, the American Zionist Emergency Council.<sup>22</sup> The ultra-orthodox *Agudath Israel*, which has always opposed the Zionist Organization on the ground of secularism, looks forward toward the restoration of the Jewish theocratic state. Among the extremist groups should be mentioned the so-called Hebrew Committee for National Liberation, led by Peter Bergson.<sup>23</sup> This organization aims for the

21. The organization claimed a membership of 5,000 at the end of 1944.

22. For the programs of these groups, see below.

23. A Palestinian Jew whose original name was Hillel Kook. He has also promoted the Committee for a Jewish Army and the Emergency Committee to Save the Jews of Europe. Despite the sensational character of



immediate recognition of the Jewish state, of which the Jews of Palestine and all stateless Jews would be considered citizens. To differentiate between the members of the Jewish state and Jewish citizens of other states, he refers to the former as Hebrews and to the latter as Jews. The Committee for National Liberation has established a "Hebrew Embassy" in Washington, which is recognized neither by Jewish official bodies nor by any government.

Despite the variety of points of view on the Zionist question among American Jews, it is clear that there is a common agreement on a minimum program. All Jewish bodies, including those specifically anti-Zionist, are unanimously opposed to the 1939 White Paper, which is regarded not only as a repudiation of the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate but a violation of the democratic principles of equality. The overwhelming majority of Jews, Zionists and non-Zionists alike, are agreed on three fundamentals: 1) free entry of Jews into Palestine unrestricted by political considerations, and non-discrimination between Arabs and Jews in the purchase of land; 2) free opportunity for the economic and cultural upbuilding of the Jewish national home; 3) communal, cultural and religious autonomy for the Jewish, as well as the Arab, community in Palestine. A substantial majority of American Jews and all official Zionists go further, and are united in the substance of the political program included under the term "Jewish Commonwealth." The minority, which adheres to an extreme political conception demanding the immediate establishment of a Jewish state, is probably larger than the minority of anti-Zionists who reject altogether the political implications of the Jewish national home conception.

#### *Palestinian Opinions on the Jewish Commonwealth*

In Palestine—as already noted in the previous chapter—there was also some disagreement from the Jewish Commonwealth point of view, although the authoritative bodies like

its activities, the Hebrew Committee and affiliated organizations have, as a result of extensive publicity, obtained the endorsement of leading American Jews and non-Jews. It submitted a separate program to the San Francisco Conference to which, despite its irresponsible character, *The New York Times* gave prominent notice along with the report of the plan of the Jewish Agency, which is the recognized worldwide Zionist authority.

the Jewish Agency, the *Vaad Leumi* and the *Histadrut*, and the major political parties, strongly supported the program. The dissent in Palestine is of particular interest because it comes from Zionist groups and is largely on the ground that the Jewish Commonwealth formula does not give any adequate consideration to the Arab-Jewish problem. The general basis of the opposition of the *Ihud* group in Palestine has been indicated above.<sup>24</sup> Their positive proposal was based on the idea of promoting unity among the Arabs and Jews in Palestine, in the Middle East generally, and in the world at large. The argument supporting the proposal urged that neither an Arab nor a Jewish state would be conducive to the development of the desired unity, since either of these proposals meant domination of one people by the other, and would lead to unavoidable conflict between them. Unity could be attained only through a bi-national state which would enable both peoples to develop their common country jointly. Moreover, the projected bi-national state could exist only within the framework of a greater union of the Semitic-Arab countries, and later of all the countries of the Middle East; and this federation would necessarily become part of a broader international structure.

After discussion, the following declaration, published September 3, 1942, was adopted as the major aims of the *Ihud* organization:<sup>25</sup>

Firstly that it adheres to the Zionist movement in so far as this seeks establishment of a Jewish national home of Jewish people in Palestine and to struggle throughout the world for a new order in international relationship and for a union of large and small peoples for a life of freedom and justice without fear of oppression and want.

Secondly, the Union Association therefore regards a union between the Jewish and Arab peoples as essential for building up Palestine and for meeting its basic problems. It will strive for cooperation between the Jewish world and Arab world in all branches of life—social, economic, cultural and political—thus making for revival of the whole Semitic world.

Thirdly, the main political aims of the association are: Firstly, a government in Palestine based upon equal political rights of the two peoples; secondly, agreement of a steadily growing Palestine

24. See Chapter XIV, p. 1015.

25. *The New York Times*, September 5, 1942.

Jewry and the whole Jewish people to a federative union in Palestine and neighboring countries. This federative union should guarantee national rights of all people within it; thirdly, a covenant between the federative union and Anglo-American Union which would be part of a future union of free peoples. This union of free peoples will bear the ultimate responsibility for establishment of stability in international relations in the new world after the war.

The *Ihud* group announced that it would cooperate with the League for Jewish-Arab Rapprochement which included the *Hashomer Hatzair* and other groups concerned with promoting a bi-national conception. It was made clear also that the *Ihud* did not intend to carry on any separatist political negotiations but recognized the Jewish Agency as the appropriate body for such purposes. As Miss Szold explained in a letter to the Hadassah organization, the *Ihud* was a "free, voluntary organization with the one aim of clearing up the subject of the relations between the two peoples settled in Palestine." In her view, the organization wished to promote personal contact with Arabs and to stimulate discussion on a friendly basis concerning the future development of Palestine in a manner calculated to guard the rights of both peoples and grant them possibilities of human and national development. It was thus in the nature of an agency for the creation of public opinion, rather than a party or political body.

Some time had elapsed between the first meeting in August, 1942, and the clarification of its purposes several months later. Meanwhile a great deal of opposition developed towards the *Ihud*, particularly in the United States, where the name of Dr. Magnes carried with it considerable prestige in liberal circles. As noted above, the Zionist Organization adopted resolutions condemning the bi-national proposal, and Hadassah went so far as to repudiate *Ihud* by name. A virulent and unrestrained attack came from the New Zionist Organization (Revisionists) headed by Colonel Morris J. Mendelsohn, in which he alleged that Dr. Magnes had never had any considerable following among Palestine Jewry nor in the World Zionist Movement, and that the views he expressed on the Palestinian question were shared only by a small group of his personal friends and collaborators.

Among moderate Zionists the major criticism of the *Ihud* policy was on the ground of its vagueness in the matter of im-

migration. On this question there seemed to be a difference of opinion among the members of the *Ihud* organization. Some of them favored maximum Jewish immigration, limited only by economic factors. Dr. Magnes, however, emphasized the necessity of some political limitation on immigration calculated to reconcile the Arabs. While insisting that Jewish immigration should not be interrupted and that a steadily increasing stream of immigrants should be permitted to enter Palestine, he also laid stress on the Arab fear of a Jewish majority, which he evidently felt was justifiable. Whatever little chance there was of solving the Palestine problem, therefore, depended on the possibility of reaching an Arab-Jewish agreement on immigration.<sup>26</sup>

If Dr. Magnes' position aroused opposition among the Zionists, the Arabs appear to have been equally unsympathetic. He found it necessary to write the Arab press, correcting statements it had published to the effect that the *Ihud* was opposed to the Zionist aim of the establishment of a Jewish national home. On one occasion, Auni Bey Abdul Hadi took pains to dissociate himself from Dr. Magnes' proposals. He denied a report which had appeared in *Falastin*, that he had met Dr. Magnes in connection with the *Ihud* organization or that he had at any time discussed the program of *Ihud* with him.<sup>27</sup> He explained: "What really happened is that I met him accidentally at a tea party at the home of one of my Arab friends."

The most important organized opposition from within Zionist ranks to the Commonwealth formula was that of the *Hashomer Hatzair*, which constitutes a minority party within the Labor movement of considerable strength and prestige.<sup>28</sup> Although the *Hashomer Hatzair* was in sympathy with some of the principles of the *Ihud* organization, it did not greet the formation of the new organization with enthusiasm. At first it viewed the *Ihud* as a rival of the League for Jewish-Arab Rapprochement calculated to fragmentize the movement of Jewish-Arab cooperation. *Ihud's* ambiguity on the question of immigration was interpreted as a readiness to accept permanent minority status. While the *Hashomer Hatzair* agreed

26. For his concrete proposal, see below, p. 1176.

27. *Haaretz*, September 9, 1942.

28. They are estimated to represent 17,000 members and to constitute about one-fifth of the voting strength in the Federation of Labor (*Histadrut*).

that collaboration between other than working class groups was possible, nevertheless it did not regard favorably Dr. Magnes' willingness to negotiate with the Mufti and other representatives of the reactionary landowning classes. They regarded this as evidence of his failure to understand that social-economic alignments were back of the problem of effective Arab-Jewish cooperation. In their own approach to the problem of Arab-Jewish rapprochement, they emphasized the significance of close cooperation between the Jewish and Arab workers as the best means of achieving an eventual agreement.<sup>29</sup> However, when Dr. Magnes was attacked as disloyal to the Zionist cause, the *Hashomer Hatzair* defended his right to express a divergent opinion, and when the viewpoint of the *Ihud* on immigration was clarified, their opposition to it was withdrawn.

The position of the *Hashomer Hatzair* was expressed at the meeting of the General Council in November, 1942, referred to above, when the adoption of the Biltmore Program was proposed by Ben-Gurion. This program received three votes, two of the *Hashomer Hatzair* representatives and one of the Socialist Zionists (*Poale Zion Left*). The *Hashomer Hatzair* at that time submitted a number of resolutions which included the following:

The new world order, which is to follow the victory of the United Nations, cannot be established on the foundations of peace, equality, and justice unless the problem of Jewish homelessness is solved. It is therefore urged that the gates of Palestine be opened.

A system of government under international supervision must be established which will give the Jewish Agency the right to direct Jewish immigration in accordance with the full absorptive capacity of the country and in a manner commensurate with the distress of Diaspora Jewry at the end of the war.

Rights will have to be granted to the Jewish Agency to promote the development of the country, including the right of settling all State domains and waste lands under a scheme devised with a view to benefit both peoples of the country by close settlement of Jews on the land and the development of Arab farming.

A system of government is to be established after the war based on political parity of both peoples which, while making full provisions

29. Editorial, *Hashomer Hatzair*, September 15, 1943.

for the unhindered fulfillment of Zionist aspirations, will advance the country toward political independence along bi-national lines.

While being pledged to an unabated effort to bring about the fulfillment of Zionist aspirations, as the only solution of the Jewish problem, the Zionist movement will have to be the leading force in the struggle of Diaspora Jewry for the full restoration of its civil and economic rights and for the just punishment of the Fascist criminals.

The major address defending the resolutions and explaining the position of the *Hashomer Hatzair* was given by Meir Yaari, generally recognized as the intellectual leader of the movement. He explained that the *Hashomer Hatzair* had always regarded British imperialistic aims in the Middle East with suspicion, and it had to be assumed that Great Britain would retain trusteeship over Palestine after the war through a continuance of the Mandate or in some other form. In view of this, it was sheer self-deception to believe that when victory came, the Jews would be granted control of land regulations and immigration, as was proposed in the Jewish Commonwealth program. Moreover, the idea of bringing millions of refugees straight to Palestine immediately after the war, as advocated by Ben-Gurion, could result only in "organized catastrophe." The Labor movement in Palestine had always stood for planned immigration of a pioneer character, and this program of selective, planned immigration was a primary cause of success in upbuilding the *Yishuv*. Only by intensifying and expanding the colonization movement could a firm basis be laid for a larger immigration than hitherto. This alone could be described as "maximum Zionism" in the genuine sense of the term. The "Nordau Plan"<sup>30</sup> of throwing in great numbers without regard to agricultural development would turn all of Palestine into a huge Tel-Aviv with all the chaos of speculation and land boom which had accompanied the fourth *aliyah* (immigration) in 1924-1926.

*Hashomer Hatzair* agreed with the other Zionist parties that minority status in all the countries of the world constituted the basic problem of the Jews: the essential meaning of Zionism was to cease being a minority at least in one country, "to stop

30. See also Chap. XV, p. 1135 n.

being a minority in Palestine." *Hashomer Hatzair*, like the majority in the Labor Party, strove for an immigration of two million Jews into Palestine, but this would require a considerable period of time—perhaps from ten to fifteen years. The disagreement with Dr. Magnes was not on the ground of his emphasis of the significance of an agreement with the Arabs, but because his proposal failed to make maximum immigration a *sine qua non*, and thus involved the danger that the Jews would remain a permanent minority. While Yaari explained that he did not wish to suggest exact figures, he thought that an annual immigration of 150,000 to 250,000 in the early years immediately after the war was not impossible of achievement, if the Jews were aided by an international loan for a large-scale plan of colonization.

Furthermore, though determined to carry on with or without the consent of the Arabs if necessary, *Hashomer* regarded a period of peace and agreement with them imperative. Yaari believed that the Biltmore Program would be regarded as a plan of domination by the Jews over the Arabs. In his opinion, the Jewish Commonwealth proposal was inconsistent with the decision of previous Congresses, which had affirmed the principle of non-domination of one people over the other, without regard to the numerical proportion of the two nations. In order to avoid the possibility of such domination when the Jews became a majority, the *Hashomer Hatzair* proposed that political parity be made the basis of organization. Moreover, without prophesying the form that an Arab Federation would ultimately take, whether it would include Iraq and Iran or be of narrower scope, the future of Palestine should be envisaged in terms of participation in such a Federation.

The principal Labor political party in Palestine (*Mapai*) voted for the Biltmore Program by a large majority, but, as noted above, three members representing an opposition within the Labor Party abstained. The abstaining group was the *Ahduth Avodah* (Unity of Labor) fraction which forms an opposition to the Ben-Gurion-led majority in the Labor Party, and which is sympathetic to the *Hashomer Hatzair*. Its abstention from voting on the Biltmore Program was based on a certain diffidence as to the value of using the slogan of Jewish Commonwealth in formulating immediate policy. It was thought dangerous to announce a Jewish state without asking

how this idea was to be translated into reality. The group felt that the term Jewish Commonwealth had not been defined with sufficient clarity.<sup>31</sup>

Do we mean the whole of Palestine, and if so, provided we get state authority, what are the problems which we shall have to face and how are we to arrange our relations with the present majority population? . . . From this angle we may say again now that a systematic demand for the whole of Palestine, for the acknowledgment of our rights to settle in all parts of the country, for the continuation of immigration and the destruction of the chains of the White Paper, that such demands in practice for the purpose of concentrating the majority of the Jewish people in the country without elucidating the formula for the future political structure has more practical, concrete, constructive content than any declaration. From the point of view of the future, everyone understands and knows that the demand for free Jewish immigration and colonization in Palestine for the concentration of the Jewish people there, will lead in the end to Jewish political self-government.

A new party—*Aliyah Hadashah* (New Immigration)—formed in 1943, also indicated a lack of enthusiasm about espousing the Jewish Commonwealth slogan. The membership is derived largely from recent German immigration, although others have joined the group. Its general orientation is along the lines of liberal social democracy and it has made a particular appeal to writers, scholars and teachers.<sup>32</sup> In the balloting held in 1944, it polled a considerable vote and succeeded in electing a number of representatives to the Elected Assembly and the *Vaad Leumi*. In its resolutions it demanded the abrogation of the White Paper and the initiation of a plan which took into account maximum possibilities for Jewish immigration and settlement in Palestine. At the same time it resolved "to make every possible attempt to coordinate the needs of the Jewish people with those of the Arab people on the basis of mutual recognition of each other's rights and on the basis of a policy of equal political and economic status for all citizens without domination of one people over the other."

31. *Tnuah L'ahdut Avodah*, No. 25, December 22, 1944.

32. Among the membership are Felix Rosenblueth, a leader of German Zionism and former member of the Zionist Executive; Robert Weltsch former editor of the *Juedischer Rundschau*, and Georg Landauer, Zionist worker and publicist.



In fine, while there is considerable sentiment among the Jews in Palestine for compromise on the ultimate political constitution, there are no organized groups who would follow Dr. Magnes in his acceptance of compromise on the question of immigration. As in the United States, the overwhelming majority of the *Yishuv* is behind a program for maximum immigration and land settlement in Palestine, in harmony with Jewish need and with the maximum potentialities of a full development of the country. A complete picture of the attitude of the *Yishuv* would include a reference to views which go beyond the Biltmore Program to demand the immediate establishment of a Jewish state. Such groups in Palestine are more aggressive than similar groups in the United States and, though still a minority, greatly surpass the small number of *Ihud* adherents.

#### *British and American Policies*

Speculation as to future British policy for some time ranged all the way from a liberalized White Paper which would allow an increased but limited immigration and some modification of the land restrictions on the one hand, to the designation of the whole of western Palestine as a Jewish state, on the other. For a time after the Teheran Conference there was serious discussion of partition proposals; one persistent report with considerable authority behind it claimed that the British Government was ready to set up a Jewish state in boundaries similar to—but more generous than—the partition proposal made by the Palestine Royal Commission in 1936.

In accordance with this plan the whole of western Palestine less the Samaria District—a triangular area with points at Jenin, Tulkarm and Nablus—would be established as a Jewish state. The excluded area includes about 3,275 square kilometers, or one-eighth of Palestine, and has a population of approximately 225,000, nearly all Arabs. The plan, as reported, was to join the “triangle” to Trans-Jordan, creating an enlarged state under Emir Abdullah. The exclusion of the Samaria District from the rest of Palestine would leave the latter with an Arab population (including Moslems, Christians and others) of some 900,000, and a Jewish population of about 550,000. In other words, an immigration of 400,000 or 500,000 Jews into Palestine during the next few years would establish a Jewish majority in the Jewish state.

The report that this was the preferred solution of the British Government continued to be believed in Zionist circles, but there was no confirmation. After the Yalta Conference, in February 1945, while meetings were going on in Cairo, a considerable stir was created by British press reports to the effect that the Arab Foreign Ministers meeting in Cairo had under advisement a British proposal for an Arab Federation under Emir Abdullah, including a Jewish state of Palestine *linked* with a Christian state of Lebanon. Denials of the rumor were published within twenty-four hours; it is, however, possible that some such plan was suggested for discussion from some British quarter.

The only authoritative statement was that made by Prime Minister Churchill in his speech in the House of Commons, February 27, 1945, after the Yalta Conference. This declaration indicated that no decision on Palestine or the Middle East would be made until "the war is over." The relevant paragraph in Churchill's speech is as follows:

Although we did not reach a solution of the problems of the Arab world and of the Jewish people in Palestine, I have hopes that when the war is over good arrangements can be made for securing the peace and progress of the Arab world and generally of the Middle East and that Great Britain and visitors who are taking an increasing interest in those regions will be able to play a valuable part in proving the well known maxim of the old free trader: "all legitimate interests are in harmony."

Liberal and labor public opinion in Great Britain leaned toward a clear-cut solution of the Palestine problem in the spirit of a full implementation of the Balfour Declaration. The conference of the British Labor Party in June, 1943, reaffirmed the policy in favor of building Palestine as the Jewish national home. It asked that the Jewish Agency be given authority to make the fullest use of the economic capacity of the country to absorb immigrants and to develop the country, including the development of unoccupied and undeveloped lands. The report on "International Post War Settlement" submitted by the National Executive Committee of the Labor Party in April, 1944, included a paragraph on Palestine which suggested a radical solution, going far beyond the Jewish Commonwealth program of the Zionists. It called for a policy of

mass immigration to allow the Jews to become a majority, and, in line with proposals to transfer national minorities in Europe for the purpose of stable political arrangements, suggested also the encouragement of a transfer of Arabs to neighboring countries which were more sparsely settled. The statement on Palestine included the following paragraph:

Here we halted half-way, irresolutely, between conflicting policies. But there is surely neither hope nor meaning in a Jewish National Home unless we are prepared to let the Jews, if they wish, enter this tiny land in such numbers as to become a majority. There was a strong case for this before the war, and there is an irresistible case for it now, after the unspeakable atrocities of the cold-blooded calculated German-Nazi plan to kill all Jews of Europe. There is a strong case here, based on human grounds, for promoting stable settlement on the one hand and for the transfer of population on the other hand. Let the Arabs be encouraged to move out as the Jews move in. Let them be compensated handsomely for their land and their settlement elsewhere be carefully organized and generously financed. The Arabs have many wide territories of their own; they should not seek to exclude the Jews from this small area of Palestine, which is less than the size of Wales. Indeed, we should re-examine the possibility of extending the present boundaries of Palestine by agreement with Egypt, Syria or Transjordan. Moreover, we should seek to win the full sympathy and support of both the American and Russian Governments for the execution of this Palestine policy.

The Labor and Liberal press generally, as well as *The Times*, while not unsympathetic to a clear-cut solution of the Palestine problem favorable to the Zionists, nevertheless criticized its advocacy of the general plan to transfer large national minorities and decried especially the proposal to transfer Arabs. However, the Labor Party's conference in June supported the Executive Committee's proposals, including its resolutions on Palestine. Answering the criticism of the plan to transfer Arabs from Palestine to other Arab countries, Sir Arthur Greenwood, deputy leader of the British Labor Party, pointed out the fact that the Labor Party's declaration had not suggested the use of any sort of compulsion, but merely proposed encouraging Arabs to be settled elsewhere on carefully organized and financially generous terms.

Resolutions calling for the abolition of the White Paper and

the faithful implementation of Britain's obligations under the Mandate and the Balfour Declaration were voted by liberal and left parties and by the International Trade Union Conference in London. The resolution of the British Commonwealth Party explicitly demanded the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine. While opposing the principle of compulsory emigration in any part of the world, it recommended that an international commission be appointed, including Jewish and Arab representatives, to draw up a plan involving a minimum displacement of the Arab population and providing for facilities for transfer of Arabs to countries adjacent to Palestine. The resolution of the I.T.U.C. used the language of the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate and not that of the Biltmore Program. Nevertheless, it was regarded as an unequivocal pro-Zionist declaration. An Arab representative complained that the resolution was "more far reaching than the Balfour Declaration." A special significance was attributed to the Trade Union resolution because not only delegates from England, the United States, France, and other countries voted for the resolution but Soviet representatives also joined in the general approval. This was taken as an additional evidence of the fact that the Russian Government was changing its previously negative attitude on Zionism.

After Churchill's speech on February 27, 1945, in which he declared that the solution of the Palestine issue would be postponed until after the war, Liberal and Labor opinion became even more definite in its advocacy of a solution in full harmony with Zionist aspirations. Some of the opinion explicitly supported the establishment of a Jewish state in at least part of Palestine, as is indicated in the following "leader" in the *Manchester Guardian* of March 14, 1945:

It is now certain that no decision on Palestine was taken during the talks in Egypt which followed the Crimean Conference, and it is probable that no decision can be expected until after Germany's defeat. That perhaps is reasonable, though the Government should realize that a solution cannot much longer be postponed. Moreover, it is becoming increasingly clear that when it comes the solution must provide, in some form or other, for a Jewish State in Palestine—a Jewish State in which (as Mrs. Dugdale points out in a letter on this page) the Arabs would have full rights. There are, however, certain things which could and should be done now. The most impor-

tant is to remove the restrictions on Jewish immigration into Palestine which were imposed by the White Paper and which are now hampering the resettlement of Europe. In the liberated countries of Eastern Europe, in Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary there are still many Jews, refugees from Nazi persecution who, though no longer in danger, are still unwanted, without homes, possessions, or prospects. Few, if any, wish to remain in Europe after their terrible experiences no matter how democratic the new regimes may appear. These people should be allowed to enter Palestine at once. It is true that this would mean cancelling the White Paper, but is that so serious? The White Paper has long been dead. Its official burial would be only an act of decency which would do more than anything else to put a stop to Jewish unrest in Palestine.

The American Presidents who succeeded Woodrow Wilson and many American Congressmen have, during the last score of years, indicated sympathy for the Zionist aspiration and expressed admiration for the Jewish achievement in Palestine. However, no official statement on Palestine was made by the American Government after the Anglo-American Convention of 1924, until the summer of 1937, when the report of the Royal Commission was under discussion. In February, seven nationwide Jewish organizations had submitted to the Palestine Royal Commission a memorandum on the "American Interest in the Administration of the Palestine Mandate." Another memorandum was submitted to the State Department in which it was contended that the United States had the right to participate in the disposition of Palestine.<sup>33</sup> The State Department, however, seems to have taken a limited view of its rights in the modification of the Palestine Mandate. About the same time, a formal exchange of correspondence took place between the Department of State and the British Foreign Office. On August 4, 1937, the American Ambassador in London wrote to the British Foreign Office, expressing satisfaction with the assurances given by His Majesty's Government to the effect that the United States Government would be kept informed of any proposals which might be made to the Council of the League of Nations for the modification of the Palestine Mandate. The Ambassador requested that the proposals be

33. "A Brief Statement of the Basis and Scope of the Right of the United States to Participate in any Disposition of Palestine," Palestine Economic Corporation, 1937, New York.

communicated to the American Government in ample time to enable it to make whatever observations it regarded as necessary for the preservation of American rights in Palestine. There was no indication, however, that the United States claimed that its assent was needed to changes in the Mandate affecting the Jewish national home policy.

A more complete expression of views was given in a memorandum issued by the State Department on October 14, 1938, at the time the Partition Commission proposal was being discussed.<sup>34</sup> It recorded the interest of the American Government and people in the development of the Jewish national home and called attention to the fact that "American intellect and capital have played a leading role" in the development of Palestine. The memorandum declared that the American Government retained the right under the Convention of 1924 to be informed of any proposals for changes in the Mandate and to make observations for the purpose of preserving the American rights under the Convention. The position was summed up as follows: "None of these articles (the Convention of 1924) empower the Government of the United States to prevent the modification of the terms of any of the mandates. Under their provisions, however, this government can decline to recognize the validity of the application to American interests of any modifications of the mandates unless such modification has been assented to by the Government of the United States."

President Roosevelt took the same view in a letter dated October 19th, written by him in answer to a telegram on the question.<sup>35</sup> The main idea is expressed in the following paragraph:

We expect . . . to have the opportunity afforded us of communicating to the British Government our views with respect to any changes in the Mandate which may be proposed as a result of the forthcoming report of the Palestine Partition Commission. I understand, however, that under the terms of our convention with Great Britain regarding the Palestine Mandate, we are unable to prevent

34. S. S. Jones and D. P. Myers (editors), *Documents in American Foreign Relations, January 1938-June, 1939*, World Peace Foundation, Boston, 1939, p. 447.

35. The letter was to Mayor Thomas J. Spellacy of Hartford. See Reuben Fink, *America and Palestine*, p. 56.

modifications in the Mandate. The most we can do is to decline to accept as applicable to American interests any modifications affecting such interests unless we have given our assent to them. You may be sure that we shall continue to follow the situation with the closest attention.

The promulgation of the 1939 White Paper did not at the time elicit any response from the executive branches of the government. However, Congressional reaction was indicated in statements issued by the Senators and members of the House of Representatives. On March 7, 1939, when reports were being received of Great Britain's intention to issue a statement of policy unfavorable to the Jewish national home idea, twenty-eight Senators made a declaration of American interest in the Balfour Declaration and the developments of the Jewish national home. It concluded as follows: "It is our belief that the Balfour declaration embodies a moral obligation, not only to the Jewish people but to the United States and to all governments which approved that instrument. We believe that the civilized forces of the world should give every assurance of support to Great Britain in a policy directed toward the preservation of the Balfour declaration and the redemption of the common pledge of establishing in Palestine a home of refuge and hope for the sorely oppressed Jewish people. We, therefore, venture to express our hope that the spirit and the letter of the Balfour declaration be preserved in all its integrity."<sup>36</sup>

The expression of views from the House of Representatives came through the Committee on Foreign Affairs, of which Sol Bloom of New York was Chairman, and was signed by fifteen of the twenty-five members of the Committee. The statement was issued on May 25, 1939, a week after the publication of the 1939 White Paper. It maintained that the White Paper was a clear repudiation of the 1924 Convention between the United States and Great Britain with respect to Palestine. It also called the attention of the House and the State Department to the Lodge-Fish Resolution of June 30, 1922, which stated: "The United States of America favors the establishment in Palestine of a National Home for the Jewish People." It

36. Reuben Fink, *op. cit.*, p. 62.

pointed out that Americans had invested over a million dollars in Palestine relying on the treaty between Great Britain and the United States to protect their interests and called on the American Government "to protect these rights by proper protests and to see to it that the treaty is carried out in good faith." The protest summed up the situation as follows:<sup>37</sup>

. . . [The] declaration of the British Government is a repudiation of the Balfour Declaration, the Mandate of the League of Nations, and of direct concern to us, a violation of Article 7 of the Treaty between the United States and Great Britain, in that the contemplated action of the British Government proposes to restrict further immigration of Jews into Palestine and to reduce the Jewish people in Palestine to a permanent minority status. On neither of these matters has our Government been consulted, as required by the Treaty.

Despite these protests, no official action was taken by the United States Government with reference to the White Paper. Expressions of views favorable to Zionism by Congressmen continued. In 1941, the American Palestine Committee was reconstituted, with Senator Robert F. Wagner as chairman and Senator Charles L. McNary, the Republican minority leader, as co-chairman. The Committee was organized to sponsor the Zionist cause and was joined by sixty-eight Senators and some two hundred members of the House of Representatives. On the occasion of a twenty-fifth anniversary celebration of the Balfour Declaration, held March 2, 1942, members of Congress associated with the American Palestine Committee, issued a statement entitled "The Common Purpose of Mankind," in which they reiterated their belief in the Balfour Declaration. The statement read in part: "The reasons which, twenty-five years ago, led the American people and the Government of the United States to favor the cause of Jewish National restoration in Palestine are still valid today. In fact, the case for a Jewish Homeland is overwhelmingly stronger and the need more urgent now than ever before. In Palestine, the resettlement has advanced from the status of a hopeful experiment to that of a heartening reality, while in Europe the position of the Jews has deteriorated to an appalling de-

37. *Ibid.*, p. 63.



gree. Millions of uprooted and homeless Jews will strive to reconstruct their lives anew in their ancestral home when the hour of deliverance will come." <sup>38</sup>

There was still no action nor even an expression of views that might be regarded as official. However, in November, 1943, in connection with hearings held before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on the problem of Jewish and other refugees, Mr. Breckinridge Long, Assistant Secretary of State, made a declaration which indicated perhaps a somewhat broader interpretation of the American position than had hitherto been indicated by the State Department. Mr. Long said:<sup>39</sup>

I cannot add much to what your knowledge already is, if I can add anything. Of course you realize that Palestine is operated under a mandate of the League of Nations granted to the British Government and that we were not parties to the authority which created the mandate. We made a treaty subsequently with Great Britain so as to give us a right under the mandate to protect the rights of American citizens in Palestine. But the question of Palestine has a larger significance than just the authority which created it, and we have always been interested, and I think Mr. Bloom's communication this morning constitutes additional evidence of the fact that the American Government is not entirely obtuse about Palestine or is not disinterested in the situation that is developing there. We have been interested and we will continue to be interested from the point of view of the larger aspects of world security and of world peace, as well as the rights of humans and humanitarian sympathies and the religious sentiments involved.

After the American Jewish Conference, held in August, 1943, when the Jewish Commonwealth resolution was adopted, the American Zionist Emergency Council began to press for action. Such action was desired particularly in the light of the fact that the terminal period of the White Paper (March 31, 1944) was closely approaching and no announcement of change of policy on the part of the British Government had been made. Resolutions, identically worded, were introduced

38. *Ibid.*, p. 65.

39. *Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Seventy-Eighth Congress, H. Res. 350 and 352, November 26, 1943, p. 38.*

in the House of Representatives (January 27, 1944) and in the Senate (February 1, 1944). Both resolutions were bi-partisan in their sponsorship, the House resolution being introduced by Representative James A. Wright (D., Pa.) and Ranulf Compton (R., Conn.), and the Senate resolution by Robert F. Wagner (D., N. Y.) and Robert A. Taft (R., Ohio). The resolution read:

Whereas the Sixty-seventh Congress of the United States on June 30, 1922, unanimously resolved "that the United States of America favors the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of Christian and all other non-Jewish communities in Palestine, and that the holy places and religious buildings and sites in Palestine shall be adequately protected"; and

Whereas the ruthless persecution of the Jewish people in Europe has clearly demonstrated the need for a Jewish homeland as a haven for the large numbers who have become homeless as a result of this persecution: Therefore be it

*Resolved*, That the United States shall use its good offices and take appropriate measures to the end that the doors of Palestine shall be opened for free entry of Jews into that country, and that there shall be full opportunity for colonization so that the Jewish people may ultimately reconstitute Palestine as a free and democratic Jewish commonwealth.

Hearings on the Wright-Compton resolution were held before the Committee on Foreign Affairs during February, 1944.<sup>40</sup> The Zionist organizations presented their case, which was supported by Christian leaders, spokesmen of organized labor, and a large number of members of the House of Representatives who appeared during the sessions to record their approval of the resolution. The American Jewish Committee put itself on record as being in favor of those clauses in the resolution which stated "that the doors of Palestine shall be opened for free entry of Jews into that country, and that there should be full opportunity for colonization," but took no stand on the final clause which spoke of the ultimate reconstitution

40. A full account, with documents, is given in *Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Affairs*, House of Representatives, Seventy-Eighth Congress, H. Res. 418 and 419.

of "Palestine as a free and democratic Jewish commonwealth." The American Council for Judaism, which was well represented, favored that part of the resolution which dealt with immigration and colonization, but strongly opposed the Jewish Commonwealth. The Arab representatives<sup>41</sup> opposed all parts of the resolution—those dealing with immigration and colonization as well as the political goal of Zionism.

The general tenor of discussion led the Zionists to believe that there would be favorable action on the resolution, either in the form presented or in somewhat modified form. However, while the Committee on Foreign Affairs was considering the matter, a letter (March 17, 1944) was received by the Chairman of the Committee from the Secretary of War, stating that it was "the considered judgment of the War Department that without reference to the merits of these resolutions, further action on them at this time would be prejudicial to the successful prosecution of the war." As a result, the Committee on Foreign Affairs decided that "action upon the resolutions at this time would be unwise," and consideration of the resolution was further postponed. The discouraging effect of the postponement of action was to an extent offset by a statement issued by President Roosevelt a week earlier, which was the first evidence of official disapproval of the White Paper. The statement was issued during an interview accorded by the President to Dr. Wise and Dr. Silver, co-chairmen of the American Zionist Emergency Council, who reported through the United Press:

The President authorized us to say that the American Government has never given its approval to the White Paper of 1939. The President is happy that the doors of Palestine are today open to Jewish refugees, and that when future decisions are reached, full justice will be done to those who seek a Jewish National Home, for which our Government and the American people have always had the deepest sympathy and today more than ever, in view of the tragic plight of hundreds of thousands of homeless Jewish refugees.

41. The Arab position was stated by Philip K. Hitti, Professor of Semitics at Princeton University, who said "I represent nobody but myself," and Faris S. Malouf, President of the Syrian and Lebanon American Federation. K. S. Twitchell, Consulting Engineer for the Saudi Arabian Mining Syndicate, an American corporation, who also claimed that he represented only himself, joined the Arabs in opposition to all aspects of the Zionist program.

The resolutions aroused a nationwide discussion of the question of Palestine and the White Paper.<sup>42</sup> While there was considerable neutral and even some hostile opinion, the general tenor of public opinion was favorable to the Zionist cause. On the same day that President Roosevelt issued his encouraging message, a National Conference on Palestine, composed of leading liberal and labor organizations, met in Washington to demonstrate friendship for the Zionist cause.<sup>43</sup> In their resolutions the Conference called for the abrogation of the 1939 White Paper, and support of the Wright-Compton Congressional resolutions calling for effective measures to the end that Palestine be reconstituted by the Jewish people as a free and democratic Jewish Commonwealth. The American Federation of Labor also unanimously adopted a resolution demanding the withdrawal of the 1939 White Paper, and the implementation of the Balfour Declaration in a manner, "that would realize the aspirations of the Jewish people to build their own commonwealth in Palestine." The CIO at its convention joined in the general demand for the "abrogation of the so-called Chamberlain White Paper."

During the pre-election summer of 1944, both the Republican and Democratic Parties included planks in their platforms supporting the Zionist program. Both platforms called for the opening up of Palestine to unrestricted Jewish immigration and land settlement. The Republican platform condemned the President for his failure to insist "that the mandatory of Palestine carry out the provisions of the Balfour Declaration." The Democratic platform followed the line of the postponed Palestine Resolution in favoring a policy which would "result in the establishment there [in Palestine] of a free and democratic Jewish Commonwealth." Thomas E. Dewey, the Repub-

42. The Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America, in October, 1944, issued a Bulletin in their Information Service entitled "Conflict over Palestine," which purported to analyze the conflict "without rendering any verdict on the issue." While making statements which indicated the Jewish as well as the Arab position, the general treatment of the subject was such as to leave the impression that the Federal Council was strongly biased against the Zionist position.

43. The following groups were represented: The American Palestine Committee, the Christian Council on Palestine, American Federation of Labor, Congress of Industrial Organizations, Free World Association, Union for Democratic Action, Unitarian Fellowship for Social Justice, and the United Christian Council for Democracy.

lican candidate for the presidency, and Franklin D. Roosevelt, as the Democratic candidate, expressed themselves as being in harmony with their respective party platforms. In a message sent through Senator Wagner to the convention of the Zionist Organization of America held in Atlantic City during October, President Roosevelt expressed his personal support of the Jewish Commonwealth program: "Efforts will be made to find appropriate ways and means of effectuating this policy as soon as practicable. I know how long and ardently the Jewish people have worked and prayed for the establishment of Palestine as a free and democratic Jewish commonwealth. I am convinced that the American people give their support to this aim; and if re-elected, I will help to bring about its realization."

After the elections in November, an attempt was made to bring the Palestine Resolution before the House again. The Secretary of War had declared in October that the war situation had so improved that it no longer constituted a cause for further postponement of the resolution. Nevertheless, action on the resolution was again interrupted, this time by the State Department. In a statement issued on December 11th, it was explained that the State Department considered the passage of the resolution at that time "to be unwise from the standpoint of the general international situation." The action of the State Department was variously explained as being connected with the differences of opinion between the Allies with reference to current issues (the Polish question, British policy in Greece and problems of Allied administration in Italy) and the tense situation which had arisen as a result of the continuing terror in Palestine culminating with the assassination of Lord Moyne.<sup>44</sup>

The Zionists hoped that their position would be supported by President Roosevelt at the Yalta Conference in February, 1945, and that some indication of the position of the United Nations on Palestine would then be given. However, Churchill

44. It was generally understood that the President still opposed the passage of the resolution at that time. A division of opinion occurred in the American Zionist Emergency Council. One of the chairmen, Dr. Abba Hillel Silver, felt that the Resolution should be pressed. Dr. Wise was of the opinion that it should not be urged against the advice of the President. The difference of opinion led to the resignation of Dr. Silver, who was later re-elected co-chairman.

in his speech to the House of Commons, February 27, 1945, indicated that no decision would be reached until the end of the war. President Roosevelt in his address to Congress a week later made no reference to the Palestine situation except incidentally in one of his extemporaneous interpolations: "Of the problems of Arabia, I learned more about that whole problem, the Moslem problem, the Jewish problem, by talking with Ibn Saud for five minutes than I could have learned in exchange of two or three dozen letters." This was received in some Jewish quarters with considerable uneasiness. However, in a statement made to Dr. Stephen S. Wise, March 16, 1945, President Roosevelt reiterated his position on the Zionist issue and indicated that he had in no way changed the views he had expressed formerly.

Despite the many statements made indicating that public opinion was favorable to the Zionist aspirations, there was no indication that the State Department was ready to take a positive stand. The anti-Zionist influence emanating from the University of Beirut continued, it appears, to have had considerable influence. But the real basis of opposition to open support of the Zionist claim, it was generally believed, was connected with American interests in Saudi Arabian oil.<sup>45</sup> In the competition for the favor of Ibn Saud, a non-committal policy on Palestine could be a bargaining advantage. The following comment by Edgar Ansel Mowrer, though harsh, may not be harsher than the political reality.<sup>46</sup>

You might suppose that Christian nations would now be eager to provide for the survivors of a group they so egregiously failed to protect. Unhappily, they are not. For San Francisco will be full of

45. That there may be some connection between the anti-Zionist attitude of some of the teachers of the American University of Beirut and the oil interest in Arabia, is indicated by a letter to the *New York Herald Tribune* (August 10, 1944) by Stuart C. Dodd, a professor of sociology at the American University. He described Jewish immigration into Palestine as an example of "imperialism" and then quite naively went on to say that "America has a large and increasing stake in the oil fields of Arabia. Insofar as we make bitter enemies of the Arabs, the Palestinian plank (in the Republican and Democratic platforms) tends toward a future choice before us of losing those oil fields or keeping them with a bayonet and the lives of American soldiers."

46. *New York Post*, April 19, 1944.

other "influences," united by their determination that little Palestine shall never become a Jewish commonwealth.

For instance: Exotic representatives of Arab despots, who recently consented to declare war upon an Axis already defeated; hard-faced representatives of the British colonial office, frantic in their back-to-the-wall effort to build up the British empire in its delicate Middle Eastern section; miscellaneous lobbyists identified by their insistence that although Jewish blood is doubtless thicker than water, it cannot possibly be as thick as rich black petroleum, fresh from Arab wells, at so many dollars a barrel.

## CURRENT PROPOSALS FOR THE FUTURE OF PALESTINE

This final section is devoted to a summary of proposals for the future of Palestine, arranged under five major headings:

1. The official Zionist position: the Jewish Commonwealth.
2. Proposals which make explicit use of the term "Jewish State."
3. Proposals for a division of Palestine between Jews and Arabs: cantonization or partition.
4. Proposals based on constitutional bi-nationalism.
5. Proposals for placing Palestine under an international authority.

Some of the proposals are hardly more than suggestions, while others are carefully elaborated plans resulting from many years' discussion. The plans summarized include those sponsored by the Zionist parties, by other Jewish organizations, and by individuals—Jewish and non-Jewish leaders of thought—who offer solutions to the Palestine problem with at least some consideration for the Jewish need and the Jewish rights under the Mandate. The Arab position, which virtually denies any rightful claim of the Jewish people to Palestine, does not come under this category. It has been fully dealt with in preceding chapters and it has undergone no essential change during the war period. Nevertheless, for the sake of completeness, a brief review of the Arab position will be made before entering on the main presentation of positions.

### *Summary of Arab Position*

The Arab view is that Palestine is an Arab country and must remain so. The Bludan Conference, held in Syria in

September, 1937, declared: "Palestine is Arab and its preservation as such is the duty of every Arab." The World Interparliamentary Congress of Arabs and Moslems, held in Cairo in October, 1938, likewise asserted: "Palestine should be maintained in its entirety as an Arab country." The Arab Higher Committee, in its Memorandum of July 23, 1937, the last official expression of the organized political viewpoint, declared that any solution acceptable to the Arabs must be along the following lines:

1. The recognition of the right of the Arabs to complete independence in their own land;
2. The cessation of the experiment of the Jewish national home;
3. The cessation of the British Mandate and its replacement by a treaty similar to treaties existing between Britain and Iraq, Britain and Egypt, and between France and Syria, creating in Palestine a sovereign state;
4. The immediate cessation of all Jewish immigration and of land sales to Jews, pending the negotiation and conclusion of the treaty.

The idea that Palestine is Arab might be interpreted to mean that it should become an Arab country, culturally as well as politically, e.g., Arabic would be the only official language and serve as the medium of instruction in the public schools. In such a conception, the Jews would be regarded merely as a religious denomination. From time to time this view finds expression in the Arab press. A recent article in *Falastin* argues that the Jews are good at assimilation as a result of their life among other groups, and that the Arabs, on their part, have proved their capacity for assimilating other peoples. Therefore, it would be the right thing for the Jews to assimilate themselves to the Arab way of life, just as immigrants in Western countries assimilate to the cultures of the countries in which they settle.<sup>47</sup>

Some such notion is implied in the resolutions of the Palestine Arab Congresses and in statements made by members of the Palestine Arab Executive in the early years of the Mandate. In recent official declarations, however, Arab leaders—generally from outside of Palestine—have indicated that they are prepared—provided that the Jewish settlement in Pales-

47. Summarized in *Mishmar*, August 26, 1943.



tine is not enlarged without Arab consent—to give the Jews the rights of a minority nationality along the lines indicated in the Declaration of the Kingdom of Iraq.<sup>48</sup>

It will be remembered, however, that the Iraqi Government did not live up to the spirit of this Declaration even in the case of the Kurds, for whom a special provision was made in the treaty. Moreover, in Iraq national minority rights are not at all applicable to the Jews who are regarded merely as a religious community. For instance, Hebrew may be taught for strictly religious purposes only, and not as a language. In the most recent statement of their position, contained in the Annex on Palestine in the Covenant of the League of Arab States established at the Cairo Convention in February, 1945, there is no mention of Jewish rights or position in Palestine.

Soon after the Arab Conference in Cairo, *The New York Times* correspondent at Jerusalem<sup>49</sup> cabled a report to the effect that the Arab representatives at Cairo were ready to consider a plan by which the Jews would be allowed additional immigration up to the number of Moslem Arabs in Palestine. A figure of 300,000 Jewish immigrants was mentioned on the assumption that there were already about 700,000 Jews in Palestine.<sup>50</sup> This arrangement would give the Christians of Palestine—estimated at about 150,000—the balance of voting power. Anne O'Hare McCormick discussed the plan favorably as indicative of a willingness on the part of the Arabs to agree to a compromise.<sup>51</sup> However, there has been no intimation from Arab sources that the plan would be acceptable.

As indicated in the previous section, the so-called "moderate" Arab leaders now accept the 1939 White Paper, although they have not made any public statement to this effect. Conceivably, they might agree to some additional Jewish immigration provided that the ratio of Jews to the general population would not be increased; but there are no signs that the Arab leaders would accept more than this.

48. *Palestine Partition Commission Report*, p. 298. See above, Chap. XI, p. 755.

49. Julian J. Meltzer, *The New York Times*, March 10, 1945.

50. Neither the Government statistics nor the Jewish estimates warrant the use of such a high figure for the present population of Palestine. The Jewish population of Palestine most probably does not exceed 600,000.

51. *The New York Times*, March 11, 1945.

*The Official Zionist Program: The Jewish Commonwealth*

No precise definition—in the sense of a constitutional program—has been given to the term “Jewish Commonwealth.” During the period of the Balfour Declaration it was frequently used interchangeably with “Jewish State,” sometimes by the same writer. Likewise, it was generally regarded as synonymous with the term “Jewish National Home.” Dr. Weizmann recently declared: “The term ‘Jewish Commonwealth’ states explicitly what is implicit in the term ‘Jewish National Home.’” The terms “Jewish National Home,” “Jewish State,” and “Jewish Commonwealth” are used in the same sense in the following paragraph by Lloyd George in his explanation of the meaning of the Balfour Declaration:

There has been a good deal of discussion as to the meaning of the words “Jewish National Home” and whether it involved the setting up of a Jewish National State in Palestine. I have already quoted the words actually used by Mr. Balfour when he submitted the Declaration to the Cabinet for approval. They were not challenged at the time by any member present, and there could be no doubt as to what the Cabinet then had in their minds. It was not their idea that a Jewish State should be set up immediately by the Peace Treaty without reference to the wishes of the majority of the inhabitants. On the other hand, it was contemplated that when the time arrived for according representative institutions to Palestine, if the Jews had meanwhile responded to the opportunity offered them by the idea of a National Home and had become a definite majority of the inhabitants, then Palestine would thus become a Jewish Commonwealth.

Insofar as there was any distinction between the terms “Jewish State,” and “Jewish Commonwealth,” the latter was employed when the intention was to emphasize the democratic and cooperative principles underlying the future Jewish State. At the Pittsburgh Convention in 1938,<sup>52</sup> when a program was proposed for the development of the Jewish national home along the lines of a commonwealth, the emphasis was laid on social ownership of the natural resources and public utilities of the country and on the employment of the cooperative principle in the development of agriculture, industry and commerce.

52. See above, Chap. III.

The labor movement in Palestine has always preferred the term "Jewish Commonwealth" to "Jewish State," and the concept "Labor Commonwealth" has frequently been used to indicate the aim of Labor Zionism. Recently the use of the term "Jewish Commonwealth" has also served to indicate a readiness to accept such limitations on national sovereignty as would be imposed by an international authority if such were formed after the war.

In interpreting the Jewish Commonwealth program it is essential to understand its conception of Arab-Jewish relations. The official Zionist position has always recognized the obligation to develop the Jewish national home without prejudicing the rights or welfare of the native population, and has proceeded on the assumption that there was room in Palestine for both Arabs and Jews. It is not too much to say that the position of the Zionist leadership from the Twelfth Carlsbad Congress in 1921 to the Twenty-First Congress in Geneva in 1939 was strongly tinged with bi-nationalism.<sup>53</sup> This is evidenced in the often-quoted Resolution of the Carlsbad Congress in 1921 which declared "the determination of the Jewish people to live with the Arab people on terms of unity and mutual respect, and together with them to make the common home into a flourishing community, the upbuilding of which may assure to each of its peoples an undisturbed national development."<sup>54</sup> In a speech in Glasgow on February 12, 1922, reprinted in a Zionist Organization and *Keren Hayesod* Bulletin, Weizmann declared that the Jews had in mind "a Palestine which would develop exactly as the English and French in Canada had, with two civilizations working for a common good, or Switzerland, where three peoples worked and lived together."<sup>55</sup>

The Zionist leaders kept to this general view despite the riots of 1929, when the non-domination formula became the guide of policy. In his presidential address at the Seventeenth

53. See "Zionist Policy," pp. 85-101, in Jewish Agency for Palestine, *Memorandum to the Palestine Royal Commission*.

54. *Ibid.*, p. 93. The Resolution was formulated in German and the word here translated "community" is *Gemeinwesen*. Elsewhere it is translated "commonwealth," as for instance on p. 95 of the Jewish Agency *Memorandum*.

55. Bulletin No. 63, February 15, 1922. See *Memorandum*, p. 90.

Zionist Congress in 1931, Dr. Weizmann declared: "The Arabs must be made to feel, must be convinced, by deed as well as by word, that, whatever the future numerical relationship of the two nations in Palestine, we, on our part, contemplate no political domination." He went on to say: "Provided that the Mandate is both recognized and respected, we would welcome an agreement between the two kindred races on the basis of political parity."<sup>56</sup> At the conclusion of the Seventeenth Zionist Congress, Nahum Sokolow, who succeeded Dr. Weizmann as president of the Zionist Organization, although not mentioning political parity, spoke in the same vein. He stated that it was part of the program of the newly elected Zionist Executive: "to take active measures in the economic, social and political spheres with a view to furthering friendly relations and establishing a rapprochement between the Jews and Arabs in Palestine, starting from the basic principle that without reference to numerical strength, neither of the two peoples shall dominate, or be dominated, by the other."<sup>57</sup>

The extremism and growing truculence of the Arab leaders resulted in a loss of hope on the part of the Zionist leadership for the policy of conciliation and cooperation. The changing attitude was crystallized by the report of the Palestine Royal Commission of 1937. The report emphasized the political incompatibility of the two peoples and the wide disparity between the two systems of culture. In order to strengthen its partition proposals, it emphasized the original intention of the Balfour Declaration as envisaging the ultimate establishment of the Jewish State, and interpreted the 1922 Churchill White Paper as not precluding the formation of a Jewish State. Among the rank and file of organized Zionists there had always been a suppressed desire for a Jewish state in Palestine. Now that the British Commissioners spoke openly for a Jewish state, no Jewish party could well appear before its following with a lesser demand. When the 1939 White Paper appeared, whatever justification remained for a policy of compromise on the political issue fell away. Formerly there was some basis for the belief that Great Britain would adhere to the essence of the Mandate, but now that the British indicated that they

56. *Ibid.*, p. 88.

57. *Ibid.*, p. 97.

were ready to join with the Arab opposition to keep the Jews in the position of a minority, there was no alternative for the Zionist leaders but to insist on the fulfillment of the original intention of the Balfour Declaration, i.e., the opportunity of establishing a commonwealth in which the Jews, by virtue of the fact that they would constitute a majority, would exercise the predominant influence in Palestine.

Although the current definition of the purpose of Zionism in terms of the establishment of a Jewish Commonwealth explicitly denies the validity of bi-nationalism in the sense of political parity, it continues to assume bi-nationalism in the cultural and communal sense. It allows for the type of bi-nationalism which is exemplified by the constitution of Canada, where the French minority has a wide range of autonomy as to language, education and religious control, despite the predominance of the English element in the country as a whole. To avoid confusion of terms, however, it would be best to define the Jewish Commonwealth conception as duo-cultural rather than bi-national. The Jewish Commonwealth idea asserts absolute equality of all inhabitants in civil, religious and political rights, regardless of race, nationality or creed, and goes beyond the usual interpretation of democracy in Western countries—based as it is on the individual—in positing the equal right of the Arab section of Palestine to develop as a distinct community and cultural nationality. The Jewish Commonwealth conception, moreover, assumes the necessity of promoting activities to advance Jewish-Arab rapprochement. Such activities would include spreading a knowledge of Arabic and of Arab culture among the Jews, establishment of mixed playgrounds in districts where Jewish and Arab children naturally meet, and the promotion of good neighborly relations in rural as well as urban communities.

In view of the fact that the *Histadrut* has played an important role in formulating the Jewish Commonwealth program, its conception of Arab-Jewish relations should be taken into account in defining the Jewish Commonwealth program. The *Histadrut* regards cooperation with the Arabs in the field of labor as ultimately the key to a full cooperation between the two peoples. The resolutions adopted at the third *Histadrut* Convention in 1927 provided for the creation of a Confederation of Palestine Labor (*Brith Poale Eretz Israel*)

which would constitute an overhead organization for all workers of Palestine.<sup>58</sup> The aim of the Palestine Labor League—as it is more briefly designated—was stated to be: “The union of workers of Palestine regardless of religion, nationality or race, into one league for the purpose of improving their economic, social and cultural position.” Under this confederation there would be Jewish unions and Arab unions and each national group would constitute an autonomous section within the confederation. All the Jewish units would be an organic part of the *Histadrut*, as the General Federation of Jewish Workers in Palestine. The Arabs might likewise organize their own special Arab section.

The *Histadrut* advocates common unions among government employees, particularly the railway and telegraph workers where the cultural level between the Arab and Jewish groups is not very different and where common wage levels may be achieved without reducing the standard of the Jewish worker. While the *Histadrut* does not conceive its function to be that of an aggressive missionary labor organization among the Arabs, it stands ready to assist Arab workers whenever they show a willingness to be organized and to extend to them direct help in the form of medical services and financial assistance during strikes. The bi-national attitude of the *Histadrut* organization is epitomized in the following: “We want to help the Arab worker found an Arab labor organization which will have a fraternal bond with our *Histadruth*. We do not intend to make a Jew or a Zionist out of the Arab any more than we mean to conceal our Zionist aspirations from him.”<sup>59</sup>

The Jewish Commonwealth proposal assumes also that the Arab community will have a public school system parallel to the Jewish school system, with exactly the same mode of supervision and the same rights to receive support from federal and communal sources.<sup>60</sup> It is congruous with the idea of allowing community organization and special religious courts as now permitted under the Religious Communities Ordinances and the regulations governing the Moslem *Sharia* courts. In other

58. See above, Chap. VIII, p. 561.

59. Abba Hushi, “Organizing Arab Workers,” *Jewish Frontier*, December, 1942, p. 19.

60. Recently, with the inclusion of an Arab section in the district of Tel-Aviv, the municipality has opened a school for Arabs with Arab teachers and with Arabic as the language of instruction.

words, the Jewish Commonwealth program envisages an increase, not a diminution, of the communal and cultural autonomy of the Arab and Jewish communities, as provided for under the Mandate.

The following authoritative statements may be taken as indicating the official Zionist interpretation of the meaning of the Jewish Commonwealth.

Shortly before the formulation of the Biltmore Program, Dr. Weizmann wrote:<sup>61</sup>

. . . The Arabs must, therefore, be clearly told that the Jews will be encouraged to settle in Palestine, and will control their own immigration; that here Jews who so desire will be able to achieve their freedom and self-government by establishing a state of their own, and ceasing to be a minority dependent on the will and pleasure of other nations.

In that state there will be complete civil and political equality of rights for all citizens, without distinction of race or religion, and, in addition, the Arabs will enjoy full autonomy in their own internal affairs. But if any Arabs do not wish to remain in a Jewish state, every facility will be given to them to transfer to one of the many and vast Arab countries. Considering the strategic and economic importance of Palestine, the inclusion of the Jewish state within the British Commonwealth of Nations would be to the interest of both. But we should also be ready, if necessary, to consider joining, under proper safeguards, in federation with Arab states.

A Jewish state in Palestine would be more than merely the necessary means of securing further Jewish immigration and development. It is a moral need and postulate, and it would be a decisive step towards normality and true emancipation. I believe that after the war Jews everywhere can gain in status and security only through the rise of a Jewish state, and this would be especially the case if that state is a part of the British Commonwealth.

In his Biltmore Conference speech, to which reference has been made in the preceding chapter, David Ben-Gurion epitomized the essential principles of a solution of the Zionist problem as being three in number:

A clear and unequivocal reaffirmation of the original intention of the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate to re-establish Palestine as a

61. "Palestine's Role in the Solution of the Jewish Problem," *Foreign Affairs*, January, 1942, pp. 337-338.

Jewish Commonwealth as made clear by the President of the United States on March 3, 1919.

The Jewish Agency for Palestine, as the trustee for the prospective immigrants and settlers, should have full control over Jewish immigration and be vested with all necessary authority for the development and upbuilding of the country, including the development of its unoccupied and uncultivated lands.

Complete equality to all inhabitants of Palestine, civil, political and religious; self-government in all municipal affairs; autonomy for the different communities—Jewish and Arab—in the management of all their internal affairs—education, religion, etc.

In testimony before the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives on February 15, 1944, Mr. Emanuel Neumann submitted a statement which was regarded as representing the prevalent view of the American Zionist Emergency Council. He said, in part:

When we Zionists speak of a Jewish Commonwealth, we certainly do not mean a state which is exclusively Jewish. We do not mean to drive the existing Arab population into the desert or cast it into the sea. On the contrary, those who choose to do so are to remain. Moreover, their civic and personal rights shall be inviolate. There shall be full and complete equality before the law. Not only that, but the Arabs shall have every right and possibility to preserve and develop their cultural and religious heritage. Their language shall be recognized and their traditions respected. And in addition, they shall share fully in the economic advantages and opportunities, and the prosperity which will come with the modernization of the country and the development of its resources. Indeed this has already been the case in a substantial measure.

If, then we are asked what we mean by the adjective Jewish as applied to the future Commonwealth of Palestine, my answer is that it is a short abbreviated way of saying that through the repatriation of large numbers of European and other Jews, the Jewish people will attain a numerical majority in Palestine and thereby permanently guarantee the open door for others who may follow; so that Palestine shall never cease to serve as a sanctuary and Homeland for any and all Jews, from whatever part of the world, who may choose to go there in the future. It will also be a Jewish Commonwealth in the vital sense that in that country, in that little corner of the world, the Jewish people, no longer living under minority conditions, but as the majority, will be free to apply their talent, their industry, their genius, and leave the indelible impress of their civilization upon



their ancestral land as in the days of the Kings and the Prophets.

But the development of this Jewish Commonwealth shall take place under democratic institutions and in the democratic spirit. There shall be no crowding out of minority elements and no "racial superiority." The Jews will preponderate and lead in the development of the country without dominating or oppressing the minority. Jews and Arabs, devoted to their respective cultures and traditions, shall cooperate as free and equal citizens and jointly contribute to the prosperity and welfare of a common, single, unitary State. The Arab citizens of the Jewish Commonwealth will be as favorably situated as are the French speaking citizens of the British Dominion of Canada. It will be a free and democratic and preponderantly Jewish state composed of Jews, Moslems, Christians and, if there are any, Buddhists as well—compatriots all. All shall be eligible to public office, even the highest.

Leo Kohn, Political Secretary of the Jewish Agency in Palestine, issued a statement on November 2, 1944, on the status of the non-Jewish residents of a future Palestine Jewish Commonwealth. The statement was made in direct reply to a series of questions posed by a non-Jewish correspondent in a letter to the editor of the *Palestine Post*. The statement is as follows:

The Jewish Commonwealth, for which Jews throughout the world are striving, is not conceived as an exclusively Jewish polity. It is realized that a considerable section of its population will not be Jewish by race or religion. The Commonwealth is to be designated as Jewish because it is intended to be the national home of the Jewish People and, with that end in view, is to be open to any Jew who desires to settle in Palestine. That function, indeed, will be its principal *raison d'être*. Without entering at this stage into a complete exposition of the contemplated constitution of the Jewish Commonwealth, the following replies may be given to the specific questions:

1. The status of the non-Jewish citizens of the Jewish Commonwealth would be exactly the same as that of its Jewish citizens. All citizens would be subject to the identical laws administered by a democratically elected government. It is, furthermore envisaged that there would be a wide measure of local self-government in urban, semi-urban and rural areas. In addition, the Moslem and Christian sections of the population would enjoy full communal autonomy as regards the management of their religious, educational and social institutions.

2. The guarantee for the protection of the property, lands, etc.,

of non-Jewish citizens would be the same as that ensuring the rights of Jewish citizens, viz., the law of the country enacted by a legislature and administered by a government representative of and responsible to all citizens.

3. All citizens, without distinction of race or creed, would enjoy adult suffrage and be entitled to representation both in the legislative and the executive organs of the Commonwealth. Non-Jewish citizens would be eligible for ministerial office. No citizen of the Jewish Commonwealth would be at a disadvantage as a candidate for public employment by reason of his race or religion.

4. The fellahin and Beduin would enjoy the same status and rights as other citizens of the country. They would also benefit from the introduction of measures of local self-government.

5. The religious rights of non-Jews, whether residents, visitors or pilgrims, would be safeguarded by constitutional guarantees. These would relate, in particular, to such matters as the freedom of worship, the right to maintain religious and charitable institutions, questions of family law and personal status, and the protection of places of worship and pious foundations. Moslem Holy Places would be administered by Moslems, Christian Holy Places by Christians. The Moslem Religious Courts and the Courts of the several Christian communities would continue to exercise the same jurisdiction as at present.

It should be added that the Jewish Commonwealth will not rest content with establishing a merely formal equality of status between Jewish and non-Jewish citizens. It will endeavour to bring about a greater measure of real equality in education and standards of life by social legislation and economic development.

While there are different trends and emphases in the Jewish Commonwealth point of view, the prevailing attitude assumes that a transitional period may be necessary before the establishment of the Jewish Commonwealth. On the basis of the above declarations and in line with recent discussions among Zionists, the predominant view of the Jewish Commonwealth program might be summarized thus:

*Establishment of the Jewish Commonwealth.* In the postwar settlement Palestine should be designated as the Jewish Commonwealth, to be constituted as such when the Jews become a majority in the country. The Jewish Commonwealth is to have a democratic constitution and will be "Jewish" by virtue of the fact that the majority of the population will be Jews. The constitution will have no theo-

cratic or racial basis. After it is established the Commonwealth need not, in fact, be called "Jewish" but may have some neutral or geographical name, e.g., "The Palestine Commonwealth."

*The Area of Palestine.* The Jewish Commonwealth proposal is opposed to partition and demands that all of Palestine, west of the Jordan at least, should be assigned to the Jewish Commonwealth, and that such adjustment of boundaries shall be made as is requisite for large scale irrigation and land development schemes. Moreover, the ban on Jewish immigration in Trans-Jordan should be removed and settlement of Jews should be permitted under suitable conditions to be determined by the international postwar settlement authority.

*Transitional Jewish Agency Regime.* The powers of the Jewish Agency—now recognized by the Mandate as the instrument of the Jewish people in the matter of upbuilding Palestine—should be augmented in two directions: 1) it should be given adequate control over Jewish immigration for the purpose of achieving a Jewish majority as quickly as possible; 2) it should be given adequate authority to enable it to develop the potential absorptive capacity of Palestine. The Jewish Agency will cooperate with the trustee for Palestine—presumably Great Britain—appointed under international authority to administrate Palestine in the transitional period.

*Palestine Development Authority.* The Jewish Agency would be empowered to create a Palestine Development Authority charged with the responsibility of fully utilizing the natural resources of Palestine for the good of the present inhabitants and for the rapid expansion of the economic absorptive capacity of Palestine. The constitution of the Palestine Development Authority should provide for the right of acquiring land and natural resources through condemnation at prices established by the courts, and should impose the duty of improving existing Arab localities as well as promoting Jewish settlements.<sup>62</sup> The funds for the development projects should be supplied partly by the international agencies and these bodies should be duly represented in the Palestine Development Authority.

*Immigration.* The Jewish Agency will undertake to respect the principle of economic absorptive capacity in the sense of the potential absorptive capacity of Palestine fully developed. It will adhere to the rule that Jewish immigration should not lead to unemployment, cause displacement from the land, or bring about the deterioration of the standard of living of the present inhabitants. However,

62. E.g., in accordance with the policy now adopted by agreement between the Jewish National Fund and the Palestine Administration in construction work in Arab sections. See Alexander Lourie, "Jordan Valley Authority," *Jewish Frontier*, May, 1944, p. 14.

it repudiates the so-called "economic absorptive capacity" procedures as determined by the British administration in the past in view of the fact that such procedures were devised largely for the purpose of hampering Jewish immigration and were, moreover, guided by static economic presuppositions.

*The Problem of Transfer.* The Jewish Commonwealth proposal assumes that Jews will have the priority of immigrating into Palestine. However, a basic postulate is that the present inhabitants of Palestine and their offspring shall have a full right to remain in Palestine. The Jewish Agency would be ready to cooperate with neighboring Arab states in facilitating an exchange of population or a transfer of Arabs from Palestine to other Arab areas. It assumes that no large migration of population will take place, regarding transfer as an auxiliary factor but not an indispensable one. Above all, the principle is that no transfer shall be made excepting by voluntary agreement on the part of families transferred and of the governments of the countries to which transfer will be made.

*Relation to the Palestine Arab Community.* The Jewish Commonwealth proposal assumes not only absolute equality of rights—civic, political and economic—for all individuals in Palestine, but proposes also that each of the two peoples—Arab and Jewish—be recognized as national communities with equal rights in the development of their religious, communal and cultural interests. Arabic as well as Hebrew will be recognized as official languages and each group will have its own educational system. Although rejecting the principle of constitutional parity, it assumes that Arabs and Jews will be recognized in government appointments and will be duly represented in the judicial and executive branches as well as in the legislative.

*Regional Federation and International Authority.* The Jewish Commonwealth proposal would welcome the formation of a regional economic federation of Middle Eastern states for the purpose of coordinating customs policies, and for promoting planned development. Such a federation would have as its objective full utilization of the natural resources of the Middle East, raising its standard of agricultural production, and development of industry and commercial relations. The Jewish Commonwealth conception is based on the hope of an extension of international control in world affairs. While accepting the assumption that Great Britain will continue to be the trustee of Palestine during the transitional period, it welcomes the participation of the United Nations in the formulation of a policy for Palestine.

The Jewish Commonwealth proposal may be said to differ from the more extreme Jewish State plans in the following

points: 1) It does not demand the immediate establishment of the Jewish state after the war, but envisages a transitional period in which the Jews will be given the powers necessary to form a Jewish majority; 2) it assumes the continued co-existence of the Arab people in Palestine and therefore makes full provision for equality in religious, cultural and communal affairs, as well as in individual rights; 3) it places great emphasis on economic development and requires that the Jewish authority be granted quasi-governmental powers to realize the potential absorptive capacity of the country; 4) it envisages economic development in contemporary social-economic terms, giving primary consideration to the part that organized labor must play in a modern economy and the importance of a high standard of living for the whole population; 5) it emphasizes the significance of regional development and of conceiving the development of Palestine and the Middle East as part of a general movement toward international organization.

#### *Proposals Using the Term "Jewish State"*

At the present time, there are two Zionist groups which use the slogan "Jewish State" as the basis of their policy: 1) The New Zionist Organization; 2) the Jewish State Party. The latter, the Jewish State Party, is affiliated with the World Zionist Organization; the New Zionist Organization, formerly the Revisionist Party, is no longer affiliated.

#### *The New Zionist Organization*

The New Zionist Organization seceded from the World Zionist Organization in 1935. It was founded by Vladimir Jabotinsky and sustained an irreparable loss with his death in 1942. Although numerically stronger than the State Party, the New Zionists represent a small group relative to the Zionists of the world. In addition to differences on World Zionist affairs, the New Zionist Organization also disagrees in its attitude on internal questions. It is opposed to the predominance of labor elements in the Zionist movement. Conflicts between labor and capital in Palestine should be settled not by strikes and lock-outs, but by the decision of a Supreme Court of Arbitration. While disclaiming anything but a purely nationalist outlook, the New Zionist Organization is generally regarded in the Jewish world as a "rightist" group. While Revisionists have

sometimes been accused of supporting aggressive action, the organization, as such, is committed to the employment of political methods only.<sup>63</sup>

As to general Zionist policy, their major demand is the immediate recognition of Palestine and Trans-Jordan—"44,000 square miles"—as the Jewish State. As an emergency need they urge that the United Nations grant an international loan and provide the technical help required for transferring a million Jews from East-Central Europe to Palestine within twelve months after the war is over.<sup>64</sup> They would base their colonization plan not as has been the procedure of the Zionist Organization, but on a State Land Reserve which would be created by requisitioning land with fair compensation. The New Zionists are also promoting the idea of the organization of a "World Jewish Council" elected on a democratic basis to replace the Jewish Agency in the World Zionist Organization.

The "Principles of New Zionism" are officially stated to be as follows:<sup>65</sup>

*The Aim.* To reconstitute Palestine, including Trans-Jordan, as the Jewish State; to gather in it all those Jews who, for any reason whatever, regard themselves as homeless, thus putting an end to all involuntary dispersion; to build a Jewish civilization whose language shall be Hebrew, its soul the Bible, its order freedom and social justice.

*Free Vote Democracy.* Palestine as the Jewish State being a demand of all Jewry, the Supreme Council of the Zionist movement shall be elected by all Jewish men and women who wish to record their vote, without any qualifications or restrictions. The Supreme Council shall take over the functions of the Jewish Agency mentioned in the Palestine Mandate. It shall assume, in due course, the title and authority of a World Jewish Assembly.

*The Arabs.* The Arab minority within the borders of the Jewish State shall enjoy all those rights which the Jews in other countries demand for themselves.

63. See Chap. XIV above.

64. This is known as the Max Nordau Plan. In 1922, Nordau urged immigration to Palestine in large numbers, without regard to the immediate economic absorptive capacity of the country. The "plan" was a statement made in a speech and has been variously interpreted as meaning the immigration of five hundred thousand to two and a half million Jews in one large wave.

65. "What Zionism Stands For," *American Jewish Chronicle*, June 20, 1940.

*Labor and Capital.* All conflicts between labor and capital in Palestine shall be settled not by force of pressure but by the judgment of a Supreme Court of Arbitration, representing labor, capital, and the general public.

*Defense.* To building our State, we ask of the Mandatory no sacrifice of money or men; we build, we pay, and we offer our soldiers.

*Free Immigration.* The right of any Jew to enter Palestine at any time is absolute; to bar Jewish immigration is a crime, to break the bar a duty.

### *The Jewish State Party*

The Jewish State Party was established in 1933. It is a constituent part of the World Zionist Organization and is recognized as a party on the same basis as the other parties in the Zionist Organization. It consists mainly of the remnant of the Revisionist Party which did not secede from the regular Zionist Organization when the New Zionist Organization was founded. Numerically it is a very small group consisting mostly of journalists and professional men with practically no mass following. However, the founders of the party are Zionists of long standing and include a number of able leaders. Meir Grossman, now resident in the United States, is generally regarded as its leader at the present time. While opposing the present leadership and policies, the Jewish State party is loyal to the Zionist Organization as such, regarding it as a great heritage of the work of Theodor Herzl and as the authorized representative of the Jewish people. In internal questions it represents a middle class, nationalist orientation, and regards itself as liberal in its attitude toward labor. However, it objects to giving the labor movement the leading position in Zionism and opposes the introduction of any "class consciousness" in the work of upbuilding Palestine. It "demands that both workers and employers, both national and private capital, shall have their full and equal share" in carrying out the aims of Zionism. Apart from the demand for a clear-cut policy that would permit of no compromise or whitening down, its main difference from the present program of the Zionist Organization lies in its insistence that Trans-Jordan be included in the Jewish State. It regards its own program as a well balanced and logical elaboration of the Herzlian conception.

Its position on the main issues may be briefly indicated in the following summary:<sup>66</sup>

*Anglo-Jewish Cooperation.* The Jewish self-governing Palestine of the future should be linked up with the British Empire by close ties. Great Britain must, however, recognize the historic right of the Jewish people in Palestine, and give practical expression to this recognition by facilitating immigration, protecting Jewish industry, carrying out agrarian reform and assuring the Jewish population of its due share in public works and public services.

*Immigration.* This historic, undisputed right of the Jewish people to return to their ancient homeland should be unequivocally recognized. No authority is justified in depriving them of this privilege, which must be fully utilized in accordance with the spirit of the Mandate, under the control and guidance of the World Zionist Organization and in cooperation with the Mandatory Power. The doors of Palestine must be kept open to the persecuted Jewish masses who are anxious to reconstruct their lives in the Land of Promise.

*Repatriation Regime.* There should be introduced a system of legislative and administrative measures in Palestine, a *Repatriation Regime*, calculated to assist Jewish colonization and expressly to facilitate the establishment of the Jewish State. Neither the present vacillating British policy in Palestine, which sabotages the up-building of the country, nor the archaic and planless colonization by the Zionist Organization, can make Palestine the home of millions of Jews.

*Restoration of Trans-Jordan.* Western Palestine and Trans-Jordan (Eastern Palestine) are historically and economically one country. As an indivisible part of the Palestine mandated territory, Trans-Jordan ought not to remain excluded from any scheme of land settlement and development. The Jewish State Party urges the immediate opening up of Trans-Jordan for Jewish immigration and colonization which, it believes, will redound to the benefit of Arabs as well as of Jews.

*Defense of the Yishuv.* The Jewish population of Palestine should have the right to organize for the protection of its life and property. The continued Arab attacks on the *Yishuv*, which have resulted in much loss of Jewish lives and property, make it essential to reorganize the present security system in Palestine, by providing for direct Jewish participation in the defense forces of the country—military, gendarmerie and police.

*The Land Problem.* The existing land legislation of Palestine which hampers the acquisition of land by Jews and favors the ab-

66. *Jewish State Zionism*, published by the Central Committee of the Jewish State Zionists of America, New York. Adapted and abbreviated.



sentee *effendi* landlords should be radically changed. Land legislation should aim at the improvement of the lot of the small holders and should facilitate close settlement of Jews on the land, as expressly provided for in the Mandate. Land reserves for future immigration should be created by means of appropriate agrarian reforms, including the allocation of State lands for this purpose.

*Government Responsibility for Jewish Education and Health Services.* The present method, under which the bulk of the State revenues of Palestine is expended for the benefit of the Arabs, cannot continue. The Jewish population must receive its adequate share. The government of Palestine must assume complete financial responsibility for the Jewish school and health systems, as well as for the Jewish social welfare institutions, without infringing upon their internal economy.

*Jewish Labor.* Zionism aims at the political and economic rebirth of the Jewish Nation on the soil of its ancient Homeland, and this can be achieved only by Jewish labor. The opportunities for Jewish labor are provided by Jewish agricultural and industrial enterprises brought into the country for the specific purpose of Jewish development. The Jewish State Party therefore recognizes the basic principle of employing Jewish labor in all branches of Palestinian Jewish economic life and public services.

*Tozeret Haaretz.* The Jewish State Party stands for sustained and organized effort for enlargement and creation of markets for Palestinian products as a most essential contribution towards the development of productive activities in Eretz Israel. It therefore demands the establishment of a central council for *Tozeret Haaretz* (popularization of Palestinian products) and the creation of an export bank, whose duty will be to find markets for the products of Palestinian industry.

*Arab-Jewish Relations.* "We visualize the Palestine of the future as a country of peaceful cooperation between all sections of the population based on equality of right and mutual respect, and we consider the economic welfare of the non-Jewish population a prime necessity for the welfare of the country. This attitude determines the relationship of the Jewish State Party towards the Arabs in Palestine. We desire peace, friendship and neighborliness with the non-Jewish population in the process of the historically pre-destined re-establishment of *Eretz Israel*, but we cannot surrender the sovereign right of the Jewish Nation to Palestine."

*Vladimir Jabotinsky*

The points of view of the Jewish State Party and of the New Zionist Organization are indebted to the thinking of the late

Vladimir Jabotinsky. Jabotinsky always maintained that the only real meaning of the Balfour Declaration was the creation of a Jewish State in Palestine on both sides of the Jordan. He believed such a Jewish State could hold a population of twelve million. Although Jabotinsky, like other Revisionists, favored a transfer of Arabs on a large scale, he did not regard this as essential to his conception. He thought that "Palestine, astride the Jordan, has room enough for the million of Arabs, room for another of their eventual progeny, for several million Jews, and for peace; for so much peace that there would then be peace also in Europe."<sup>67</sup> Jewish immigration into Palestine was an absolute right and should be conducted in accordance with the "Max Nordau Plan." Jabotinsky believed that the solution of the Jewish problem consisted of two interrelated parts—a Jewish State for those who wanted it, and genuine equality for Jews in Eastern Europe who wished to stay there or who could not be released. With reference to the Arabs, he was ready to accept any plan which did "not involve renunciation of the Jews' intention and right to transform Palestine into a Jewish State."

In 1934, the Revisionist Executive, under the leadership of Jabotinsky, presented a plan for making Palestine an independent dominion within the British Empire. It was made clear that this plan was to go into effect only after the Jews constituted a majority of the inhabitants of Palestine. The plan, which may be regarded as Jabotinsky's most carefully elaborated conception, is as follows:<sup>68</sup>

#### *1. Civil Equality*

1. Provided nothing be done to hinder any foreign Jew from repatriating to Palestine, and, by doing so, automatically becoming a Palestinian citizen, the principle of equal rights for all citizens of any race, creed, language or class shall be enacted without limitation throughout all sectors of the country's public life.

2. In every Cabinet where the Prime Minister is a Jew, the vice-Premiership shall be offered to an Arab, and vice versa.

3. Proportional sharing by Jews and Arabs both in the charges and in the benefits of the State shall be the rule with regard to Parliamentary elections, civil and military service, and budgetary grants.

67. Vladimir Jabotinsky, *The War and the Jew*, Dial Press, 1942.

68. *Ibid.*, pp. 215 ff.

4. The same rule shall apply to mixed municipalities or country councils.

## *2. Languages*

1. The Hebrew and the Arabic languages shall enjoy equal rights and equal legal validity.

2. No State law, proclamation or ordinance; no coin, banknote or stamp of the State; no publication or inscription produced at the State's expense shall be valid unless executed identically in both Hebrew and Arabic.

3. Both Hebrew and Arabic shall be used with equal legal effect in Parliament, in the Courts, in the schools and in general before any office or organ of the State, as well as in any school of whatever degree.

4. All offices of the State shall answer any applicant, orally and in writing, in the language of his application, whether Hebrew or Arabic.

## *3. Cultural Autonomy*

1. The Jewish and the Arab ethno-communities shall be recognized as autonomous public bodies of equal status before the law.

Should the Christian Arabs, or any other group of citizens reasonably justified in claiming autonomy, also demand a measure of independent recognition, Parliament shall be entitled to grant the request.

2. The following matters shall be delegated by the State to each ethno-community with regard to its members:

- (a) religion and personal status;
- (b) education in all its branches and grades, especially in the compulsory elementary stages;
- (c) public relief, including all forms of social assistance;
- (d) settlement of ordinary law cases arising out of the above-mentioned matters.

3. Each ethno-community shall elect its National Diet with the right to issue ordinances and levy taxes within the limits of its autonomy, and to appoint a national executive responsible before the Diet.

4. A permanent Minister of Cabinet rank, independent of all parties, shall represent each ethno-community in the country's government.

## *4. The Holy Places*

1. The relevant areas within the Old City of Jerusalem, to be delimited under the authority of the League of Nations, shall enjoy the same measure of extra-territoriality as that universally recognized in the case of embassies.

2. Each of these areas shall constitute a municipality under a council appointed by agreement between the ecclesiastic authorities concerned.

3. A similar regime shall apply, *mutatis mutandis*, to other holy sites within the country.

4. Except in war, pilgrim permits of sufficient duration shall be freely granted to nationals of any State; subject only to genuine requirements of hygiene, traffic and public safety, and provided any paupers among the pilgrims shall be maintained and in due course repatriated, at the expense of the respective ecclesiastic authority.

5. A delegate of the League of Nations, with the status of Ambassador, shall be appointed to represent the interests concerned.

### 5. Land

1. A Palestine Land Court shall be formed including, among other members, judges and agricultural experts belonging to both ethnocommunities.

2. All the waste lands, as well as all lands inadequately cultivated in the opinion of the Court, shall be requisitioned (under fair compensation in the case of the latter) to form the State's Land Reserve.

3. After improvement at the expense of the State, reclaimed areas of the Land Reserve shall be divided into allotments to be granted, at fair prices and easy terms of credit, to individual applicants and groups.

4. Allotments shall be distributed under the Land Court's supervision to Jewish and Arab applicants and groups indiscriminately.

5. Each applicant shall have to satisfy the Land Court:

(a) that he owns no other land;

(b) that he possesses a reasonable minimum of capital or equipment for working that land, no matter whether his own or supplied by supporters;

(c) that he will work the land personally.

### *Other Proposals for a Jewish State*

In addition to the proposals made by Jewish organizations and leaders, a number of proposals have been made by Britishers and Americans concerned with the Jewish problem as part of a settlement of the postwar international situation. Of particular interest among these are the proposals made by Norman Angell, Reinhold Niebuhr and Ely Culbertson.

*Norman Angell.* Sir Norman Angell <sup>69</sup> starts with the prem-

69. Norman Angell, "The Conditions for Zionist Success," *Jewish Frontier*, June, 1943.

ise that Zionism is "an indispensable element in the solution of an age-old problem." Before discussing the difficulties of its consummation, he states what he would like to see take place:

Palestine should become a self-governing Jewish state, a true homeland of the Jews, master of its own immigration policy, open to development without the restrictions and complications imposed by the presence of an Arab population nearly twice as great as the Jewish population; and by the fears and incompetencies and even hostilities of the mandatory or guardian power; and that such a Palestine should have secure defense. Without this last condition the others are not of much value.

This question of defense—which, in his mind, is crucial to any realistic approach to the problem of the establishment of a Jewish state—arises out of the ineluctable fact of the existence of a large Arab population in Palestine. The ideal would be to solve the problem of defense through international organization in which the power of the whole would be pledged to the defense of each member. Should this desired ideal solution of the problem of international organization fail to materialize due to the retirement of the United States to isolationism, or semi-isolationism, then the Jewish State could achieve security only through membership in the British Empire, or British Commonwealth, terms which Angell uses interchangeably. In such a case, a Jewish state would have dominion status like New Zealand and Australia. There would be no statutory compulsion to force the Jewish state to become part of the defense system of the British Empire, but a gentlemen's agreement would be reached for defensive purposes in the event of threatened aggression. He believes it probable that in the future, commitments for defensive purposes will have to be more definite than those which have held together the dominions of the British Commonwealth in the past.

It is only after the question of defense is surmounted that it would be possible to tackle the Arab problem along more constructive lines than in the past. He does not think that it is enough to depend on the improvement of the material interests of the Arabs to convince them of the desirability of Jewish immigration. Nationalist motivations take little account of the welfare interests of individuals. In order to solve the Jewish-Arab problem in Palestine Angell regards it essential to re-

duce the size of the Arab population through emigration. While he is strongly opposed to any forcible transfer of Arabs from Palestine, he believes that if a definite Arab area outside of Palestine were developed and offered to the Palestinian Arabs on attractive conditions, a voluntary Arab emigration in large numbers could be expected. A sizable Jewish immigration could under these conditions soon transform Palestine into a country with a predominantly Jewish population. He opposes making Palestine a state in an Arab federation because the power in federal organizations tends to drift toward the federal center, and such a federal center in a Pan-Arab federation would be Arab-controlled.

*Reinhold Niebuhr.* Professor Niebuhr<sup>70</sup> believes that Jews require a homeland in Palestine for two reasons. In the first place, even the most generous immigration laws of the Western democracies will not permit the dispossessed Jews of Europe to find a haven in which they may look forward to a tolerant future. In the second place, he believes the Jews to be a national group and every national group has a right to a homeland of its own. The Jews as a minority suffer from two types of discrimination, religious and racial, and it is idle to speculate which is the primary source of prejudice. In a fully democratic world where religious and cultural divergences would be permitted in each country, perhaps Zionism would not be necessary; and no doubt many Jews in the Western nations have achieved a satisfactory position in which the disabilities from which they suffer as members of a minority group are relatively insignificant in comparison with the advantages they enjoy. But there are millions of Jews, both in the Western world and in the remnants of the feudal world—in Poland and the Balkans particularly—who ought to have a chance to escape from the intolerable handicaps and to establish themselves in psychological and social security in Palestine.

He does not think that the formation of a Jewish state in Palestine can be achieved by the consent of the Arab world. No solution acceptable to the Arabs would give the Jews an

70. Reinhold Niebuhr, "Jews After the War," *The Nation*, February 21 and 28, 1942; "The Jewish State and the Arab World," *Jewish Frontier*, January, 1942. This statement was ready before the Conference of the Committee of Christian Leaders, Clergymen and Laymen, on behalf of Jewish immigration into Palestine, held in New York December 14, 1942.

adequate opportunity, and an Arab-Jewish federation in Palestine would perpetuate animosities into the indefinite future. He does not think that there can be an absolutely "just solution of this conflict—any more than there can in any other similar conflict—of competing claims." He thinks that the weight of justice in the claim to Palestine rests with the Jews on the grounds of the desperate need for a homeland and on the ground of historical considerations. Instead of attempting to find a middle-of-the-road pattern of solution in Palestine, he suggests the claim of the Jews to Palestine, or a sufficiently large part of it, be recognized, and that as far as the Arabs are concerned, compensating advantages be given to them in the Near Eastern situation. Despite the fact that the Arabs have made no substantial contribution to the defeat of the Axis, he thinks it would be wise statesmanship to allow the Arab world to become federated and thus strengthen their greater unity and independence.

He conceives of the Jewish State as an entity within the framework of the British Empire. He does not attempt to work out a constitutional plan, but suggests that a sufficiently large part of historic Palestine be set aside for a Jewish State which would have "territorial integrity, political independence within the framework of a commonwealth of nations, and the means of economic survival." The accomplishment of such a plan would be dependent upon American support: the United States has the advantage of not being embarrassed, as is Great Britain, by the problem of its relation to the Arab and Moslem world. He believes that the establishment of a Jewish State in Palestine is feasible if the plan were to obtain the consent and support of the two great democracies, the United States and Great Britain.<sup>71</sup>

*Ely Culbertson.* Culbertson offers two alternative schemes for the establishment of a Jewish State as part of his general plan for the creation of a World Federation. Both solutions

71. Bertrand Russell has also come out for a Jewish State in Palestine. He advocates the establishment of Palestine as an autonomous Jewish State with international guarantees of protection against foreign aggression. He would give the Jewish authorities in Palestine or through an international organization large powers with reference to the regulation of immigration. He recognizes the Arab opposition and believes that this might be solved by giving them "large compensating concessions in nearby countries."

are within the framework of his concept of World Federation, which includes a Middle Eastern Federation as one of the eleven regional federations within the total scheme. The Middle Eastern Federation would eventually comprise Turkey, Iraq, Syria, United Arabia, Afghanistan and Egypt. Although he speaks of national sovereignty, Culbertson provides that each nation will entrust part of such sovereignty to the regional government and to the World Federation.

In the first solution which he offers, Palestine would become a Jewish sovereign state in the following manner:<sup>72</sup>

a. A large part of the Mohammedan and Christian populations of Palestine shall be transferred to another territory in the Middle East, where equivalent or better land and living conditions shall be provided, together with a reasonable bonus. This transfer shall be effected only with the consent of the groups concerned.

b. The expenses of this transfer shall be borne, half by the Jewish state and half by the World Federation.

c. The special religious rights of non-Jewish churches in Jerusalem, as well as the rights of minorities, shall be fully safeguarded.

d. The creation of the Jewish Palestine state shall in no way affect the rights of citizens of Jewish extraction in other states.

He recognizes that the Arabs are attached to Palestine, but he thinks that it is reasonable to assume that a large number would consent to emigrate if sufficient inducement is offered. On the lands so vacated, hundreds of thousands of homeless Jews from Europe could be settled. It would then be possible, in short order, to form a Jewish majority in Palestine, which would be necessary for the creation of the "sovereign Jewish State" under the Middle Eastern World Federation.

An alternative plan is offered in the event that the Arabs would not consent to emigrate from Palestine and the Jews would remain a minority. In that case, Palestine ought to become for a transitional period a ward of the World Federation itself: "Let the government of the World Federation be Palestine's own sovereign state." Any citizen of the world could then enter Palestine if he chose; Jewish immigration intensified by the need of providing for the Jewish refugees from Europe would result in giving Palestine a Jewish majority. After the

72. Ely Culbertson, *Summary of the World Federation Plan*, World Federation, Inc., New York, 1943, p. 22.



Jews had attained a majority a plebiscite would be arranged leading to the creation of a Jewish state.

### *Cantonization and Partition Plans*

Cantonization and partition plans endeavor to solve the Arab-Jewish conflict by dividing the territory included in present Palestine—or in Palestine and Trans-Jordan—and giving to each people control of respective areas. Zionist opinion, which in 1937 was ready to give favorable consideration to the partition idea proposed by the Royal Commission, is now definitely opposed to any decrease of the area of Jewish Palestine. Although the Permanent Mandates Commission did not appear to favor the partition proposal when it was proposed by the British Government, at its last meeting in 1939, when the White Paper was rejected, there was some suggestion that partition might be worth reconsidering. The British Government, it will be remembered, definitely abandoned the partition proposal after the Woodhead Commission reported against it. Nevertheless, during the war it was again proposed in British liberal circles as a possible solution preferable to the 1939 White Paper.<sup>73</sup> In the light of the possibility of a renewal of the discussion on partition, and in view of the fact that cantonization and partition proposals involve principles which may be employed in plans carrying different names, these plans may be reviewed in some detail.

### *Cantonization*

Cantonization was the precursor of partition. It was first publicly proposed by the late Ittamar Ben-Avi,<sup>74</sup> editor of the *Doar Hayom*, a Hebrew daily in Palestine. He made the proposal in a number of articles written at various times and later published under the title *Judea Now, or Cantons and Sister Cities*.<sup>75</sup> Ben-Avi was more concerned with the immediate establishment of independent Jewish cantons in those areas which were already well populated by the Jews. He regarded

73. *Manchester Guardian*, October 27 and November 11, 1943.

74. Son of Eliezer Ben-Yehuda, renowned figure in the popularization of Hebrew speech in Palestine.

75. Ittamar Ben-Avi, *Yehudah Miyadith o "Cantonim" V'aarim Acha-yoth*, Tel-Aviv, 1930.

the Jewish cantons as the nuclei of a Jewish state which would be developed later. He did not evolve a general plan of cantonization which would include Arab cantons and Jewish cantons under a common government.

A genuine cantonization plan has been worked out by a Britisher, Mr. Archer Cust, who served in the Palestine Administration for almost fifteen years in various capacities.<sup>76</sup> He states: "The essence of the cantonization scheme is that areas should be officially defined within which Jewish acquisition of land and close settlement would be permitted and encouraged in discharge of the positive obligations under the Mandate regarding the Jewish national home, and without which the land would be reserved for the needs of the indigenous population." The basis for defining the Arab-Jewish cantons would be the existing distribution of the two peoples. Generally speaking, the Jewish canton would include the coastal plain, while the heart of the Arab canton would be in the hill country. The capital of the Jewish canton—to be considered as the Jewish National Home—would be Tel-Aviv. The Arab canton would be united with Trans-Jordan; Emir Abdullah would be the head of the government and Nablus would be the capital. There would be no enforced transfer from one canton to another. Each cantonal government, the Jewish and the Arab, would have wide powers in internal affairs in the determination of the official language and the administration of the local law. Jerusalem, Bethlehem and Haifa would be excluded from both Jewish and Arab cantons and administered directly by the Mandatory Power which would remain the over-all government of the cantons as well as of the British enclaves.

The canton administration would send representatives to a central legislature or Council of State, presided over by the British High Commissioner. The British commissioners of Jerusalem and Haifa would also sit on the Council of State, as well as such other officials as might be determined. Detailed plans as to the relationship between the central government and the cantons are not gone into, but Mr. Cust states that it should be developed along the experience of federal constitu-

76. Archer Cust, "Cantonization: A Plan for Palestine," *Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society*, Vol. XXIII, April, 1936, Pt. 2, pp. 194-220.

tions. The mandatory government, which would be identical with the central legislative council, would control defense, customs, passports, railroads, post and telegrams, antiquities and collection of taxes. All other governmental functions would be left to the canton administrations.

The plan was submitted to Mr. Norman Bentwich and Professor H. A. R. Gibb. Bentwich thought that neither the Jews nor the Arabs would accept the plan. It was a Solomon's judgment—dividing the baby between the two mothers—and would not solve any of the real problems. It could not satisfy the Zionist aims, nor fulfill the conditions of the Balfour Declaration. Professor Gibb<sup>77</sup> likewise rejected the plan and gave the following reasons:<sup>78</sup>

1. He did not believe that either the Arabs or the Jews would accept the plan.

2. The valid objections by the Arabs against Syria dividing an otherwise united country would be valid in this kind of partition as well.

3. The income of the country would be unequally divided between the two cantons since the Jews through their canton would contribute the greatest share and this would cause friction within the federal government.

4. What kind of law, he asked, would prevail in the country; British law, Arab law, Jewish law, or all three? Would an Arab residing in a Jewish canton be subject to Jewish law?

A general criticism against the cantonization plan was that the analogy with Switzerland or Canada, on which it was based, was faulty. In these countries the several populations were already on the land: the French in Canada, for example, were not demanding large additional immigration of Frenchmen. On the other hand, the essential Jewish problem was that of immigration and a division of the small country into tiny cantons could not satisfy the Jewish need.

77. Professor Gibb's leaning may be discerned from the fact that he regards the 1939 White Paper as a satisfactory solution. See *The Arabs*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1941, p. 23, where he says: "Only with the issue of the 'White Paper' of April [sic] 1939 have the foundations been laid of a stable policy which may serve to reconcile the local interests of both Jew and Arab, pending a settlement which will embrace the whole or the greater part of Arab Asia."

78. *Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society*, loc. cit.

*Federated State of Palestine*

Under the title "The Federated State of Palestine," Judge Bernard A. Rosenblatt<sup>79</sup> has suggested a plan applying the federal principle employed in the United States as a means of achieving a reasonable solution of Jewish and Arab demands in Palestine. A prerequisite condition of this "Federated State" plan is to consider the whole British mandated territory of Palestine, which includes Trans-Jordan, as a unit. Instead of the partition of this Greater Palestine into two rival states, he proposes the evolution of a federation of Palestine and Trans-Jordan into "two sister states of a federated Palestine."<sup>80</sup> He says: "The American principle of federation might be successfully applied to the solution of the Arab-Jewish problem so that the so-called Jewish state, like the state of New York or New Jersey, would be less an expression of any latent chauvinism than the essence of the 'home rule' principle inherent in the Balfour Declaration and the Palestine Mandate."<sup>81</sup>

Judge Rosenblatt projects a Palestine Council in which each territorial unit—Jewish and Arab—would be equally represented as in the United States Senate. The federal council would be presided over by the British High Commissioner who would have plenary jurisdiction over the holy places of Nazareth, Bethlehem and the Old City of Jerusalem. The Jewish and Arab states would be united in their foreign policy and in matters of common economic interest. The finances of the federal government would be derived from a unified customs system. A federal army would be organized against external aggression. Each state would retain full sovereign rights over internal affairs, including immigration and would control its own police force and might maintain a militia. The constitution would provide for reciprocal rights for the Jewish and Arab minorities within each state.

The Jewish state in the Federated Union would be smaller than present-day Palestine. As in recent partition proposals,

79. At one time a member of the Zionist Executive in Palestine and now President of the American division of the Palestine Foundation Fund (*Keren Hayesod*).

80. Bernard A. Rosenblatt, *Federated Palestine and the Jewish Commonwealth*, Scopus, New York, 1941, pp. 8–9.

81. *Ibid.*, p. 22.

the area, including roughly the district of Samaria, referred to by Judge Rosenblatt as the Nablus compound comprising about 3,300 kilometers and almost exclusively populated by Arabs, would be separated from Palestine and included along with Trans-Jordan in the Arab state. In the remainder of Palestine, which would be constituted a Jewish commonwealth *ab initio*, a majority could be quickly established through immigration over which the Jewish state would, of course, have complete control.

• *The Partition Proposal of the Palestine Royal Commission*

The Palestine Royal Commission which investigated the disturbances of 1936 came to the conclusion that in the interests of a lasting solution it would be best to divide Palestine into an Arab state and a Jewish state, certain enclaves being retained under British control.<sup>82</sup> It laid down the principle that any plan proposed must conform to the obligations undertaken by the Mandatory Power, afford a reasonable prospect of the eventual establishment of self-supporting Arab and Jewish states, and include the fewest possible Arabs in the Jewish state and the fewest Jews in the Arab state. It also indicated that in the interests of practicability the new regime should not be introduced all at once and that the existing Mandate continue to be the governing instrument of the Palestine administration during the transitional period. The Royal Commission set forth its partition plan as a means of giving concrete shape to the principles that should underlie partition, rather than for the purpose of presenting a definitive scheme. Nevertheless, its recommendations were carefully elaborated.

The main elements of its plan may be summed up as follows :

1. *A Treaty System.* The Mandate for Palestine should be replaced by a treaty system in accordance with the precedent set in Iraq and Syria, and a new mandate for the Holy Places should be instituted. Treaties of alliance should be negotiated looking toward the creation of two sovereign independent states: one Arab, one Jewish. In the case of the Arab state—which would consist of Trans-Jordan united with the eastern and southern part of Palestine—the treaty would be made with the Government of Trans-Jordan and the representatives of the Arabs in Palestine. In the case of the Jewish state—

82. See above, Chap. XII.

which would lie north and west of the Arab state—the treaty would be made with the Zionist Organization.

2. *The Holy Places.* The partition of Palestine should take into consideration the necessity “of keeping the sanctity of Jerusalem and Bethlehem inviolate, and of insuring free and safe access to them for all the world.” For this purpose an enclave should be demarcated, extending from Jerusalem and Bethlehem to the sea, providing a corridor including the towns of Lydda and Ramleh and terminating at Jaffa. Furthermore, in due respect to Christian sentiment in the world at large, Nazareth and the Sea of Galilee would be included in the British mandated area. The protection of the Holy Places should be considered a permanent trust, to be terminated only if and when the League of Nations and the United States desired this.

All the inhabitants in the territory administered by Great Britain as Mandatory would stand on equal footing and the principle of non-discrimination in fiscal and economic matters would be maintained, but neither the policy of the Balfour Declaration would apply nor Arab claims recognized, and there would be only the “official language,” namely, that of the Mandatory administration. The Mandatory would also be charged with protecting religious endowments, buildings, monuments and places in the Arab and Jewish states as are sacred to the Jews and to the Arabs, respectively. Revenue for administration of the Mandatory Government would be in part obtained by way of customs duties and direct taxation, but if this should prove inadequate, Parliament should vote the money needed to make good the deficit.

3. *The Frontiers.* The general principle to be followed in the partition of Palestine should be the separation of areas in which the Jews have acquired land and settled, from those which are wholly or mainly occupied by the Arabs.

Thus, the boundaries of the Jewish state should be drawn to include: the Maritime Plain from a point south of Jaffa to Mt. Carmel in the neighborhood of Haifa; the Plains of Esdraelon and the Valleys of Jezreel; and part of Galilee including Safed and the Huleh Basin. The Jewish state would include the sub-districts of Acre, Safed, Tiberias, Nazareth, Haifa, and the City of Tel-Aviv, and some territory south of Jaffa.

The Arab state would include the remaining part of Galilee; the northern part of the Plain of Acre; the central hill country of old Samaria and Judea, except for Jerusalem and its vicinity. The towns of Nablus, Jenin and Tulkarm, centers of Arab nationalism, would be included. The Arab bloc would extend eastward to the River Jordan between the Dead Sea and Beisan, and it would include the huge area stretching south and southwest to the Egyptian frontier

down to Aqaba. This whole area would be joined to Trans-Jordan in a unitary Arab state.

Since Arabs would have land and population in the Jewish areas and vice versa, special provisions would have to be made in certain instances. Safed, Tiberias, Nazareth and Haifa in the Jewish state would, for a period, be kept under mandatory administration. Jaffa, situated in the British enclave, should form part of the Arab state and be given special opportunities of transit through the Jaffa-Jerusalem corridor. The Arab state should have access to Haifa for commercial purposes, and the Jewish treaty should provide for the free transit of goods in bond over the railway between the Jewish state and the Egyptian frontier. The same principle should apply with reference to access for commercial purposes to the Gulf of Aqaba. An enclave of the northwest coast of the Gulf of Aqaba should be retained by the Mandatory Administration, and the treaty should provide facilities for the free movement of goods between the mandated area, Haifa, the Egyptian frontier and the Gulf of Aqaba.

4. *Subventions, Tariffs and Ports.* Partition would deprive the Arabs living in Palestine of the higher level of public services made possible by the large surplus government revenue derived from the Jews. In view of the fact that the right of sovereignty granted to the Jews would give them certain benefits, they should be expected to help promote the welfare of Arabs outside their own area through the payment of a subvention to the Arab state when partition became effective. The public debt of Palestine also should be divided between the Arab and Jewish states.

The Arab and Jewish states would determine their own tariffs and the same would apply to the mandatory government, subject to the terms of the mandate. However, if the tariff policies of the different regimes should vary, great difficulties would be encountered. An essential part of the proposed treaty therefore would be a commercial convention establishing a common tariff over the widest possible range of articles designed to facilitate the freest possible interchange of goods between the three territories concerned.

Smooth working of partition would be promoted if a collection of customs at the ports were endorsed for a period to the mandatory government. The mandatory government would collect the custom duties and remit the sums to the respective states. This would apply not only to Haifa and Acre, which would for a time remain under mandatory administration, but also to Jaffa and Tel-Aviv. The port at Haifa would be under British control. A second deep-water port might subsequently be built as a joint harbor for Jaffa and Tel-Aviv to be controlled by a joint Harbor Board composed of representatives of the Arab and Jewish states and presided over by an officer of the mandatory government.

In the event of partition, agreements entered into by the government of Palestine for the development and security of industries (e.g., the agreement with the Palestine Potash Company) should be taken over and carried out by the governments of the Arab and Jewish states. Guarantees to that effect should be given in the treaties. The security of the electric power station at the juncture of the Yarmuk and the Jordan should also be guaranteed.

5. *Nationality and the Exchange of Land and Population.* All persons domiciled in the mandated area, including Haifa, Tiberias, Safed and the enclave on the Gulf of Aqaba (as long as they remain under Mandatory Administration) who now possess the status of British protected persons, would continue to do so. Apart from this, all Palestinians would become the nationals of the states in which they are domiciled.

If partition is to be effective in promoting a final settlement, there must be, sooner or later, a transfer of land and an exchange of population in order to make each state as homogeneous as possible. The Treaties should provide that, if Arab owners of land in the Jewish state or Jewish owners of land in the Arab state, should wish to sell their land and any plantations or crops, the Government of the State concerned should be responsible for the purchase of such land at a price to be fixed, if required, by the Mandatory Administration. For this purpose a loan should, if necessary, be guaranteed for a reasonable amount.

The existence of large minorities in either state would constitute the most serious hindrance to the smooth and successful operation of partition. The problem of compulsory transfer must therefore be boldly faced. The exchange of Greek and Turkish populations in 1923-1924 indicated that despite recognized difficulties, a vigorous and courageous dealing with the problem can lead to a removal of irritations and the establishment of friendly relations in the outcome. Although Dr. Nansen, who supervised the exchange of populations, was first sharply criticized for the alleged inhumanity of his proposal, it is now generally recognized that the operation was wise and of permanent benefit to both sides.

However, the analogy of Palestine with the Greco-Turkish situation (as the Royal Commission proceeds to say) "breaks down at one essential point." In the former instance, a surplus of cultivable land was available for the settlement of the evacuated Greeks. Although the Jews own some land in the area assigned to the proposed Arab state, the amount is not large and would not suffice even if exchanged for Arab holdings in the Jewish section for the resettlement of any large number of Arabs. The problem, however, could be solved through large-scale plans for irrigation, water storage, and the development of Trans-Jordan and Beer Sheba. Such developments



would make room for a much larger population in these areas. The cost of such proposed developments would be larger than the Arab state could bear, and Parliament should be asked to make a grant to meet such a scheme.

*The Jewish Criticisms of the Royal Commission Proposal*

The Twentieth Zionist Congress, meeting at Zurich in 1937 and the meeting of the Council of the Jewish Agency which immediately followed, rejected as unacceptable the scheme of partition put forward by the Royal Commission, but directed the Executive of the Jewish Agency to enter into negotiations with the British Government to ascertain the precise terms of of the proposed establishment of the Jewish state. The Executive of the Jewish Agency never submitted formal representations on the question of partition, but it appears that the Jewish authorities in Palestine presented criticisms of the proposed partition plans and made suggestions for partition which would possibly be more acceptable. One outstanding difference between the Jewish plan and that of the Royal Commission related to the question of transfer of populations. Although the Jewish plan was not opposed to voluntary transfer, it did not depend on it for a solution. Underlying the Jewish view was the belief that Palestine's absorptive capacity could be greatly developed if scope were given to the Jewish effort, and that there would be room for a substantial Arab minority in the Jewish state who would be satisfied to remain because of superior economic conditions and because they would be given equality of opportunity and full cultural, educational, and religious autonomy.

There were two major Jewish criticisms of the partition plan as proposed by the Royal Commission: 1) that the area assigned to the Jewish state was too small and gave inadequate development opportunities; 2) it excluded Jerusalem with its large Jewish population from the Jewish state. With reference to the first point, the Jewish plan of partition added the following areas to the Royal Commission plan:<sup>83</sup>

- (a) An additional area in the Gaza sub-district (only a small portion of the Gaza sub-district would be included in the Jewish State) ;

83. *Ibid.*, pp. 111-112. For full plan see Map 7 in the appendix of the *Palestine Partition Commission Report*.

- (b) A part of the Beer Sheba sub-district;
- (c) The southern portion of the Beisan Plain;
- (d) An area on the eastern side of the River Jordan lying between the Yarmuk River on the north and a line opposite the southern edge of the Beisan Plain on the south, and bounded on the east by a line drawn in the hills overlooking the Jordan Valley. (This area is situated in Trans-Jordan.)

The separation of Jerusalem from the Jewish state was severely attacked by the Jews of all parties. The Jews agreed that the Holy Places of Jerusalem—Christian, Moslem and Jewish—should be entrusted to the Mandatory Power as an international trustee. These Holy Places, however, were concentrated in the Old City and the need for a special regime for that part of Jerusalem could not justify the exclusion of the whole city from the Jewish state. A memorandum presented by Jews to the Partition Commission stated the situation as follows:<sup>84</sup>

. . . It has been truly said that Jewish Palestine without Jerusalem would be a body without a soul. Jerusalem has throughout the ages been the spiritual centre of the Jews, dispersed as they were over the face of the earth. . . . It is a symbol of Jewish national life and practically synonymous in the minds of Jews with Palestine. Throughout the ages, Jews have persisted, in spite of all obstacles, in attempting to re-establish themselves in Jerusalem. In this latest phase of the Return to Zion, Jews have built the greater part of the new Jerusalem outside the city walls. This area outside the walls has a Jewish population of over 70,000, forming an almost compact unit: it includes the central Jewish National and religious institutions—the Jewish Agency and Zionist Organization, the General Council of Palestine Jews, the Chief Rabbinate, the Hebrew University and the National Library and various foundations established by Jewish communities throughout the world. The separation of this Jerusalem from the Jewish State is an injustice to both. Apart from the special significance of Jerusalem, spiritual and political, the loss thereby entailed to the Jewish State in terms of population, economic position and taxable capacity would be irreparable.

As part of their proposals, the Jews suggested that the new Jewish Jerusalem, together with the western suburbs and an extension curving around the Hebrew University, where 71,-

84. *Palestine Partition Commission Report*, p. 73.

000 out of a population of 74,500 were Jews, should be included in the Jewish State. It was further proposed that the lines of the Jerusalem Enclave be redrawn so as to permit the new Jerusalem to be included with that part of the Jewish State which ran south of Jaffa. The Jewish proposal also suggested that the town of Hebron, eight miles south of Jerusalem, important to the Jews because of its historical association<sup>85</sup> should be included in the Jerusalem Enclave assigned to the Mandatory Power.

*Criticism by the Woodhead Commission and Recent  
Partition Proposals*

While it was generally understood that Arab opposition was a decisive factor in leading the British Government to retract its decision to divide Palestine, the Woodhead Commission based its rejection of the partition proposal on practical grounds.<sup>86</sup> It held that the Royal Commission's scheme was unworkable for the following reasons: a voluntary transfer of populations between the Arab and the Jewish states, in order to make each more homogeneous, was impracticable; until further investigation of the water resources, it was premature to assume that intensive new settlements could be created in Beer Sheba; improvements in the valleys where water was available would be costly; the Arab state could not be self-supporting; the proposed Jewish state could not be easily defended since no boundary could be found west of the Jordan which afforded a satisfactory strategic line. In sum, apart from the political difficulties, there were administrative, financial and economic problems which precluded any practical solution. The alternative plans diffidently suggested by some members of the Partition Commission were on the whole even less valid on economic grounds than the Royal Commission's proposal.

It must be remembered, however, that the Partition Commission was limited by its terms of reference, which prej-

85. It contains the burial place of the Patriarchs and was the first capital of King David. Before the disturbances in 1929, when the Jewish settlement was massacred, it had an important *Yeshiva*.

86. See above, Chap. XII, p. 868, where the alternative proposals put forward by some of the members of the Partition Commission are analyzed.

udiced their conclusions from the outset. The principle suggested by the Palestine Royal Commission for the partition of Palestine, i.e., to separate the areas in which the Jews had acquired land from those which were mainly occupied by the Arabs, was obviously calculated to base the proposals primarily on the existing status without giving adequate consideration to the possibilities of development. The directive indicated by the Permanent Mandates Commission gave greater consideration to the need of expanding the Jewish national home. It read: "Any solution to prove acceptable should therefore deprive the Arabs of as small a number as possible of the places to which they attach particular value, either because they are their present homes or for reasons of religion. And, further, the areas allotted to the Jews should be sufficiently extensive, fertile and well situated from the point of view of communications by sea and land to be capable of intensive economic development, and consequently of dense and rapid settlement . . ." <sup>87</sup> However, as the Partition Commission pointed out, the objectives of the first part relating to the Arabs were irreconcilable with the objectives envisaged in the second part designed to facilitate the Jewish development. In fine, the Partition Commission's judgment was conditioned by irreconcilable terms of reference, based largely on a static conception of the Jewish and Arab areas.

During recent years partition has been discussed in British circles in more liberal terms, with the primary objective of fulfilling the intent of the Balfour Declaration and bringing about a clear-cut solution of the Palestine problem with due regard to Jewish needs. The assumption is made that the absorptive capacity of Palestine can be greatly increased and that the Jews, though at present a minority in certain districts, could soon become a majority through a well directed scheme of immigration. One recent proposal suggests that there should be assigned to the Jewish state the whole of western Palestine less the "Nablus Triangle," (i.e., the Samaria District including the sub-districts of Jenin, Tulkarm and Nablus) which would be added to the Arab state of Trans-Jordan. The division of the British mandated territory of Palestine would be roughly as follows:

87. *Palestine Partition Commission Report*, p. 233.

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	<i>Sq. Km.</i>	<i>Total Population</i>	<i>Arabs</i>	<i>Jews</i>
The Jewish Commonwealth of Western Palestine	23,000	1,500,000	900,000	600,000
The Arab State of Eastern Palestine and Trans-Jordan	91,000	600,000	600,000	Negligible

Under such a plan, the Jews would still constitute a minority in the area set aside for the Jewish state. However, an immigration of half a million Jews within the next few years would create a working majority. The Jewish state would thus be set up, cultural autonomy and local self-government being guaranteed to the Arab minority. The increase in the ratio of Jews to Arabs could be accelerated if, simultaneously with a large Jewish immigration, assistance would be given to Arabs who consented to resettle in Eastern Palestine and Trans-Jordan. The additional population and financial aid for irrigation and improvement of cultivation would lift Trans-Jordan out of its stagnant, poverty-stricken condition and set it on the road to development.

### *Bi-National Plans Based on Parity*

The Jewish Commonwealth conception envisages a duo-cultural society in Palestine which may properly be called "bi-nationalism." Nevertheless, the assumption is that the Jews would ultimately constitute a majority and occupy the predominant place in the general life of the country. The term "bi-nationalism" in the stricter sense as applied to the discussion of the Palestine problem represents quite a different orientation: the heart of the idea is that Palestine should be considered neither an Arab nor a Jewish state exclusively or primarily; it should be regarded as the common country of both peoples. Thus, the bi-national programs for Palestine involve the idea of "parity": i.e., that the two peoples, Arab and Jewish, be equally represented in the various branches of government whatever the numerical ratio of the population might be at any time. Moreover, while an external international force may in the beginning be necessary to create the political and economic structure of the bi-national state, the assumption is that inner consent will in the end be necessary

for lasting peace and sound government. Therefore, in the bi-national conception, the promotion of mutual understanding between the two peoples through education and cooperative endeavor in the daily life becomes a primary element in the program of Zionist endeavor that must always be kept in the focus of attention and not be left to an incidental or to a secondary line of activity.

Bi-nationalist plans based on parity have been proposed only by Jews. Undoubtedly some British and American thinkers sympathize with these ideas, but for the most part Western leaders think in terms of the organization of society on the basis of the individual and are inclined to favor plans which assume the principles of rule by the majority alongside of a guarantee of civil and religious rights, and to an extent cultural rights, for the minority. At times some of the promoters of bi-nationalism have represented their conception as likely to be accepted by the Arabs because of its moderation. The Arab political leaders, however, have consistently rejected the bi-nationalist concept; nor has any Arab intellectual come forward to sponsor the idea. In general, it would appear that bi-nationalism rests on a social, ethical and religious idealism rather than on the experience of practical politics.<sup>88</sup>

Though representing a minority of the Jews of Palestine, the proponents of bi-nationalism and parity have been very active in presenting their views. The following summary includes proposals which are mainly concerned with promoting Arab-Jewish rapprochement in the social and economic fields as well as definite political proposals.

#### *The League for Arab-Jewish Rapprochement*

From the beginning of Jewish settlement in Palestine, some outstanding Zionists had criticized the main trend in the movement as being neglectful of the problem of Arab-Jewish relations. Ahad Ha'am, the formulator of "Cultural Zionism," had, as early as 1891, drawn attention to the seriousness of the Arab question. Itshak Epstein, an eminent Hebrew philologist concerned with the development of modern Hebrew, and a universally respected and beloved teacher in Palestine, writing in 1907, urged that "Zionists must reach an alliance with

88. For the criticism of the parity conception by the Palestine Royal Commission, see above, Chap. XII, p. 832.

the Arabs, whose cooperation will be won gradually through practical activities which will benefit the country, ourselves and them.”<sup>89</sup>

There had been several attempts to organize a society which would make Arab-Jewish cooperation its major aim—the *Brith Shalom* (Covenant of Peace) in the twenties and *Kedmah Mizraha* (Toward the Orient) in the late thirties. Distinguished writers and scholars participated in both organizations, but the number was relatively small. The general tenor of the criticism emanating from these groups was that the Zionist policy had failed because of the neglect of the Arab question. It was alleged that although the Zionist Organization had frequently made pronouncements in favor of cooperation with the Arabs, in practice it had done little or nothing to promote cooperation. Rather, it had based its policy on a pro-British line, believing that the Arabs would be reconciled to the Jewish national home partly because of benefits derived from its development, partly because they would in the end accept it as a *fait accompli*. The Zionists had underestimated the national and social consciousness of the Arab peoples. Certain policies of the Zionist Organization and practices of some elements of the *Yishuv* were diametrically opposed to Arab-Jewish rapprochement, e.g., the *Tozeret Haaretz* (Popularize Palestine Products), which in the guise of promoting native products, resulted in a boycott of Arab goods; and *Avodah Ivrit* (Jewish Labor), which, beginning with the idea of self-labor and non-exploitation of the Arab worker, in the end had the effect of a boycott against Arab labor.

In March 1939, at the time of the London Conference, there appeared a collection of articles published in Hebrew at Jerusalem, entitled “At the Parting of our Ways.”<sup>90</sup> Among those who participated were members of the old *Brith Shalom* and the *Kedmah Mizraha*, but there were some new personalities drawn from the intellectual circles of recent German immigrants. The contributors represented different views on Judaism and Zionism—the common ground was “a recognition of the importance of the Arab question and a desire to solve it in

89. M. Perlman, *Chapters of Arab-Jewish Diplomacy, 1918–1922*, Jewish Social Studies, Vol. VI, No. 2, p. 124.

90. *Al Parashat Derakhenu*, Jerusalem, 1939. The editorial board consisted of Rav Ben Binyamin, Robert Weltsch, C. M. Kalvarisky, Ernst Simon, and Jacob Petersail.

the spirit of mutual respect and mutual understanding—frankly, openly and honestly.”<sup>91</sup> Following this publication a new association was organized in August 1939, under the name, League for Arab-Jewish Rapprochement.<sup>92</sup> The object of the League was stated to be: “To unite all those who recognize the need to establish Jewish-Arab relations and to promote cooperation between the two peoples, as well as those who recognize the imperative need to solve the problem of Palestine on the basis of economic progress and the free development of Jews and Arabs along national, cultural and social lines.” Among the activities outlined were: enlightenment and propaganda by means of lectures and publications; promotion of the teaching of Arabic in Hebrew schools and of Hebrew in Arabic schools; courses designed to acquaint each people with the history, culture and customs of the other; the development of economic and cultural relations between Palestine and the adjacent countries. In connection with the resolution of the Twenty-First Zionist Congress (Geneva, August, 1939), which instructed the Zionist Executive to appoint an inquiry commission to examine Arab-Jewish relations, the League established a number of research committees on the economic, educational and social aspects, and especially a Political Commission for the discussion of a constitution of a bi-national state in Palestine.

During the summer months of 1940, after Italy's entry into the war, the League presented a memorandum to the Zionist Executive in which it urged that the Jewish Agency recognize the right of Arabs to establish military formations of their own for the defense of Palestine, alongside the Jewish formations. Moreover, although agreeing to separate national formations, they advocated that the Jewish Agency should not hinder Jews from taking part in mixed formations if they so wished. Other concrete suggestions were: joint activity of Jews and

91. The article by Dr. Kalvarisky includes a statement of various programs proposed by him, as well as one submitted in 1919 to King Faisal and to the All-Syrian Congress. An outstanding article is by M. Erem of the Socialist Zionist Party (*Left Poale Zion*) who attacked the *Histadrut* Arab Labor policy as driving the Arab worker into the arms of a chauvinist feudal reaction. A summary of the article in English is available in the bulletin issued July 28, 1943, by the Hadassah Committee for the Study of Arab-Jewish Relations.

92. Dr. H. M. Kalvarisky was the chief promoter of the new organization.



Arabs for cooperation in air raid protection, establishing first-aid stations, and organization of volunteer fire companies; abandonment of the boycott against local Arab products and extending assistance to Arab villages in marketing agricultural products. They decried the attempt to make out all Arabs as fascist sympathizers and proposed that quick and solid support be given to any Arab groups and personalities who were ready to conduct anti-Nazi activities in the direction of promoting Arab-Jewish understanding.

The Socialist Zionists joined the League at the beginning. *Hashomer Hatzair* regarded the work of the League favorably, but thought that its attitude on the fundamental principles of Zionism had not been clearly expressed. Negotiations were carried on between the *Kibbutz Artzi*<sup>93</sup> and the League, looking toward the inclusion of a statement in the latter's constitution on Zionist principles: the right of Jewish immigration; the connection of the Jewish people with Palestine; opposition to a minority status in Palestine. The negotiations ended in a complete agreement and the *Hashomer Hatzair* joined the League for Arab-Jewish Rapprochement in the summer of 1942. The following principles were adopted as a basis:<sup>94</sup>

*General Principles of the League:*

1. The League is based on the assumption that the upbuilding of Palestine as the common homeland of the Jewish people returning to its homeland and of the Arab people settled in Palestine must be established on comprehensive and permanent mutual understanding and agreement between the two peoples.

2. The principle of the return of the Jews to their historic homeland for the purpose of developing their autonomous national life there—is a primary right beyond dispute; a primary right of the same order is the right of the Arabs of Palestine to autonomous national life and to connection with other sections of the Arab people; i.e., outside of Palestine.

3. The League shall act recognizing the right of the Jews to immigrate and to settle in Palestine according to the full economic absorptive capacity of Palestine and in a volume that will assure the growth and development of the *Yishuv* for full and autonomous

93. The representative body of the settlements associated with the *Hashomer Hatzair*.

94. The protocol was signed on June 23, 1942. The translation of principles is based on a circular issued by the League for Arab-Jewish Rapprochement dated August 6, 1942.

economic, social, cultural and political life in cooperation with the Arab people.

4. On the basis of principles of immigration as formulated in paragraph 2 above, agreed-upon quotas could be fixed for periods of several years; but the League shall oppose any tendency to crystallize the Jewish community as a minority in Palestine.

*Principles of an Arab-Jewish Agreement:*

1. Recognition of the right of the Jews to return to the historic homeland and to build in it their autonomous national life; recognition of the right of the Arabs of Palestine to autonomous national life in their connection with the other sections of the Arab people.

2. Non-domination—irrespective of numerical strength of the two peoples of Palestine.

3. Bi-national regime in Palestine.

4. Positive attitude towards the participation of Palestine, as an autonomous bi-national unit, in a federation with the neighboring countries when conditions have been prepared and after the basic rights and vital interests will have been secured for the Jewish people returning to its homeland and for the Arab people settled in Palestine.

*Functions of the League:*

1. To struggle within the *Yishuv* and the Zionist movement for a policy of rapprochement, cooperation and agreement between Jews and Arabs.

2. To strive for the consolidation of a corresponding force within the Arab community.

3. To develop activities among the Arabs in the domains of economic, social, cultural and political life.

4. Research.

5. Training of workers for activities among Arabs.

*Hashomer Hatzair Conception (Bi-Nationalism on the Basis of an Ultimate Jewish Majority)*

Although the attitude of the *Hashomer Hatzair* toward Arab-Jewish relations differed in important respects from the majority in the Palestine Labor Party, in practice it generally followed the *Histadrut* leadership until shortly before the war, when it began to work along independent lines. In May, 1939, for instance, in connection with picketing carried on at Petach Tikvah against the employment of cheap Arab labor by Jewish plantation owners, *Hashomer Hatzair* decided "to obli-

gate our comrades not to participate in picketing which may antagonize or injure established Arab workers even if voted by the majority of the local Labour Council.”<sup>95</sup> In February 1941, a special department of Arab activities was organized under *Kibbutz Artzi*, the representative body of *Hashomer Hatzair* settlements. Special efforts to increase contacts between members of the *Hashomer Hatzair* settlements and the neighboring Arab villages were made. Moreover, *Hashomer* found it necessary to formulate its point of view anew. At the Sixth Convention of *Kibbutz Artzi* in April 1942, the leader of *Hashomer Hatzair*, Meier Yaari, declared that since the Jewish state had now become the cornerstone of the policy of the Labor Party, *Hashomer Hatzair* could no longer subordinate its view for the sake of unity of program and a united political front of the Labor movement in reference to Zionism was no longer possible.

The *Hashomer Hatzair* position involved a critique of the policy hitherto followed by the Zionist leadership and the *Histadrut*, and included a statement of principles and line of action for the future.<sup>96</sup> It was alleged that Zionist leadership was never active enough in pursuit of a policy of rapprochement with the Arabs. To be sure, no agreement with the existing Arab leadership could have been achieved. The social-economic interests of the Husainis and Nashashibis were too far apart from the middle class and labor orientation of the *Yishuv* to have made collaboration possible. A more persistent effort toward collaboration, however, would have stimulated the development of more progressive forces; would have increased the sense of class consciousness among the Arabs; and would have facilitated the development of a new type of Arab representative—other than *effendis*, to speak for the Arab masses.

The analysis proceeded to point out that at the close of the war, new opportunities would arise for Arab-Jewish collaboration. With the defeat of the Nazis, the Arab leaders who were most active in anti-Jewish efforts should have been discredited. The social structure should have appreciably changed and new

95. *Bulletin of Kibbutz Artzi*, Department of Moshavah Activities, May, 1939.

96. Based largely on material compiled and translated by Avraham Schenker for the Esco Foundation for Palestine, and on other material supplied by the *Hashomer Hatzair* headquarters in New York City.

economic and social forces would have come into play. Four classes, or social groupings, were seen to be emerging: the *fellahin*; the Arab workers; the Arab middle class engaged in citriculture and in industry; the Arab professional class and intelligentsia. For each of these the *Hashomer Hatzair* program outlined a modus of collaboration.

*The Fellahin.* In the past, the Jews had tried to defend themselves against the competition of the cheap products of the Arab peasants by instituting the principle of *Tozeret Haar-etz*, which in effect later was tantamount to a boycott of Arab production. The problem of cheap Arab competition must be met in a more constructive way. The *fellahin* should be organized along cooperative lines parallel to the Jewish agricultural cooperatives. Both Arab and Jewish cultivators must be united in the support of a tariff policy designed to protect producers of both nations against the dumping of cheap products from neighboring countries. As in the case of immigration, the substitution of the boycott by a more constructive policy must be accompanied by political agreement which will gain the acquiescence of the Arab cultivator to the expansion of the Jewish settlement on the basis of an agricultural development plan adapted to the interest both of Jewish and Arab farmers. Moreover, picketing against Arab rural workers on Jewish farms was inconsistent with the policy of rapprochement and could not be effective against the penetration of cheap labor in the Jewish owned economy. The tactic to be adopted should include opposition to unorganized labor, and this opposition should be directed against the Jewish plantation owners, not against the Arab worker.

*The Arab Worker.* The endeavor of Jewish labor groups must be to help the Arab working class movement which, despite progress it has made in the war years, is still weak. The wages and conditions of work of the Arab laborer and artisan are still far behind the standards achieved by organized Jewish workers. The proposal of the *Histadrut* to base the organization of labor on separate national unions, Arab and Jewish, federated by an over-all organization, is not adequate. The concept of *Irgun Meshutaf* (Common Organization), which requires that Jews and Arabs be organized in single unions, is, in the view of *Hashomer Hatzair*, essential. The program of a Common Organization would be to reduce the amount of unor-

ganized labor within the country; the gradual equalization of different standards of living; the assurance of equal rights to work for the laborers of both nations in all fields of enterprise—Jewish, Arab and Government.

Cooperation with the Arab worker cannot come about so long as the program of "only Jewish Labor" is followed to the point of excluding all Arab workers from the Jewish economy. The first plank in policy would be to work out an agreement with a progressive Arab labor group based, on the one hand, on acceptance of the principle of mass Jewish immigration into Palestine; and on the other hand, on the affirmation of the equal right of Arab and Jewish workers in the field of economic endeavor. The Jewish and Arab labor organization would have a common interest in preventing the flood of cheap labor streaming into Palestine from surrounding countries. It is the view of the *Hashomer Hatzair* that a union between Arab and Jewish working classes will not only promote economic interests but also form a basis for agreement on constitutional questions in respect to Palestine's future.

*The Arab Bourgeoisie.* With the growth of Arab citriculture and the beginning of Arab industry in the cities, a middle class alignment has begun to develop which has common interests with the Jewish middle class in matters of taxation, imports and exports, etc. Indeed in recent times, common action between Arab and Jewish plantation owners has been more frequent than between Arab and Jewish workers.<sup>97</sup> From the *Hashomer Hatzair* point of view of class struggle, this development is not without its advantages, for it tends to weaken the lines of national cleavage and to strengthen class consciousness. The united front which is developing among middle class Jews and Arabs as against Jewish and Arab workers will gradually intensify the sense of the solidarity among the Arab-Jewish working class.

*The Arab Intelligentsia.* *Hashomer Hatzair* considers it

97. Meir Yaari (*On the Threshold of an Era*) points out that the *Histadrut* has in some cases appeared to the Arab worker not as representative of Jewish labor, but as a Jewish employer: he has most often come in contact with the *Histadrut* through the Solel Boneh Contracting Organization, which appeared as an entrepreneur competing with Arab industrialists and contractors rather than as a labor organization. The fact that the *Histadrut* is an employer of labor as well as a labor organization complicates the issue and "does not advance the common cause of class struggle of the workers of both nations."

quite possible that a new political grouping will arise in Palestine formed of progressive Arab intellectuals and class-conscious workers. The Jewish labor organizations should look with favor on such a possible development. Arab workers and peasants will not readily accept the aid of Jewish socialist parties unless there is a parallel movement from the Arab intelligentsia. The Arabs must have their own leaders who will fight for their social and national freedom, who will take on the tasks of bringing socialist ideas to their own people, and who will seek the cooperation of their allies among the Jewish people.

Besides a policy of cooperation with each of these class groupings, *Hashomer Hatzair* program calls for a general over-all political understanding as a basis for permanent agreement with the Arabs of Palestine and the Middle East. Such a program must have two aspects: it must aim to obtain Arab agreement to Jewish immigration in such proportions as will allow, in the course of years, the concentration of millions of Jews in Palestine and in neighboring Arab countries; on the other hand, it must satisfy the social and national aspirations of the Palestine Arab, guaranteeing the autonomy of the Arabs within the framework of a Palestine bi-national state and an Arab Federation which will include Palestine and the nearby countries. However, "Palestine should not become an integral part of an Arab Federation until the full political autonomy of the Jews will be guaranteed and until they become a numerical majority."<sup>98</sup>

It is made clear, however, that the achievement of the free agreement aimed at is conceived as a matter of slow development, to be consummated in the future. Until the time when a progressive socialist movement develops among the Arabs and an agreement is reached through negotiation with a duly elected Arab leadership, the Jews must continue to "demand that the United Nations and the British Empire carry out their obligations under the Balfour Declaration." The main issue of Zionist policy must still be mass immigration, concentrated settlement on free lands, the right of autonomy of the *Yishuv*, and the right of defense of the *Yishuv*. Moreover, after a formal understanding shall have been reached with an authoritative Arab leadership regarding main points of policy,

98. Meir Yaari, *On the Threshold of an Era*.

including the status of Palestine, immigration, colonization and political cooperation with neighboring countries, even then international guarantees based on the Balfour Declaration will be needed until the Jews are secure from the danger of remaining a minority.

*Palestine Committee on Constitutional Development*

In collaboration with the *Hashomer Hatzair*, the League for Jewish-Arab Rapprochement named an independent committee,<sup>99</sup> the majority of whose members were not affiliated with the League, for the purpose of submitting to the Agency definite proposals on a political and constitutional basis for the solution of the problem of Arab-Jewish relations in Palestine.<sup>100</sup> The Committee began its work in February 1940 and published a draft report in June, 1941.

No terms of reference were specified in the appointment. The Committee, at their first session held in Tel-Aviv on February 19, 1940, stated that their inquiry would be limited by two conditions: 1) It would, on the one hand, "preclude any ultimate solution that would artificially or arbitrarily curtail or limit the Jewish right to immigrate to Palestine, economic circumstances permitting"; 2) it would consider only such solutions as would "systematically promote the rapprochement between Jews and Arabs and simultaneously render active aid to the Arabs in solving their own economic and political problems in an equitable manner through joint efforts with the Jews." The Committee considered the question of immigration to be the main difficulty. For a transitional period it was ready to consider quota arrangements in order to mitigate the Arab fear of being swamped by a mass Jewish immigration. For a permanent solution it was necessary to work out "a system of relations which would divest the question of numerical preponderance of all practical significance . . ." They argued

99. The members of the committee included representatives of *Hashomer Hatzair* and of the *Left Poale Zion*, and prominent German Zionists who had recently immigrated to Palestine.

100. This was in line with the resolution taken at the Twenty-Third Zionist Congress, which met at Geneva in August, 1939, instructing the Zionist Executive "to appoint an Inquiry Commission to examine Jewish-Arab relations in the political, economic, cultural, and social fields, to determine the possibilities of collaboration between Jews and Arabs in all these branches of activity, and submit their conclusions and proposals to all the various institutions of the Zionist movement.

further that the principle of non-domination accepted by all Zionist bodies was "intrinsically incapable of implementation in an either wholly Arab, or wholly Jewish, state." The constitution should reflect the bi-national character of Palestine, and this meant that the sovereignty over the country should be held jointly and equally by two units constitutionally recognized as of equal weight and status, one representing the Jewish, the other, the Arab, interests.

The central idea in the Committee's Report is that to make non-domination work in a bi-national state implies accepting the principle of parity, which is defined as follows: "The essence of parity is in the equality of numerical representation. It ranks the component units of a state notwithstanding any difference in the numerical voting strength of their electors." The Report recognizes that parity entails the danger of a deadlock and for that reason endeavors to limit its use to crucial issues. In ordinary legislation the Committee believes that some Arabs would vote with Jews and some Jews with Arabs, in accordance with their economic and social interests. The parity clause would come into play by two-thirds vote of either community when it felt its basic rights endangered. The Committee admits that the bi-national state would require a complex set of guarantees, checks and balances, but it thinks that the scheme would be workable if accompanied by proper safeguards against anti-racial and anti-religious agitation and against discrimination in the economic life. The organization of a general federation of Middle East countries, the Committee believes, would have a favorable effect on the willingness of Arab leaders to accept a bi-national solution.

In their constitutional proposals they outline two schemes: 1) Regional Federation; 2) Communal Federation. Under the scheme of Regional Federation, Palestine would be divided into two parts—one predominantly Jewish, the other predominantly Arab.<sup>101</sup> The regions would administer their internal affairs within limitations defined by the constitution, and together they would maintain the Federal Government and constitute the two component units of the parity system. Within

101. However, there would be two Federal areas: 1) Jerusalem, the capital, would, like Washington, be under Federal jurisdiction; 2) the *Negev*, which would be open to settlement by citizens of both the Jewish and Arab regions, without discrimination.



each region, the principles of equality of all inhabitants would be assured, two official languages recognized, and educational freedom granted to the minority. Immigration and control of land legislation would be in the hands of the predominant nationality in each region. The basic laws—civil, commercial, criminal—would be federal, but the administration of justice would be regional, with a Federal Supreme Court as a higher court of appeals. The police force would be under the control of each region, but under the supervision of a Federal Minister of the Interior. The military force would consist of a small standing army and a voluntary militia; parity being maintained as far as possible in the officer corps. A Federal Civil Service College would be established with an equal number of students from each region, and parity would be maintained in the civil services. Education, health, social welfare, economic development and labor legislation would be within the regional competence; but the Federal Government would exert its influence through stipulating minimum standards, exercising supervision and granting subsidies. Foreign affairs, transportation, harbors and public works would be in the hands of the Federal Government. Taxation would be partly federal and partly regional. There would be a Federal Parliament of two chambers including: 1) a House of Representatives, elected by democratic suffrage; 2) a State Council composed of an equal number of representatives from each region. The President and Vice-President would be, alternately, Jew and Arab. Each region would have a single chamber parliament.

In the second plan—Communal Federalism—the citizens of the country would be divided into two communities, one Arab, the other Jewish. The community citizenship would pass on by inheritance, but could be changed through special formalities. The communal organization could be developed on principles already laid down in the Religious Community Ordinance in Palestine which has served as the means of organizing the Jewish Community. Each communal organization, headed by a National Council, would have a double function to perform—of administering its own internal affairs, and of participating as a body in the management of the State affairs within a system of parity. The functions of the communal government would embrace education, public welfare and

social service, and the National Councils of each community would have the power to impose certain taxes over and above the general taxes levied by the State. As in the case of the regional scheme, there would be a parliament consisting of two chambers—a House of Representatives and a State Council, the latter equally divided between the two communities. The Executive would consist of two Jews and two Arabs, each of the four acting as President for one year in rotation. Parity would be observed in the federal civil services, the officers corps, etc. Both the state and communal taxes would be collected by the Federal Government and only the communal taxes for education, health and social service would be fixed by the communities. Immigration would be controlled by the Federal Government. The constitution should guarantee the right of Jews to immigrate to the full measure of the economic absorptive capacity of the country. But there would be a transitional period, of about ten years, in which immigration would be restricted in accordance with a prior agreement. The limitation should be based on a quota of numbers, not on a percentage basis.

Both in the transitional period and later, immigration should be subject to the economic absorptive capacity of the country, and to determine this a small Immigration Board should be elected, consisting of an equal number of Arabs and Jews. The members of this Board should be elected for life or for a long period so as to be free from political pressure. The Committee believes that a tradition of objective and impartial decision could be built up. If the Board, however, should not be able to agree, the decision would go to the Cabinet, and failing of agreement there, the President would cast the deciding vote. Since the President would alternate from year to year, the scheme would assure justice without being subject to a deadlock. The acquisition of land would also be made subject to safeguards and a similar procedure, as in immigration, would be followed, involving a Land Transfer Board outside parliamentary jurisdiction.

The Committee emphasizes the importance of the social-economic factors. Occupational intermingling would be encouraged; both Arabs and Jews should be represented in the various vocations; equalization of the standards of living of Jews and Arabs would be part of state policy. For a considerable

period of time this would mean a transfer of funds from the Jewish region or community to the Arab section of the population.

*Bi-nationalism on the Basis of a Jewish Minority  
or of Numerical Parity*

The proposals for bi-nationalism outlined above are opposed to the limitation of Jewish immigration by political considerations. They either—as in the case of *Hashomer Hatzair*—make an ultimate Jewish majority a prerequisite, or—as under the plan of the Committee on Constitutional Development—make no absolute statement about numerical ratio but imply a maximum immigration restricted only by economic absorptive capacity. There is no political party or organized group which has advanced the bi-national idea on any other basis, but a number of individual suggestions have been made.

*Viscount Samuel and Bi-Communalism Under the Mandate.*<sup>102</sup> As an alternative to partition, Viscount Samuel (formerly Sir Herbert Samuel) offered, in 1937, a plan which included the following points:<sup>103</sup>

1. A limitation of immigration for a period of time during which the Jews should not exceed forty percent of the population.
2. In those districts of Palestine which are now predominantly Arab and wish to remain so, the sale of land to Jewish purchasers or their agents should be subject to legal restriction.
3. The opening up of Trans-Jordan for development and settlement for both Arabs and Jews, with the financial assistance of the British Government.
4. Recognition of the national aspirations of the Arabs and the promotion of a great Arab confederation in the Middle East.
5. A guarantee by the League of Nations of the sanctity of the Holy Places of Islam in Palestine.

It was Viscount Samuel's opinion that no final solution of the constitutional structure of Palestine should be devised at that time. The Mandate should be continued. In addition to the Jewish Agency, an Arab Agency should be created with the

102. Viscount H. Samuel, *Parliamentary Debates, Lords*, July 20, 1937; "Alternatives to Partition," *Foreign Affairs*, October, 1937; "Palestine, The Present Position," *The Contemporary Review*, July, 1939.

103. See above, Chap. XII, p. 880.

power to prohibit land sales in territories which are now predominantly Arab. Two communal organizations should be set up along the lines of the Palestine Religious Community Ordinance which would have large powers in the matter of education, public health, agricultural development and local self-government. A Central Council for Palestine, representing the two communities but not based on numerical population, should be set up, with British officials present to render help and to advise. The Central Council should have an advisory character at the outset but its powers might later be increased. Viscount Samuel thought that if schemes such as this could be implemented for a period of years the two peoples would learn to cooperate and a constitutional form could then be developed through the consent of both peoples.

*The Kalvarisky Proposal.* In a letter addressed to the Jewish Agency, dated London, March 5, 1939, Dr. C. M. Kalvarisky, the persistent advocate of Arab-Jewish rapprochement, outlined an alternative to the proposals of the Government which were being discussed at the time and which later appeared in the form of the White Paper. He repeated the usual first principles laid down by Jewish bi-nationalists, that Palestine is a country common to Jews and Arabs, and declared that any solution must take into account the right of the Jews to establish their national home; the aspiration of the Arabs for independence; the right of Jewish immigration; the principle of non-domination. The following are the clauses of the agreement proposed:

1. The Mandate shall be terminated after a transitional period of ten years.
2. During this ten year period Jewish immigration shall be permitted until the Jewish population reaches parity with the Arabs.
3. At the end of the above period an independent bi-national state shall be created based on parity in legislative and administrative bodies.
4. During the transitional period the country shall be governed under the supervision of the Mandatory Power by a Council of Ministers and a Legislative Council to be created immediately and on which Jews and Arabs shall be equally represented.
5. When Palestine attains independence in conformity with the conditions outlined, the country shall become an autonomous part of an Arab Confederation as soon as such a body is formed.

6. Practical schemes shall be drawn up for economic cooperation on a broad basis between the Jews and Arabs and for joint development of Palestine and other Arab countries and for Jewish colonization in neighboring countries.

Kalvarisky says that conversations which he had held during the previous year with Arab leaders—some of whom were then attending the Round Table Conference in London as representatives of the Palestine Arabs—led him to believe that if an Arab Federation were organized and if “the Jews proved their desire for cooperation with the Arabs,” consent could be obtained for a government based on bi-nationalism and parity. He further says that some of the Arab leaders went so far as to waive their objections to an ultimate Jewish majority.

However, the “Arab suggestions” which Kalvarisky appends to his plan seem to contradict his belief that the Arabs were ready to accept parity of numbers, not to say an ultimate Jewish majority. According to Kalvarisky’s own account, the Arabs were willing to accept a bi-national, autonomous Palestine, and a Legislative Council and Government based on parity; their suggestion included the substitution of the Mandate by a treaty with England and Palestine’s entry into the League of Nations and into a federation of Arab states. However, Jewish immigration during the agreed period—which they proposed should be ten to fifteen years—should not exceed whatever would be required to bring the Jewish ratio to 40–42 percent of the total population, and “under no conditions” more than 44 percent.

*Dr. Judah L. Magnes and the “Union” Idea.* From the beginning of his activity in Palestine, Dr. Magnes has been a consistent advocate of Arab-Jewish rapprochement, having been one of the early leaders of the *Brith Shalom* movement. Though often defending his view on practical grounds, it clearly rises from his religious and moral outlook, his belief in democratic cooperation and international comity. In urging a coming together of Arabs and Jews, he has been wont to lay stress on the common Semitic origin of both peoples. He believes that the natural sense of kinship has been disturbed by the Arabs’ fear of being dominated by the Jews. From this fear, he alleges, springs the Arab opposition to Jewish immigration and to the entire scheme of the Jewish national home.

He comes to the conclusion, therefore, that limitation of immigration is an essential element in achieving an understanding. While he has repeatedly denied that he counsels permanent minority status for the Jews, his recommendations indicate that the Jews must be ready to remain a numerical minority unless an Arab federation is organized. He says: "A bi-national Palestine as an autonomous unit within a larger unit is the direction in which thinking should be done."<sup>104</sup>

Dr. Magnes' most recent formulation of the problem appears in an article in *Foreign Affairs*, January, 1943. Essentially, he restates his old position: that the demand for a state on the part of both Jews and Arabs must lead to conflict and that if the danger of civil war is to be averted, an alternative based on a reasonable compromise must be reached. He no longer hopes, however, that such a compromise will be achieved through negotiation between the Jews and the Arabs; moreover, he now thinks that Great Britain's authority in the Middle East has been so impaired that His Majesty's Government, unaided, can no longer be depended upon for imposing the necessary compromise. He urges, therefore, that the moral and political support of the United States be brought into play to help Great Britain to "re-establish the authority necessary to keep Palestine from becoming a menace to the world's peace."

He suggests the selection of a few Englishmen and Americans to cooperate with Jews and Arabs in canvassing possibilities. In the meantime he proceeds to give the general outline of the kind of compromise which he thinks "might be imposed upon the Jews and the Arabs by a sufficiently high moral and political authority without giving reasonable cause for rebellion." The basic idea is "Union": this "must be the guiding political ideal of the United Nations if they are to achieve victory." Union for Palestine has the following three aspects:<sup>105</sup>

1. Union between the Jews and the Arabs within a bi-national Palestine.
2. Union of Palestine, Trans-Jordan, Syria and the Lebanon in an

104. See "Palestine and Arab Union," *Bayoth Hayom* (Problems of the Day).

105. *Foreign Affairs*, January, 1943, p. 243.

economic and political federation. These lands form a geographical unit and constituted a political and economic union several times between ancient Semitic days and the First World War.

3. Union of this federation with an Anglo-American union which is assumed to be part of that greater union of the free nations now laboring to be born out of the ruins of the decaying world.

Dr. Magnes recognizes that immigration is the crux of the problem. However, the question of numbers, he avers, would lose its primary significance for the Arabs once a federation of the four states mentioned in his plan was created. Since in such a federation the Arabs would have a population of several millions, they would lose their fear of being dominated by a Jewish majority in Palestine. But until a federation is formed, Dr. Magnes maintains, Jewish immigration would have to be limited. He suggests two basic provisions:

First, whatever percentages and periods might be fixed, the Jewish population would never be permitted to become more than one-half of the total population.

Second, instead of dividing Jewish immigration into equal yearly quotas, as large a number as was economically possible should be admitted in the years immediately following the close of the war, to mitigate the fate of thousands of homeless Jews.

This solution he regards as still falling short of a completely satisfactory one because it continues to involve the majority-minority complex, but he believes it to be the best compromise that can be accomplished until an Arab federation is achieved, which he evidently feels is the key to a final solution. The Jews, he thinks, can be an important factor in the creation of the proposed federation through lending scientific, financial, social, industrial and agricultural assistance. He suggests an economic union of Palestine, Trans-Jordan, Syria and Lebanon, as the first step toward promoting a political federation.

Another feature of his plan is to make Jerusalem, the holy city of three religions, the capital of the projected federation:<sup>106</sup>

Geography and history alike fit it for this great destiny. Should it once again become a center of spiritual and intellectual exchange, it

106. *Ibid.*, January, 1943, p. 248.

will restore contact between Judaism, Christianity and Islam. So far these three faiths have failed in their efforts to create a society based upon ideals of righteousness and mercy. Yet despite the afflictions visited upon Israel in the Christian West, we may not despair of the West. And Israel, which once achieved great things for mankind in the Middle East, can acquire renewed youth and deeper wisdom if it is re-invigorated and rooted once more in the ancestral soil. The new Jerusalem, then, would symbolize a new relationship between Judaism, Christianity and Islam in the cradle of their origin; and in the new Jerusalem they would work out together part of their common problems with that old-new East which contains among its other elements the vast, vibrating, spiritual powers of Russia, India and China.

Dr. Magnes' article in *Foreign Affairs* reveals a number of changes from previous formulations. He still seems to lean in the direction of a ratio of 40 to 60 in the proportion of Jews to Arabs during the next ten-year period, but now explicitly makes numerical equality his ultimate goal. In the light of the need for a large immigration immediately after the war, he abandons the plan of equal annual quotas and instead suggests that an agreement be reached with the Arabs for dividing the total immigration to be allowed in accordance with the need at various periods. The most significant change in attitude, however, is his willingness to impose the compromise despite the fact that in the past he made "Arab consent" a prerequisite of any plan.<sup>107</sup> In a note he states that "Arabs of some consequence"—as well as Jews—are in accord with the general purport of his proposals,<sup>108</sup> and that if a clear compromise decision is made and firmly carried out, there would be no violence.

107. As late as 1937, in his speech on partition at the Session of the Council of the Jewish Agency on August 18th, he said: "Everything I have said and done in my life, as far as Palestine is concerned, from the beginning up to this day, has been based upon the fundamental thought that in what we do and what we plan, we should endeavor to get Arab consent."

108. It is noteworthy that while outstanding Jews have associated themselves with Dr. Magnes' proposals, no Arab of consequence—or of no consequence, for that matter—has given any public support to the type of proposal offered by him. Those who, like Professor Philip K. Hitti, sometimes mention Dr. Magnes' name with an air of approbation, interpret him as intending only a spiritual and cultural center and as agreeing to permanent minority status for the Jews in an Arab-dominated country.



*Proposals for the International Control of Palestine*

To the moral idea that Palestine is the cradle of two religions—Judaism and Christianity—and is sacred also to Moslems, the events of the last quarter of a century, and especially the experience of the two world wars, have added forceful material reasons for considering Palestine as a region which ought to be internationally controlled. Palestine has been rapidly regaining its ancient position as the highway of commerce between continents: it opens the way to trade from Europe to India and the Far East and occupies a key position in the whole structure of the Middle East, whose importance as a rich reservoir of oil and as an economic and strategic center, is becoming clearer every day.

Anne O'Hare McCormick recently gave expression to the time-honored theme of Palestine's international character in the following words:<sup>109</sup>

Of all places on earth it seems destined by history, geography and spiritual predilection to be inter-religious, inter-racial and international. How fitting it would be if this haven for a persecuted people, this holy land of three religions, this cradle whence branches of the human race started their tangled growth, this strategic pivot of air routes, sea lanes, land routes between East, West, North and South, should become headquarters of the universal peace organization the peoples of the world desire now as never before.

In another article of the same series, she quotes an American general who had studied the problem of Palestine at close range for a long time. His solution was "to make Palestine the first international state administered by a government composed of Jews, Moslems and Christians." Once international control was established, he would place no restrictions on immigration or emigration. "If the Arabs prefer to move to the neighboring all-Arab lands, they would be free to do so. The Jews would be free to come in to the limit of the absorptive capacity of the country."

However, the obvious reasonableness of the idea of internationalizing Palestine is matched by a conspicuous paucity of concrete proposals. Even the concept "international" has hardly been defined in relation to Palestine. Does the concept mean administrating Palestine by a condominium of nations,

109. *The New York Times*, January 10, 1945.

placing it under an international commission, or subordinating it to a sovereign international authority? Does international control signify trusteeship for a transitional period, or is it proposed as a permanent solution? Is it to be associated with a full implementation of the rights of the Jews under the existing Mandate, with due respect to the non-Jewish communities? Or, is it designed to safeguard the Christian interest in Palestine and to secure a position for the Christian minority out of all relation to its numerical strength? Is it directed toward the maintenance of the dominance of the present Arab-Moslem majority? Or, does internationalization mean the guarantee of freedom of movement into and out of Palestine, the maintenance of equality of opportunity, and the promotion of its development for the general welfare? Furthermore, a proposal to internationalize Palestine comes up against the hard fact that the world still lacks an effective international authority.

It will be remembered that during the First World War—in accordance with the Sykes-Picot Treaty of 1916—it was proposed to internationalize Palestine through a condominium of Russia, France and Great Britain. The administration was to be set up after consultation with the other Allies and the Sharif of Mecca.<sup>110</sup> The Mandate for Palestine under which Great Britain assumed responsibility for the Administration of Palestine, with the primary purpose of establishing the Jewish national home, implied, in theory at least, a form of international control. The Mandate was to be exercised on behalf of the League of Nations; the degree of authority of the Mandatory was defined by the Council of the League of Nations in the Articles of the Mandate for Palestine; and in accordance with Article 24 of the Mandate, “the Mandatory was to make to the Council of the League of Nations an annual report to the satisfaction of the Council as to the measures taken during the year to carry out the provisions of the Mandate.”

In effect, however, Great Britain exercised absolute sovereignty over Palestine. Neither the Arabs nor the Jews could directly bring a dispute before the League of Nations since they were not themselves members of the League. Even peti-

110. The plan was never worked out in detail since it was later abandoned in favor of British control under the authority of the League of Nations.

tions and objections could be forwarded to the League only through the British Government which had the right to make a comment in advance and to defend its position through a special representative. Although the British Government could send commissions of investigation at will, the Permanent Mandates Commission was not permitted to examine the situation on the spot. Any criticism made by the Permanent Mandates Commission of the actions of the British Government came after the fact, and recommendations for change in the future were in the category of advice which Great Britain could accept or reject. In the matter of the 1940 Land Regulations which implemented the 1939 White Paper, the high-handed action of the British Government led Mr. Clement R. Attlee, speaking on behalf of the Labor Party, to declare in Parliament:<sup>111</sup> "The action of the Government in making themselves the judge of their own case, in taking action contrary to the Permanent Mandates Commission's decision, and in disregarding the Council of the League of Nations, will cause . . . a very wide feeling that instead of acting up to their obligations under the Mandate, they are flouting the authority of the League and international law."

In the light of experience, the validity of plans for international control of Palestine must be judged by what is proposed on the controversial aspects of the Palestine problem, and what measures are suggested for securing the implementation of the decisions of the international authority. Unfortunately, suggestions made for the future international control of Palestine are not only few, they are also for the most part vague.

One proposal is suggested by Quincy Wright, authority on the League of Nations' mandates. Although the application of the Atlantic Charter to the Near East situation must logically eventuate in complete independence for Syria, Lebanon and Trans-Jordan, he considers the case of Palestine different because of the special interest of world religion in the Holy Land. He says: "Palestine is perhaps the outstanding area of the world in which self-determination is inapplicable because of the greater weight of external, as compared to internal, political forces in shaping its destiny." He believes that "a billion

111. *Parliamentary Debates, Commons*, Vol. 357, cols. 2057-2060, February 28, 1940.

adherents of the three religions outside of Palestine should outweigh the opinion of a million and a half people within the territory.”<sup>112</sup> He proposes, therefore, that Palestine “should be recognized as a permanently internationalized area in which the holy places are protected, and Jews, Christians and Muslims are allowed to develop their cultural and religious life in autonomous communities. To maintain such a situation would require an international organization able to defend and maintain order in the area.” This seems to imply that the ultimate decision with reference to matters affecting Palestine would be vested in an international authority which would consider the problems in their international scope with due consideration to the Jewish problem. However, on another occasion<sup>113</sup> he indicated that Jewish immigration into Palestine should be controlled not only by the capacity of the country to absorb a larger population, but also by consideration of the strength of the Arab opposition. The “realistic” view, that threat of violence is a primary consideration in determining what an international position should be, obviously undermined the whole concept of international authority. However this may be, Professor Wright’s proposal seems to be designed to protect the rights of the existing communities in Palestine and to strengthen the Christian position, and not to offer a solution which would give adequate consideration to the Jewish problem in Europe or to the aspirations of Zionism.

Mr. Norman Bentwich,<sup>114</sup> also an authority on the mandates system, has a more consistent international approach, as well as keener realization of the connection of Palestine with the complex Middle Eastern situation.<sup>115</sup> His view is that a transitional period of international supervision of the Middle East is essential to a permanent solution of the many complex problems of the area. Such a period would give an opportunity for a broader study of the political future of Palestine in rela-

112. Quincy Wright, “The Future of the Near East,” in Philip W. Ireland, ed., *The Near East, Problems and Prospects*, pp. 213–214.

113. At a lecture delivered before Hadassah on March 26, 1942.

114. Norman Bentwich was formerly Attorney-General of Palestine. Since 1932 he has held the chair of International Relations at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. He is the author *inter alia* of *The Mandates System* (Longmans, Green, 1930), *England in Palestine* (Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner, 1932), *Legislation of Palestine 1918–1925* (comp.) Alexandria, 1926.

115. Norman Bentwich, *Judaea Lives Again*, Gollancz, London, 1944.

tion to the neighboring lands. The United Nations should entrust the responsibility for administering Palestine not to a single Mandatory but to a body which would represent the interests of all groups concerned, including Arabs and Jews, and the educational interests of foreign religious bodies. The representative authority acting on behalf of the United Nations would control the amount of Jewish immigration, the policy on land settlement, the development of self-governing institutions during the transitional period, and would stimulate economic advance and promote the welfare of the population. He sums up his proposal as follows:<sup>116</sup>

The guarantors of the National Home after the war will be the world society directed by the United Nations. Great Britain has admitted in her last statement of policy that she has found the double trust of the Mandate hard to execute. She should welcome, therefore, the sharing of the trust with the other members of the United Nations. The international body, which, it is hoped, would include a Jew and an Arab, would be concerned not only with the scrutinising of the acts of the Administration—which is all the Mandates Commission of the League of Nations was allowed to do—but with the positive measures for the economic and social well-being of the peoples and their development towards self-government.

Sumner Welles makes a proposal to replace the present British Mandate by an international trusteeship which will exercise control over Palestine for a transitional period. During such a transitional period "all the outstanding international problems in the Near East could be equitably solved and the commonwealth of Palestine can be prepared to enjoy its independence." Under an international trusteeship Mr. Welles believes that "the number of Jewish immigrants permitted entry into Palestine would in the future be limited solely by the capacity of the land profitably to take care of them."<sup>117</sup> He recognizes that the problem of Arab-Jewish relations in Palestine is highly complex and controversial and he would encourage direct negotiations with the view to settlement of these basic questions between Jewish leaders and the leaders of the Arab world. But he believes that the problem can be solved in a spirit of justice only if the negotiations are undertaken

116. *Ibid.*, pp. 154–155.

117. Sumner Welles, "New Hope for the Jewish People," *The Nation*, May 5, 1945, p. 512.

under the auspices and with the assistance of the international organization. The success of the negotiations would be secured if the great Powers would press for it.

Though still essentially only an outline of position, the fullest suggestion for an international solution is that proposed by Carl J. Friedrich<sup>118</sup> in his brief study, *American Policy toward Palestine*.<sup>119</sup> In his opinion, American isolationism aided and abetted the wavering British policy of "progressive whittling down of the idea of the national home." He urges that, in line with America's departure from its isolationist past and its awakening to a new sense of international responsibility, the United States formulate a definite and explicit policy with reference to the future of Palestine. This, he submits, is required for a number of reasons: the growing acuteness of the Jewish problem in Europe and the pressure which it is bound to exert in the direction of admitting large numbers of refugees into the United States; the substantial economic assets of American citizens in Palestine as well as their interest in the oil resources of the Middle East; the unsettled conditions in the Middle East which are bound to remain a source of future international dissension unless clear-cut decisions are promoted and a firm policy adopted, backed by strong international action.

The new American policy with respect to the Jewish national home, Professor Friedrich suggests, would include the following:<sup>120</sup>

1. The removal of present restrictions on the movement of people into and out of Palestine;
2. The removal of restrictions to settlement and reclamation, such as restrictions on land purchase;
3. The removal of restrictions on the movement of goods into and out of Palestine, as far as practicable;
4. A program of rapid and large-scale economic development, including basic reclamation and irrigation works, industrial development, and the like, with a view to maximizing absorptive capacity;

118. Carl J. Friedrich is Professor of Government at Harvard University and Radcliffe College and a prominent participant in the activities of public interest groups. He is author of *Foreign Policy in the Making*, *Constitutional Government and Democracy*, and *The New Belief in the Common Man*.

119. Published by the American Council on Public Affairs, Washington, 1944.

120. Friedrich, *American Policy toward Palestine*, p. 54.

5. Opposition to all efforts to use political maneuvers, especially terror, for the purpose of preventing the development of a Jewish majority, should the Jews throughout the world continue to back development in Palestine and thus bring this about;

6. Participation in such international authorities as may be required to insure an unimpeded implementation of natural economic trends.

This approach to the problem of Palestine would be along the lines of the general American approach in other international questions and would be motivated by "our interest in peace, our interest in democracy, and our stake in world prosperity and economic development." He recognizes that such a policy runs counter to the present attitude of the British Colonial Office and that a large section of British public opinion is not in harmony with it. He sees in this divergence of views, as in other international problems, an issue "not between nations, but between the emerging world democracy and the forces of reaction and special interest."<sup>121</sup> He recognizes, moreover, that the policy will probably encounter Arab resistance, but he expresses the opinion that such a risk must be taken and that the events of the last quarter of a century have taught us that the passive policy of inaction is even more dangerous. In the method of handling the problem of the Jewish national home his main point is that the future American policy must rest upon the "conviction that problem areas such as Palestine call for recognition of their worldwide significance, rather than narrow local considerations."

The program which Professor Friedrich commends, it will be noted, gives no special privilege to the Jewish people as such; nor does it define the ultimate political status of Palestine or the form which the future government will take. Nevertheless, he believes that if the measures advocated were carried out—namely, the removal of restrictions on immigration and emigration, the promotion of a program of rapid and large-scale economic development, the firm maintenance of security—Palestine would have the opportunity of becoming a "Jewish commonwealth" in the sense that "it would be a self-governing country with an established Jewish majority as the preponderant factor in its future development." Needless to say,

121. *Ibid.*, p. 55.

his plan assumes that constitutional guarantees will be provided for equal rights for all sections of the population, and that the self-governing Palestine envisaged would, after its establishment, be associated with a regional federation under a wider international democratic structure. Professor Friedrich's conception is based on the conclusion that the British administration of Palestine was essentially restrictive of Jewish development rather than conducive to the facilitation of the Jewish national home and that, in reality, all that is needed to enable the Jews to build a flourishing commonwealth in Palestine is to grant them genuine equality of opportunity under international sanction for a full and free development of Palestine's potentialities.

Driven by the sense of urgency induced by the fateful events which have befallen the Jewish people during the past decade and a half, the Zionist movement felt impelled to define its purposes and to pursue its objectives with vigor. The overwhelming majority of Zionists subscribed to the program for establishing a Jewish Commonwealth, based on a Jewish majority, in Palestine. A definite settlement of the Palestinian question was not only advocated among Jews but also found expression in public opinion in England and in the United States. The British Government was however unwilling or unable, in the midst of a war for survival, to shift radically from its policy of the 1939 White Paper; and the United States Government, despite urging in Congressional circles and the commitments of both political parties, was unwilling to press its ally.

The Jewish Commonwealth program represents a middle-of-the-road position between that of the New Zionist and Jewish State parties of Revisionist ideology, and the bi-national state program of an important section of the Labor Zionists and other groups. It provides for a transitional period, during which the Jewish Agency is to be endowed with powers necessary to effect a Jewish majority, chief among these powers being control over immigration and authority to develop Palestine's natural resources. The Jewish Commonwealth is envisaged as a political order in which the Arabs will be guaranteed not only personal rights generally accorded in democratic constitutions, but also communal, cultural, and



religious autonomy. The Jewish Commonwealth will be "Jewish" primarily in the sense that it will be based on a Jewish majority. The proponents of the Jewish Commonwealth generally view with favor the entry of Palestine, under suitable conditions, into a Middle East federation.

The New Zionist and Jewish State programs are characterized by insistence on the immediate establishment of a Jewish majority, the demand for the inclusion of Trans-Jordan in the territory of Palestine, emphasizing the attributes of political sovereignty, while minimizing concern for the national status of the Arabs. The essence of the bi-national state program is that Palestine should be a state belonging equally to the two nations—Jewish and Arab. The constitution would provide for political parity regardless of the numerical ratio between the two nations. The bi-national program, perhaps more than that of the Commonwealth, affirms Palestinian entry into a Middle East federation. Various proponents of the bi-national program differ as regards the need for a Jewish majority, the League for Arab-Jewish Rapprochement and the *Hashomer Hatzair* parties deeming a Jewish majority a *conditio sine qua non*, while the *Ihud* group would be satisfied with parity or less, for Jews. The *Hashomer Hatzair* stresses increasing proletarianization of the Arabs, thus developing solidarity along class lines and eliminating the present divisiveness of mutually exclusive nationalisms.

While the Jewish Commonwealth, New Zionist, and Jewish State programs were being positively asserted, plans for partition, cantonization, or federation were well-nigh discarded, largely because of failure to arrive at a plan which could satisfy the Arabs and at the same time afford Jews scope for implementing their aspirations. All plans put forward are predicated on the absorptive capacity of Palestine. The Commonwealth, the New Zionist, and Jewish State Party programs all contemplate voluntary, not enforced, migration of Palestinian Arabs to neighboring countries, and only as an incidental, not primary, condition for accomplishing their respective programs.

In recent years, plans have been recommended for the internationalization of Palestine. These have however been vague as to Palestine's role as an answer to Jewish needs and Zionist aspirations.

# SUPPLEMENT

## PART I

### A DIGEST OF EVENTS PERTAINING TO PALESTINE: APRIL, 1945, THROUGH APRIL, 1946.<sup>1</sup>

**I**N THE year that followed the defeat of the Nazi military power, it became clear that the Palestine question was bound up with the whole question of eventual balance of power in the Middle East. The newborn United Nations had drafted the machinery for trusteeships, but action regarding Palestine was postponed pending the conclusion of the Anglo-American inquiry. In Palestine the Jewish community was openly resisting British restrictions on immigration. The Arab League was unifying the Arab states in which the chief point of agreement was opposition to Zionism. The Arab delegates to the United Nations exerted their efforts to restrict expansion of the Zionist program. The British were inclined to create and maintain an Anglo-American partnership in matters concerning Palestine, and when the recommendations of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry were made public, the first reaction of the British was insistence on maintaining that partnership.

#### *BRITISH AND AMERICAN ACTION*

Although the British Labor Party came into office in July, 1945, it did not make public its policy regarding Palestine until four months later. Since 1939, the Labor Party had been on record as opposing the White Paper with its land transfer and immigration restrictions. In May, 1945, at the Party's annual conference, Hugh Dalton, then a member of the Churchill Government and now Chancellor of the Exchequer in the Attlee Government, stated that the Labor Party had already made abundantly clear its position in favor of unrestricted entry of Jews into Palestine. He reiterated the Party's pre-

1. The sources for this paper were the Jewish Telegraphic Agency Bulletins and the general press. Except for some editing the paper is presented as prepared by Augusta Cohen.

vious commitments in favor of a Jewish state and urged that Russia as well as America be drawn into the future settlement of the fate of Palestine. "Having regard to the unspeakable horrors which the Jewish people had suffered," Mr. Dalton declared, "it was morally wrong and politically indefensible to restrict the entry into Palestine of Jews desiring to go there. Not all Jews might desire to go there; it was for them to decide. The Palestine problem, however, did not concern the British Government alone. Close agreement and cooperation should be secured between Britain, America and Russia, particularly if they were to assure not only the settlement of the Palestine question but of those connected with the surrounding countries. If such a settlement was to stand firm and unshakable, it was indispensable that steps be taken to get common support for the policy of giving facilities for the creation of a free, happy and prosperous Jewish State of Palestine."

On May 27, 1945, the Jewish Agency petitioned the British Government that Palestine be proclaimed a Jewish state. In addition, the Agency asked for authorization to bring to Palestine as many Jews as possible in order to speed development of the country's resources, and urged that an international loan be provided to assist in the transfer of Jews from Europe to Palestine, and that international facilities be set up for the emigration from Europe of all Jews desiring to settle in Palestine. This was substantially the position maintained throughout the year. The World Zionist Organization emphasized: "There can be no solution to the inseparable twin problems of the Jewish people and Palestine except by constituting Palestine undivided and undiminished as a Jewish state in accordance with the purpose of the Balfour Declaration. Any delay in the solution of the problem, any attempt at half measures, any decision which, however favorable, remains on paper and is not faithfully and speedily implemented, would not meet the tragedy of the hour and might only increase suffering among the Jewish people and tension in Palestine."

President Truman revealed at a press conference held on August 16, 1945, that he advocated free and open settlement of Palestine by Jews to the point consistent with the maintenance of civil peace. This, in effect, put the United States

Government on record as opposing the British White Paper and represented, now that the war was over, an abandonment of the policy of circumventing the Palestine question on grounds of "military expediency" which had been pursued by the State Department throughout the war. At the same time the President warned that he had no intention of sending 500,000 American soldiers to keep the peace in Palestine. The matter of a Jewish state, he said, would have to be worked out with the British and Arabs. Later, Secretary of State Byrnes announced that the United States was committed to a promise made by the late President Roosevelt in a letter to King Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia dated April 5, 1945, in which he gave his assurances that there would be no action taken hostile to the Arab people, and that no decision would be made by the United States Government with respect to "the basic situation in Palestine" without full consultation with both Arabs and Jews.

On November 13, 1945, President Truman disclosed that he had appealed to Prime Minister Attlee in a letter of August 31st to open the doors of Palestine to 100,000 displaced Jews in Germany and Austria; the Prime Minister had rejected this proposal. The President had based his recommendation on a report by Earl G. Harrison, Dean of the Law School, University of Pennsylvania, and American representative on the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees, who, as the President's special envoy, had made a survey of the displaced Jews in Germany and Austria. Mr. Harrison suggested their immediate evacuation and urged the opening of Palestine to Jews now in the displaced persons camps, contending that "there was no decent solution for many European Jews other than Palestine." Mr. Harrison urged the admission to the United States of the small number of Jews who wanted to come. This recommendation as well as representations made by a number of interested groups may have influenced the President in December to issue a directive under which a maximum of 39,000 persons (Jewish and non-Jewish) could enter the United States from Central and Eastern Europe and the Balkan countries on the pre-war quota basis. Meanwhile, the Harrison report had focused considerable attention on the plight of the remnant of European Jewry and had

highlighted the tragic situation of the displaced Jews in particular. Jews and non-Jews, Zionists and non-Zionists were shocked into the realization that the rehabilitation of the displaced Jews as well as of many of those in the Balkan countries would be well nigh impossible in Europe. The reasons were obvious:

Europe represented for them the graveyard of 6,000,000 Jews who had perished in the Nazi assault on civilization. There were few Jews remaining in Europe who had not lost their dear ones, and this accentuated their feeling of being cut off from all that was related to their past lives. The recurrence of anti-Semitism in Rumania, Hungary and Poland, where the governments had taken legal measures to outlaw anti-Semitism and where the authorities were nevertheless unable to curb underground fascist armies who were perpetrating pogroms against Jews, strengthened the conviction of many that Palestine afforded the only immediate possibility of rescue.

Even in Germany and Austria, under American administration, a tendency toward discrimination against Jews was not absent, despite the many efforts of commanding officers to provide adequate care for them. Mr. Harrison had reported that "as matters now stand we appear to be treating the Jews as the Nazis treated them except that we do not exterminate them." Later, when conditions had improved somewhat, he pointed out that he had not suggested improving the situation in the camps but abolishing the camps altogether. Again he stressed Palestine as the only practicable solution.

The vast majority of the Jews in the camps and a large number in the Balkan countries were determined to get to Palestine. They clung to this solution as the only one that would enable them to start life anew.

Thousands of lines of newsprint were consumed several months later when Lieutenant General Frederick Morgan, British head of UNRRA, charged in a press interview that there was a vast Jewish plot, engineered by an unknown secret Jewish organization, to get Jews out of Europe. He stated that he had seen an exodus of Jews from Poland, all of them well dressed, well fed, healthy and with "pockets bulging with money," and that he was not convinced by "all the talk about pogroms in Poland." By the end of the year, he predicted, there would be a "hard core" of 300,000 to 500,000 Jews in Germany,

"the seeds of World War III." Whatever validity lay in the Morgan charges, several indisputable facts emerged from the welter of statements, explanations and counter-statements which followed:

Thousands of Polish Jews were infiltrating the American zones of occupation in Germany and Austria; they were aggravating a situation which, as the Harrison report had indicated, was already proving insurmountable; and not only the 75,000 to 100,000 Jews in Germany and Austria but tens of thousands from Poland were determined to get to Palestine by any route they could take.

Clearly the situation of the Jews would have to be dealt with swiftly. The last of the certificates available under the White Paper quota had been exhausted; the European Jews were to some degree taking matters in their own hands by migrating as best they could toward Palestine; President Truman's proposal had been rejected and the British Government had offered no substitute solution.

The long awaited declaration of British policy came on November 13, 1945, when Foreign Secretary Bevin and President Truman announced simultaneously in London and Washington that the United States Government had agreed to the formation of an Anglo-American Inquiry Committee to study the question of the Jews in Europe and the possibility of their immigration to Palestine, as well as to appraise the situation in Palestine itself. Mr. Bevin indicated that it was unlikely that Palestine would provide a complete solution, suggested that there should not be an exodus of Jews from Europe, and was careful to draw a distinction between a Jewish home and a Jewish state.

The new policy was criticized by Dr. Chaim Weizmann, chairman of the Jewish Agency, as a repudiation of Great Britain's pledges. He condemned Secretary Bevin for drawing a distinction between a Jewish state and a Jewish home. The Zionist Organization of America accused the British Labor Government of violating its pre-election pledges, charged that they were attempting to reduce Jewish Palestine to "another ghetto," and called upon the United States Government to insist on the immediate entry of 100,000 Jews into Palestine, as delay would mean "doom" for the Jews of Europe.

Mr. Bevin's statement may be summarized as follows:

1) We cannot accept the view that the Jews should be driven out of Europe, or that they should not be permitted to live again in those countries without discrimination, contributing their ability and talent toward rebuilding the prosperity of Europe.

2) The British Government has a double obligation to the Jews on one side and to the Arabs on the other. Britain has made every effort to devise some arrangement which will enable Arabs and Jews to live together in peace and to cooperate for the welfare of the country, but all such efforts have been unavailing. The whole history of Palestine since the Mandate was granted has been one of continual friction between the two races, erupting at intervals in serious disturbances.

3) Palestine, while it may be able to make a contribution, does not by itself provide sufficient opportunity for grappling with the whole Jewish problem. The British Government is anxious to explore every possibility for giving the Jews a proper opportunity for revival.

4) Repercussions of the conflict between Jews and Arabs have spread throughout the world. On the one hand, civilization has been appalled by the sufferings which have been inflicted in recent years on the persecuted Jews of Europe. On the other side of the picture, the cause of the Palestinian Arabs has been espoused by the whole Arab world, and has become a matter of keen interest to their ninety million co-religionists in India. Considerations not only of equity and humanity but also of international amity and world peace are thus involved in any search for a solution.

5) In dealing with Palestine, all parties have entered into commitments. There are the commitments imposed by the mandate itself, and, in addition, the various statements of policy which have been made by His Majesty's Government in the course of the last twenty-five years. Further, the United States Government itself has undertaken that no decision should be taken in respect to what in its opinion affects the basic situation in Palestine without full consultation with both Arabs and Jews. Having regard to the whole situation and the fact that it has caused this world-wide interest which affects both Arabs and Jews, His Majesty's Government decided to invite the Government of the United States to cooperate with them in setting up a joint Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry under a rotating system to examine the question of European Jewry and to make a further review of the Palestine problem in the light of that examination.

To make such other recommendations to His Majesty's Government and the Government of the United States as may be necessary to meet the immediate needs by remedial action in the European

countries in question or by the provision of facilities for emigration to and settlement in countries outside Europe.

The Palestine question, Mr. Bevin announced, was to be dealt with in three steps:

Consultation with the Arabs with a view to an arrangement which will insure that there is no interruption of Jewish immigration at the present monthly rate pending receipt of the ad interim recommendations of the Committee.

Exploration of the possibility of devising other temporary arrangements for dealing with the Palestine problem until a permanent solution of it can be reached, after consideration of the ad interim recommendations of the Committee.

Preparation of a permanent solution for submission to the United Nations.

At a conference with American correspondents following his statement in Commons, Secretary Bevin stated that:

1) Palestine is to become a trustee state of the United Nations and in time will have self-government as a Palestinian, not a Jewish, state.

2) Britain will maintain the present monthly rate of 1,500 Jewish immigrants into Palestine monthly after the White Paper quota is exhausted.

3) The Arabs are now being consulted about Jewish immigration.

4) The great problem is assimilation. "A lot of these races form enclaves of their own and that is one of the things the world must get over. Assimilation is a vexing problem. All nations are frightened of racial developments within their states and the Jews therefore present a very difficult problem indeed."

5) Mr. Bevin drew a distinction between a Jewish state which he said "we did not undertake to establish" and a Jewish home, "and that we must fulfill."

6) "I am very anxious that Jews shall not in Europe overemphasize their racial position. The keynote of the statement I made in the House is that I want the suppression of racial warfare, and therefore if the Jews, with all their sufferings, want to get too much at the head of the queue you have the danger of another anti-Semitic reaction through it all."

In answer to questioning in the House, Secretary Bevin stressed the same theme: "I beg you at this crisis not to pursue racial antagonisms. The most difficult thing to settle in this



world is when racial antagonisms arise." At another point he stated: "I assure the House that Jewry, apart from the Zionist organization, Jewry as a whole, is anxious to see a final solution. The Arabs are meeting me very well and I thank them for it."

The Zionist bodies condemned the inquiry procedure and charged Secretary Bevin with prejudging the inquiry by asserting that Palestine alone could not grapple with the Jewish problem. They protested the distinctions drawn between Jewry and Zionists, between a Jewish state and a Jewish home. The Jewish Agency, on December 2nd, charged that the new policy maintained the White Paper which was condemned by competent international authority as a violation of the Palestine mandate and had been repudiated by the British Labor Party as a breach of faith. Insisting that every Jew "impelled by material or spiritual urge to settle in Palestine" may do so "as of right," the Agency emphasized that the establishment of a Jewish commonwealth in Palestine was compatible with "the full protection and the promotion of the interests of its Arab inhabitants and with the development of friendly relations with neighboring states." The Agency further stated that:

The Jewish people must reject any political settlement in Palestine which deprives it of its basic and internationally recognized rights, makes the entry of Jews into their homeland contingent on the control of others and condemns them in Palestine to a minority position which has been the cause of Jewish sufferings and degradation in other lands . . .

The Jewish people will not abandon the struggle for the attainment of its full nationhood and for a new life of national freedom and dignity in its own country. It will spare no effort and sacrifice until the restoration of a Jewish commonwealth in Palestine is achieved.

In accepting the British proposal for Anglo-American participation in the inquiry procedure, President Truman indicated that he still favored admission of 100,000 displaced Jews to Palestine, and that he favored creation of a "democratic state" in Palestine but opposed the establishment of a Jewish state or any other sovereign state based on "religion, race or creed." At the same time he withdrew his support from the

Wagner-Taft Resolution on Palestine which had been endorsed by him as well as by the Democratic Party in its pre-election platform.

Disregarding the President's opposition, Congress passed the Wagner-Taft Resolution, the Senate on December 17, 1945, and the House on December 19th. The resolution called on the United States to "use its good offices" to the end that Palestine be opened for the free entry of Jews to the maximum of its agricultural and economic potentialities, and advocated that the United States support "full opportunity for colonization and development" so that Jews "may freely proceed with the upbuilding of Palestine and the Jewish national homeland and in association with all elements of the population establish Palestine as a democratic commonwealth in which all men, regardless of race or creed, shall have equal rights."

#### UNITED NATIONS ACTION

At the San Francisco Conference (April 25-June 26, 1945) Palestine as such was not on the agenda, since, according to the agreement reached at Yalta by the Big Three, no discussions of specific territories were to take place at the United Nations Conference. Nevertheless the trusteeship system, which had a direct bearing on Palestine, was discussed and outlined. At San Francisco both Britain and the United States submitted proposals for the establishment of trusteeships. From the American draft it could be assumed that the United States was in favor of "international trusteeship," while the British spoke of "territorial trusteeship." Five Arab states were represented in the United Nations—Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and Syria—and at San Francisco their delegates acted as a bloc on all matters affecting the interests of the Arab League. They filed with the United Nations Secretariat the Pan-Arab Treaty which had been ratified in Cairo in March, 1945, by seven Arab states, including the above named as well as Yemen and Trans-Jordan. The treaty provided for cultural, economic and political collaboration between the Arab states. An appendix dealing with Palestine asserted that the legal independence of the Arab countries had been approved *de jure* by the League of Nations in Geneva; that Article 22 of the Versailles Treaty acknowledged their independence; and that when Palestine gained its *de facto* inde-

pendence, the decisions of the Arab League Council would automatically become applicable to Palestine. At San Francisco the Arab League delivered a petition to President Truman and Prime Minister Churchill demanding the transfer of the Palestine mandate to an Arab state.

The Jewish Agency submitted to the Conference a five-point program, asking for the constitution of a "free and democratic Jewish Commonwealth," abolition of restrictions on Jewish immigration, development of the country and aid in immigration and settlement. A further five-point supplementary memorandum, urging specific amendments to the various trusteeship proposals, was submitted later by the Agency urging the United Nations Conference on International Organization (UNCIO) to:

- 1) Include in the chapter of the charter of the United Nations dealing with international trusteeship a clause designed to preserve existing Jewish rights acquired under the mandate system of the League of Nations.

- 2) Center responsibility for the transfer of League of Nations mandates to the authority of the United Nations in the hands of the permanent members of the Security Council. In the case of any particular territory held under mandate by a United Nation not a member of the Security Council, the responsibility would be shared by the nation holding such mandate.

- 3) Define the beneficiaries of the trusteeship system so as to take into account the rights of the Jewish people as a whole to Jewish immigration and settlement in Palestine.

- 4) Qualify provisions for non-discrimination or the "open door" in regard to trusteeship areas by imposing requirements of reciprocity.

- 5) Vest the General Assembly and the Social and Economic Council with power sufficient to enable them to carry out their supervisory functions in regard to trusteeship areas.

Four basic principles of significance to the future of dependent territories and their people were embodied in the United Nations Charter: first, that administering nations should be accountable to the world community; second, that advancement of dependent peoples should be of primary concern; third, that dependent territories must be administered in such manner as to contribute to the maintenance of peace and security;

and fourth, that equal economic opportunity should be accorded to all member states of the United Nations.

Machinery was established for trusteeship of territories now held under mandate, the administering authority to be one or more states or the Organization itself; it would be a matter for subsequent agreement which territories were to be brought under the trusteeship system and upon what terms.

Articles 79 and 80 of the charter covering the disposition of mandated territories provided:

*Article 79*

The terms of trusteeship for each territory to be placed under the trusteeship system, including any alteration or amendment, shall be agreed upon by the states directly concerned, including the mandatory power in the case of territories held under mandate by a member of the United Nations.

*Article 80*

Except as may be agreed upon in individual trusteeship agreements . . . and until such agreements have been concluded, nothing in this chapter shall be construed in or of itself to alter in any manner the rights whatsoever of any states or any peoples or the terms of existing international instruments to which members of the United Nations may respectively be parties. . . .

This chapter shall not be interpreted as giving grounds for delay or postponement of the negotiation and conclusion of such agreements for placing mandated and other territories under the trusteeship system.

The adoption of Article 80, referred to frequently as the Palestine Clause, followed several unsuccessful attempts by the Arab League, first to provide for multiple trusteeships, and later to force Palestine under immediate guardianship of the world organization, apparently in order to achieve Arab control over Palestine and to obviate Zionist claims. The Soviet delegate also objected to Article 80 on the ground that it would freeze the entire mandate system in its status quo, without giving the people of British and French colonies a chance to improve their lot. The United States on the other hand took the position that the clause would serve as a temporary stabilizing force until subsequent agreements were made.

The definition of the "states directly concerned" came up in numerous discussions at the meetings in London of the United

Nations Preparatory Commission (in December), at the General Assembly (in January) and again at the meeting of the Social, Humanitarian and Cultural Committee (in February). A Yugoslav proposal made at the Preparatory Commission meeting, and endorsed by the Soviet Union, recommended that the mandatory powers and the United States, the Soviet Union and China be considered the "states directly concerned." This met with opposition from both the British and the Americans who proposed establishment of a temporary trusteeship council. No agreement was reached at that time.

At the January meeting the United States proposed that the Allied powers of the First World War, with the exception of Japan and Italy, be the "states directly concerned," while the British urged that the nations in proximity to the territory should be the states concerned. The British and American representatives continued to oppose the Soviet recommendation for participation of the Big Five in all trusteeship negotiations, the British apparently wishing to prevent the Soviet Union from being brought into Middle Eastern and Mediterranean affairs, and the United States to avoid the need for Soviet agreement regarding the Japanese islands. The Arab delegates, obviously having Palestine in mind, urged that not only territorial proximity but social, economic, linguistic and historical ties and the security of neighboring countries should also be determining factors. The Arab states later withdrew their proposal, reserving the right to raise the subject at a later date.

An American trusteeship resolution was finally approved by the Trusteeship Committee. It pledged the United Nations members "to accept the obligation to develop self-government among the peoples who have not yet attained it." However, the much debated question of "states directly concerned" was again by-passed.

On January 17, 1946, Secretary Bevin announced to the United Nations Assembly that Trans-Jordan would be established as a sovereign state. On March 22, 1946, a treaty was signed by Secretary Bevin and Prime Minister Hashim of Trans-Jordan terminating the British mandate. The treaty strengthened the British position in the Middle East, providing for the maintenance of British forces in the country at the time and obligating Trans-Jordan to provide lines of communica-

tion through the country. A measure of collective self-defense provided for mutual assistance in the event either nation became involved in hostilities as a result of attack by a third.

The American Zionist Emergency Council, in a communication to the State Department, requested the United States Government to withhold recognition of Transjordanian independence. They stated that separating Trans-Jordan from Palestine would violate the territorial integrity of Palestine, violate Article 80 of the United Nations Charter and run counter to the United States-British agreement announced on November 13th. The Lebanese delegation to the Arab League also expressed dissatisfaction with the terms of the treaty, in view of the concessions made to Great Britain regarding maintenance of military strength in Trans-Jordan.

Granting independence to Trans-Jordan added a sixth state to the Arab representation in the United Nations, and the anticipated entrance of Yemen will bring the number of Arab members to seven. The strength of the Arab states in the United Nations was also considerably enhanced with the election of Egypt as one of the six non-permanent members of the Security Council, of Syria to the Budgetary Committee, and of Lebanon to the Social and Economic Council.

### *THE YISHUV*

During the course of the year the *Yishuv* united in opposition to the British White Paper, to its limitations on immigration and land sales, to the concentration of troops and other manifestations of military rule in the country, and, above all, to the apparent refusal of the Mandatory power to permit entry of European Jewish survivors to Palestine. Acts of violence had been performed solely by extremist groups, the *Irgun Zvai Leumi* and the Sternists. The *Hagana* now emerged as a most potent force, serving at the same time as the moderator for the *Yishuv* between measures of militancy or self-restraint, and as the public forum for the resistance movement. The temper of the *Yishuv* could be gauged from the broadcasts of the "Voice of Israel" and from the pronouncements of the Jewish National Council.

At an emergency conference late in September, 1945, the Jewish National Council and the Zionist Actions Committee issued a joint proclamation appealing to the British people "to

prevent a calamity and to open the doors of Palestine to large-scale immigration of surviving Jews from Europe," and emphasized that Palestinian Jews would never submit to decrees which would prevent other Jews from entering Palestine. "Immigrants will stream to Palestine by all means," the manifesto warned.

On November 27th the Jewish Agency, in a communication to the State Department, charged the British administration of Palestine with introducing a reign of terror in Palestine "with a view to intimidating the Jews" into submission to the White Paper policy. An American correspondent of the Overseas News Agency was expelled by British authorities after reporting on October 19th that Palestine in October, 1945, was reminiscent of Greece in October, 1944. He cited the presence of large numbers of British troops and the sporadic clashes between the Jews, the police and the military as evidence that "the stage was being set by the British for armed intervention which the Colonial Office would describe as steps toward the prevention of massacres" among Jews and Arabs, and as efforts at the "establishment of law and order." The number of British troops in the Middle East was estimated at about 50,000; and when it made its report public in April, the Anglo-American Inquiry Committee stated that "the aggregate of persons in the whole-time police and prisons services of Palestine in 1945 was 15,000. The Committee also reported: "Palestine is an armed camp. We saw signs of this almost as soon as we crossed the frontier, and we became more and more aware of the tense atmosphere each day. Many buildings have barbed wire and other defenses. . . . It is obvious that very considerable military forces and large numbers of police are kept in Palestine. The police are armed; they are conspicuous everywhere; and throughout the country there are substantially built police barracks."

Rigorous censorship of the local press was maintained, especially of reports reflecting criticism of British policy in Palestine or in the British zone of occupation in Germany. Two Hebrew newspapers were temporarily suspended for publishing material of this nature although it had been passed by the censor.

Sweeping powers to curb illegal immigration were granted to the High Commissioner, and it was announced that the gov-

ernment would confiscate any vessel or aircraft used to smuggle in illegal immigrants. The actual number of visaless immigrants who landed was not established, but there was an indication that during the year there were several thousand. When the Government, in January, 1946, granted an interim immigration quota of 4,500 for a three-month period, 1,350 certificates were deducted for illegal immigrants. On November 15, 1945, the Government proclaimed that the death penalty would be meted out to persons bearing arms or any "warlike stores," and that life sentences would be imposed on persons in whose quarters arms would be found. The defense regulations were further extended in January to give almost exclusive jurisdiction to military courts over acts of terror. The death penalty was extended to "any member of any group or body committing an offense against these regulations." Visaless immigration was dealt another blow when it was ordained that vehicles, vessels, or aircraft engaged in the traffic would be forfeited.

Following the Bevin pronouncement in November, 1945, the Jewish National Council was even more emphatic than heretofore in its condemnation of the Mandatory power. On December 6th the Council declared that the "Jewish people's resistance cannot be conditioned by government-made laws or government consent," as the *Yishuv* "does not recognize the moral legality of laws preventing the rescue of those exposed to death and starvation."

In a manifesto on January 31st the Council stressed that while the issuance of the interim monthly quota "removes the public insult of consultation with the Arabs on even this pitifully small quota, three demands of the Jews remain unfulfilled—completely free immigration into Palestine, abrogation of the land laws, and recognition of the Jewish Agency as the body in which control over immigration and colonization should be vested." Appealing to the Arabs in Palestine and in neighboring countries to recognize the sincere desire of the Jews to assist them in developing the Middle East, the Council announced that "The Jewish nation will not accept a fate of eternal wanderings. We demand the right to establish our independence, guaranteed by the nations of the world, and we will defend our right with all our strength."

The "Voice of Israel" radio station declared, October 11,



1945, that an active resistance movement had been formed to assist the immigration of Jews into Palestine. Subsequently the station warned that "we will release our prisoners by all ways and means at our disposal," and openly claimed responsibility for various attacks on arms depots and coastal areas where illegal immigrants were attempting to enter. They charged British police with attempting to convince Arabs that the Jews were rising to attack them and accused the military of training men to disguise themselves as members of Jewish settlements in order to carry out raids on Arab villages. British troops were advised not to accept the "false indoctrination" they were receiving.

Late in December David Ben-Gurion and Moshe Shertok, representatives of the Jewish Agency Executive, were summoned to the headquarters of High Commissioner Cunningham and asked to appeal to the Jews of Palestine to end the terrorism. They declined to comply, stating that the organized Jewish community was not responsible, charging that the Agency's ability to combat the excesses had been nullified because of the Government's "violation of the fundamental laws of the country which was its mandate." The attitude of the leadership, although still condemnatory of violence, now hardened to blame of the authorities.

The *Yishuv's* solidarity with the resistance movement was perhaps best demonstrated in February when 50,000 Jews in Tel-Aviv attended the funeral of four raiders killed in an attack against a British police force at Sarona. For six hours the resistance movement controlled the city. Jewish newspapers openly published black-bordered obituary notices giving the names of the victims and their connection with the *Hagana*.

Having declared that it was resolved to defend the *Yishuv* from attack, to aid the entry of Jewish refugees from Europe and to deprive the authorities of weapons, which they charged were intended to be used illegally against the inhabitants of the *Yishuv*, the *Hagana* openly stated its intention to destroy military objectives, to capture arms for the above-mentioned purposes, and to aid the admission of immigrants in every possible way. A typical attack was that which occurred at the coast guard stations at Sidi Oli and Givat Olga in November. These posts were blasted as a reprisal action against the interception of Jewish immigrants. The British troops followed up

with a large-scale search for arms, for attackers and for illegal immigrants, which became the typical pattern for British retaliatory action. The troops, in that instance, invaded five near-by Jewish settlements using some 3,000 military vehicles and an estimated 20,000 soldiers. In the attack and the ensuing searches both Jews and British officials were wounded. The High Commissioner issued an official communiqué, which the Jewish bodies later charged was not true to the facts, the Government claiming that the military had acted with discipline and restraint and that the Jews had opened fire. The Jews protested that none of the settlers had had arms or weapons and that it was the British who had fired on the settlers. The British often conducted intensive house to house searches for attackers, for illegal arms, for illegal immigrants and for the headquarters of the underground radio. Thousands of Jews were detained for questioning; large areas were cordoned off and placed under curfew. The curfew was described by members of the *Yishuv* as the most stringent measure of all, because it hampered daily business and social life, prevented children from attending school and created an atmosphere of tension. That many of the "incidents" of violence were the work of young people, and that some involved adolescents became clear, as persons brought to hospitals after attacks were often under eighteen. The Jewish community criticized the authorities, pointing out that official communiqués were grossly exaggerated and that often a crowd of youngsters had participated against a regiment of troops.

Although the struggle of the Jews was not anti-Arab in character, it was clearly anti-British. The resistance movement's policy toward the Arabs was enunciated by the "Voice of Israel": "All we want is that the Arabs should not permit themselves to be incited against us. We do not want a single piece of land of neighboring Arab countries. All we ask of the Arabs of neighboring countries is that they refrain from interfering in the affairs of Palestine." To the Mandatory power the "Voice of Israel" announced: "We are not terrorists, we do not want bloodshed. But we are resisting the White Paper Policy. The only way the Government can carry out this policy is by violence and terror."

There were hardly any incidents involving clashes between Jews and Arabs. True, riots had occurred in Cairo where na-

tionalistic Arab mobs staged a demonstration on November 2, 1945, Balfour Day; this however was not only anti-Jewish but anti-British, anti-Christian and anti-alien as well. More serious were the anti-Jewish pogroms which occurred from November 4th through November 7th in Tripoli, where for centuries Arabs and Jews had lived peacefully together. Over 100 Jews were killed in the most brutal way, hand grenades were thrown into synagogues, and Jewish property was destroyed and plundered. The question as to who was responsible for these demonstrations has not yet been cleared up entirely. Pro-Axis elements among the Arab population were blamed for the excesses. On the other hand, British authorities were blamed for being ineffective. It was pointed out that on other occasions the British had been able to halt "riots" with swiftness and effectiveness.

### THE ARABS

Since the end of the war in Europe the Arabs have been waging violent political warfare against Zionism. Repeated pleas were addressed to the British Government, the United States Government and the United Nations for abrogation of the Zionist program. There was constant insistence on the stoppage of immigration and land sales. Continuous requests were made for the return of deported Arab leaders, including Haj Amin al-Husaini, the ex-Mufti of Jerusalem who had been deported from the country during the war for complicity in Nazi activities. Jamal Husaini, meanwhile, was permitted to return and was warmly welcomed by the Arab community. He immediately assumed an active role in the newly formed Palestine Arab Higher Committee, presiding over its deliberations. This body, created as the Palestine arm of the Arab League, brought most of the Arabs of Palestine together into a unified group. To present their case abroad, the Arabs established offices in Washington and London. It was reported that two Arab companies were to be formed with a joint capital of \$6,000,000, with the stated purpose of buying back "Arab land" from Jews. Declarations of Arab and Moslem unity for the defense of the Arabs of Palestine were issued by Emir Abdullah, ruler of Trans-Jordan, and Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia, by King Farouk of Egypt and by the Regent of Iraq. Anti-Zionist unity was always the theme; and the warning was

often repeated that a holy war would break out between the Moslem and Christian worlds if Palestine was to be reopened to large-scale Jewish immigration.

The announcement by the Arab League that its member-states would institute a boycott against all Jewish-produced goods from Palestine, beginning on January 1, 1946, was explained by the League Secretary, Abdul Rahman Azzam Bey, to be necessary, because Jewish industry in Palestine is "based on Zionist funds, collected in foreign countries to serve a political purpose: the establishment of a Jewish national home and state in Palestine." "This purpose is not realizable," he declared, "except by the exploitation of markets in Arab countries." Although, soon thereafter, the Arab rulers gave their assurances of full cooperation, there was little indication of the effectiveness of the boycott. Because of the close interdependence between Jewish and Arab markets the Arabs could not enforce the boycott without losing more by it than would the Jews. In January, the Jewish Agency complained to the United Nations that "economic warfare against a section of a neighboring country is in conflict with the purpose and spirit of the United Nations, and contrary to the provisions of its charter," and appealed to the United Nations to inform the Arab states that the boycott was in conflict with their obligations as United Nations members.

### *THE ATTITUDE OF THE SOVIET UNION*

There was evidence during the year that the Soviet Union was displaying interest, not only in the Dardanelles, Iran and other parts of the Middle East, but also in Palestine. The Iran incident, in which Russia encouraged the independence of Azerbaijan, might lend credence to the theory that Russia was extending her influence in the area by fostering separatist independence movements. The Soviet position on trusteeships, in which she urged participation of the Big Five, has been cited above. During the year the Jewish community of Palestine had contacts with various Soviet trade-union groups and with Jews in Russia. A more cooperative attitude on the part of the Soviet Union toward Zionism was also seen in its policy of permitting Zionist activity in the Balkan countries.

The Palestine Communist Party declared in April, 1945, that they would join with the *Histadrut* for the abolition of the

White Paper and for the establishment of a Jewish National Home. The Communist Party of the United States passed a resolution in July, 1945, urging abrogation of the White Paper and development "in collaboration with the Arab people" of a Jewish National Home in Palestine. A spokesman of the British Communist Party issued a statement at about the same time, endorsing the recommendations of the World Trade Union Congress that the "Jewish people must be enabled to continue the building of Palestine as their national homeland." It was reported that when Dr. Emil Sommerstein, Polish leader, visited the Kremlin, he asked Joseph Stalin whether he would be interested in an international solution of the Jewish problem. Stalin's answer, which he specifically authorized Dr. Sommerstein to make public, was, "Certainly and seriously." A somewhat different view from that expressed by the Communists of the United States and Great Britain, and referred to above, was expressed in the *New Times*, a Moscow periodical, and reported in the *New York Times* on February 2, 1946. The British are reprimanded for setting up the inquiry; the Arabs are not left free of blame; and as for the Jews, the humanitarian angle rather than the Jewish national homeland is stressed:

What are the lawful foundations for the Commission on Palestine and who gave it authority to solve the problem without the participation of the directly interested parties? The Arab public is indignant at the attempts made to solve the Palestine problem behind their back; it is hardly possible to justify the necessity for the existence of the Anglo-American Commission, especially at a moment when the mechanism of the United Nations Organization has started to function.

Another test for the Arab League is the Palestine question. It is clear that the creation of normal conditions for the life and future of the Jews in Europe does not depend on the quota of Jewish immigration into Palestine but on the energetic extermination of fascism and liquidation of racial fanaticism and its consequences—on real help to the Jewish populations.

On the other hand, the problem of Palestine has acquired such a sharp character because the difference of interest of England and America in the Near East is reflected in it. It must be recognized that during the short time it has existed the Arab League's activities have not yet produced positive results from the viewpoint of defense of the interests of Arabian countries.

In the sharp political situation which is forming in these countries

the near future will show to what measure the league will justify the hopes of those who wish to see in it active support for the unity and independence of the Arab lands.

### *AMERICAN INTERESTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST*

Mention should be made here that the British and the Russians were not alone in their interest in maintaining or extending their influence in the Middle East. As a result of World War II the United States has become increasingly involved in the affairs of that part of the world. American oil interests have expanded steadily, with a huge Saudi-Arabian investment with which the Army and Navy Petroleum Board is especially concerned. On January 8, 1946, the Trans-Arabian Pipe Line Company (a subsidiary of the American Arabian Oil Company, which is jointly owned by the Standard Oil Company of California and the Texas Company) received a concession from Saudi-Arabia to build a thousand-mile oil pipe line across Palestine to a Mediterranean port. This involved a British-American oil agreement. The recent completion of a United States Army airport at Dharan on the Persian Gulf might indicate that its usefulness will lie in providing protection for the oil interests in the area. American banking concerns are investigating the economic potentialities of the Middle East. The plans of the Palestine Economic Corporation, largest American business enterprise in Palestine, include the construction of modern irrigation water works on a public utility basis; development of low-cost housing projects; direct investment in basic manufacturing undertakings; indirect investment in industry through erection of factory buildings for lease to small manufacturers; and extension of credits for agricultural development. In the *New York Herald Tribune* of November 15, 1945, Walter Lippmann, discussing the solution of the Palestine question, stated that the United States must become "a principal power in that part of the world." The United States must make the momentous decision that the whole Middle East is a region of such vital interest to the peace and prosperity of the world, that we must be present in the Middle East—present somewhere, for example at the port of Haifa. Comparing this decision "in its importance with that taken in 1900 by President McKinley and Secretary Hay in regard to China," Lippmann points out that "that was

the beginning of the chain of events which led us into the Philippines and into Eastern Asia and . . . to the occupation of Japan."

### ANGLO-AMERICAN COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY

A brief summary of the testimony gathered by the Committee in Palestine and the Middle Eastern countries is given below.<sup>2</sup>

#### *Testimony of the Jews*

Dr. Chaim Weizmann, chairman of the Jewish Agency, stated that although he advised the eventual establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine, when the Jews were in the majority, he did not demand the establishment of such a state immediately, but wanted mass Jewish immigration; he was not interested in the "trappings" of a Jewish state, but wanted "state power" for the Jews to develop the country, and the immediate abolition of the White Paper; he wanted peace with the Arabs and was willing to meet with them at any time to discuss the future of the country. One of the fundamental causes of anti-Semitism, Dr. Weizmann asserted, was the fact that Jews exist. "We carry the germs of anti-Semitism in our knapsack." "The Jews," he said, "are a group of people who have lost all the attributes of a nation but have maintained their existence as a ghost nation with the hope for a return to Israel to keep us alive." Of the 1,250,000 Jews remaining in Europe, 60 percent wished to leave. He invited the Committee of Inquiry to tour Palestine and "see the life, energy and vitality which has been sowed in this earth." "The Jews of Europe want to go only to Palestine," he declared, "and only Palestine is willing to accept them." He asserted that Palestine can absorb double and triple its present population, and that he had not given up hope of an agreement with the Arabs. He asked the Committee to follow a line of "least injustice," pointing out that the Arabs emerged from the war with two kingdoms, four republics, six states in the United Nations and one seat in the United Nations Security Council. "I do not know whether this is commensurate with their efforts in the war."

The Jewish Agency, in a sixty page memorandum, advocated

2. Chronicles, March-April, 1946. Issued by Library of Jewish Information; published by The American Jewish Committee.

that the world Jewish problem be attacked at its roots and that the "lesson of the catastrophe (in Europe) is clear; the remnant must be evacuated to Palestine and this must be attempted as quickly as possible." The Agency proposed a self-governing state "in which all citizens regardless of race or creed, shall enjoy equal rights and all groups shall control their own internal affairs." Stating that the proposed state would be Jewish only in the sense that Jews would have the right to enter it and therefore it would serve the special function of providing them with a refuge, the Agency stressed that for the state to achieve these ends, a Jewish majority was essential. The criteria for European refugees, it added, must be transport, and the temporary absorptive capacity, not immediate economic absorption. From the long term viewpoint, the memorandum stated, "the Jewish Agency has worked out plans for absorption in a relatively short period of years of the first 1,000,000 Jews. Once a Jewish majority has been created, a Jewish state will be effectively established."

David Ben-Gurion, chairman of the Jewish Agency Executive, emphasized that Zionist leadership would not renounce its claim to the establishment of a Jewish commonwealth in Palestine. "Our aim," he said, "is not a majority. Our aim is a Jewish state. By a 'Jewish state' we mean Jewish soil, Jewish labor, a Jewish economy, Jewish schools, language and culture. We also mean Jewish security. We mean complete independence." The Agency, he said, had given up its attempts to cooperate with the Palestine Government to stop political violence because it was futile, "since the war ended and the remnants of European Jewry are still prohibited from going to their home in Palestine." Regarding Arab-Jewish relations, Ben-Gurion stated, "The conflict between us is most tragic, because it is a family conflict. But it will not last long. We will carry out our work of regeneration. Even if obstacles increase, we will continue with our work." Ben-Gurion declared that Palestine Jews could defend themselves if British troops were withdrawn. "A Jewish state will be established because it is a matter of life and death." Under present circumstances, whether there would be a future Jewish compromise would depend on British policy. A few days later, making a second appearance before the Committee, Ben-Gurion stressed that the *Hagana* was not under the control of the Jewish Agency,



and that the Agency was not engaged in illegal or secret activity. The British chairman declared to Ben-Gurion, "I ask you again, I beg you to raise your voice in the interests of peace." To this Ben-Gurion replied, "I appreciate your words and I ask you to reciprocate. You have a weightier voice than I."

Dr. Isaac Bruer of the *Agudas Israel*, the orthodox group, stressed that his organization was not interested in the establishment of a Jewish state but in increased immigration of Jews into Palestine.

David Abulafig and Itzhak Abbadi, reporting on the situation of 1,000,000 Jews in the Middle East, stressed that the Sephardic Jews identified themselves with the Zionist cause. Although the situation of the Oriental Jews living in Middle Eastern countries was growing precarious, an understanding between the Arabs and the Jews could be brought about because of "their general Oriental outlook." "This will be possible," they said, "only if a Jewish state is established in Palestine." They advised the Committee that the Jews in Middle Eastern countries would fear to speak frankly before the Committee and charged that "fanatic nationalism" in the Middle East was causing a rise in anti-Semitism as well as anti-foreign feeling.

In Damascus three Jewish representatives, David Totah, Sabri Kignado and Dr. David Pinto, testified. Each made a one-minute speech. The substance of their testimony was: "We are Syrians like every other Syrian. We enjoy full freedom. We are prosperous and well treated. We have no relationship whatsoever with the Zionist movement."

Dr. Judah L. Magnes, president of the Hebrew University and head of the *Ihud* group, testified that only establishment of a bi-national Arab-Jewish state with eventual numerical equality of Jews and Arabs, would solve the Palestine problem. Under the plan of *Ihud*, Palestine would be divided into several districts, some of which would be purely Jewish, others completely Arab and the remainder a mixed population. The country would be ruled by a consultative body on which Jews and Arabs would have equal representation with the High Commissioner as chairman. Dr. Magnes accused the Palestine Government of not training Palestine Jews and Arabs to fill the highest executive jobs in the local administration, and ad-

vocated greater participation by both peoples in running their own affairs. "Palestine is not just a Jewish or an Arab land . . . A Jewish state means Jewish domination; an Arab state means Arab domination . . . Jews must have ample immigration to be able to safeguard their further development in many fields; the Arabs want self-government: given this, they will agree to Jewish immigration." Opposing partition, Dr. Magnes stated that Jewish-Arab cooperation was the only possible alternative to war. The way to bring the people together was by establishment of the legislature he proposed, under which both the problem of Jewish immigration and the question of absorptivity could be decided. The British Government's refusal to admit displaced Jews to Palestine, he charged, had created great bitterness in the heart of every Jew. "It is no wonder that the highly idealistic Jewish youth took up guns and bombs."

In a memorandum the *Ihud* group proposed an interim immigration of 100,000 Jews, and as a long term policy, that the Jewish population should have a chance through immigration of becoming one-half the population. With an annual Jewish immigration of 60,000 for eleven years, the Jews would be entitled later to additional immigration to keep pace with the greater Arab rate of reproduction.

The Board of Deputies of South African Jews urged the establishment of a Jewish Commonwealth, abrogation of the White Paper and unrestricted Jewish immigration. They emphasized that South Africa and the rest of the world were closed to Jewish immigration and that the "time has come for the Jews to be permitted to enter one country as of right."

Marc Jaffe, chairman of the Palestine Economic Corporation, and Harry Wolfson of the Palestine Jewish Colonization Association, testifying regarding commercial and colonization activities, stated that the Arab boycott would be ineffective if increased immigration were permitted because the local population could then consume the entire output of Jewish enterprises; that the Arabs living near PICA colonies had benefited greatly from improved agricultural methods and were very friendly to the Jews.

Goldie Meirson, *Histadrut* leader, stressed the community's readiness to accept as many immigrants from Europe as were allowed to enter, and denied that a Jewish state would mean the domination of the Arabs.

Moshe Shertok, political chief of the Jewish Agency, maintained that many efforts had been made to secure a reconciliation with the Arabs; that at times it seemed some elements of agreement were in sight, but "Arab leaders who are inclined to discuss compromise privately, are not inclined to state this view publicly." He also charged that the attitude of the British administration contributed to the failure to reach an accord because the Government was sympathetic to Arab criticism and apologetic for anything they did for the Jews.

A 5,000 word memorandum signed "Head Command, Jewish Resistance Movement" was presented to the Committee. It warned that virtually every Jew in Palestine was a member of the resistance movement and that in order to curb the *Hagana* all the Jews would have to be crushed. It emphasized the importance of setting up a Jewish state and described the contribution of the *Hagana* to the war effort in establishing an unofficial home guard in Palestine and volunteering for special intelligence and commando work for the British. Declaring that members of the movement were not terrorists, the memorandum continued: "If there is terrorism, it is practiced by the authorities. If against unseaworthy craft carrying a few hundred refugees, the British Government sends reconnaissance planes, destroyers, operates radar stations, builds special police posts, uses airborne troops, that is terrorism." Defining its own activities, he stated: "when we attack these things we do nothing more than defend ourselves from Government terror." Declaring that the resistance movement was not anti-British, and that the complication was created by the British Government's repudiation of the Mandate, the memorandum stressed that thus far "we have confined ourselves to defense against hostile assaults and a few warning actions." If the Inquiry Committee's recommendations were to be anti-Zionist, the memorandum warned, "our resistance will continue to spread and increase. We will not acquiesce to the handing out of a solution which consigns the last hope of the Jewish people to the grave. Our resistance is likely to result in the creation of a new problem—a problem of British security in Palestine—and this problem will be resolved only by a Zionist solution." "In order to destroy the resistance movement," the memorandum further warned, "or even the *Hagana*, it will be necessary to destroy

the whole Jewish community in Palestine and uproot the eternal love of Zion from the hearts of Jews throughout the world." Asserting that it had sufficient trained men and equipment for a long and difficult struggle, the resistance movement declared that it did not intend to throw all its forces into one decisive battle with the British Empire's forces. "Our strength," the document stated, "lies in the fact that every Jew in Palestine is on our side, and that 12,000,000 Jews stand behind us. For every thousand killed or imprisoned, other thousands will step forward to take their places. Even those who do not bear arms can fight with the weapons of peaceful resistance and civil disobedience. We are not merely a secret society—we are the fighting Jewish nation." Compromise solutions or postponement of solution were condemned in advance by the resistance movement. They declared that the Jews themselves would enforce a Zionist solution and that not a single American or British soldier would be needed. The document also discounted the fears of a pro-Soviet orientation of the Arab states as a result of a Zionist solution, maintaining that such a threat by the Arabs would be "empty" since Soviet influence over the Arabs would be a death warrant for the present Arab ruling class.

### *Testimony of the Arabs*

At the hearings in Cairo in March, Abdul Rachman Azzam Bey, secretary of the Arab League, testified that Arabs were opposed to the establishment of a Jewish state and to further Jewish immigration into Palestine. In a nine page memorandum, the League asked for abrogation of the British mandate over Palestine and the setting up of an independent Arab state. Opposition to Zionism was not based on religious prejudices, it maintained, but it was unjust to force the Arabs to accept into "their country" foreign people whose avowed intention it was to wrest the country from its owners and occupants. Azzam Bey stated that Jews were welcome in Arab countries as long as they remained a minority. He justified the Arab boycott of Jewish-made goods as part of the struggle against Jewish immigration, and stated that it would be lifted only if the Zionists gave up their political aspirations in Palestine. He stressed that "our Jewish cousins" have never been

persecuted in Arab states, but that they "turned into something else when they went west and returned with imperialistic ideas, foreign support and pretensions of superiority."

Dr. Fadl el Jemali of the Iraq Foreign Office delivered an attack on the principles of Zionism, which he charged was similar to Nazism in content and technique, and warned that Zionism was causing increased anti-Semitism in Iraq. He contended that Palestine was too congested and stated that the Arabs do not want to live like Americans but prefer their own customs. Sheikh el Bakri, representing the Moslem Brotherhood, a religious order with a membership exceeding 500,000, the Moslem Youth Organization and the Arab Union, rejected Zionist demands which "would cause a threat to peace." An attack on the British and Americans was made by Sahel Harb Pasha of Egypt, chairman of the Moslem Youth Group, who stated, "We Arabs have lost confidence in the Atlantic Charter. You are driving us to extremes and we will fight for our lives." Hassan el Banna, founder and leader of the Moslem Brotherhood, requested the Committee to obtain the return of the former Mufti, Haj Amin al-Husaini.

Jamal Husaini presented the demands of the Palestine Arab Party: an independent Palestine under Arab rule; abrogation of the Palestine mandate; abandonment of Zionist aims; and stoppage of Jewish immigration. He said that the Arabs in Palestine "find themselves deprived of their chief leader, the Grand Mufti; for whom they cannot accept any substitute." Questioned by British Committee member Richard Crossman concerning the Mufti's collaboration with the Nazis, Husaini stated that the Mufti fled to Germany because it was the only place to which he could escape. He alleged that the Mufti did not help the Germans but "only wanted to get something out of them if they won," and admitted that in spite of the Mufti's record, the Palestine Arab Higher Committee still felt he enjoyed the confidence of the Arabs. He stated that Germany had not been the Arabs' enemy. If the British and Americans were unable to solve the Palestine problem, he stated, British troops and police should withdraw from the country and the Jews and Arabs should be allowed to solve the problem by force if necessary. As Ben-Gurion claimed for the Jews, so Husaini also stated that the Arabs were able to defend themselves. He added that if the British troops withdrew there

would not be bloodshed "because if the Zionists know that they will not be pampered, and spoiled as in the past by the British, we would become friends." Thirty percent of the Jews would leave Palestine, he charged, if they realized that they could not have a Jewish national home. "The remainder will stretch out their hands to us, and we will extend, not only our hands, but our arms and embrace them."

Auni Bey Abdul Hadi, another representative of the Arab Party, reaffirmed the fact that the Mufti was still leader of the Arab Higher Committee, but denied that he had ever engaged in Nazi activities. When shown a photograph from a Vienna newspaper showing the Mufti giving the Nazi salute during an inspection of a Moslem SS unit, Abdul Hadi first suggested that perhaps the photograph was a forgery and then added that if it were not, the explanation was that the Mufti thought Hitler would win.

The Arab Higher Committee presented a 200,000 word memorandum rejecting a bi-national state and offering "full citizenship" to the over 500,000 Jews in Palestine, provided an Arab state was established and further immigration to Palestine barred. The Arab Committee declared that they would refuse to consent to the continuation of limited Jewish immigration while the proposed state was being set up, on the grounds that even limited immigration would encourage Zionists to believe that if they exerted more pressure they would obtain further concessions.

King Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia, in a written statement, warned Great Britain, and the United States that if they sponsored Jewish immigration into Palestine they would risk incurring the enmity not only of the Arabs but of all Moslems of India and China. A representative of the Syrian Government supported the claims of the Palestine Arabs, declaring that "Syrians are in agreement with Palestine Arabs in opposing the danger of Zionism." In Bagdad, the press was barred from the hearings. In Lebanon, Premier Riad es Solh agreed with the general Arab case. A dissenting view was expressed by Monsignor Ignatz Moubar, Archbishop of the Maronite Church in Beirut, who maintained that the Anglo-American Committee had not heard the "true voice of Lebanese public opinion" and that the Christian majority in Lebanon, not represented in the present Government, supported the Jewish re-

construction in Palestine. Sami Taha, representing Arab labor, charged that "Zionism is an instrument of imperialism." Completing the Arab case, Albert Hourani and Achmed Shukeri of the Jerusalem Arab office admitted that the establishment of an Arab state in Palestine would involve "great risks," but expressed uncompromising opposition to any other solution." No solution, they maintained, was possible without the use of force. An Arab state, they contended, could be maintained with the aid of the Arab League, despite Jewish Agency or *Hagana* opposition. They rejected partition, creation of a bi-national state, and immediate entry of 100,000 Jews with the future of Palestine left unsettled.

### *Other Testimony*

A twenty-six chapter report was presented by the Palestine Government on the "administration of Palestine" under the Mandate. The data, it was announced, would not be made public until after the Committee had left the country. Additional testimony not released was that of the opinions of experts regarding the Lowdermilk plan.

A memorandum submitted to the Committee by the South African Jewish delegation from Prime Minister Jan Christian Smuts asserted that the Balfour Declaration was not a temporary expedient but was intended as a declaration of long range policy. General Smuts emphasized that the White Paper was in conflict with the terms of the Palestine Mandate.

The Church of Scotland Presbytery of Jerusalem opposed the Lowdermilk irrigation plan, declaring that if it were carried out, it would harm the sanctity of Christian holy places.

Dr. Weston H. Stewart, Anglican Bishop of Jerusalem, expressed opposition to the Lowdermilk plan "because Christian sentiment would be profoundly shocked if the holy places were sacrificed to any nationalist or imperialist scheme of industry or commerce," and deplored the extent to which politics permeated the education of young people in Palestine.

Greek Orthodox Bishop George Hakim opposed the Zionist stand and stated that Palestine was an Arab land and should be kept Arab.

The views of the Assyrian people of the Middle East, as presented in a document signed by Assyrian leaders, expressed

support of the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine. The document declared that the Arab League did not represent the Assyrians.

## PART II

### SUMMARY OF THE REPORT OF THE ANGLO-AMERICAN COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY.

JAMES G. McDONALD <sup>3</sup>

Appointed by the governments of the United States and of the United Kingdom, the six American and six British members together constituted a single committee which was to report its findings to the two governments. Its assignment—one of extreme difficulty and importance—was defined by the two governments in broad yet specific terms.

#### *THE COMMITTEE'S TASK*

#### *THE COMMITTEE'S TERMS OF REFERENCE*

1. "To examine political, economic and social conditions in Palestine as they bear upon the problem of Jewish immigration and settlement therein and the well-being of the peoples now living therein.

2. "To examine the position of the Jews in those countries in Europe where they have been the victims of Nazi and Fascist persecution, and the practical measures taken or contemplated to be taken in those countries to enable them to live

3. James G. McDonald was a Member of the Anglo-American (Palestine) Committee of Inquiry; 1914-16, Assistant Professor of History, Indiana University; 1915-16, Harvard University Traveling Fellow in Spain; 1916 and 1917 (summers), Professor of International Relations, University of Georgia; 1916-18, Assistant Professor of History, Indiana University; 1919-33, Chairman of the Foreign Policy Association; 1933-Jan. 1, 1936, League of Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Coming from Germany; 1936-38, member of the editorial staff of the *New York Times*, specializing on international relations; 1938-42, President of the Brooklyn Institute of Arts and Sciences; May, 1940-July, 1942, member of the Board of Education of the City of New York; since 1933, Honorary Chairman of the Foreign Policy Association; since 1938, Chairman of the President's Advisory Committee on Political Refugees.



free from discrimination and oppression and to make estimates of those who wish or will be impelled by their conditions to migrate to Palestine or other countries outside Europe.

3. "To hear the views of competent witnesses and to consult representative Arabs and Jews on the problems of Palestine as such problems are affected by conditions subject to examination under paragraphs 1 and 2 above and by other relevant facts and circumstances, and to make recommendations to His Majesty's Government and the Government of the United States for ad interim handling of these problems as well as for their permanent solution.

4. "To make such other recommendations to His Majesty's Government and the Government of the United States as may be necessary to meet the immediate needs arising from conditions subject to examination under paragraph 2 above, by remedial action in the European countries in question or by the provision of facilities for emigration to and settlement in countries outside Europe."

#### *PERSONNEL OF THE COMMITTEE*

The composition of the Committee, which was announced in Washington and London on November 15, 1945, and which was to operate under a rotating chairmanship, was:

*Joseph C. Hutcheson*, Judge of the Fifth Circuit Court at Houston, Texas. (American Chairman)

*Sir John E. Singleton*, Judge of the King's Bench Division of the High Court of Justice, London (British Chairman)

*Frank Aydelotte*, formerly President of Swarthmore College, now Director of the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton, and American Secretary of the Rhodes Trust.

*Frank W. Buxton*, Editor of the *Boston Herald*.

*Wilfred P. Crick*, Economic Adviser to the Midland Bank, London, formerly with Ministry of Food.

*Richard H. S. Crossman*, Member of Parliament (Labour), formerly Fellow and Tutor of New College, Oxford, assistant editor of *New Statesman* and *Nation*, and Deputy Director of Psychological Warfare, A.F.H.Q., Algiers.

*Bartley C. Crum*, practicing law in San Francisco.

*Sir Frederick Leggett*, until recently Deputy Secretary of the Ministry of Labour and National Services.

*Major Reginald E. Manningham-Buller*, Member of Parliament (Conservative), a barrister.

## *Report of Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry* 1219

*James G. McDonald*, formerly Chairman of the Board and now Honorary Chairman, Foreign Policy Association, High Commissioner for Refugees, member of the editorial staff of the *New York Times* and President of the Brooklyn Institute of Arts and Sciences.

*Lord Morrison* (Robert Craigmyle, Baron Morrison), Member of Parliament (Labour).

*William Phillips*, formerly Under Secretary of State, Ambassador to Italy, personal representative of the President with the rank of Ambassador at New Delhi, and Delegate to the London Naval Conference, 1935.

### *THE COMMITTEE'S ACTIVITIES*

In the preface to its Report the Committee summed up its activities:

"The Governments urged upon us the need for the utmost expedition in dealing with the subjects committed to us for investigation, and requested to be furnished with our Report within one hundred and twenty days of the inception of our inquiry.

"We assembled in Washington on Friday, 4th January, 1946, and began our public sessions on the following Monday. We sailed from the United States on 18th January and resumed our public sessions in London on 25th January. We left for Europe on 4th and 5th February, and, working in subcommittees, proceeded to our investigations in Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Austria, Italy and Greece. On 28th February we flew to Cairo and, after sessions there, reached Jerusalem on 6th March. In Palestine, our sessions were interspersed with personal visits to different parts of the country during which we sought to acquaint ourselves at first hand with its various characteristics and the ways of life of its inhabitants. Subcommittees visited the capitals of Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Trans-Jordan to hear the views of the Arab Governments and representatives of bodies concerned with the subjects before us. We left Palestine on 28th March and have concluded our deliberations in Switzerland on 20th April."

### *GENERAL PROPOSALS BY THE COMMITTEE*

The Committee, responsive to its broad terms of reference, included in its Report recommendations on a wide variety of problems—some ideological and general, others concrete and

specific. Among the Committee's general pronouncements are the following:

A. Though most of the Jewish "victims of Nazi and Fascist persecution in Europe" who wish to leave that continent desire to go to Palestine, that comparatively small country "alone cannot meet (their) emigration needs . . . ; the whole world shares responsibility for them and indeed for the resettlement of all 'displaced persons.'"

B. Because "a considerable number of Jews will continue to live in Europe we recommend . . . that our Governments together, and in association with other countries, should endeavor immediately to find new homes for all such 'displaced persons,' irrespective of creed or nationality, whose ties with their former communities have been irreparably broken.

"Though emigration will solve the problems of some victims of persecution, the overwhelming majority, including a considerable number of Jews, will continue to live in Europe. We recommend therefore that our Governments endeavor to secure that immediate effect is given to the provision of the United Nations Charter calling for 'universal respect for, and observation of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion.'"

C. "That Palestine shall be neither a Jewish State nor an Arab State."

D. "The principle that Arab economic, educational and political advancement in Palestine is of equal importance with that of the Jews."

E. The "various plans for large scale industrial and agricultural development in Palestine . . . if successfully carried into effect, could not only greatly enlarge the capacity of the country to support an increasing population but also raise the living standards of Jew and Arab alike."

F. "In the interests of the conciliation of the two peoples and of general improvement of the Arab standard of living, the educational system of both Jews and Arabs [should] be reformed, including the introduction of compulsory education within a reasonable time."

G. "It should be made clear beyond all doubt to both Jews and Arabs that any attempt from either side, by threats of violence, by terrorism, or by the organization or use of illegal armies to prevent its execution, will be resolutely suppressed."

### *SPECIFIC PROPOSALS BY THE COMMITTEE*

Among the Committee's concrete recommendations are:

A. The immediate authorization of 100,000 certificates for admission to Palestine and the pressing forward (of actual immigration) as rapidly as conditions will permit.

B. Beyond the first 100,000 and "pending the early reference to the United Nations and the execution of a trusteeship agreement" the mandatory should "facilitate Jewish immigration under suitable conditions."

C. The continuance of the Government of Palestine "as at present under mandate pending the execution of a trusteeship agreement under the United Nations."

D. Categorically, the Committee recommended "that the land transfers regulations of 1940 be rescinded and replaced by regulations based on a policy of freedom in the sale, lease or use of land, irrespective of race, community or creed and providing adequate protection for the interests of small owners and tenant cultivators."

### *THE HEART OF THE REPORT*

The full Report of the Committee is a lengthy document of more than 40,000 words. The substance of the Report is contained in Chapter I entitled "Recommendations and Comments." The other chapters, II to X and the seven appendices, serve to supplement or amplify points made in Chapter I. It is this latter, therefore, which deserves to be quoted in full.

## CHAPTER I

### RECOMMENDATIONS AND COMMENTS

#### THE EUROPEAN PROBLEM

Recommendation No. 1. We have to report that such information as we received about countries other than Palestine gave no hope of substantial assistance in finding homes for Jews wishing or impelled to leave Europe.

But Palestine alone cannot meet the emigration needs of the Jewish victims of Nazi and Fascist persecution; the whole world shares responsibility for them and indeed for the resettlement of all "displaced persons."

We therefore recommend that our Governments together, and in

association with other countries, should endeavor immediately to find new homes for all such "displaced persons," irrespective of creed or nationality, whose ties with their former communities have been irreparably broken.

Though emigration will solve the problems of some victims of persecution, the overwhelming majority, including a considerable number of Jews, will continue to live in Europe. We recommend therefore that our Governments endeavor to secure that immediate effect is given to the provision of the United Nations Charter calling for "universal respect for, and observation of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion."

*Comment.* In recommending that our Governments, in association with other countries, should endeavor to find new homes for "displaced persons," we do not suggest that any country should be asked to make a permanent change in its immigration policy. The conditions which we have seen in Europe are unprecedented and so unlikely to arise again that we are convinced that special provision could and should be made in existing immigration laws to meet this unique and peculiarly distressing situation. Furthermore, we believe that much could be accomplished—particularly in regard to those "displaced persons," including Jews, who have relatives in countries outside Europe—by a relaxation of administrative regulations.

Our investigations have led us to believe that a considerable number of Jews will continue to live in most European countries. In our view the mass emigration of all European Jews would be of service neither to the Jews themselves nor to Europe. Every effort should be made to enable the Jews to rebuild their shattered communities, while permitting those Jews who wish to do so to emigrate. In order to achieve this, restitution of Jewish property should be effected as soon as possible. Our investigations showed us that the Governments chiefly concerned had for the most part already passed legislation to this end. A real obstacle, however, to individual restitution is that the attempt to give effect to this legislation is frequently a cause of active anti-Semitism. We suggest that, for the reconstruction of the Jewish communities, restitution of their corporate property, either through reparations payments or through other means, is of the first importance.

Nazi occupation has left behind it a legacy of anti-Semitism. This cannot be combatted by legislation alone. The only really effective antidotes are the enforcement by each Government of guaranteed civil liberties and equal rights, a program of education in the positive principles of democracy, the sanction of a strong world public opinion—combined with economic recovery and stability.

## REFUGEE IMMIGRATION INTO PALESTINE

Recommendation No. 2. We recommend (a) that 100,000 certificates be authorized immediately for the admission into Palestine of Jews who have been the victims of Nazi and Fascist persecution; (b) that these certificates be awarded as far as possible in 1946 and that actual immigration be pushed forward as rapidly as conditions will permit.

*Comment.* The number of Jewish survivors of Nazi and Fascist persecution with whom we have to deal far exceeds 100,000: indeed there are more than that number in Germany, Austria and Italy alone. Although nearly a year has passed since their liberation, the majority of those in Germany and Austria are still living in assembly centers, the so-called "camps," island communities in the midst of those at whose hands they suffered so much.

In their interests and in the interests of Europe, the centers should be closed and their camp life ended. Most of them have cogent reasons for wishing to leave Europe. Many are the sole survivors of their families and few have any ties binding them to the countries in which they used to live.

Since the end of hostilities, little has been done to provide for their resettlement elsewhere. Immigration laws and restrictions bar their entry to most countries and much time must pass before such laws and restrictions can be altered and effect given to the alterations.

Some can go to countries where they have relatives; others may secure inclusion in certain quotas. Their number is comparatively small.

We know of no country to which the great majority can go in the immediate future other than Palestine. Furthermore, that is where almost all of them want to go. There they are sure that they will receive a welcome denied them elsewhere. There they hope to enjoy peace and rebuild their lives.

We believe it is essential that they should be given an opportunity to do so at the earliest possible time. Furthermore, we have the assurances of the leaders of the Jewish Agency that they will be supported and cared for.

We recommend the authorization and issue of 100,000 certificates for these reasons and because we feel that their immediate issue will have a most salutary effect upon the whole situation.

In the awarding of these certificates priority should, as far as possible, be given to those in the centers and to those liberated in Germany and Austria who are no longer in the centers but remain in those countries. We do not desire that other Jewish victims who wish or will be impelled by their circumstances to leave the coun-

tries where they now are or that those who fled from persecution before the outbreak of war should be excluded. We appreciate that there will be difficulty in deciding questions of priority, but none the less we urge that so far as possible such a system should be adhered to, and that, in applying it, primary consideration should be given to the aged and infirm, to the very young and also to skilled workmen whose services will be needed for many months on work rendered necessary by the large influx.

It should be made clear that no advantage in the obtaining of a certificate is to be gained by migrating from one country to another or by entering Palestine illegally.

Receiving so large a number will be a heavy burden on Palestine. We feel sure that the authorities will shoulder it and that they will have the full cooperation of the Jewish Agency.

Difficult problems will confront those responsible for organizing and carrying out the movement. The many organizations—public and private—working in Europe will certainly render all the aid they can; we mention UNRRA especially. Cooperation by all throughout is necessary.

We are sure that the Government of the United States, which has shown such keen interest in this matter, will participate vigorously and generously with the Government of Great Britain in its fulfillment. There are many ways in which help can be given.

Those who have opposed the admission of these unfortunate people into Palestine should know that we have fully considered all that they have put before us. We hope that they will look upon the situation again, that they will appreciate the considerations which have led us to our conclusion, and that above all, if they cannot see their way to help, at least they will not make the position of these sufferers more difficult.

#### PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT: NO ARAB, NO JEWISH STATE

Recommendation No. 3. In order to dispose, once and for all, of the exclusive claims of Jews and Arabs to Palestine, we regard it as essential that a clear statement of the following principles should be made:

(I) That Jew shall not dominate Arab and Arab shall not dominate Jew in Palestine. (II) That Palestine shall be neither a Jewish state nor an Arab state. (III) That the form of government ultimately to be established, shall, under international guarantees, fully protect and preserve the interests in the Holy Land of Christendom and of the Moslem and Jewish faiths.

Thus Palestine must ultimately become a state which guards the rights and interests of Moslems, Jews and Christians alike and

accords to the inhabitants, as a whole, the fullest measure of self-government consistent with the three paramount principles set forth above.

*Comment.* Throughout the long and bloody struggle of Jew and Arab for dominance in Palestine, each crying fiercely: "This land is mine"—except for the brief reference in the Report of the Royal Commission (Hereinafter referred to as the Peel Report) and the little evidence, written and oral, that we received on this point—the great interest of the Christian world in Palestine has been completely overlooked, glossed over or brushed aside.

We therefore emphatically declare that Palestine is a Holy Land, sacred to Christian, to Jew and to Moslem alike; and because it is a Holy Land, Palestine is not, and can never become, a land which any race or religion can justly claim as its very own.

We further, in the same emphatic way, affirm that the fact that it is the Holy Land sets Palestine completely apart from other lands and dedicates it to the precepts and practices of the brotherhood of man, not those of narrow nationalism.

For another reason, in the light of its long history, and particularly its history of the last thirty years, Palestine cannot be regarded as either a purely Arab or a purely Jewish land.

The Jews have a historic connection with the country. The Jewish National Home, though embodying a minority of the population, is today a reality established under international guarantee. It has a right to continued existence, protection and development.

Yet Palestine is not, and never can be a purely Jewish land. It lies at the crossroads of the Arab world. Its Arab population, descended from long-time inhabitants of the area, rightly look upon Palestine as their homeland.

It is, therefore, neither just nor practicable that Palestine should become either an Arab state, in which an Arab majority would control the destiny of a Jewish minority, or a Jewish state, in which a Jewish majority would control that of an Arab minority. In neither case would minority guarantees afford adequate protection for the subordinated group.

A Palestinian put the matter thus: "In the hearts of us Jews there has always been a fear that some day this country would be turned into an Arab state and the Arabs would rule over us. This fear has at times reached the proportions of terror . . . Now this same feeling of fear has started up in the hearts of Arabs . . . fear lest the Jews acquire the ascendancy and rule over them."

Palestine, then, must be established as a country in which the legitimate national aspirations of both Jews and Arabs can be reconciled without either side fearing the ascendancy of the other. In our view this cannot be done under any form of constitution in which



a mere numerical majority is decisive, since it is precisely the struggle for a numerical majority which bedevils Arab-Jewish relations. To ensure genuine self-government for both the Arab and the Jewish communities, this struggle must be made purposeless by the constitution itself.

#### MANDATE AND UNITED NATIONS TRUSTEESHIP

Recommendation No. 4. We have reached the conclusion that the hostility between Jews and Arabs and, in particular, the determination of each to achieve domination, if necessary by violence, make it almost certain that, now and for some time to come, any attempt to establish either an independent Palestinian state or independent Palestinian states would result in civil strife such as might threaten the peace of the world. We therefore recommend that, until this hostility disappears, the Government of Palestine be continued as at present under mandate pending the execution of a trusteeship agreement under the United Nations.

*Comment.* We recognize that in view of the powerful forces both Arab and Jewish, operating from outside Palestine, the task of Great Britain, as mandatory, has not been easy. The Peel Commission declared in 1937 that the mandate was unworkable, and the Permanent Mandates Commission of the League of Nations thereupon pointed out that it became almost unworkable once it was publicly declared to be so by such a body. Two years later the British Government, having come to the conclusion that the alternative of partition proposed by the Peel Commission was also unworkable, announced their intention of taking steps to terminate the mandate by establishment of an independent Palestine state.

Our recommendations are based on what we believe at this stage to be as fair a measure of justice to all as we can find in view of what has gone before and of all that has been done. We recognize that they are not in accord with the claims of either party, and furthermore that they involve a departure from the recent policy of the mandatory.

We recognize that, if they are adopted, they will involve a long period of trusteeship, which will mean a very heavy burden for any single Government to undertake, a burden which would be lightened if the difficulties were appreciated and the trustee had the support of other members of the United Nations.

#### EQUALITY OF STANDARDS

Recommendation No. 5. Looking toward a form of ultimate self-government consistent with the three principles laid down in Recommendation No. 3, we recommend that the mandatory or trustee should proclaim the principle that Arab economic, educational and

political advancement in Palestine is of equal importance with that of the Jews; and should at once prepare measures designed to bridge the gap which now exists and raise the Arab standard of living to that of the Jews; and so bring the two peoples to a full appreciation of their common interest and common destiny in the land where both belong.

*Comment.* Our examination of conditions in Palestine led us to the conclusion that one of the chief causes of friction is the great disparity between the Jewish and Arab standards of living. Even under conditions of war, which brought considerable financial benefits to the Arabs, this disparity has not been appreciably reduced. Only by a deliberate and carefully planned policy on the part of the mandatory can the Arab standard of living be raised to that of the Jews. In stressing the need for such a policy we would particularly call attention to the discrepancies between the social services, including hospitals, available in Palestine for Jews and Arabs.

#### SOCIAL AID

We fully recognize that the Jewish social services are financed to a very great extent by the Jewish community in Palestine, with the assistance of outside Jewish organizations; and we would stress that nothing should be done which would bring these social services down to the level of those provided for the Arabs, or halt the constant improvements now being made in them.

We suggest that consideration be given to the advisability of encouraging the formation by the Arabs of an Arab community on the lines of the Jewish community which now largely controls and finances Jewish social services. The Arabs will have to rely, to a far greater extent than the Jews, on financial aid from the Government. But the Jews of Palestine should accept the necessity that taxation, raised from both Jews and Arabs, will have to be spent very largely on the Arabs in order to bridge the gap which now exists between the standard of living of the two peoples.

#### FURTHER IMMIGRATION POLICY

Recommendation No. 6. We recommend that pending the early reference to the United Nations and the execution of a trusteeship agreement, the mandatory should administer Palestine according to the mandate, which declares, with regard to immigration, that "the administration of Palestine, while insuring that the rights and position of other sections of the population are not prejudiced, shall facilitate Jewish immigration under suitable conditions."

*Comment.* We have recommended the admission of 100,000 immigrants, victims of Nazi persecution, as soon as possible. We now deal with the position after the admission of that number. We cannot

look far into the future. We cannot construct a yardstick for annual immigration. Until a trusteeship agreement is executed it is our clear opinion that Palestine should be administered in accordance with the terms of the mandate quoted above.

Further than that we cannot go in the form of a recommendation. In this disordered world speculation as to the economic position of any country a few years ahead would be a hazardous proceeding. It is particularly difficult to predict what, after a few years have passed, will be the economic and political condition of Palestine. We hope that the present friction and turbulence will soon die away and be replaced by an era of peace, absent so long from the Holy Land; that the Jew and Arab will soon realize that collaboration is to their mutual advantage, but no one can say how long this will take.

The possibility of the country sustaining a largely increased population at a decent standard of living depends largely on whether or not plans referred to in Recommendation No. 8 can be brought to fruition.

The Peel Commission stated that political as well as economic considerations have to be taken into account in regard to immigration, and recommended a "political high level" of 12,000 a year. We cannot recommend the fixing of a minimum or of a maximum for annual immigration in the future. There are too many uncertain factors.

We desire, however, to state certain considerations which we agree should be taken into account in determining what number of immigrants there should be in any period. It is the right of every independent nation to determine in the interests of its people the number of immigrants to be admitted to its lands. Similarly it must, we think, be conceded that it should be the right of the Government of Palestine to decide, having regard to the well-being of all the people of Palestine, the number of immigrants to be admitted within any given period.

In Palestine there is the Jewish National Home, created in consequence of the Balfour Declaration. Some may think that that declaration was wrong and should not have been made; some that it was a conception on a grand scale and that effect can be given to one of the most daring and significant colonization plans in history. Controversy as to which view is right is fruitless. The national home is there. Its roots are deep in the soil of Palestine. It cannot be argued out of existence; neither can the achievements of the Jewish pioneers.

The Government of Palestine in having regard to the well-being of all the people of Palestine cannot ignore the interests of so large a section of the population. It cannot ignore the achievements of the last quarter of a century. No Government of Palestine doing its

duty to the people of that land can fail to do its best not only to maintain the national home but also to foster its proper development and such development must, in our view, involve immigration.

The well-being of all the people of Palestine, be they Jews, Arabs or neither, must be the governing consideration. We reject the view that there shall be no further Jewish immigration into Palestine without Arab acquiescence, a view which would result in the Arab dominating the Jew. We also reject the insistent Jewish demand that forced Jewish immigration must proceed apace in order to produce as quickly as possible a Jewish majority and a Jewish State. The well-being of the Jews must not be subordinated to that of the Arabs; nor that of the Arabs to the Jews. The well-being of both, the economic situation of Palestine as a whole, the degree of execution of plans for further development, all have to be carefully considered in deciding the number of immigrants for any particular period.

Palestine is a land sacred to three faiths and must not become the land of any one of them to the exclusion of the others, and Jewish immigration for the development of the national home must not become a policy of discrimination against other immigrants. Any person, therefore, who desires and is qualified under applicable laws to enter Palestine must not be refused admission or subjected to discrimination on the ground that he is not a Jew. All provisions respecting immigration must be drawn, executed and applied with that principle always firmly in mind.

Further, while we recognize that any Jew who enters Palestine in accordance with its laws is there of right, we expressly disapprove of the position taken in some Jewish quarters that Palestine has in some way been ceded or granted as their state to the Jews of the world, that every Jew everywhere is, merely because he is a Jew, a citizen of Palestine and therefore can enter Palestine as of right without regard to conditions imposed by the Government upon entry and that therefore there can be no illegal immigration of Jews into Palestine. We declare and affirm that any immigrant Jew who enters Palestine contrary to its laws is an illegal immigrant.

## LAND POLICY

Recommendation No. 7. (a) We recommend that the land transfers regulations of 1940 be rescinded and replaced by regulations based on a policy of freedom in the sale, lease or use of land, irrespective of race, community or creed and providing adequate protection for the interests of small owners and tenant cultivators. (b) We further recommend that steps be taken to render nugatory and to prohibit provisions in conveyances, leases and agreements relating to land

which stipulate that only members of one race, community or creed may be employed on or about or in connection therewith. (c) We recommend that the Government should exercise such close supervision over the holy places and localities such as the Sea of Galilee and its vicinity as will protect them from desecration and from uses which offend the conscience of religious people; and that such laws as are required for this purpose be enacted forthwith.

*Comment.* The Land Transfers Regulations of 1940 sought to protect the Arab tenant and small owner by prohibiting the sale of land save to a Palestinian Arab in one zone, by restricting such sales in another, and allowing unrestricted sale of land only in the third zone. Their effect has been such as to amount to discrimination against the Jews; their tendency is to segregate and keep separate Arabs and Jews. In the zones where sales are prohibited or restricted, they have protected the Arab from the temptation to dispose of his land, on which his livelihood and that of his family so often depend, for a sum out of all proportion to its real value.

Though made with the object of maintaining the existing standard of living of Arab cultivators, and of preventing the creation of a considerable landless Arab population, they afford no protection to the Arab living in the free zone. He may sell his land for a fantastic price and add to the congestion in the other zones by moving there. An Arab living a short distance away, just across the zone boundary, cannot obtain anything approximating the same sum for land of equal quality.

We are opposed to any legislation or restrictions discriminating against Jew or Arab. We recognize the need for protecting the Arab small owner and tenant, for providing against a large landless Arab population, for maintaining, indeed for raising, the Arab standard of living. This necessity was also recognized in the Peel Report (Chapter IX, paragraph 10) which endorsed the following principles of earlier reports, that (i) unless there is a marked change in the methods of cultivation the land in Palestine is unable to support a large increase in population, and (ii) there is already congestion on the land in the hill districts. Those principles are as true, if not truer, today.

We do not believe that the necessary protection for the Arab can be provided only by confining the Jew to particular portions of Palestine. Such a policy, suggested by the Peel Commission, is consistent with their proposed solution, partition, but scarcely with that put forward by us.

The leases granted by the Jewish National Fund contain a provision that no labor other than Jewish shall be employed by the lessee on or about or in connection with the land subject to the lease,

and a further provision that a sublease shall contain similar terms.

As we have said, we are opposed to such discrimination. We appreciate that one of the reasons for such provisions was to secure employment for Jewish immigrants on the land. We do not think that the object justifies the retention of such stipulations which are harmful to cooperation and understanding between Arab and Jew.

Land acquired by the Jewish National Fund or for a Waqf by the Supreme Moslem Council becomes inalienable. The Peel Commission expressed the view in its report (Chapter IX, paragraph 80) that caution on the part of the Government in disposing of state domain to these bodies was desirable. The situation required watching. It would not be to the interests of the inhabitants of Palestine if too large a proportion of the land should become inalienable, whether held by one organization or another.

In the small, thickly populated country of Palestine, with its rapidly increasing population, it is in the interest of Jews and Arabs alike that all land should be developed and put to the fullest possible use. The settlement of title to land should proceed as quickly as possible and the development of state lands, not required for public purposes and capable of use, should be facilitated.

The Holy Land of Palestine contains within its borders and throughout its territories places sacred to the followers of three great religions. The "Lido," with its dancing and swing music on the shore of the Sea of Galilee, offends the sensibilities of many Christian people.<sup>1</sup> Reports came to our notice of other projects, the completion of which would be equally objectionable. We, therefore, feel it right by our recommendation to emphasize the necessity for close supervision and to recommend the strengthening of the law should that be required.

### ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Recommendation No. 8. Various plans for large-scale agricultural and industrial development in Palestine have been presented for our consideration. These projects, if successfully carried into effect, could not only greatly enlarge the capacity of the country to support an increasing population but also raise the living standards of Jew and Arab alike.

We are not in a position to assess the soundness of these specific plans, but we cannot state too strongly that, however technically feasible they may be, they will fail unless there is peace in Palestine. Moreover, their full success requires the willing cooperation of adjacent Arab states, since they are not merely Palestinian projects. We recommend therefore that the examination, discussion and execu-

1. The "Lido" is owned and operated by a Christian Arab.

tion of these plans be conducted, from the start and throughout, in full consideration and cooperation not only with the Jewish Agency but also with the governments of the neighboring Arab states directly affected.

*Comment.* The building of the Jewish economy has enjoyed the advantage of abundant capital, provided on such terms as to make economic return a secondary consideration. The Arabs have had no such advantage. In principle we do not think it wise or appropriate that plans such as the project for a Jordan Valley Authority should, if judged technically sound, be undertaken by any private organization, even though that organization, as suggested by the Jewish Agency, should give an assurance of Arab benefits and Arab participation in the management.

Such proposals, by reason of their magnitude and far-reaching effects, should be conceived as public projects, suitable for government enterprise and accepted only provided that they are calculated to benefit all parts of the population. But the undertaking of a worthwhile project should not be held up merely from financial considerations which could be overcome with the aid of semi-philanthropic resources. Some compromise should not be impossible which would combine Jewish finance with Government responsibility and control.

We welcome the knowledge that the Government of Palestine has itself prepared programs for post-war development; we could wish that means might be found for projects of larger range and on a more ambitious scale; but we recognize that until political peace is restored there is great difficulty in raising the necessary funds whether from revenue or borrowing.

Meanwhile it is suggested that the Government should acquire powers, at present lacking, to investigate fully the extent of the country's water resources, to control the use of underground water and to determine rights to surface water.

We doubt whether Palestine can expand its economy to the full, having regard to its limited natural resources, without a full and free interchange of goods and services with neighboring countries. In some respects, indeed, as in certain projects involving water supply, their active collaboration is indispensable to full development on an economic basis.

The removal of Article 18 of the mandate would clear the way to those comprehensive tariff and trade agreements, not conflicting with any international obligations that might be accepted by the mandatory or trustee, which could ultimately lead to something like a customs union—an objective already in mind as between the surrounding countries—of the Arab League.

## EDUCATION

Recommendation No. 9. We recommend that, in the interests of the conciliation of the two peoples of the general improvement of the Arab standard of living, the educational system of both Jews and Arabs be reformed, including the introduction of compulsory education within a reasonable time.

*Comment.* In Chapter XVI of the Peel Report, the bad features of the educational system of Palestine and the great disparity between the money spent on Arab and Jewish education were pointed out. The report also emphasized that both Jewish and Arab education in Palestine were nationalistic in character. Particular attention was called to nationalist propaganda in Arab schools.

Our investigations disclosed that today the Jewish schools also—controlled and largely financed by the Jewish community—are imbued with a fiery spirit of nationalism. They have become most effective agencies for inculcating a spirit of aggressive Hebrew nationalism. We would urge most strongly that adequate control must be exercised by the Government over the education of both Jews and Arabs in order to do away with the present excited emphasis on racialism and the perversion of education for propaganda purposes. The Government should ensure, by a careful supervision of text books and curricula, and by inspection of schools that education contributes to the conciliation of the two peoples.

We believe further that a large share of responsibility for Arab education might well be assumed by an Arab community, similar to the Jewish community already established in Palestine. But if the Arab and Jewish communities are to set themselves the goal of compulsory education, a much higher proportion of the annual Palestinian budget must be devoted to education than heretofore, most of which will be spent on Arab education. This will only be possible if the proportion of the budget now devoted to security can be substantially reduced.

We would also stress the urgent necessity for increasing the facilities for secondary, technical and university education available to Arabs. The disparity between the standard of living of the two peoples, to which we have already drawn attention, is very largely due to the fact that the Jewish professional and middle-class so largely outnumbers that of the Arabs. This difference can only be removed by a very substantial increase in the facilities for higher education available to Arabs.

## THE NEED FOR PEACE IN PALESTINE

Recommendation No. 10. We recommend that, if this report is adopted, it should be made clear beyond all doubt to both Jews and



Arabs that any attempt from either side, by threats of violence, by terrorism, or by the organization or use of illegal armies to prevent its execution, will be resolutely suppressed.

Furthermore, we express the view that the Jewish Agency should at once resume active cooperation with the mandatory in the suppression of terrorism and of illegal immigration, and in the maintenance of the law and order throughout Palestine which is essential for the good of all, including the new immigrants.

### AN INTERPRETATION

Public attention, in the months immediately following the publication of the Committee's Report, May 1, 1946, was naturally concentrated on the concrete recommendations, notably on that calling for the prompt admission into Palestine of the 100,000 Jewish victims of Nazi and Fascist persecution still in the displaced persons' centers in Europe. There was a general feeling that action or inaction on this minimum but vital proposal would be a test of the good faith of the two governments which had set up the Committee.

The Committee's other specific recommendations affecting Palestine—a continuing program of facilitating Jewish immigration, land reform and the maintenance of the present mandate until it was supplemented by a new trusteeship under the United Nations—though less dramatic, attracted less attention than the demand for the 100,000 but were just as important. Emptying the centers in Europe of their Jewish occupants would solve only the first and most immediate phase of the problem of European Jewish displaced persons. Other hundreds of thousands of Jews, in the judgment of the Committee, were unable to rebuild their lives in their old homeland and would, therefore, have to leave Europe. Hence, its recommendations for the continued facilitating of Jewish immigration into Palestine.

It is significant that no member of the Committee expressed any doubt about the capacity of Palestine to absorb additional hundreds of thousands of Jewish immigrants. The evidence presented at the hearings and in the field had been overwhelming that Jewish newcomers, by reclaiming barren or waste land—desert, swamp and eroded hills—and by developing new industries and enlarging old ones had steadily created and would continue to create opportunities for still other immigrants into Palestine.

A fundamental, one might say the most fundamental, step in this expansion of the absorptive capacity of the country would be, in the opinion of the Committee, the prompt and radical reform of the 1940 land regulations. These anti-Jewish decrees, integral parts of the 1939 White Paper program to limit at once and to close by 1944 the doors to further Jewish immigration, would have to be "rescinded and replaced by regulations based on a policy of freedom in the sale, lease or use of land" if opportunities were to be found for large numbers of additional Jewish immigrants. The way in which the mandatory government carried out this recommendation was felt to be another test of its willingness to make the Committee's work effective.

Palestine was, of course, not the only country to which Jewish displaced persons were to be encouraged and to be enabled to go. In broad terms—indeed these are broad to the point of weakness—the Committee recommended that Britain and the United States "together, and in association with other countries, should endeavor immediately to find new homes for all such displaced persons." Unfortunately, there were no prompt or generous responses to this admonition, nor when one looked at the record of national immigration policies throughout the world in recent years did he find grounds for optimism that governmental immigration policies would be liberalized in the near future.

This dubious prospect gave added importance to the Committee's recommendation that the British and American Governments "endeavor to secure that immediate effect is given to the provision of the United Nations Charter calling for universal respect for and observation of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion." It was recognized that if the governments of the world did in fact translate these noble aims into reality, there would be much less need for the Jews to leave Europe and the pressure upon Palestine and other countries of refuge would be proportionately reduced. But much as the Committee desired to see the establishment of the equality of human rights throughout the Continent and indeed throughout the world, it could not close its eyes to the probability that religious and racial discrimination would not disappear during the lifetime of the present generation.

The Committee's recommendation that the present government of Palestine be continued until it can be replaced by a new trusteeship under the United Nations was almost inevitable. Despite the nearly constant irritations and the occasional conflict between the Mandatory administration on the one side and Jews and Arabs on the other, which have marred the British Administration, no practical alternative to the continuance of that role was presented to the Committee. The irresponsible suggestion of some Jewish and some Arab witnesses that the British withdraw immediately could hardly have been seriously intended and was not seriously considered by the Committee, for it was realized that such precipitate withdrawal would have been an invitation to civil war in the Holy Land. Great Britain seems fated to bear the major responsibility for the government of Palestine until self-government becomes practicable there.

On the thorny issue of the form of ultimate self-government in Palestine, the Committee limited itself to a categorical negative. But its uncompromising proclamation that there shall be neither a Jewish nor an Arab State can hardly be said to have made the solution easier. This asseveration satisfied neither the majority of Jews nor Arabs in or outside of Palestine. No one can quarrel with the Committee's declaration "that the form of government ultimately to be established, shall, under international guarantees, fully protect and preserve the interests in the Holy Land of Christendom and of the Moslem and Jewish faiths." But when this has been said the solution of the problem of self-government in Palestine is not appreciably nearer.

The Committee's recommendation that efforts should be made to equalize the living standards of the Jews and Arabs in Palestine by raising those of the latter commanded general assent. Jewish leaders in Palestine have long recognized that the comparative backwardness of the mass of the Arab population is a disadvantage to the whole community. Jewish enterprise and capital have it is true both directly and indirectly benefited the Arabs as well as the Jews. Nonetheless, there was no serious dissent from the proposal that more should be done than in the past by the Government "to bridge the gap . . . between the standard of living of the two peoples."

But where would the Government find this required large

additional source of income? Obviously only through the greatly enlarged agricultural and industrial productivity of the country. This the Committee admitted to be true. It took account of the presentation before it of "various plans for agricultural and industrial development" and admitted that "these projects if successfully carried into effect, could not only greatly enlarge the capacity of the country to support an increasing population but also raise the living standard of Jew and Arab alike." Nonetheless, in its recommendation on economic development the Committee failed to make any concrete affirmative proposals. The generalities to which it limited itself are so obvious as to have little value.

Much more downright and suggestive were the Committee's recommendations on education. Obviously there was the most urgent need for an improvement in the system of Arab education which left all save a small minority of the population illiterate. It is doubtful, however, whether the Committee's recommendation of "the introduction of compulsory education within a reasonable time" was anything more than a pious hope. And not without a measure of justice were strong objections raised by Jewish spokesmen to the Committee's charge that Jewish schools (there is no illiteracy among the Jews) "are imbued with a fiery spirit of nationalism."

The Committee's final recommendation—the need for peace in Palestine—could not be challenged. But how attain this universally desired peace in a land so hotly contended for by conflicting groups of interests and people? It is difficult to have confidence that on this most basic problem of all the Committee made as large a contribution as it should have made.

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